

It is difficult to count all the military operations carried out in more than two years of the war, but the raids behind enemy lines in the Moscow region, on the Western and Central fronts are especially memorable. The legendary commander K.K. Rokossovsky has repeatedly expressed gratitude and appreciation to the fighters and commanders of the OMSBON. They wrote many heroic pages in the history of the partisan movement. In the ranks of OMSBON, Heroes of the Soviet Union D.N. Medvedev, M.S. Prudnikov, K.P. Orlovsky, E.I. Mirkovsky, V.A. Karasev, as well as Nikolai Kuznetsov and his comrades in the partisan detachment Nikolai Prikhodko, Boris Galushkin, Fedor Ozmitel. For the exemplary performance of special tasks behind enemy lines and for the courage and courage shown at the same time, 880 fighters and officers of the OMSBON were awarded state awards. And the brigade commander Gridnev entered the fate of each of them with his strictness, exactingness, humanity and spiritual warmth.

During the combat operations of OMSBON, a unique experience was accumulated, which was widely used in the deployment of guerrilla warfare in the occupied territories.

By the end of 1943, the brigade completed its task and was disbanded. And many pupils of Vyacheslav Vasilyevich continued military service in the Fourth Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, which led the partisan movement, and formed its strong backbone.

Gridnev himself was appointed to the post of adviser to the NKVD of the USSR at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Mongolia, where he already served in 1932-1936 as an instructor in the State Internal Security Department (GVO) of the MPR.

In the first weeks of my stay in Ulaanbaatar, there were many meetings with old friends from a previous business trip. As they say, "the soldiers recalled the days gone by and the battles where they fought together." Vyacheslav Vasilyevich kept in his memory everything to the smallest detail, which related to his first long-term business trip to Mongolia.

After graduating from the Higher Frontier School of the OGPU in 1924, the young commander, who was considered among his comrades as a highly experienced and hardened "old man", served in the Transcaucasian border district on the Soviet-Iranian border. For his courage and heroism, he was twice awarded with an honorary military weapon.

Life went on, service went well, children grew up. In his thirties, he was known to his superiors and subordinates as an experienced border guard, who, as noted in his certification after completing advanced training courses, had developed tactical thinking and operational skills.

"How do you feel about the transfer to a new job?" - he was asked in the autumn of 1932 in the personnel apparatus of the Border Troops Directorate. Service is service. And in principle against translation

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Gridnev could not and did not want to object. But the proposal turned out to be unexpected - to leave for the Mongolian People's Republic to assist the fraternal country in creating border troops and organizing a service for protecting its state border.

Already from the first meetings and conversations with Mongolian colleagues, it became clear to the new instructor of the border department of the state internal security of the MPR that the young republic did not have border troops as such, there were no specialists in border protection either, and the borders were somehow covered by border police detachments. Everyday painstaking work began on the training of personnel, the formation of outposts and detachments. Communicating with partners, Gridnev soon felt the difficulty and inconvenience of talking through an interpreter. Therefore, he quickly and quite successfully studied the Mongolian language. As a result, the work became more productive, and communication with local colleagues and friends was filled with new positive emotions and sparkled with many imaginative colors and shades.

Working days were quite often interrupted by by no means extraordinary events, participation in which was associated with great risk and a serious threat to life itself. When the Gridnevs arrived in Mongolia, their colleagues, Mongolian friends, and old-timers of the Soviet colony were fresh, for example, in the memory of the tragic denouement of the Japanese-provoked rebellion of Buddhist clergy - lamas in Arkhangai aimag in May 1932. Then, together with the Mongolian detachment, the chief adviser of the GVO, Viktor Stanislavovich Kiyakovsky, perished. In 1982, at the site of that unequal battle, the Mongols erected a monument to him and his comrades.

The Green Frontier, especially in the Manchurian sector, lived a busy life. Through it, not only the White Guards expelled from the USSR, but also foreign intelligence agencies acted. Of course, the Japanese were distinguished by a special "zeal". Reliable pre-emptive information was needed to counter their intrigues and disrupt hostile measures against the USSR and the MPR. For these purposes, V.V. Gridnev attracted a number of foreigners to cooperate, who supplied Soviet intelligence with information about the situation in Manchuria occupied by the Japanese and the activities of the occupiers and the White Guards there.

Vyacheslav Vasil'evich also happened to get into unusual troubles. Noteworthy in this regard is the story of an attempt to export the valuables of the Irkutsk treasury to China.

In the summer of 1921, under the onslaught of the Red Army, the troops of Baron Ungern! went with battles to China through Mongolia. Leaving Russia, the baron and his entourage took with them gold and jewelry, which were stored in the Irkutsk branch of the State Bank. Fearing that the loot, which was carried by a caravan of 200 camels, could be confiscated by the Chinese authorities, Ungern ordered the commandant of his

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headquarters to Colonel Sipailo to bury valuables until "better times" in the area of the Mongolian lake Buir-Nur. The order was executed, and the Buryat Cossacks, led by the centurion Makeev, who guarded the caravan and participated in the burial of the warehouse, were shot by Sipailo's henchmen on the orders of the same Ungern.

And now, more than ten years later, Soviet intelligence became aware that Sipailo, who had turned up in the city of Hailar in Manchuria, put together a group of 16 volunteers, acquired the latest drilling rig, and set off in two cars to the area of Lake Buir-Nur. The purpose of the expedition was obvious. There was no time to form a special detachment to capture violators of the Mongolian-Chinese border, so the operation was entrusted to instructor Gridnev. To help him, a squadron of Mongolian cavalry was assigned, which was stationed near the Sipailo camp. Unfortunately, it was not possible to take the treasure hunters by surprise. Seeing the approaching cavalry, they jumped out of their tents half-dressed, jumped into trucks and fled to the steppe, leaving behind all their equipment, including drilling facilities. When examining the camp in one of the tents, they found two "strongly asleep" Japanese, who, obviously, out of fright, introduced themselves as businessmen. When their names were reported to Moscow, the Center ordered that they be handed over immediately to the Japanese military mission in the city of Kalgan. These "merchants" actually turned out to be regular Japanese intelligence agents operating under the guise of employees of the research bureau of the South Manchurian Railway.

Upon further examination of the area, it was found that the Sipailo people drilled several wells, but the treasure was never found. Apparently, they did not have its exact landmarks, but most importantly, they did not take into account the fact that over the past years the sloping shores of the lake have noticeably changed their outlines under the influence of seasonal fluctuations in the water level. The treasure of the joint Soviet-Mongolian expedition also failed to be found. So the mystery of the gold and jewels stolen by the White Guards from the Irkutsk treasury still remains unsolved.

However, to indulge in memories for a long time was an unaffordable luxury in the new conditions. All the time and energy were now devoted to solving issues related to strengthening the interaction between the state security agencies of the USSR and the MPR in order to defeat the fascist forces as soon as possible.

troops in the west and preparing the last decisive blow in World War II against militaristic Japan in the east. In addition, Gridnev and his subordinates took a strong part in the reception and transfer to Soviet organizations of funds received from Mongolian citizens to the USSR aid fund. Thousands of individual parcels, echelons with gifts to Soviet soldiers went to the front. In 1943, with the money raised by the Mongolian

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Soviet workers built and handed over to the Soviet Army the air squadron "Mongolian arat" and the tank brigade "Revolutionary Mongolia". More than 100 thousand horses were delivered to the USSR through the state line.

Many Mongolian servicemen and security officials admired the steadfastness and courage of the Soviet people, were confident in our victory, and expressed their ardent desire to take a personal part in the battles against the Nazis. But they faced a different task - to vigilantly protect the borders of their country from a possible invasion of the troops of militaristic Japan and frustrate the plans of the intelligence services of foreign countries, which, to put it mildly, had no sympathy for the Mongolian People's Republic of the USSR. The scope and intensity of this important joint work of Vyacheslav Vasilyevich and his apparatus with Mongolian friends at that time is evidenced, for example, by the fact that in 1943-1944 260 major and complex operational measures were carried out.

The victorious 1945 came. The war in Europe was over. The Soviet Army liberated one European country after another. On May 9, Victory Day was celebrated, but the final point in World War II had not yet been set. This was to be done in the East. In connection with the impending entry of the Soviet Union and Mongolia into the war with Japan, Gridnev and his Mongolian friends had noticeably more trouble. Numerous mobile task forces were formed and trained, which were to carry out a surprise capture of Japanese border outposts and reconnaissance posts and destroy enemy lines of communication. Mongolian border guards, who knew the ways of crossing the border and were well oriented on the adjacent side, stood out as guides to the advanced reconnaissance detachments. Ways and methods of interaction were worked out in advance with representatives of the military command, tactical military and operational tasks were clarified. It was necessary to prepare in a new way for resolving issues related to the protection of the rear of the Soviet and Mongolian troops.

..August 9, 1945, at 0:10, the Soviet-Mongolian operational groups silently approached the outposts of the Japanese and captured them. Communication lines were instantly cut. At the same moment, hundreds of light signals flashed, indicating that the first part of the combat mission was completed. In response, the silence of the desert was torn by the roar of shots, the rumble of engines, the clang of caterpillars, the clatter of horse hooves. The darkness of the night was streaked with numerous light rays. It was tanks, armored cars and motor vehicles of the Soviet-Mongolian cavalry mechanized group of troops under the command of Colonel General I.A. who went on the attack with their headlights on. Pliev? The attempts of the Japanese and Manchurian troops to stop this barrage of fire, which swept away everything in its path, did not lead to anything. A powerful raid to a depth of 950 km was one of the decisive operations in the Far East, the law

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which, as is known, was the complete defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army and the troops of the ally of the Emperor of Japan Hirohito - the puppet ruler of Manchukuo Henry Pu Yi?.

Defeated Japan capitulated. The long-awaited peace has come, for which mankind, and above all the Soviet people, paid a very high price. The sacrifices made were not in vain. Vyacheslav Vasilyevich also thought so, plunging headlong into new worries. The main thing now was to help the Mongolian friends in solving the problems of ensuring the state security of their country. Another three years of the business trip flew by unnoticed.

... Returning to his homeland in January 1949 by train, Vyacheslav Vasilyevich recalled his many Mongolian friends, mentally said goodbye to them. The soul was warmed by their strong

hugs before parting, heartfelt conversations and sincere wishes of happiness and good luck for the future. Warm and cordial were the last meetings with the Mongolian leaders Kh. Choibalsan\* and Yu. Leaving Mongolia, he took her away in his heart. Then, it was not uncommon for him to meet our people who had visited and worked in Mongolia, and all of them, as one, always remembered this country and its people with heartfelt gratitude and love. And behind him, an unofficial title was firmly entrenched - Chekist Gridnev, a friend of the Mongolian people.

In 1950-1960, Vyacheslav Vasilievich headed the famous "forest school", which trained personnel for Soviet foreign intelligence. Then for 30 years he lived an active and troublesome life as a restless pensioner. He wrote articles for departmental journals, spoke to young intelligence officers, took care of preserving the good memory of the heroes of the wars and battles of the "invisible front" that had gone down in history.

During the years of service, Vyacheslav Vasilievich repeatedly received awards and was proud of them. But he almost never wore them, limiting himself even on solemn occasions to modest order ribbons. Being retired, sometimes he looked at his orders and medals. The collection looked impressive: the Order of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of the Patriotic War [degrees, two Orders of the Red Banner of the MPR, the Order of the Polar Star of the MPR, and many medals. He perceived each award sign not as important only in itself, but as a signal of memory, resurrecting those specific deeds for which it was received. But the highest reward, which evoked unforgettable and unique emotions, was always for him the success of many dozens of his students, who became excellent scouts, selflessly devoted to their homeland and their professional duty.

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On January 1, 1991, Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Gridnev died, leaving a good and grateful memory of his relatives and friends, friends and associates, heirs of the great cause to which he served and was faithful to his last breath.

Baron Ungern von Sternberg Roman Fedorovich (1886-1921) - military personnel of the Russian Imperial Army, lieutenant general, participant in the First World War (1914-1918). In August 1917, he was sent by the provisional government of Russia to Transbaikalia to form military units. Participated in the Civil War against the Soviet authorities as the commander of the Asiatic cavalry division, which was distinguished by sadistic cruelty. He was defeated by the Red Army, fled to Mongolia, was extradited by the Mongols to Siberian partisans and shot by the verdict of the Siberian Revolutionary Tribunal.

Pliev Issa Alexandrovich (1903-?), General of the Army, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of the MPR, participant in the Great Patriotic War.

Henry Pu Yi - Emperor of Manchukuo (a puppet Manchu state) created by the Japanese in Northeast China and existed from March 1932 to August 1945.

Khorlogiin Choibalsan (1895-1952) - a prominent statesman of Mongolia, Marshal of the MPR, Prime Minister of the MPR (1939-1952). Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal (1916-1989) - a prominent statesman of Mongolia, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the MPR (1952-1974), chairman of the Great People's Khural of the MPR (1974-1984).

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Far from the front line, in South America

Argentina, Buenos Aires, July 1941, the second month of Hitler's aggression against the Soviet Union. Our illegal agent, who recently arrived in this country, receives an important task from the Center. He is invited to organize sabotage work to disrupt the supply

Germans with strategic raw materials from the countries of South America, to take any other measures to reduce and suspend the flow of such cargo across the ocean to Europe for the enemy, to select agents for sending intelligence to the occupied by the Nazis and neutral countries.

This directive came to the intelligence officer in a roundabout way: from Moscow to the New York residency by radio, in cipher, there its contents were applied in cryptography and partially in cipher (already different) between the lines of an ordinary everyday letter and sent by airmail to Buenos Aires to the address of a certain Mr. F., through whom the message arrived at its destination. Having shown the cryptography, the scout somewhat unexpectedly found a postscript at the end of the text - the Center congratulated him on being awarded the Order of the Red Star for his recent participation in a special assignment. He understood ~ it was about the so-called Mexican case of 1940.

Who in Buenos Aires was the recipient of this letter from New York? Here we must refer the reader to the previous, third volume of essays, where one of the active participants in this operation appeared under the pseudonym "Felipe" among the people who attacked Trotsky's house in Mexico City in May 1940.

Recall that at that time it was not possible to liquidate Trotsky. The Mexican police organized an intensive search for the attackers, and there were at least 20 of them. Almost all of them were identified, many were arrested, some were later tried. In the course of a meticulous investigation, the police received a fairly detailed description of Felipe's typical examples, and a sketch of him was compiled and appeared in the newspapers.

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The scout had to go deep underground, he often changed addresses of residence in the capital, with the help of makeup he somewhat changed his appearance. At a critical moment, he was forced to seek refuge ... in a private clinic for the mentally ill, where he spent about two months. Much later, recalling the past, Felipe, with his characteristic sense of humor, wrote: , did not doubt at all that I was a 100% psycho. At first it surprised and amused me, and then it began to embarrass and disturb me: how not to stay here too long ... "

With the help of existing connections, "Felipe" acquired a new foreign passport (his previous document turned out to be expired by that time). Having received a Cuban transit visa, in August 1940, Felipe headed for Havana by sea. He stayed there for several months, was in contact with Eitingon (Tom) who arrived in Cuba, his leader in Mexico. They decided that Felipe would go to Argentina, where he lived until 1936, and await further instructions from the Center.

In December 1940, having safely arrived in Argentina, Felipe settled in the capital, joined a small enterprise as a shareholder, and in July 1941 received a task from the Center, about which the reader is already aware.

It was necessary to start its implementation with the selection of personnel, that is, people who were completely reliable and capable of carrying out this very specific work. To this end, "Felipe" first of all contacted friends known to him from the joint struggle during the Spanish Civil War. I also established contact with a prominent figure in the progressive wing of the mass political movement. On their recommendations, I met and talked with dozens of candidates, determining their suitability and possibilities for the planned cases.

The first to join the organization was the 27-year-old Argentine "Tinto", an intelligent, well-educated person. During his student years, he took part in the leftist youth movement, and then in the activities of a number of public organizations. A native local resident, he was well versed in the environment, knew the city and the country well, had connections in a wide variety of social strata. This sensible, strictly organized man in

he mastered the logic of persuasion to a high degree and enjoyed indisputable authority among the comrades with whom he happened to cooperate. His wife "Dora" fully shared her husband's anti-fascist convictions and subsequently became a very valuable worker.

Another assistant at Felipe was the Italian Marcello. He left his homeland in 1926 due to persecution for his progressive activities. There he was arrested, he was in prison, one

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time was in a semi-legal position. In Buenos Aires, he got a modest job as a mechanic in workshops. At the time of the events described, he was 46 years old. This is how "Felipe" described him after the war: "... An ideal underground worker, his appearance is the most ordinary, without any special features. Modest, tireless, extremely hardy. He has inexhaustible connections in the city. Easily makes friends and wins over ordinary people: port workers, artisans, shoemakers, street vendors, etc. Joker, joker. A reliable friend, a wonderful comrade.

Both Felipe's assistants were also engaged in the selection of people, and by the autumn of 1941, the start of recruiting an illegal organization had been laid.

At first, however, it was necessary to find out what specific strategic raw materials, in what volumes and by what methods, are purchased for the Germans, how and where they are transported before being sent across the ocean. To collect such information, all the connections that the underground had in business circles in Argentina were used. At the same time, a similar problem was solved in Chile, where Felipe had several reliable friends and where he traveled several times during the war.

years.

After some time, the situation was cleared up. It turned out that mainly Chilean saltpeter, the starting material for the manufacture of explosives, was exported to Germany. In 1942, for example, the Germans imported about 100 thousand tons of this raw material from Chile. In addition, industrial oils, grain, cotton, tobacco, and certain types of food were purchased. Cargo was transported to Europe both from Chilean ports and, in especially large quantities, from Buenos Aires, the largest and most technically equipped port on the Atlantic coast.

Since the Germans could not use sea vessels under their own flag due to the tight Anglo-American blockade of sea communications, the carriers were the ships of the states that officially declared their neutrality - Portugal, Spain, Sweden. Most of the cargo went to the ports of Germany itself, but some of it was unloaded in Portugal and Spain, from where it was delivered by coastal ships or heavy trucks to France occupied by the Germans.

Long deliberations began on the most appropriate methods of sabotage. Neither Felipe nor his comrades had ever done such things before. In addition to the most primitive ideas about the technique of organizing fires and explosions, gleaned from American action movies, no one had a clear idea of what sabotage weapons could be. A variety of options were considered, sometimes clearly unrealistic, sometimes even naive. Subtracted somehow from the agricultural allowance,

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that cereals are susceptible to some fungal diseases. An idea arose to organize the spoilage of grain in warehouses, where it was stored in anticipation of shipment to Germany, using this method. In one of the letters to the Center in 1942, "Felipe" wrote: "... We are trying to arrange the infection of wheat by depriving ...". However, the plan remained unrealized. For the same purposes, it was planned to use ... locusts. To determine its ability to devour large masses of grain, experiments were carried out: specially caught locusts were released in a grain "warehouse" equipped in the basement of a city house. And although the first experiments gave encouraging results, from

this idea had to be abandoned: the main grain warehouses were located on the periphery, and it was difficult to select reliable performers there.

In the end, it was decided that arson could be the most appropriate method of sabotage. We adopted a variant of an incendiary projectile with an igniter based on a chemical reaction and with the possibility of controlling the moment of ignition in time. We identified the main objects of sabotage: cargo in warehouses and on the way from storage to the port of Buenos Aires, as well as the carrier ships themselves.

It became necessary to select a specialist capable of developing the chemical basis and design of the incendiary projectile. "Marcello" found such a person, he was given the pseudonym "Domingo". He was an Argentine who, according to his own statement, had an "incomplete higher chemical" education. He did not work in his specialty, switched to commerce, but did not achieve success. According to the collected reviews, he was an honest, modest, not very young man with not fully formed political convictions. At the same time, he was a pacifist and condemned fascism as a system with its aggressive nature. "Marcello" deepened relations with him and invited him to provide assistance to the "underground anti-fascist movement." Explained exactly what is expected of him. He received consent, and the organization was replenished with a valuable specialist, a dedicated worker. (Looking ahead, we note that all subsequent members of the sabotage group were involved in work exclusively on an anti-fascist basis. They did not resort to any other motives - material interest, etc.).

After many weeks of painstaking work, Domingo developed a chemical mixture and a schematic diagram of an incendiary projectile. Omitting technical details here, we will only point out that the components of the incendiary mixture could be found on the free market, and the design made it possible to "start" the projectile for a predetermined period, with a delay from 1-2 days to two weeks. The body of the projectile was made of brass. The product was assembled with strict observance of the sequence of operations: installation of a detonator, for

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pouring incendiary mixture, etc. The position when carrying the projectile is vertical. From the moment it was turned to a horizontal position, a chemical reaction began, after which, after a predetermined time interval, the incendiary mixture flared up. Under the pressure of gases and high temperature, the brass body was destroyed and the flame burst out.

..Much later, the Center decided to test the actual ability of these projectiles. The technical service of the NKGB of the USSR was given a working notebook "Domingo" with the corresponding notes and drawings. Here is an extract from the expert opinion of specialists dated April 1945: <... Presented are drawings and a description of a handicraft incendiary projectile, consisting of ... (a list of device parts follows. - Approx. Aut.).

Conclusion: the device can be used to ignite combustible and hardly flammable materials.

From a letter from "Felipe" to the Center dated May 29, 1942: "To work with thermite bombs, I organized a laboratory where I have two people who are specially engaged in this business."

Only after the war did these mean lines of the military report become clearer. "Laboratory" is, of course, an involuntary exaggeration. In fact, it was a semi-dark basement that looked more like a warehouse of things that had long served their time. "Domingo" managed there with his assistant.

The Argentine "Oscar", a qualified locksmith, was engaged in the manufacture of metal equipment. Knowing his worth, a respectable, family man, on the advice of Tinto, he got a job at a naval arsenal in the port, at an object that in itself was of intelligence interest. According to the drawings transferred to him, in a short time he mastered the manufacture

metal parts of the projectile and parts for the detonator. Then he constantly improved them. The expensive metal considered in the arsenal - brass - was obtained by a method that is qualified as theft by the legislation of all countries. In case of a question from the master, who would have noticed an extraneous detail on the machine, there was an explanation: crafts for the home or "left" work. The usual situation in those years.

For operational needs, "Marcello" picked up eight premises in the capital. They were kept by the attendants of wealthy homeowners: janitors, gardeners, caretakers of buildings. Most often, these were married couples and they always had non-residential premises at their disposal - basements, sheds, closets.

The most important link in the emerging organization was to be the direct perpetrators of sabotage actions. They were selected with special care, and as a result, a group of eight daredevils was assembled. We mention them here to save

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The thread for history is the names of these brave fighters against fascism on a distant front.

Verzhbitsky Felix Klementievich, a Pole, a native of Western Ukraine, a repair worker in the port docks. At the same time, he was Domingo's assistant in assembling incendiary shells. Almost every day he came to the "laboratory" - early in the morning or in the evenings, depending on the shift in the port, he also spent his days off here. It was not easy for a blacksmith by profession, who received only a primary education and had previously dealt only with welding and forging metal, to switch to "fine" work with pharmaceutical scales when preparing incendiary mixtures, while wearing rubber gloves so as not to leave fingerprints. He did an excellent job with this.

Grigory Ivanovich Furdas, a Ukrainian, did painting work at the port docks.

Yaremchuk Grigory, Ukrainian, cousin of Furdas, sailor on port barges.

Borisyuk Pavel Stepanovich, Ukrainian, port handyman.

Yakov (surname not established), a native of Western Ukraine, a port warehouse worker.

"Mathis", a Spaniard, on the advice of "Tinto" left his former job in the city and got a job as a loader in the port.

"Florindo", Argentine, father of adult children. He was a functionary of the trade union of loaders in the port. He was a foreman for the maintenance of quay cranes. He had the opportunity to freely pass to all ships in the port.

"Bonito", Argentine port loader.

By the spring of 1942, organizational work was completed. The general management of the group was provided by "Tinto", communication with the performers in the port was carried out by Verzhbitsky and Borisyuk.

The first military action was carried out not in the port, but in the center of Buenos Aires, on the main metropolitan highway Corrientes. There was a large bookstore "Goethe", which was the headquarters of the Nazi propaganda center, which widely distributed fascist periodicals and literature throughout the country. The young German woman Greta, an acquaintance of Marcello, was chosen as the performer. Through her, they studied the store's working hours, the possibility of visiting the printed materials warehouse located in the same place. On the appointed day and hour, the incendiary projectile, placed in a shopping bag, "Marcello" handed over to "Greta". The girl visited the store, bought some book and, having seized the right moment, went into the warehouse and attached her bag to a pile of books. The warehouse caught fire late at night, as predicted. According to newspaper reports, the causes of the fire remained unclear, and the damage caused by the fire was assessed



at 25-35 thousand am. dollars. The propaganda apparatus of the Germans was dealt a tangible blow.

One of the most significant acts of sabotage by the underground was the arson in 1942 of a large portside warehouse owned by the German firm Hoffmann & Co. It was located in the Avellneda area on the banks of the Riachuelo deep-water channel, from which sea ships passed directly to the warehouse for loading. In some periods, tens of thousands of tons of Chilean saltpeter accumulated there. A plan arose: to immediately destroy a large supply of raw materials on the spot. Yakov was busy working at the warehouse. On a predetermined day, an incendiary projectile was handed over to him. The laying went well. Everyone was looking forward to the result. However, the estimated time passed and nothing happened. The underground workers were acutely worried about the failure, reproached Verzhbitsky for the unsuitably assembled projectile. But they did not deviate from the planned plan. A projectile-double was made, two interconnected devices. Hopefully one of them will work. And so it happened.

In the dead of night there was an explosion of enormous force, a great fire arose. The flames shot up to a great height and immediately engulfed the entire warehouse. It was not possible to bring down the fire quickly, it burned for more than two days. Later, repair workers said that individual structures of the warehouse were scattered over a distance of up to half a kilometer. The incident was long and widely covered by the entire metropolitan press. As the newspapers reported, the fire destroyed 40,000 tons of saltpeter, and the damage amounted to 150,000 am. dollars. An investigation did not reveal the cause of the fire. The perpetrators of the arson were not found, but the fact that it was someone organized sabotage, the police had no doubts.

The main efforts of the underground were directed to combat operations in the port. This work was carried out almost continuously from the spring of 1942 to the middle of 1944. Each planned action was previously discussed in detail. It was determined who would receive the projectile from the warehouse, who would carry it to the port territory, who and where specifically would have to lay it.

Most often, incendiary shells were placed in the holds of ships that were loading, that is, when the dates of their departure were already known. Fires usually broke out on the high seas, although there have been a few cases where the cargo started burning only in the ports of destination, in Spain in particular.

Part of the shells were laid directly into the cargo on their way from the warehouses to the side of the ship. Here, the circumstance was used that the lack of mechanized berths in the port was compensated by loading "from the water", from port self-propelled barges. Barges delivered the cargo to the ships, and it was moved into the holds by the lifting mechanisms of steamships. "From the water" work was only during daylight hours. Those barges that did not have time to unload during the day, leaving

laid up for the night. Watchmen were hired to protect them for a fee.

Being a full-time sailor on one of the barges, Yaremchuk quite often agreed to work on the night shift. At this time, he put shells in standard canvas bags with saltpeter, intended for loading "from the water". At each operation, he opened the bag, removed a kilogram and a half of loose mass from there, making room for the projectile, and sewed it up again. All this was done at night, almost by touch. Thus, the cargo on board the ship arrived already with the "stuffing". Sometimes it happened that two or three sacks processed by Yaremchuk were delivered to the ship at once, they fell into different holds, and this increased the chances of an unconditional fire.

Another method of laying was used: directly on the ships by the time they left the docks after repair. This was done by Verzhbitsky, who worked, as already mentioned, in the port repairing ships. The paradox was that several times he participated in the elimination of the consequences of fires on them, organized by his comrades or by himself.

Information about every fire in the ocean, the underground workers rightly considered their real success. The fact is that in the fight against fire, the holds of the burning ships were inevitably heated by sea water. As a result, the cargoes became unusable, as there were numerous testimonies of sailors returning from voyages to Buenos Aires.

The final results of the activities of the sabotage group were summed up after the end of the Great Patriotic War. Already in Moscow, "Felipe" admitted that in the course of business he did not particularly care about accounting for transactions. He could not keep such records for secret reasons. His current reporting was extremely brief and irregular due to the imperfection of the communication system. As a result of checking all the surviving documentation and conversations with some participants who came to the USSR, the main results of the group's work on sea lanes were reduced to such indicators.

In sabotage work, 140-170 incendiary shells were used. The largest number of bookmarks was made by "Matis", "Florindo", Yaremchuk and Furdas.

A large number of fires occurred on ships carrying strategic raw materials for Germany. There is a list of these courts - fourteen names. However, this is not a complete list, the names of some transports, "processed" by the underground, they could not remember due to the prescription of time.

Two transatlantic cargo ships with 10,000 tons of saltpeter on board each were sunk. (It is curious to note that the newspaper reports masked the fact that these ships were carrying

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liters. In one case, they talked about a batch of flax, in the other about food products. And the cause of the death of the latter was not called a fire, but "a collision in the ocean with a floating mine.")

In the water area of the port, three self-propelled barges with saltpeter were burned, as well as several tons of casein in the holds of a steamer preparing for a voyage across the ocean.

As a result of the actions of the underground, by the middle of 1943, the export of Chilean saltpeter through the port of Buenos Aires was significantly reduced. The Germans were forced to transfer part of the transport operations to the port of Montevideo in Uruguay.

It was not possible to calculate with a certain degree of accuracy the material damage inflicted on the enemy. In any case, it can be assessed as significant.

At the same time, according to the financial report presented by Felipe in Moscow in January 1947, the expenses for organizing subversive work amounted to 2,000 am. dollars. These are the purchase of chemicals, tools and materials for the manufacture of incendiary projectiles, the rent of the necessary premises, payment for the owners of safe houses and addresses for correspondence with the Center, and transportation costs when performing operational tasks. The report was approved by the Center. At the same time, a certain amount of money was allocated for settlements on existing debts that arose due to delays of couriers from New York with money.

Subversive work in Argentina was stopped in the middle of 1944 at the direction of the Center. Moscow had serious grounds for such a decisive order. By this time, first information was received from our intelligence agency in the UK, and then documentary materials from the British and American intelligence services, indicating that they had attacked the trail of our underground organization in Argentina. It turned out that back in November 1941, British military censorship in Bermuda intercepted a letter from New York to Buenos Aires (that is, from the Center to Felipe) with cryptography and cipher. Then two more similar letters were checked, as well as five letters from Felipe to New York. A search began for persons involved in work for Soviet intelligence. The scale of the measures taken is evidenced by the fact that large forces of the US intelligence services were involved in this development and

UK in Latin America. At some point they were close to the goal, but failed to take advantage of the favorable situation. And the following happened.

The reader knows that along with the sabotage work, "Felipe" was entrusted with the selection of people for sending to the fascist-occupied and neutral European countries. During one of his trips to Chile, "Felipe" met there, having the recommendation of a reliable person, the Cuban ambassador to Chile. After a short

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contact "Felipe" tried to recruit the ambassador and secure his consent to travel to Europe "in the interests of the fight against fascism." However, it was not possible to reach an agreement with the diplomat, and "Felipe" stopped all relations with him, without attaching any significant importance to his failure (he did not even report this to the Center in a timely manner). The erroneousness of such actions became obvious when the Center received the mentioned documents from Great Britain, which, in particular, stated: "In early 1943, a Russian illegal representative in Argentina, whose identity is unknown to us or to the with the latter ... and invited him to go to a neutral country. They were especially interested in Turkey." If the secret service had shown greater promptness, consequences dangerous for the underground could have arisen.

The instructions received from Moscow were carried out accurately. The sabotage group in the port, including "Domingo" and "Oscar", was disbanded (the participants were explained: there was no need, in Europe in June 1944 a second front was opened). "Marcello" took care of "closing" the safe houses. Operational correspondence with New York has ceased, the keepers of postal addresses in Buenos Aires have received the necessary instructions. Verzhbitsky was instructed to liquidate the warehouse where incendiary shells were stored.

For every member of the underground, Felipe and Tinto, who was switched to another line of work, found kind words and heartfelt thanks for participating in patriotic activities. Felipe was able to allocate 50 am. dollars for "Marcello", he was bought a suit "for a long and faithful service." 100 am. Dollars in bonuses were received by the port group of Verzhbitsky. From this money, "Matis", one of the most active militants, was purchased a watch. (We repeat that none of the underground workers received a monetary reward. All lived on their very modest earnings.)

It is with regret that we have to report that the liquidation of the Argentine "economy" was not without an emergency. This happened at the end of October 1944 in a safe house where ammunition had been kept for some time. Verzhbitsky and two of his comrades were engaged in dismantling incendiary shells. Moving a container with an incendiary mixture from place to place, Verzhbitsky inadvertently moved a metal tool, which caused a spark, followed by a strong explosion.

Spread on the floor, covered in blood, losing consciousness from his injuries, Verzhbitsky ordered his friends to immediately leave the apartment. Half an hour later the police arrived. A search was carried out, the wounded man was arrested and sent under escort to the hospital. He immediately went to the operating table. Doctors had to amputate his left arm above the elbow and remove his left eye. Nothing about the possibility of preserving, at least partially, vision in the right eye

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consolation was not said. Since that time, at the age of 36, F.K. Verzhbitsky for life remained blind.

In the hospital, the wounded was under guard for two weeks, then he was transferred to the prison hospital. Exhausting interrogations began. As best he could, he defended himself and denied almost everything: both direct evidence (and there were enough of them), and involvement in a "conspiratorial" organization, and the presence of accomplices, which the investigators were especially interested in. Through his wife, Verzhbitsky was given the advice of a lawyer involved in this case - to refuse to give any evidence and

refer to his physical disability caused by a severe head wound (Argentine law provided for such a possibility). This new position of the defendant infuriated the investigators.

The jailers set out to exert a moral and psychological influence on the arrested person. He was placed in a cell with criminals sentenced to hard labor for life and waiting to be sent to Tierra del Fuego. But the calculations of the investigation did not materialize. These criminals, having accepted a "political terrorist" into their midst, were amazed by his willpower, endurance, and conviction. He told them about international events, about military operations on the fronts of the Second World War, about the people of Soviet Russia. The cellmates began to treat him with respect, as best they could, defended him from the arbitrariness of the jailers.

As a result of the measures taken, with the help of the aforementioned lawyer, it was possible to avoid bringing the case to court and obtain the release of Verzhbitsky on bail. Since his continued stay in the country was unsafe, he was smuggled into neighboring Uruguay. Two weeks later, his wife and children were transferred there. The family lived in this country until they left for the Soviet Union in 1956.

..So, the documentary material preserved in the archive, which is the basis of this narrative, has been exhausted. Naturally, many details did not fit into the scanty lines of reports from the war years and remained, as it were, "behind the scenes".

Years passed, and we managed to supplement the information with the testimonies of some former underground workers who arrived in the Soviet Union in the 50-60s after performing other reconnaissance missions. Their recollections made it possible to restore some episodes, to better imagine the conditions in which the group's activities took place.

So, it was confirmed that the most dangerous thing was the delivery of incendiary shells to the port territory. The difficulties were exacerbated when fires broke out on the ships. The port began to be guarded more strictly, the number of controllers increased, and a strict access system was introduced. Personal searches were practiced, bags with food were shaken. At the ladders of ships, even at the holds, an additional

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body protection. Dogs were involved, apparently trained for explosives.

Under these circumstances, I had to be smart. For example, shells were hidden in food bags and camouflaged with yerba-mate bags, these packages did not arouse suspicion. Then "Oscar" was instructed to prepare the bodies of the shells more flat and elongated. They were attached with a bandage to the inside of the leg, above the knee. The calculation was accurate: during a personal search, and this happened, the guards probed the clothes mainly along the line of the side pockets, in the police manner. The following technique was also used: shell casings were made in the shape of a large banana. A similar design was placed around the neck like a half-necklace, and the throat was tightly wrapped with a woolen scarf. In this form, a worker hurrying to the port in the morning did not attract much attention to himself.

During the entire period of work of the sabotage group, there was not a single case of disruption of the planned operation due to the impossibility of bringing shells into the port.

It happened that Verzhbitsky had to hand over shells to the performers early in the morning. He took them from the warehouse the night before and kept them at home... under the bed during the night. The Florindo once kept a charge for about a week, because there was an unforeseen delay in the departure of the ship on which it was supposed to be laid.

I recalled an episode when only the resourcefulness of "Domingo" helped to avoid trouble. He was driving a package of chemicals to the safe house in his personal car. For some unknown reason, they suddenly ignited. And this is during the day, on a busy street! Keeping cool

"Domingo" left the car, ran into the store, bought several siphons of sparkling water and put out the fire on his own. There was no police intervention.

Between the members of the underground group - people of many nationalities, of different ages, education, social status - truly friendly relations have developed and strengthened. Each tried his best to help the other. When Furdas' wife fell seriously ill, a fundraiser was organized to pay for doctors and medicines. When in need of money, they borrowed "till payday." The Argentines helped their friends Ukrainians and Poles in numerous everyday affairs, who were not fully accustomed to local features,

did not speak Spanish well enough.

The everyday life of the underground is marked by moderation and modesty. Excesses were not allowed, every peso was saved. It happened that the courier from New York with the money was delayed. Then Felipe had to resort to loans from friends.

The wives of the underground workers were of great benefit. "Louise" - the wife of "Felipe" - was responsible for the technical side of the correspondence with the Center (work with cipher, cryptography, etc.), kept records of financial expenses

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dov. Like "Dora" - the wife of "Tinto", - maintained a secret relationship with members of the organization.

The wife of "Marcello" and their daughter handed over incendiary shells to their intended destination. The artist's daughter carried them in a paint box.

Maria Grigorievna Verzhbitskaya behaved unusually steadfastly when she was subjected to many hours of interrogation about her husband's "criminal" connections. How could, confusing the investigation. When visiting the wounded in the hospital and prison, she "took" two infant twins with her, which somewhat softened the attitude of the administration towards the prisoner.

... More than half a century has passed since the events described. Most of the underground members of the Argentine group are gone. However, the bright memory of the deeds of the patriots, their contribution to the cause of victory over fascism, is still alive.

"Felipe" in the post-war period for several more years, together with "Louise", was in illegal work abroad.

"Tinto" and "Dora" after many years of successful work abroad arrived for permanent residence in the USSR.

Grigory Ivanovich Furdas in 1954 with his daughter Maria-Louise returned to his homeland, to Lvov. He worked at a local car factory. The daughter received a higher pedagogical education. G.I. Furdas died in March 1990 in Lvov.

Pavel Stepanovich Borisjuk returned to his native Volyn region in 1957 with his wife Maria. He worked in Kovel at a food industry enterprise, his wife worked as a seamstress. P.S. Borisjuk died in 1986.

Felix Klementievich, Maria Grigorievna Verzhbitsky, their children - the twins Louis and Angelika and daughter Sonya, who was born in Uruguay in 1951, settled in Lyubertsy near Moscow. Felix Klementievich worked as a puncher at the Lyubertsy training and production enterprise of the All-Russian Society of the Blind. His wife, along with touching care for her husband, troublesome care for children, worked for a long time as a seamstress at the Ukhtomsky haberdashery enterprise. Their children became adults, two elders received higher education. Louis graduated from the Moscow Institute of Physical Education and works in the system of sports organizations. He and his wife Lyudmila have two children. The first-born in honor of his grandfather is named Felix. F.K. Verzhbitsky died in 1986, his wife outlived him by six years.

Members of the Argentinean group, on the proposal of the USSR State Security Committee, were awarded state awards.

"Felipe" was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, "Tinto" - the Order of the Red Star, their wife, as well as M.G. Verzhbitskaya - military medals.

Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 1, 1968 "for the courage and dedication shown in the struggle

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against fascist [Germany during the Second World War], F.K. Verzhbitsky was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class. At the same time, he was awarded the medals "For the Victory over Germany" and "20 Years of Victory over Germany". The solemn ceremony of awarding took place on March 13, 1968 in the meeting room of the KGB, on Lubyanka, in the presence of a large number of intelligence officers.

...During the period of the most active activity of the Argentinean group, there were fears in the Center whether "Felipe" himself had firmly established himself there, since there was no information from him in this regard. Sent him a request. Here is his answer dated April 30, 1943: "I ask you personally to never worry about me. I sit here firmly. I only deeply regret that in these difficult days for our sacred Motherland I have not yet been able to bring more significant benefits.

Felipe and his comrades adequately completed the combat mission that confronted them during the Great Patriotic War.

Let us mention that although Felipe did not achieve positive results in the selection of candidates for sending to Europe, he managed to recruit (not counting the members of the sabotage group) about 20 agents in Argentina and Chile, who were used by him as sources of information, and several people — couriers for communication with New York. Many of them successfully collaborated with Soviet intelligence for a long time in the post-war period.

Nlegfa take (Spanish) - Paraguayan tea, the national drink of a number of countries in South America. It was sold in bright multi-coloured packaging in relatively bulky bags. The Argentines made fun of themselves: "We drink mate only once a day - from morning to evening."

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The thorny path of cooperation

Few people know that during the Great Patriotic War there was official cooperation between Soviet and British intelligence services to conduct subversive work against Nazi Germany. Unfortunately, the main actors who carried out this cooperation have passed away, and everything that is told in this essay is based solely on the surviving documentary materials of the Russian foreign intelligence archives.

After the attack of fascist Germany on the USSR, the first serious step towards the creation of an anti-Hitler coalition was the conclusion on July 12, 1941, of an agreement between the USSR and England on joint actions in the war against fascist Germany, which provided for the provision of mutual assistance. The agreement was signed in Moscow as a result of negotiations with a representative government delegation from London. And already on August 13, in the development of this agreement, a representative of the British secret service to conduct subversive work against Germany and its allies, Lieutenant Colonel Guinness, who arrived in Moscow to negotiate with Soviet intelligence on cooperation, settled in the Moscow Hotel National. In the evening, Guinness was at a dinner with the British Ambassador Kerr, who told him that the Russians wanted to start negotiations the very next day, that is, August 14, 1941.

The British carefully tried to hide from the Soviet side the official name of the service represented by Guinness. But gradually, through various sources, it was established that this service was part of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare and was called the Special Operations Executive (SOE). In the operational correspondence of the NKGB, it received the code name "Sect".

So, negotiations began on August 14. From the Soviet side, their implementation was entrusted to the most experienced foreign intelligence workers Vasily Mikhailovich Zarubin, who was introduced

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Guinness as General Nikolaev, and Ivan Andreevich Chichaev. The negotiations were conducted exclusively secretly, without the involvement of a secretary and an interpreter. Zarubin assured Guinness that besides him and Chichaev, only Stalin, Molotov and Beria knew about the negotiations.

As follows from the Guinness report obtained by intelligence in London, "negotiations began after breakfast every day and continued until three or four in the morning with a break for lunch ... On the whole, there was a striking unanimity on all basic principles." At the same time, Guinness noted that the views of the Russians on certain issues were "so different from ours that they may affect our future cooperation." Guinness could not be denied insight.

The negotiations ended with the signing on September 29, 1941, of two documents: "A record of what the Soviet and British representatives agreed on in their conversations on the question of subversive work against Germany and her allies" and "Preliminary plan for a common line of conduct in subversive work for the leadership of the Soviet and British communications sections. The documents were signed by Nikolaev (Zarubin) and Guinness. In this regard, Guinness emphasized in his report to London: "Both by me and by the Russian authorities, the agreement is considered not as a political agreement, but as a basis for the practical work of our connecting links and does not need an official signature."

As such "connecting links", the documents provided for the creation of corresponding communication sections in Moscow and London. Lieutenant Colonel Guinness was appointed head of the English section in Moscow (soon replaced by Colonel Hill, who was later promoted to general); head of the Soviet section in London - I.A. Chichaev, who, in connection with this, received the post of adviser to the USSR embassy in England. Together with Chichaev, M.A. Toropchenko, V.S. Suvorov and his wife Ksenia Mitrofanovna Chichaeva as a cipher secretary.

The tasks of the section included maintaining communication with the "Sect", monitoring the implementation of the cooperation agreement, agreeing on the practical measures provided for by the agreement, and their implementation.

The main provisions of the two agreed documents were promising from an operational point of view. The parties noted in them that cooperation in carrying out subversive work against [Germany "is not only desirable, but also essential for achieving our common goal of defeating the enemy." The following were envisaged as the main areas of cooperation, in particular:

- coordination of work on sabotage and identification of objects;
- exchange of information and intelligence that may be useful for subversive work;

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- exchange of achievements in the field of improvement of new technical means and methods of subversive work;
- rendering each other all possible assistance in introducing agents into the countries occupied by Germany.

A special section in the document determined the conditions for supporting the partisan movement in the occupied countries of Europe and distributed the areas of activity of the parties: behind England - Western Europe from Spain to Norway, as well as Greece; for the USSR - Romania, Bulgaria and Finland. As regards the organization of partisan detachments in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, this question was to be discussed between the USSR and the governments of these countries.

The main objects of the subversive activities of both sides in the documents were determined by all types of transport and military industry of the enemy. For some individual countries, specific objects of subversive work were identified. For example, the main objects in Romania were oil refineries, oil reserves and means of its transportation.

So, Chichaev went to London, Guinness - to Moscow, and practical work began. Soon Guinness, in the same 1941, was replaced by George A. Hill, who had extensive experience in working in Russia and was fluent in Russian. Back in August 1917, he was sent to the mission of the English Lieutenant General Poole in Petrograd and assigned to the Russian headquarters in Mogilev. He had Russian awards: the orders of Vladimir, Anna and Stanislav, presented to him by Nikolai P. Kerensky and Denikin.

In October 1918, after the expulsion of the English agent Lockhart, the organizer of the espionage and anti-Soviet conspiracy, Hill was allowed to leave Russia along with the Lockhart mission. However, he soon returned illegally to Soviet Russia and collaborated with the famous British intelligence officer Sidney Reilly. In 1922 he participated in conferences in Genoa and The Hague, worked closely with the Soviet delegation.

After a long period during which he was in the civil service and engaged in literary activities, Hill was seconded as an officer to the War Ministry in 1939, and at the end of 1941, when the English Section of Liaison with the "Sect" was being created in Moscow, his candidacy was named for the post of head of this section. Some officials in London objected to sending Hill to Moscow, considering it risky because of his past activities in Russia. However, he himself was optimistic and declared: "I do not think that the Soviet government will have objections to my inclusion in any British mission to Russia. Today we are fighting against Hitlerism, and in this matter I had solid experience." Hill sent to Moscow

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questionnaire about his past work in Russia, attached two books written by him about this work and ... received the consent of the Soviet side for his appointment to Moscow. On this occasion, the Soviet intelligence officer Kim Philby noted in his memoirs: "The Russians accepted this appointment with enthusiasm. They knew everything about Hill."

In Moscow, Hill was in constant contact with the head of the Anglo-American department of the First Directorate of the NKGB, since 1943 the deputy head of this department, Gayk Badalovich Ovakimyan, who was introduced to him as General Osipov!.

Since 1943, Andrey Grigoryevich Graur, appointed head of the Anglo-American Department, joined this work instead of Ovakimyan. A.G. Graur has been working in foreign intelligence since 1938, during this period having been in foreign work, including leadership, in the USA, Sweden and England. In 1941-1943, in London, he gained experience in liaison with British intelligence, being I.A. Chichaev.



In the first period of cooperation, the main attention was paid to the work of throwing Soviet intelligence agents from the territory of England to Germany and the countries occupied by it.

The agents trained in Moscow were sent by sea to England, where they were met by representatives of the "Sect" and arranged in a hotel. They were escorted to London by train by a junior officer of the Sect, and Chichaev was informed of the date of their arrival for a meeting. Upon arrival in London, the "Sect" placed agents in safe houses, one of which was located directly in the capital and two in the suburbs. A junior officer was also stationed there, officially for communication and solving economic issues. He, as a rule, accompanied the agents in all their movements around the city.

This was followed by the equipment of agents, the determination of the point and time of the release, a conversation with an English expert on the country where it was planned to throw the agent. Prior to boarding the plane, the agents were kept at well-guarded bases located near special airfields. Agents from London were accompanied to the plane by our representative. The release was carried out from four-engine bombers.

In total, during the period from the date of the conclusion of the agreement to March 1944, 36 agents were sent to England, 29 of which were sent to Germany, Austria, France, Holland, Belgium and Italy. Three died during the flight and four, the so-called "Hoffmann group", were returned to the USSR. This group will be discussed separately below.

There is no information about the fate of the agents withdrawn to European countries in the archives of the SVR. Only in relation to some of the documents there are notes like: "Landed, but there is no connection." natural

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but that this does not allow any assessment of the operational impact of these serious undertakings.

At the same time, the work of preparing and dropping Soviet agents on the part of the "Sect" very quickly began to cause discontent and give rise to suspicions on the part of the Soviet communications section in London.

Already in April 1942, in a message to the Center, Chichaev expressed the opinion that cooperation with the British "in terms of the transfer of people did not justify itself." "The delay in the transfer," he wrote, "the refusal to supply us with German documentation, the unwillingness to transfer to remote areas, and finally, the repetition of accidents – all this looks suspicious and indicates sabotage."

In the document of the Center dated May 5, 1942, summing up the results of cooperation with the "Sect" for 7 months, it was noted that out of 14 people sent to London before May 1, only four were safely abandoned. "From the very beginning," the document said, "instead of helping in the line of briefing, training and checking documentation, our people encountered great difficulties and nit-picking, and in some cases we dealt with obvious sabotage (for example, the British are so rudely corrected the date in one passport, spoiling the whole document).

Delays with transfers to Germany and Austria... The conclusion suggests itself that the British do not want to drop our people into these territories... Frequent references to objective conditions - bad weather, seasonality of flights, the onset of short nights, the range of routes. And the conclusion was made: "Continuing cooperation in the form in which it has been carried out so far is inexpedient."

In 1942, Soviet intelligence obtained a secret document signed by the deputy head of the SIS (the signature on the document is illegible), which revealed the true attitude of the British to cooperation with Soviet intelligence. This document, dated 8

July 1942, in particular, it was said: "In fact, the contradictions between Britain and the Soviet Union are as great as between Britain and Germany. I have no doubt that Soviet Russia is our friend only as long as she can benefit from this friendship. She does not trust us and will put all her efforts into intelligence activities against us... We cannot trust the Russians in the same way as, say, the Czechs or the Americans, or give them information that could give away an important or sensitive SOURCE."

Chichaev frankly spoke about his dissatisfaction with the work of transferring agents in a conversation with the head of the English section of communications in Moscow, General Hill, who came to London in August 1942, and a number of representatives of the "Sect". Hill, as Chichaev reported to Moscow, tried to explain everything by objective reasons, but was nevertheless forced to admit everything shortcomings and agree to

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our assessment of the results of cooperation. At the same time, he stated that Sekta wants to continue cooperation and will try to improve the service for our people for transfers. "From the exchange of opinions," concluded Chichaev, "we got the impression that the British do not think of correcting themselves. Obviously, they will continue the practice of sabotaging the transfer of our people, creating the appearance of a good desire to cooperate with us.

Indeed, time passed, but little changed. Moreover, it gradually became completely clear that deliberate delays were used by representatives of the "Sect" to develop our agents. Taking advantage of the fact that the agents were forced to live for many months in special facilities of the "Sect", the British carefully studied them. As noted in the Center's report on this issue in October 1942, "in the process of consumer services, they try to bring their people to them, even meaning to re-recruit our agents. Under the guise of consultations on issues related to the transfer, British experts hold lengthy conversations, asking them a variety of questions... The long delay of agents in England for several months morally corrupted and suppressed combat effectiveness.

The most striking example confirming this disloyal behavior of the "Sect" is the history of the "Hoffmann group". This group of agents of four people, of Austrian nationality, arrived in England at the end of 1941 to be dropped into Austria. As Chichaev later assessed, the group "turned out to be unsuccessfully selected both in terms of physical condition and moral qualities." The delay in the implementation of the event dragged on for a whole year, and this caused nervousness and unhealthy moods in the group. As it became known from intelligence data, the "Sect" took advantage of this and at the beginning of 1942 recruited "Hoffmann" to work against the USSR. He disclosed to the British intelligence the real data about himself, the nature of the tasks of the NKGB and safe houses in Austria, and also provided the British for photocopying all operational documents received by the group. The British instructed him to get through the radio operator of the group the code and ciphers that he had for communication with the Center. For his "services" "Hoffman" received a ridiculously small reward - 10 British pounds.

Upon receipt of information about the recruitment of "Hoffmann", it was decided to return the group to the Soviet Union. Upon learning of this decision, all members of the group asked British intelligence to leave them in Great Britain, giving their real names and addresses of relatives in Austria. But the British were not interested in this, and before the group left for the Union, they gave Hoffmann the task of collecting information about the defense industry of the USSR and agreed with him a password to establish communication in the USSR.

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In May 1943, the group was put on the Chernyshevsky steamer, which was heading to Vladivostok. However, while anchored in San Francisco, she went ashore and did not return. After illegally crossing the Canadian border in Vancouver, the members of the group turned themselves in to local police authorities and filed a motion to leave them to reside in Canada. At the same time, they gave

police address of two senior members of the "Sect" who can confirm their "commitment to the democratic cause".

However, as a result of the activities carried out through the NKID of the USSR, the Canadian authorities did not meet Hoffman halfway. In September 1943, members of the group from Vancouver were taken to Vladivostok on the Soviet steamer Mayakovsky and arrested. During the investigation, they gave detailed testimony, and "Hoffman" spoke in detail about his recruitment by British intelligence.

Although the claims of the leadership of Soviet intelligence to the British about the release of agents were justified, in fairness it should be noted that not all agents sent to England were well studied and prepared for such work. There were cases when, upon arrival in London, it turned out that some agent was not suitable for dropping by plane for health reasons, someone was insufficiently equipped with operational equipment, and some agents had personal documents prepared unprofessionally. There were also foreigners among the agents, who, as the case of the "Hoffmann group" showed, in some cases would need to be checked more deeply. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that one of them, like "Hoffmann", could also be recruited by British intelligence.

On October 21, 1943, a conversation was held with the representative of the "Sakta" in Moscow, General Hill, during which claims were made about the relationship of the "Sect" to cooperation. Reporting this conversation in a memo to the People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR Merkulov, intelligence chiefs Fitin, Ovakimyan and Graur emphasized that Hill "did not make any promises or proposals that could be regarded as a desire of the British to improve our cooperation ... Their attitude towards The question of cooperation with us, both in principle and in behavior towards our agents, must be regarded as a crude British tactic pursuing its own goals. In conclusion, the authors of the memorandum proposed to inform the British about the decision to withdraw their agents from England. The report contained the resolution of the intelligence chief Fitin: "Reported to Beria. Agree".

On November 2, 1944, Chichaev informed the leadership of the "Sect" about this decision. As Chichaev reported to the Center, the representative of the "Sakta" expressed neither regret about this, nor a desire to take measures to speed up the release of agents and stated: "Apparently, the end of cooperation between our organizations is coming, because after

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stopping the transfer of agents there is nothing more to do. I do not blame your organization, as the transfer of your agents was really slow. True, we had objective reasons for this, which we informed you about, but the slowness of the operation undoubtedly affected the interests of your work and you were right to express dissatisfaction with the course of operations.

In this monologue, attention is drawn to the phrase that after the termination of the transfer of agents, there is nothing more to do. By this, the British, as it were, admitted that they did nothing more to achieve those goals in the fight against a common enemy, which were recorded in the 1941 documents on intelligence cooperation. Indeed, in them the transfer of agents did not occupy the most important place. In February 1943, in a conversation with the leadership of the "Sect" in London, Chichaev emphasized that "it is only through the fault of the "Sect" that we have not yet begun to cooperate in resolving the main task - conducting subversive work, which is mentioned in the preliminary action plan of our organizations " .

Blaming the "Sect", Chichaev was only partially right, since the archive documents do not show that Soviet intelligence, for its part, proposed any specific joint measures to conduct subversive work against Germany.

The issue of a mechanism for exchanging information and intelligence data was also not worked out. The transfer of such materials from both sides was sporadic, and information about this area

cooperation can hardly be found in the six chubby volumes of the archival file called "The Sect".

Things were somewhat better with regard to the exchange of information on new technical means and methods of conducting subversive work. The parties handed over to each other samples of documents from Germany and the countries occupied by it to equip agents thrown into these countries (identity cards, stamps and seals, ration cards, etc.); exchanging data on sabotage equipment and equipment of agents, samples of radios and weapons, various types of fuses and mines.

The British side positively assessed samples of sabotage equipment received from Soviet intelligence. For its part, the Fourth Directorate of the NKGB also highly appreciated the similar materials and samples received through the "Sect". On June 30, 1942, the Fourth Directorate noted in its conclusion on the English catalog "Equipment": deserve great attention. Some of the devices and devices, after a thorough check and minor alterations, were adopted by us and justified themselves."

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During the cooperation, Sekta organized visits to a number of organizations for Chichayev, where he could get acquainted with explosive special equipment, in particular, an experimental station near London, an exhibition-museum of special equipment in London, and a parachute school in Manchester. For their part, the leadership of the Soviet intelligence briefed representatives of the "Sekta" who arrived in Moscow in 1942 with the work of the group to prepare agents for being thrown behind enemy lines.

The "Sect" took a frankly incorrect position in 1944, when the Soviet Army began to approach the countries of Eastern Europe. In the documents of 1941 on cooperation, it was agreed that support for the partisan movement in Bulgaria and Romania would fall within the scope of Soviet intelligence. However, not at all embarrassed by this, General Hill sends a letter to Ovakimyan on January 20, 1944, in which he declares his intention to strengthen the activity of the "Sect" in Bulgaria and asks for information about the material resources and the number of partisans in this country, about the location and number of troops guarding the main lines of communications from Sofia, as well as the territories safe for the deployment of their agents in Bulgaria. Hill insistently repeats his request several more times, and in March, Hill's deputy, Captain Graham, even raised the question of assisting the Sect in the transfer of weapons for the Bulgarian partisans.

Fitin reported this in March 1944 to People's Commissar Merkulov and expressed the opinion that it would be inexpedient to transmit such information to British intelligence.

The Sect is even more active in Romania. Without informing the Soviet side, on December 22, 1943, the British secretly threw into the territory of this country a group of three officers, led by a well-known intelligence officer - a specialist in Romania, Colonel Chastelin, who had connections with many prominent Romanian political figures. He had the task of establishing contact with Maniu, the chairman of the National Tzaronist Party, and assisting him in organizing a coup with the aim of withdrawing Romania from the WAR.

When information about this was leaked to the foreign press, Hill, at the request of Ovakimyan, was forced to confirm this fact and report that the group, upon landing, was captured by the gendarmerie and sent to Bucharest. It became known that, although Chastelin was formally under arrest, he was given the opportunity to make contact with the leaders of opposition political organizations in Romania and to have constant radio contact with London.

Maniu was known as a pro-English politician, and the British sought to bring him to power in Romania at the end

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1942. Then the head of the Balkan section of the "Sects" Stuart, in one of the conversations with Chichaev, raised the question of the usefulness of the British contact with Maniu in order to withdraw Romania from the war with his help, promising to cede ... Bessarabia for this. Chichaev was indignant: "It would be more useful to take care of providing us with more real assistance than to propose an agreement with the hostile side at the expense of ceding our territory; it is essentially an acknowledgment of the victory of the enemy, and we hope to defeat him." But Stuart objected to this: "After all, you are in a difficult situation, and in winter it can be even worse, so it is beneficial for you to negotiate with the Romanian opposition in order to deprive Hitler of Romania's help."

Nevertheless, the British were forced to make excuses: we allegedly did not understand them, they were only intermediaries and were not going to impose Maniu's conditions on us. It was clear that the "Sect" was trying to use cooperation with Soviet intelligence in order to bring to power in Romania the political forces that were beneficial to them, and the secret transfer of Chastelin to Romania in 1943 was another attempt to implement these plans. After the revelations in the press of the goals of Chastelin's mission, the British hurried to take him out of Romania. On August 26, 1944, Reuters reported that Chastelin arrived in Istanbul from Bucharest on a special plane of the Romanian aviation, who on Christmas Eve was sent on a secret mission to Marshal Antonescu.

However, in an effort to consolidate its position in Romania, the "Sect" did not stop there. As early as April 17, 1944, Hill informed Ovakimyan in writing that the "Sect" was sending six missions to Romania, consisting of British and Americans, with the aim of carrying out sabotage and forming partisan detachments, and expressed the hope that The NKGB will render them all possible assistance. However, apparently realizing the untenability of their plans and wishing to avoid the failure of the event, the British, a few days later, reported through Hill about "the desirability of including Soviet representatives in the groups sent to Romania." Hill proposed "to expand the cooperation of the Allied special services for active operations in Romania and to create a joint task force composed of representatives of the British, American and Soviet special services, which would be based on the territory of Romania occupied by the Red Army, for example, in Iasi, and from there would carry out activities to organize acts of sabotage on the Romanian territory occupied

the Germans."

People's Commissar Merkulov reported this proposal to Molotov, expressing the opinion that it was unacceptable, since "the British and Americans clearly desire to be able to observe the actions of our army and conduct reconnaissance in our rear." The Sect's proposal was

rejected.

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Then, at the insistence of the "Sect", the British Ambassador in Moscow, Kerr, sent a note to the USSR Foreign Ministry, in which the desire of the British government was expressed to send two small groups with reconnaissance purposes to Romania and Bulgaria. "The only function of these groups," the note said, "will be the collection of information for the purpose of counter-espionage against German underground organizations," which will be transmitted on the spot to the Soviet authorities.

To this, on December 10, 1944, the NKID of the USSR sent a clear and unambiguous answer to the British Chargé d'Affaires in the USSR D. Balfour: - while serving the interests of the cause of the United Nations, as a result of which, in the opinion of the Soviet competent authorities, the presence in these countries also of other intelligence groups, in addition to those already existing there, is hardly expedient.

Thus, attempts by British intelligence to plant their agents in Romania and Bulgaria, liberated by the Red Army, were thwarted.

The archives have preserved documents that also testify to the attempts of the "Sect" to use cooperation with Soviet intelligence to support the leader of the pro-fascist formations in Yugoslavia, General Draža Mihailović.

Intelligence had information that Mikhailovich was an old English agent and was connected with the German invaders. Therefore, when representatives of the "Sakta" in 1942, through Chichaev in London and Hill in Moscow, raised the question of providing support to General Mikhailovich in order to unite all Yugoslav forces under his command and influence the communists of Yugoslavia in the way they needed, this proposal was strongly rejected. Chichaev, in a conversation with the leaders of the "Sakta", noted that Soviet intelligence has data on the cooperation of Mikhailovich with the German and Italian invaders in the fight against the Yugoslav partisans.

All the arguments of the British about the "patriotism" of General Mikhailovich were later refuted by life itself, and the general himself was exposed as an accomplice of the Germans. The British government was forced to admit this openly, and the representative of the "Sect" in Moscow informed Hovakimyan in writing about the decision to break off relations with Mikhailovich and withdraw the English mission at his headquarters. On June 3, 1944, Sakta transmitted official information that "the British mission, which was with Mikhailovich, took off from him on a plane. Mikhailovich's intentions to abandon the fight against the Germans became completely clear."

In 1944, another event occurred that testified to the true attitude of the "Sect" to cooperation with the Soviet times.

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vedka. A report appeared in the foreign press that at the end of January, the assistant to the chief resident of German intelligence in Turkey, Erich Fermeren, and his wife appeared at the British embassy in Istanbul and announced that they had broken off their relations with Nazi Germany and asked for assistance in sending him to another country.

It was known in Moscow that Fermeren carried out important intelligence tasks in Turkey, and especially intelligence against the USSR. In this regard, on behalf of the Center, Chichaev made a statement to the leadership of the "Sect": activities of the Gestapo carried out against the USSR in Turkey, our organization urgently asks us to immediately give us a copy of the protocol of interrogation of Fermeren, as well as a copy of other documents characterizing his activities in Turkey. Naturally, Soviet intelligence was especially interested in information about sending German agents from Turkey to the USSR. However, the British were in no hurry. On March 10, 1944, the representative of the "Sect" in Moscow, Hill, confirmed in writing that Fermeren had applied to the British Embassy, but claimed that the latter was in no way connected with anti-Soviet activities in Turkey, therefore "did not make any statements about working against the USSR and was unable to make them.

For several months the British continued to assert that Fermeren's knowledge of the work of German intelligence in Turkey against the USSR was "exceptionally weak."

Even earlier, in April, Hill had reported from Moscow to London: "I can't help but feel that the Russians have an argument, a good argument, against our willingness to cooperate and an argument against us in the sense of withholding intelligence that may be of value to them. If it is not appropriate for political reasons to give them the full account of Fermerin's testimony, then, of course, it would be possible and worthwhile to draw up a special report. But such a "surgical" version must be extremely clever and must be rich."

In other words, Hill offered to prepare disinformation material, which was done. In June 1944, "Sekta" transmitted, with reference to the information received from Fermeren, detailed information about the activities of the organization, under the cover of which Hitler's intelligence worked in Turkey. However, in this document there was not a word about work against the USSR.

A little later, Soviet intelligence received information about the statements of the head of the SIS Menzies, confirming the disinformation nature of the transferred material. "I think," he said, "that Fermeren's data is different from those given to the Russians." It is no coincidence that General Hill

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put the "Fermeren case" in the first place and the refusal of the Intelligence Service to hand over to the Russians Fermeren's testimony regarding the activities of German intelligence against the USSR from Turkey.

At the beginning of 1945, when the war was drawing to a close, it became obvious that cooperation with Sekta had reached an impasse. On March 10, Chichaev was sent to London to inform the representative of the "Sect" about his departure to the Union. Hill, for his part, informed of his impending departure.

However, even before that, he handed over to Graur a memorandum with proposals for the continuation of cooperation between the British and Soviet intelligence services. The memorandum stated that due to the liberation of a large number of countries previously occupied by the enemy, the 1941 agreement was largely outdated. Therefore, "Sekta" proposes to work out a new agreement on "mutual assistance in carrying out direct actions against the enemy in the above-mentioned territories." On March 22, 1945, the British proposal was reported to V.M. Molotov. In a memorandum signed by Beria and Merkulov, an unambiguous assessment of the 1941 agreement on cooperation with the Sect was given: were disloyal to the implementation of the planned measures ... We consider it expedient to reject General Hill's proposal to conclude a new agreement. Resolution V.M. Molotov: "I have no objections."

On April 3, 1945, the chief of Soviet intelligence, Fitin, personally informed Hill about this decision at a dinner at the Aragvi restaurant. As Fitin noted in his report, the conversation about the relationship between the two organizations "was of a friendly nature." Hill, however, zealously defended the concept of the English memorandum on the development of a new agreement for the deployment of effective assistance to each other on the territory of Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia (Bohemia and Moravia), but Fitin in the correct form hinted to Hill at "tactless and disloyal behavior" "Sects" on a number of aspects of cooperation and said that it is possible to continue the fight against a common enemy on the basis of the previous agreement, "if only honestly and sincerely fulfill all the points stipulated by the agreement." He also informed the British general that no one would be sent to London to take Chichaev's place, and from now on communication with the "Sect" would be carried out in Moscow.

On May 11, 1945, Hill flew to England. Lieutenant Colonel Benham, head of the Russian section of the Sekta, who came to replace him in Moscow, "played" cooperation for several months, putting forward various options for its continuation after the war. The fact that it was a "game" is eloquently evidenced by the obtained Soviet

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intelligence text of the letter of the Minister of Economic War Oliver Littleton to the Prime Minister of England Churchill dated June 2, 1945. The Minister expresses the opinion that the Anglo-Soviet agreement on intelligence cooperation has lost its force, and writes: "The Russians did not greatly benefit from our offers to transfer information to them, and our own requests to the Russians to supply us with information received little response."

Nevertheless, we consider it politically important to show to some extent that the agreement works, especially since the Americans continue to generously pass on information to (Russians). Further, the minister proposed to create the appearance of continued cooperation and to press the US government to follow a similar course.

"We tried," the letter said, "although we did not achieve complete success, to ensure that the Americans took the same position as we did and did not give rise to offensive comparisons." On June 17, 1945, Churchill made a note on this letter: "I agree with what you propose. They should be treated the way they treat us."

On September 3, Benham was forced to report to London that the Sekta mission in Moscow was currently of no use and there was no need for it, and on September 24, on instructions from London, he sent a letter to Fitin: "With the end of the war, our mission is disbanded. he confesses, because it was created to solve the problems that arose with the war. Express our gratitude for friendly help, although our path was sometimes thorny.

1: Hayk Badalovich Hovakimyan was a resident in New York before the war. In April 1941, he was arrested by the FBI at a meeting with an agent who, as it turned out later, turned out to be a provocateur. The Americans released Hovakimyan on bail, and he was to be tried. However, after the German attack on the Soviet Union, at the direction of US President Roosevelt Hovakimyan, they did not begin to judge, and in early July 1941 he left for the USSR. In Moscow, he headed the American division of the First Directorate of the NKGB, and later became deputy chief of intelligence.

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Interaction between intelligence agencies of the USSR and the USA during the war

On a frosty Christmas day in 1943, the head of the US military mission in the USSR, Major General J.R. Dean met in Moscow an important guest and his personal friend, the head of US intelligence - the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) - Major General William Joseph Donovan. Shortly before this, Dean received a telegram from his Washington boss, General Marshall, Chief of the US Joint Staff Group. The general reported that US President Roosevelt approved Donovan's proposal to establish cooperation with Soviet intelligence and to create an OSS mission in Moscow for this purpose.

Colonel J. Haskell, a senior officer of the OSS, flew to Moscow with Donovan, whom Donovan intended to appoint as head of the OSS mission in the Soviet capital. Donovan and Haskell were personal guests of US Ambassador Harriman. Arriving at the embassy, they prepared for a long wait for a reception at the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov. The embassy officials intimidated the guests by telling them that such receptions sometimes had to be expected for up to six weeks. However, to the ambassador's surprise, Molotov invited Donovan to his place six hours after the latter's arrival in Moscow. The meeting, which was also attended by US Ambassador Harriman, took place on the evening of December 25, 1943. The ambassador introduced Donovan to Molotov, who told the people's commissar in detail about the US Office of Strategic Services he leads, its tasks, functions and specific activities in a number of countries, primarily in the Balkans. The general ended his message with a proposal for cooperation with "the relevant Soviet military organizations, if the Soviet government deems it desirable." Harriman added that if Molotov thought it desirable to further discuss these issues, then General Donovan could leave his man in Moscow, and the Soviet side could provide their

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representative in Washington. Donovan added to this that if a representative of the OSS was sent to Moscow, the latter would be part of the US military mission and report directly to its head, General Dean.



At the end of the meeting, Molotov told his American interlocutors that, although he would not be able to discuss this issue with Marshal Stalin today, since the marshal had left Moscow, he, Molotov, would talk with his military specialists, after which he would give an answer. Harriman.

In less than two days, Donovan and Dean were invited to the NKGB to meet with the head of foreign intelligence, the head of the First Directorate, P.M. Fitin and his deputy G.B. Ovakimyan, who was introduced to the Americans as A.P. Osipov.

In a conversation that took place on December 27, 1943, Donovan, at the request of Fitin, spoke in some detail about the activities of the OSS he headed, emphasizing that the main goal of this intelligence agency was to work against enemy countries outside the United States, excluding allied countries. He outlined the structure of the OSS and the methods of reconnaissance and sabotage work carried out by this department in enemy countries and declared the desirability and readiness for joint cooperation with the relevant bodies of the USSR "in order to defeat the common enemy as soon as possible." During the conversation, General Donovan outlined how he thinks about the cooperation between American and Soviet intelligence. His proposals boiled down to the following main areas of cooperation values:

- exchange of intelligence information about the enemy;
- consultations on the issues of conducting sabotage work on the territory of the enemy;
- assistance in sending agents behind enemy lines;
- exchange of materials on sabotage equipment and radio equipment and their samples.

Donovan also announced his readiness to send a special representative of the OSS to Moscow, who would work under the direct supervision of General Dean and liaise with representatives of Soviet intelligence. He also suggested that Fitin send a representative to Washington to make direct contact to exchange information and discuss joint actions. Donovan immediately announced that if an agreement was reached, he intended to appoint Colonel Haskell, who had arrived with him, as his representative in Moscow. "In general," Donovan concluded, "I will give all possible support in the matter of cooperation in order to defeat our common enemy as soon as possible."

Fitin expressed satisfaction with the conversation, but said that the issues raised in it require discussion with the relevant organizations. Nevertheless, between Fitin and Donovan was achieved

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then agreement on the need, without waiting for an official decision on the start of cooperation, to begin the exchange of information. The American general, pointing out the importance and secrecy of the exchange of information, proposed to carry it out through Dean and Haskell without involving minor persons, and announced his intention to send Haskell to Moscow in a month.

On December 30, 1943, the People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR V. Merkulov sent a memorandum to the State Defense Committee (Stalin, Molotov, Beria) about the results of the conversation with the head of American intelligence, expressing an opinion on the possibility of accepting the proposal of the Americans. In the same note, the People's Commissar proposed as our representative in the USA the candidacy of the head of the Anglo-American Department of the First Directorate, Lieutenant Colonel Andrey Grigoryevich Graur, who already had experience as our representative in cooperation with British intelligence during the WAR.

The official positive response to the memorandum of the NKGB was received by Fitin on the evening of January 4, 1944. Despite the late hour, it was decided to immediately inform the Americans, since on the morning of January 5, Donovan's departure from Moscow was scheduled. Almost already

that night, Hovakimyan managed to contact Donovan by phone, who insistently asked that Hovakimyan immediately come to meet him at the US Embassy.

The conversation at the embassy continued until four o'clock in the morning. General Donovan expressed his deep satisfaction with the positive resolution of the issue of cooperation and introduced Colonel Haskell as his future official representative in Moscow. At the same time, he asked to expedite the decision to send our representative to the USA.

On the evening of January 5, another meeting was held at the US Embassy, in which US Ambassador Harriman, Generals Donovan and Dean, Colonel Haskell and C. Bohlen took part from the American side, and P.M. Fitin, GB. Ovakimyan and A.G. Graur. The latter was immediately presented as a representative of Soviet intelligence at the OSS in Washington with the rank of colonel.

Intelligence cooperation has begun. The first thing General Donovan did on his return to the US was to agree on what intelligence material should be passed on to the Russians. As a result, on February 4, an instruction "Intelligence information to be transmitted to the USSR" was sent to all divisions of the OSS. The principle statement of the instruction: Russia "may be given original intelligence information of the OSS, which is useful to the country waging war against Germany."

Preparations for the exchange of representatives were actively carried out in Moscow and Washington, the number of employees at each

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house representative, organizational issues were resolved. Graur, his six employees and their wives were almost ready to leave when the unexpected happened.

On March 16, 1944, a telegram from Roosevelt landed on the desk of the US Ambassador to Moscow, Harriman. The President announced that the exchange of representatives was postponed indefinitely. The Ambassador was frankly disappointed with this unexpected decision of the President. Here is how General Dean describes further events in his memoirs: "Harriman and I prepared a long telegram to the President asking him to reconsider his decision. We argued our request by the fact that for the first time we managed to infiltrate the most secret intelligence service of the Soviet Union and that the relations established in this way would open the door for closer ties with other government bodies. We could then deal with the deployment of American troops in Russia in connection with mobile bases for our bombers. We have informed the President of our fears that rejection of the Donovan agreement would have an adverse effect on the mobile bomber base project.

On March 30, the president replied that domestic political considerations in the US were the prevailing factor preventing him from changing his mind. The President was sure that Marshal Stalin would understand him, and he hopes that we will emphasize that the exchange of missions has been postponed only for a while!

General Dean does not hide in his memoirs that he experienced an extremely unpleasant sensation when he arranged a meeting with Fitin to inform him of the president's decision, fearing an undesirable reaction from the leadership of Soviet intelligence.

However, the general's fears were unfounded. Back in early March, intelligence information began to come to the First Directorate of the NKGB that the head of the FBI, Edgar Hoover, strongly objected to the agreement between the OSS and the NKGB on the exchange of representatives, pointing out that the goal of the NKGB was to infiltrate the state secrets of other countries. Hoover expressed his views in a letter to the President's personal assistant G. Hopkins and asked him to prevent the exchange of representatives. He pointed out in a letter to the danger of this exchange for the United States, as well as the possibility of an unfavorable public reaction to this event.

Hoover's letter was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which returned it on February 12, 1944, with the reply that they found no reason to change the agreement between the OSS and the NKGB.

Upon learning of these moves by Hoover, General Donovan was literally furious. He called Hoover a fool and said that if he thinks that the NKVD does not have its representatives in the United States, then he is deeply mistaken.

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Whether we like it or not, the general declared, if the NKVD is going to have its representatives in the USA, it is better if they have an official mission in the USA in order to be able to control their activities.

Nevertheless, the President did not change his decision.

Thus, when General Dean met with Fitin and Ovakimyan on April 7, 1944, the leaders of Soviet intelligence were prepared for this conversation. "With Fitin and Osipov," recalls Dean, "I never met twice in the same place. It seemed that they had shelters all over the city... I saw a table laden with vodka, cognac, fruit and chocolate, and they insisted on refreshments. I was a bit skeptical about strong beers before breaking my news as I had no idea how it would be received. However, the vodka gave me courage, and probably had a softening effect on my partners in the conversation, because, as the president predicted, they showed "excellent understanding" and agreed that coordination between their secret intelligence and ours should be carried out in Moscow between them and me, playing for Donovan. On this we agreed, and this is how our cooperation began, which continued until the end of the war.

Already on his own behalf, General Dean expressed his readiness at this meeting to "give us intelligence information not only through the OSS, but also on the military, naval and other American intelligence organizations, and also to begin the exchange of samples of sabotage equipment." Looking ahead, it should be noted that the general never transmitted such information during the cooperation.

Fitin's reaction was calm and somewhat diplomatic in nature: "Since the initiative in establishing official relations between us, as well as in the question of the exchange of representatives, belonged to General Donovan (who obviously had the appropriate instructions from his leadership), and in connection with which we agreed to this proposal, having no particular interest in an urgent exchange of representatives, we do not mind a temporary delay and consider it possible to continue our contact through General Dean.

At this, the coordination of organizational issues was completed and the issue of the exchange of representatives by the Americans was never raised again.

In open American literature, many materials have been published about the one and a half year cooperation between Soviet and American intelligence services in 1944-1945. In most of them, the story is portrayed as if there was literally a constant flow of intelligence information from the US Office of Strategic Services to Moscow, while the Russians transmitted much less material to Washington. General Dean, in his memoirs, even explains this by the fact that,

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in his opinion, the Office of Strategic Services was "a more effective organization than its Russian partner"?.

However, a simple comparison of the amount of transmitted information does not say anything. Closer to the truth, perhaps, is the English author David J. Dallin, who, in his book *Soviet Espionage*, calls General Dean's opinion unconvincing. "It raises some doubts, -

he writes that such a young service as the Office of Strategic Services should be more efficient than such colossal experienced services as the State Security Service and the GRU. The difference in the amount of information exchanged between the OSS and the GB could be more justifiably explained by the completely different ideas of the two governments about the meaning, purpose and scope of allied cooperation."

In order to get an objective idea of the scope, content, and, most importantly, the effectiveness of intelligence cooperation between the two allied states in the war against Nazi Germany, it is necessary to return to the main areas of cooperation formulated in the first conversation between Fitin and Donovan.

The most important of these was the exchange of intelligence information about the enemy. This is where the collaboration started. During April-May 1944, Donovan, through Dean, handed over to Fitin informational materials on various questions of the situation in Germany and the countries occupied by it, totaling over two thousand sheets. It was mainly a reference material on Germany compiled by the Office of Strategic Services Research and Development for the US military administration and police forces. According to the information department of Soviet intelligence, the information was of "considerable interest and valuable as a rich reference material." As such, they were left for use by the information department.

An insignificant part of the transferred materials (87 sheets) accounted for intelligence reports on certain specific issues: the military economy, the general economic and internal political situation of Germany and the countries occupied by it, the state of the armed forces and the military development of Germany. Among the reports were, for example, materials on Heinkel jet fighters, on the location of the storage of Romanian oil, on the sending of reinforcements by the Germans to Italy, on the withdrawal of German troops from South Greece, and so on. Some reports dealt with issues related to Finland, Austria, Greece, Norway, France, and Japan.

All these materials were of interest to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, where they were sent.

Similar reconnaissance reports, but in smaller numbers (about 20), were transmitted by the Americans in August, September and December 1944.

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In a letter dated May 10, 1944, General Donovan informed Fitin of matters on which he would like information. Among them, in the first place were questions about the Far East (Japan, Manchuria, Korea), about the activities of Japanese intelligence agencies, about the activities of German intelligence in Finland, about the situation in a number of Balkan countries. As for Germany, the Americans were interested in the state of the German army, its weapons and the political future of Germany.

On this last question, a detailed statement (76 pages) was prepared in Moscow and sent to Dean to be passed on to Donovan. In the letter, Fitin expressed his gratitude to Donovan for the materials he had received on Germany.

In September 1944, the Americans were also given information about secret German chemical plants in Germany and Poland for the production of gases, as well as grenades and bombs filled with gases. The same materials contained information about an underground factory in Swinemünde that produced torpedoes, and about a test station for rocket torpedoes in the Merseburg area.

At the end of September 1944, General Donovan informed Fitin that the OSS task force in Romania had obtained a lot of intelligence material, which he intended to pass on to us. The materials were received in two batches in October (about 1500 pages in microfilm) and December 1944 and were of interest to the GRU. They dealt mainly with

related to the position of the Romanian oil industry and the supply of oil and fuel to the armed forces of Germany, as well as cooperation between Germany and Romania in the production and repair of military aircraft.

In November 1944, Donovan sent Fitin the material prepared by the OSS with an analysis of the possibilities of German industry, and in December he supplemented it with an assessment of the general situation in Germany. The main conclusions of these materials: even having fully mobilized its capabilities, Germany is not able to provide long-term effective resistance, at the same time, Germany's own production, food supplies and basic necessities are still sufficient to wage war throughout 1945. The document also concluded that "despite the growing awareness of the fact that the war is lost, there are still no signs of the disintegration of the home front in Germany."

However, information about the situation in the Nazi leadership of Germany, received by an OSS source in Switzerland and transferred to Fitin on the eve of the last year of the war - December 31, 1944, was of the greatest interest. In this material, the internal situation in Germany was assessed as "even more critical than is generally believed." It was said about Hitler: "Located in Berlin in a dungeon under the imperial chancellery ... The periods of the oppressed

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and excited state are so irresistible that his environment cannot predict in half an hour how he will act in this or that position. In this situation, the supreme power in the country was practically exercised by the Himmler-Goebbels-Bormann triumvirate, in which Himmler played the main role. With the commanders of the fronts - Eastern - Guderian and Western - Rundstedt - Himmler concluded an agreement: the retreat should be determined solely by strategic considerations, regardless of the prestige or wild orders of the Fuhrer.

However, both Hitler and Himmler still hoped to somehow get out of the critical situation. The calculation was based on an attempt to get in touch with the Western powers, and in case of failure, to launch the version of the disclosure of alleged Anglo-Saxon efforts in Germany, and thus try to achieve a break between Russia and its Western allies.

Based on these materials, on January 13, 1945, a special message was sent to the three most important addresses at that time - Stalin, Molotov, Beria.

Even earlier, in October 1944, information received from General Donovan about an attempt by certain circles of Germany to get in touch with the Americans with the aim of separate negotiations on surrender was sent to the same addresses. The senior OSS intelligence officer in Yugoslavia, Colonel Robert F. McDowell, was contacted in September 1944 by Hitler's special envoy for the Balkan affairs, Neubacher, who said that the latter would like to discuss the complete surrender of Germany with McDowell. At the same time, he expressed the hope that "the United States will not allow Germany and Europe to fall into the hands of communism." He wants the allied troops (meaning the Western ones. - Approx. Aut.) to be ready for the occupation of Germany immediately after its capitulation.

Unfortunately, there are no documents in the archives from which one could learn about the reaction of the USSR leadership to this information.

At the end of December 1944, when the Soviet troops were successfully developing military operations on the territory of Hungary, detailed information was received from General Donovan about the plans of the internal Hungarian opposition, led by Geza Soos, to assist in the withdrawal of Hungary from the war. The message, in particular, spoke of the desire of this opposition to establish contact with Moscow and the readiness to assist the Soviet troops in the storming of Budapest.

This information was also sent to three high addresses.

From the very beginning of cooperation, the American side showed an increased interest in the Balkans, especially in Bulgaria. Already at a meeting with V.M. Molotov on December 25, 1943, the US Ambassador Harriman and General Donovan paid the greatest attention to Bulgaria. Donovan said that his employees had established a connection in Bulgaria

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with a minority opposition group and contact with some military organizations and he would like to cooperate in this matter with the relevant Soviet organizations. In particular, it is desirable to consult with the employees of such organizations about the possibility of involving in cooperation any of the members of the current Bulgarian government. At the same time, Donovan did not hide the fact that they already have such a person.

Ambassador Harriman supported his general's request by asking V.M. Molotov, could Donovan get any additional information on Bulgaria in Moscow? Molotov's answer was laconic: the information that we can get, of course, will be provided.

From the time of the first meeting with the leaders of Soviet intelligence on December 27, 1943, until April 1944, the topic of Bulgaria was in the first place in almost all conversations and in all letters to Donovan Fitin.

On January 4, 1944, General Donovan asked the head of Soviet intelligence to provide him with information about the military, economic and political situation in Bulgaria, which "would be valuable for the Allies to achieve the goal of withdrawing Bulgaria from the war." At the same time, the general raised specific questions about troops, transport, food supplies, materials sent by Bulgaria to Germany, parties, underground groups and the characteristics of their leaders.

In a conversation with Ovakimyan on the night of January 5, Donovan repeated his request, emphasizing the great interest of the United States in Bulgarian affairs and in receiving relevant information from us. At the same time, he announced the presence in Turkey of a special OSS group under the leadership of McForman, working on Bulgaria.

On the evening of the same day, at a meeting at the American embassy with Fitin, Donovan involved Ambassador Harriman in this "attack". After the official part of the meeting and dinner, in anticipation of watching the then popular film "Yankee Doodle", the ambassador, in a conversation with Fitin, persisted in his desire to get information about the internal political situation in Bulgaria, about the opposition at the top of the country, the army and political parties. At the same time, he described Bulgaria as a very important point in the Balkans, the situation in which is favorable for the withdrawal of this country from the war. He expressed a desire to "cooperate in this matter by jointly holding a number of events."

Such perseverance of the Americans forced Fitin to declare: "You must take into account our relations with Bulgaria, and henceforth, if we cannot satisfy your request on this or that issue, you should not be offended and should understand that our possibilities are limited, and not regard our refusal as unwillingness to cooperate

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hang out with you." And then Donovan launched a new argument: "We attach great importance to Bulgaria because there is an agreement between us and the British, according to which Bulgaria is our sphere of activity in matters relating to the administration of strategic services of the United States."

After Donovan's departure from Moscow, the "Bulgarian attack" was continued by General Dean. At a meeting on February 19, 1944, with Hovakimyan, Dean stated that the Americans, with the knowledge of the British Prime Minister Churchill, were conducting preliminary negotiations on the withdrawal

Bulgaria from the war. The ambassadors of the United States and England have already informed V.M. Molotov. Regardless of the decision of the Soviet government, continued Dean, negotiations with the Bulgarians would obviously begin in the near future; therefore, General Donovan is especially interested in obtaining from us a report on Bulgaria as soon as possible in order to use it in the process of negotiations.

All this time, the information department of the First Directorate of the NKGB worked on the preparation of a solid certificate, which was compiled on the basis of official and intelligence materials in the amount of 30 sheets. On March 8, it was approved by V.M. Molotov and on March 10 sent to Dean for transfer to General Donovan.

The certificate provided detailed data on the state of the military industry in Bulgaria, on the reserves of strategic raw materials, the state of the railways, agriculture and the food situation. Much attention was paid to the Bulgarian army, air force and naval forces, the moral and political state of the country's armed forces, as well as information about German units and warships in Bulgaria. In conclusion, an assessment was made of the internal political situation in Bulgaria, including the anti-government opposition and its leaders.

At a meeting with Fitin on April 7, General Dean said that they were very impressed with the certificate and that they highly appreciated it: Ambassador Harriman was familiarized with the certificate in Moscow, who also liked it very much.

American interest in the Balkans was not limited to Bulgaria. As the Soviet troops approached the Balkan countries, the OSS quickly threw its operational groups into these countries, informing the leadership of Soviet intelligence about this. So, on July 8, 1944, General Donovan informed Fitin that the OSS had sent a group of its employees to Romania in order to collect information about the deployment of German units, about the destruction caused by bomber aircraft, and to identify objects for future bombing. As Donovan emphasized at the time, this task force has no other political or operational functions.

However, in practice it looked somewhat different. In September 1944, when Soviet troops were already on the territory of Ru

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However, information was received from the First Directorate of the NKGB that on September 2, an OSS officer in Bucharest met with the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania. The minister complained to him that the Romanian delegation to the armistice negotiations had been in Moscow for several days, but he did not receive a word about the progress of the negotiations. Meanwhile, the Red Army, according to the minister, is advancing deep into Romania, intending, probably, to occupy the whole country, and continues to disarm the Romanian units. The minister asked the OSS officer to point out to the Soviet military authorities in Romania that they should not treat it like an occupied country.

It is no coincidence that Donovan's biographer later wrote: "Neither Russian nor English services reacted to the fall of Romania with such speed as Donovan did, neither of them, apparently, had the same opportunities, thus, the laurels of luck quickly acquired the OSS"?

At the end of September 1944, Donovan informed Fitin that on September 17, 1944, "his intelligence and special operations officers had successfully penetrated the territory of Czechoslovakia occupied by the Germans and began their operations there." Donovan emphasized in a letter to Fitin that he was reporting this so that "you are fully aware of ongoing operations in this territory."

Donovan did not report any information about the actions of this group for the next month and a half, and on November 17 he asked for help in establishing the location and position of OSS intelligence officers in Czechoslovakia. The general reported that communication with the group was cut off

over two weeks ago. It included 10 officers, 11 enlisted men, and presumably 19 American pilots.

At this request, the head of the Fourth Directorate of the NKGB, Sudoplatov, was immediately instructed to take measures to clarify the fate of American intelligence officers and pilots. In December, Donovan was informed that 15 Americans were at the disposal of the Second Czechoslovak Partisan Brigade; the fate of the rest has not yet been clarified.

Even earlier, in August 1944, the Americans asked to find out the location in Slovakia of 12 American pilots shot down during an American air raid on Bratislava. Then it was possible to establish and report to the OSS a list of names of 21 officers and sergeants of the US Air Force flight personnel who were held captive in various cities of Czechoslovakia.

In early January 1945, Fitin received information from Donovan that on the night of December 27, several radio transmitters, generators, clothes and medicines had been dropped for the OSS group in Czechoslovakia. Now Americans assume you're in the area

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there was no OSS group, and they are asking to find out who got the equipment dropped by aircraft. Through the capabilities of the Ukrainian NKGB, it was possible to establish and inform Donovan that in January 1945, in the Brezno region, the Germans picked up some kind of American cargo thrown from an aircraft, which can be assumed to be destined for the OSS group.

And the last sad case in Czechoslovakia. At the same time, in January 1945, the Americans informed Fitin that, according to the German agency Transocian, 18 Americans and British were captured and shot as agents in the rear of the Germans in Slovakia. The leadership of the OSS assumes that these are employees of the American and British intelligence groups, and asks, if possible, to verify these data.

Fitin receives an order from the leadership of the NKGB to urgently check this information through the capabilities of SMERSH. It is possible to find out that in February in the Slovak newspaper "Gardista" under the headline "Anglo-American agents caught in Slovakia" information was published about the capture and execution by the Germans of a group of 18 people. In mid-March, information was received about the execution in January of a group of Americans and Englishmen of 11 people; the names of 8 of them have been identified. General Donovan was informed of all this on March 30, and on the same day he sent Fitin a letter expressing his gratitude.

One of the points of the agreement on cooperation between the Soviet and American intelligence services was the exchange of materials and samples on sabotage equipment and radio equipment. Even at the first meeting with Fitin, Donovan spoke about the special equipment and equipment being developed by the OSS for agents and painted a rather tempting picture of the exchange of experience and cooperation in this area. In particular, they talked about their own design of portable radio equipment mounted in an attaché case, about a plastic explosive device in the form of pieces of bread, about a microfilming device, and similar reconnaissance equipment.

However, the matter was limited to small things. In May 1944, Donovan asked Fitin for information about the mechanisms and methods of sabotage, and in June he received the desired information. In particular, it reported information about the experience of using delayed action mechanisms and the search for and improvement of means of sabotage.

In July 1944, Donovan sent an illustrated catalog of special weapons and mechanisms to Moscow. This material was positively assessed by the NKGB experts, who noted that the catalog contains a description of several structures and devices that were previously unknown to us and of interest.



But the next and last "gift" of the Americans disappointed Moscow experts. In November 1944 and early 1945 they

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They sent samples of portable microfilm installations developed by USS. The conclusion of the relevant service of the NKGB stated that during the examination of the equipment it was found that it "has nothing to do with micrography"; "The design of the camera and the mechanisms are not solid, and the entire setup is a device that is not very suitable for performing serious photographic work." This was the end of cooperation in the field of operational technology.

On January 9, 1945, Fitin received a somewhat cryptic letter from General Dean: "I have just received an urgent message from General Donovan in which he indicates that he has in his possession several documents received from an enemy source that he wants to give it to one of the responsible Soviet representatives in Washington. He believes that these documents are of great value to the Russians, and therefore asks for the name of the person to whom he should hand them over. On the same day, Colonel Graur received from General Dean a copy of Donovan's telegram emphasizing the urgency of the matter.

Everything happened quickly. Dean was immediately informed that the materials could be handed over in Washington personally to the Soviet ambassador A.A. Gromyko. As early as January 10, two OSS officers, Colonel Dohring and Donovan's assistant Harold Cheston, visited the ambassador and gave him over 1,500 photocliches of various materials containing the keys to Soviet ciphers captured by the Americans from the Germans in Northern Italy.

The Soviet ambassador was cautious and asked the representatives of the OSS to show him the correspondence on this issue with General Dean. In the evening of the same day, Doring personally brought and handed over to the ambassador a copy of a letter addressed to Dean on this matter. At the end of the letter, it said: "Donovan would like General Fitin to know that we have not studied this material, but we assume that it is really important for the Soviet government."

Despite the instructions of the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs A.Ya. Vyshinsky to the ambassador that he personally brought the received documents to Moscow (the ambassador was just supposed to fly there), A.A. Gromyko evaded this under a plausible pretext. And then, by order of V.M. Molotov's documents were sent to Moscow with two embassy employees.

In open American literature, the transfer of these materials to the NKGB is regarded as the most important information transmitted to Soviet intelligence during the entire period of cooperation. Of course, the transfer of secret ciphers captured by the enemy during the war is in itself a serious step, which was duly appreciated in Moscow. An examination of the documents showed that these were codes used between individual Soviet military

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units on the fronts or between them and the bodies of the NKGB-NKVD. However, the conclusion of the examination indicated that the failure of these codes had become known in due time and they were replaced by new ones. "In connection with the foregoing," the expert concluded, "the documents sent have lost their operational value."

After the surrender of Germany in May 1945, judging by the surviving archival documents, cooperation between the NKGB and the OSS practically ceased. However, one more episode of this cooperation, which took place after the war, is worth mentioning. On July 23, 1945, Fitin received a message from Donovan that the Americans had captured in Austria the head of the German intelligence network in the Balkans, SS-Sturmbannführer Wilhelm Höttl and his headquarters in the Austrian city of Steyr, along with employees and equipment. Höttl was the head of the intelligence department in the Balkans and in the Vatican of the imperial

security services. "But in the opinion of General Donovan," the letter received by Fitin said, "Höttl, wishing to cause dissension between the Soviets and the Americans, expressed his readiness to transfer the entire existing network to the American military authorities on the condition that this would be used against Soviet interests ... General Donovan not only believes that you should be aware of this, but that it would be desirable for the American and Soviet representatives on the ground to discuss ways and means of liquidating the Hoettl organization. General Donovan reports that he has entrusted the matter to one of his responsible assistants in Wiesbaden, Mr. Allen Dulles."

In a biography of Donovan published in the United States after the war, the reasons why the head of the OSS made the proposal outlined in his letter to Fitin look somewhat different. Höttl was captured by the Americans, along with the head of the imperial security service, Kaltenbrunner, who hid in a hut in the Austrian Alps. Donovan visited Kaltenbrunner, who was imprisoned in Nuremberg, and offered the American general a deal. Donovan seeks an end to his trial in Nuremberg, and he transfers the intelligence headquarters in Steyr to OSS control. At the same time, he said that Höttl's main employees were Kurt Auner in Bucharest and Paul Neunteuffel in Budapest, both high-ranking German intelligence officers with extensive experience in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

Donovan immediately refused the deal with Kaltenbrunner, but informed Bradley's army intelligence chief, General Siebert, about this offer. Meanwhile, OSS officers made contact with Auner and Neunteuffel, who immediately agreed to cooperate with the Americans. Siebert recommended that Donovan inform Fitin about the capture of Höttl and his staff. At the same time, he proceeded from the fact that the OSS would not lose anything from this, however, this

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"perhaps it would be conducive to the discovery of a new useful contact between intelligence services."

In July 1945, Fitin knew nothing of this. On July 26, he visited the acting head of the US military mission in Moscow, Colonel Pettigrew, and posed a number of additional questions to him in connection with Donovan's proposal: who else exactly was captured along with Höttl and what testimony did the latter give about his work against the Soviet Union; what documents were captured in Steyr and where they are currently located; how Donovan thinks in practice to carry out the joint work of Soviet and American representatives to eliminate the Höttl intelligence organization. Fitin would also like to know if there were other proposals from German intelligence officers and whom specifically, located in the American zone of occupation, to work against the Soviet Union.

Correspondence dragged on. Donovan did not answer any of Fitin's questions and continued to insist on a meeting with A. Dulles or personally with him, Donovan. Finally, in a letter from Dean dated August 31, Fitin was practically given an ultimatum: "General Donovan hopes that you will find this meeting desirable. Otherwise, he declares that the OSS will be forced to act independently in the matter of eliminating the Hoettl intelligence network.

The rationale for Donovan's avoidance of answering Fitin's questions and protracted correspondence with him on this matter is unequivocally revealed by the author of the general's biography: how would I then be obliged to mention some of the negotiations between Siebert, Dulles and the head of Hitler's intelligence service on the Eastern Front - General Reinhard dom Gehlen - negotiations that led to an alliance between Siebert and

Gehlen and later between Gehlen and the CIA."

Unexpectedly for Donovan, his proposal to Fitin for cooperation in the elimination of the Höttl intelligence network was strongly opposed by the joint group of chiefs of staff. The military feared that if Höttl was "transferred to the Russians and this fact becomes known, then what kind of German will be after

to work" for the Americans. "In light of the negotiations with Gehlen," says the book about Donovan, "the liquidation of the Höttl network would be disastrous. In addition, the chiefs of staff, concerned about the belligerence of the Red Army in Central Europe and not sure that the West would not eventually be forced to fight against the Red Army, should discuss whether to cooperate with German officials. Ceres - not Nazis - to collect intelligence information about Russian potentialities and intentions. Of course, they did everything possible to stop cooperation between Donovan and Fitin, for they cabled Eisenhower and Dean:

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"The move taken by the Office of Strategic Services, which led to the disclosure to the Russians of the existence of the Höttl intelligence network, was not coordinated with the military and naval departments and was not approved by the joint group of chiefs of staff." However, a few days later, the chiefs of staff approved the liquidation of the Hoettl spy network by the joint efforts of the OSS and the NKVD, and this happened, perhaps because the matter had gone too far to be stopped without arousing the suspicions of the Russians.

It was after these events that General Donovan sent his ultimatum letter dated August 31 to Fitin. The author of the book on Donovan writes that it remains unclear whether the joint liquidation of the Höttl network took place, but in October 1945 the Americans released him from the Nuremberg prison. "Yesterday's adversaries," he concludes, "became collaborators today, and yesterday's allies became today's adversaries,"

Correspondence in the case of Hoettl ends with the archival file on the cooperation of the First Directorate of the NKGB with the OSS. On September 1, 1945, all the circumstances of the Höttl case were reported in a note to the NKVD addressed to Beria, in which the leadership of Soviet intelligence spoke in favor of accepting General Donovan's proposal for a meeting of Soviet and American representatives to discuss the elimination of the Höttl agent network. The note proposed specific candidates for these negotiations. On the document is Fitin's resolution: "Prepare a message from comrade. Stalin."

The draft message was prepared by Colonel Graur. Two versions of the note to Stalin are attached to the archival file. Both are the first copies, without signatures, which means that the document was not sent to the addressee.

The archival file was closed with a brief note: "In connection with the termination of contact between representatives of the OSS and representatives of the First Directorate of the MTB of the USSR, as well as in connection with the subsequent liquidation of the OSS and the resignation of General Donovan, the case was terminated further... October 24, 1946 of the year".

The author of the book about Donovan A.K. Brown ends the chapter on OSS collaboration with Soviet intelligence by saying that General Donovan's last information to General Fitin was the transmission of a detailed description of Hitler's teeth. The description was obtained by the Americans from Hitler's personal dentist Professor Blaschke, who had fled from Berlin to Berchtesgaden together with Hitler's adjutant. However, this information turned out to be belated, X-rays of Hitler's teeth were found by Soviet Colonel Gorbushin and military translator Elena Rzhevskaya in the bomb shelter of the destroyed imperial office on Victory Day - May 9, 1945.

After the victory over Japan, the Office of Strategic Services did not last long, in October 1945 it was liquidated.

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vano by President Truman, and General Donovan returned to private practice in New York.

Cooperation between Soviet and American intelligence services lasted only a year and a half of the war. In the course of this cooperation, far from all the plans discussed at the first meeting between Fitin and Donovan on December 27, 1943 were realized. It is quite natural that each side was guided by its own political interests. "In mid-1944," writes Donovan's biographer, "relations between the OSS and the NKVD seemed to be developing satisfactorily. However, the underlying political relationship between Russia and America was not conducive to such cooperation. For grave and ominous events were brewing! The author apparently had in mind the post-war Cold War.

Nevertheless, in the course of cooperation, political and military information was obtained from American intelligence, which was of particular practical value during the war years. Expressing appreciation in one of Fitin's letters for the "atmosphere of friendly cooperation", the head of US intelligence wrote: "I am sure that our success, which we have so far had in our common cause, shows what the allies are capable of in joint actions, at least in the area of intelligence."

! Oeape].V. Te Sigapre AShapse. Tÿe Zogu oÿ Oig ÿÿÿÿÿÿ ÿÿ U/agate Sooregayop mÿÿ Kiÿÿÿÿ. - Gopdop, 1947. - R 55.

2 Ibid. - R. 57.

3 Ibid.

\* Oasha O.]. Oie Zoe r! Opare. - Ko], 1956. - 5. 498.

5 Vgomp A.S. Tÿe Gas Him. – Mami YorgK. - R. 674. Biography of Major General W.J. Donovan, based on his personal and secret documents and the diaries of his wife Ruth Donovan.

6 Ibid. - S. 752-753.

7 Ibid. - S. 753-754.

8 Ibid. - S. 754.

9 Ibid. - S. 755.

0 This is described in detail in the book by E. Rzhetskaya "Berlin, May 1945". and Vgoup A.S. - Or. c.i. - R 676.

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## Separate games

In a letter to I.V. Stalin F.D. Roosevelt dated April 7, 1945, contains the following passage: "We, Russians, think that in the current situation on the fronts, when the enemy is facing the inevitability of surrender, at any meeting with the Germans on the surrender of representatives of one of the allies, the participation of representatives of the other ally in this meeting should be ensured. In any case, it is absolutely necessary if that ally is to seek participation in such a meeting. The Americans and the British think differently, considering the Russian point of view to be wrong. Based on this, they denied the Russians the right to participate in a meeting with the Germans in Switzerland. I have already written to you and I think it is not superfluous to repeat that the Russians, in a similar situation, would by no means deny the Americans and the British the right to participate in such a meeting. I continue to regard the Russian point of view as the only correct one, since it excludes any possibility of mutual suspicions and does not give the enemy the opportunity to sow distrust among us.

April 1945. There was a month left before the capitulation of Nazi Germany. The question of whether it will be unconditional, as required by the inter-allied agreements, or whether it will be reduced to that

or some other form of collusion at the expense of the USSR, as Moscow feared, was of cardinal importance. The leaders of the Nazi regime, realizing the inevitable end of their power, went for broke, withdrawing divisions from the Western Front, opening the way for the USA and England to Germany from the West, while 147 divisions on the Eastern Front, as Stalin noted in the same letter, "...continue to fight with the Russians furiously..." and added: "Agree that such behavior of the Germans is more than strange and incomprehensible."

The fact that at the final stage of the war the issue of secret contacts between the British and Americans with the Germans was raised at the highest level needs to be explained. First of all, you should have

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in mind that these soundings took place behind the back of Hitler, who gave the strictest prohibition to establish any kind of contact with representatives of the Western powers.

As it is clear from this letter of I. Stalin, the very fact of such contacts did not raise any objections. In the course of any major conflict, the parties resort to this or that probing of the enemy's moods, unraveling maneuvers aimed at embroiling the allies in order to ensure their policy of the greatest success. And intelligence always plays a significant role here. It is she who gives the signal when it is necessary to take counter steps, to thwart a far-reaching conspiracy. And then the leadership takes a seemingly risky, but necessary step: the other side is revealed the secret of intelligence, let them know that it - the other side - has violated the permissible limits.

This was the situation at the very end of the war, when the tension of the military efforts of the Soviet Union came to a limit, and the Allies were too tempted to use the moment to their advantage. As for the Nazis, they had no choice but to play all-in, expose the Western Front, and send all the reserves against the Soviet troops. Part of the Nazi leadership believed that it would be better if the British and Americans came, occupied most of Germany, and took upon themselves the salvation of what was left of the Nazi Reich, its potential. Speaking of the "strange and incomprehensible behavior of the Germans," Stalin made it clear to the Russians that there was an attempt to divide the allies, to create unfavorable conditions for the USSR in the post-war order of Europe and the world.

Soviet foreign intelligence constantly had to monitor such maneuvers. The archives contain information about about a dozen approaches, first only from the German side, to our Western allies, and then a noticeable interest in this issue by the Allies themselves. Stalin was aware of the decisions of the Casablanca Conference of the heads of the United States and England (1941), when both sides decided not to deviate from the demand for unconditional surrender of Germany until the very end of the war. It was also known that German soundings, especially in the initial phases of the war, came from military, economic, religious and other circles, which were in opposition to Hitler on a number of issues. While the preponderance was on the side of Germany, they sought to offer England, and then the United States, a course of action that would allow them to get out of the war with the least losses and maximum damage to the USSR.

For England and the United States, these demarches were important in order to determine the degree of influence of various opposition groups in case the Soviet Union ran out of steam and a different kind of alternative became possible - a compromise with some relatively more moderate part of the German opposition, the overthrow of Hitler and the transition to a new phase of Germany's relations with Western countries.

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Actually, the first, and very unusual, attempt to keep England from active intervention was made even before the attack on the USSR. Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy for the party, shortly before the attack on the Soviet Union made a flight across the English Channel, hoping to convey through Lord Hamilton, who sympathized with Hitler, plans to neutralize or

bringing London to his side. Together with Hess, the scientists Karl and Albert Haushoffer, father and son, who assisted Hitler in the development of geopolitical doctrines, participated in the development of the initiative.

On the eve of the aggression, Moscow received information from the London residency about the essence of Hess's proposals of the following kind: "Germany is invincible, but we do not want the defeat of England ... Northern brothers in race should not continue the fratricidal war, from which only third countries will benefit. I thought there was a strong desire to make peace in London, and I am convinced that if I go back to Germany and tell the Führer that you are ready to get rid of Churchill, he will agree to make peace, provided that England adheres to "hands off Europe" policy.

Hess hoped that he would "find access to a strong party that wanted peace," which would help him return to Germany in two or three days. In Berlin and London, Hess was declared insane. He was interned and kept in England until the end of the war. However, the dossier of the negotiations that took place with him was classified until 2017. This makes it clear that it contained essential things that were not considered just conversations with a madman.

A difficult waiting period has begun. According to Soviet foreign intelligence, London was convinced that Hitler would succeed in his "blitzkrieg" and Moscow would fall after three to five weeks of fighting. The ambassador in Moscow was instructed to prepare for the opening of new consulates in the east and south of the USSR, and British intelligence to prepare for sabotage in the territories occupied by the Germans (in Ukraine, in the Crimea, in the Caucasus).

The failure of the attack on Leningrad and the defeat near Moscow, the entry of the United States into the war caused serious concern among a part of the military-diplomatic circles of Germany. Removed from command after the defeat near Moscow, Brauchitsch, one of the authors of the Barbarossa plan, a number of Wehrmacht authorities who warned against a war on two fronts, a prominent diplomat von Papen, who became the German ambassador to Turkey (1939-1944) and was hostile to Hitler because of the hostile position of the latter towards the Catholics - they all realized that Germany was plunged into an adventure, the outcome of which could be fatal.

It was Papen, who had access to the outside world, who became the coordinator of the first attempts to establish a dialogue with England. In May 1942

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Papen's men sent signals in three places at once - in Turkey, Sweden and the Vatican.

On May 12, 1942, a dispatch arrives from Stockholm stating that an employee of the German embassy in Sweden flew incognito on a Swedish civil plane to London. On behalf of the opposition group "Germany without Hitler, but with a military government" and referring to von Papen's instructions, he set out the following terms of peace:

— The British Empire remains intact;

- Germany withdraws troops from Czechoslovakia and Poland, leaving them in the area of the corridor connecting its territory with Danzig, and in the Katowice region;

— the states of Eastern Europe are restored within the pre-war borders;

- the Baltic states are declared independent;

- on these conditions, an agreement is reached with the Soviet Union.

This time the British government did not discuss the German proposals. The German diplomat was sent by the British authorities to an internment camp.

On May 13 of the same year, the residency from Ankara announced another initiative of von Papen. She was entrusted to the Turks. The General Secretary of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, in a conversation with the British ambassador, began to assure that the USSR was ready to make peace with Germany and leave England to its fate, and therefore it was necessary to get ahead of the Russians and inform on what conditions England was ready to negotiate with the Germans.

The disinformation, of course, was not worked out very gracefully, but it helped the British to understand that "the Germans are extremely alarmed about the prospects for this year's campaign." In response, the Turkish diplomat was informed that "the British government has no reason to believe that Russia is negotiating peace with Germany, and wants to receive evidence of this." The Turkish representative stated embarrassedly that "it will take a long time" but insisted that "Turkey knows more about Russia than England." This approach, however, had no continuation. Von Papen looked for more reliable channels, primarily through the Vatican.

On May 14, 1942, a signal was received from Switzerland. One of the leaders of the Swiss trade delegation, who had just been in Berlin, informed the British that the German industrialists were afraid of losing the war. They hope that "England and America will refrain from attacking Germany until the latter has defeated the USSR." For their part, they see the solution in replacing the Hitler regime with a "non-Nazi military dictatorship" to deal with. Otherwise, "socialism and communism will spread throughout Europe."

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As major defeats (Stalingrad, Kursk Bulge) grew, the desire of von Papen's people to convince the Western allies of the USSR of the need to start peace negotiations. Through the German commissioner for trade with Turkey, Baron Lersner, Papen first approached the papal nuncio in Ankara, Roncalli (the future Pope John XX). He suggested that he put pressure on Pope Pius XII to make an offer of peace to all the warring countries.

In the development of this idea, Lertzner visits Rome in 1942 and 1943. There he meets with Cardinals Maglione and Montini (the latter - the future Pope Paul VI) and together with his friend Baron Weizsäcker, the German ambassador to the Vatican, they diligently convince the entourage of the pope. Pius XII, a sophisticated politician, hesitates. He knows Germany well, where he once was nuncio, but Hitler is also clear to him. And although the Italian Queen Maria Jose joins the troubles, the pope does not dare to take such a delicate step for him. According to our intelligence reports, he sees no grounds either for an open offer of peace or for other options (message from Istanbul dated July 19, 1943).

In August 1943, Moscow received reports about the initiative of the head of the war economy [Germany, Hjalmar Schacht. His nephew Hans Rueser, a British intelligence agent named Junior, traveled to France. There he portrayed himself as an intermediary of some Swiss friend who wants to help the Germans get out of the war with dignity. Higher German officers met with him and put forward very tough conditions - the Sudetenland, Danzig and the "corridor", Eupen and Malmedy in Belgium, Alsace should remain German.

In December 1943, Moscow received information about similar soundings through intermediaries from Madrid and Lisbon. Finally, the Americans step in.

In February 1943, a certain Mr. Ball arrives in Switzerland. He settles in Bern, and more and more prominent figures begin to appear in his waiting room. Mr. Ball, aka Allen Dulles, was in charge of US political intelligence in Europe from 1942 to 1945. One of the first to come to him in February 1943 was Prince Hohenlohe, a prominent representative of the aristocratic circles of Germany. They discuss in detail plans to create a "cordon against Bolshevism and Pan-Slavism" by "expanding Poland to the east, maintaining the Romanian regime and a strong Hungary."

Dulles then discussed with General von Brauchitsch, who had come to see him, the problems of establishing a military government in Germany after the overthrow of Hitler (report from Washington on 14

June 1944). Peace condition: The United States and Britain must not allow any part of Germany to be occupied by the Soviet Union. Before this, in the last days of May 1944, Allen Dulles reports to Washington

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tone that another group of prominent German military men, headed by Colonel-General Zeitzler, chief of the general staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces on the Eastern Front, approached him with a peace proposal. She also represented the interests of industrialists and certain right-wing Social Democrats. The conditions are similar to those set by Brauchitsch - concessions in the West while maintaining freedom of action against the USSR

In July 1944, Dulles clarified that if Hitler could be destroyed, the German troops would begin a systematic retreat in the west, while concentrating their best units in the east. As you know, the attempt on the Fuhrer's life took place on July 20, 1944, but Stauffenberg and his friends failed, and the plot was brutally suppressed. The position of Germany is rapidly becoming catastrophic, and attempts to establish contact with the United States and Britain come more and more often from very high strata of the Hitler regime, but not connected in this with Hitler, much less on his behalf.

It was not possible to find out all the circumstances of the situation then, but, as Walter Schellenberg, the former head of the MI (intelligence) department of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security, confirms in his memoirs, back in August 1942, visiting Himmler's residence in Zhitomir (it was located nearby from Hitler's headquarters in Vinnitsa), he asked Himmler about the need to have a "backup solution" regarding the end of the war and allegedly secured the Reichsfuehrer's cautious consent to delicate negotiations with the Western allies of the USSR "through some neutral country" ?. Schellenberg lists those with whom he had occasion to establish covert contacts. In 1944, it was the American diplomat Hewitt, Roosevelt's personal representative for European affairs, who, in his words, "was ready to discuss the possibility of opening peace negotiations."

Then, in February 1945, the Swedish ambassador to Germany, Thomsen, informed Schellenberg that the chairman of the Swedish Red Cross Society, Count Bernadotte, had arrived in Berlin to negotiate with Himmler, who was asked to contact Roosevelt "to bring the destroyed German ship into the harbor of peace." ". It was even planned to fly to southern Germany if Berlin was occupied by Soviet troops. On April 20, Bernadotte's last meeting with Himmler took place, but these attempts to save the sinking Nazi ship (they were also signaled by Soviet foreign intelligence, for example, a message from London on April 28, 1945) were too late. Soviet troops were already on the nearest approaches to Berlin.

Nevertheless, since March 1945, a communication channel with the Americans was operating in Zurich, where on March 6, Dulles met with the SS authorized at Army Group C in Italy, K. Wolf. Kasa talks

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capitulation of German troops in northern Italy. The commander of the allied forces in Italy, Field Marshal G. Alexander, through the British ambassador in Moscow on March 12, informed the Soviet leadership about the arrival of representatives of the German commander A. Kesselring to discuss the terms of surrender. On the same day, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR spoke in favor of participating in these negotiations. However, the British Foreign Office and the US State Department rejected this proposal.

Then the Soviet Union demanded the termination of these negotiations, and the Allies began to deny the existence of further contacts with the Germans (on March 25, the President of the United States announced this, and on April 5, the Prime Minister of England). To the assertion that contacts were continuing, the Allies countered that the "Soviet informants" were misleading their government.



In fact, they tried to mislead from the other side. And contacts, according to the same Schellenberg, continued until the end of April 1945, that is, almost until the very end of the war.

Of course, the awareness of the USSR government prompted the allies to curtail negotiations with the Nazis, who at the last moment, mindful of the demand for "unconditional surrender", made a verbal trick and proposed that this most unconditional surrender be carried out in the West, freely letting the Allied troops through, but continuing to fight with the Soviet Army.

Complete surrender, however, could not be avoided. The might of the Soviet troops, the will of the leadership, and the skillful work of the intelligence officers, who constantly kept the government informed of all sorts of soundings and negotiations that the United States and Britain were secretly conducting, had their say.

Recognition of the value of foreign intelligence work is contained in the same document that was mentioned at the beginning. I. Stalin, continuing his letter to F. Roosevelt, noted: "As for my informants, I assure you, they are very honest, modest people who perform their duties carefully and have no intention of offending anyone." Further, in confirmation, Stalin cites an episode when in February the Americans gave the General Staff of the Soviet troops inaccurate information about the direction of the strike that the Germans were preparing, and Soviet intelligence officers managed to inform Marshal Tolbukhin, who "... managed to avoid a catastrophe and then utterly defeat the Germans .. Thus, I had the opportunity to once again be convinced of the accuracy and awareness of Soviet informants.

This is, perhaps, a rare example of a very warm and appreciative assessment of the activities of Soviet intelligence officers from the top leadership of the country.

The work of the foreign intelligence of the USSR to track the nature of the contacts of the allies with the German side was of current importance.

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not only to prevent the undesirable sides of separate games between the USA and Britain during the war. It helped to reveal the long-term motives for the policy of these powers at the subsequent post-war stage, which later manifested itself in a very sharp form and affected the line for the division of Germany, in the Berlin crisis, in a word, in what is usually called the Cold War phase. between former allies.

Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. T. 2. - M.: Publishing house of political literature, 1986. - P. 222.

2 Realizing that in order to develop separate initiatives, one would eventually have to resort to diplomatic channels, Himmler, according to Schellenberg, feared that the position of the Reich Foreign Minister I.F. Ribbentrop. "As long as that idiot Ribbentrop has Hitler's confidence, we can't do anything."

Undoubtedly, Schellenberg's memoirs have to be treated critically. They show a desire to whitewash and embellish oneself, to depict oneself as a champion of peace, for which the author could resort to exaggerations, exaggerations and falsifications. The text has to be checked against authentic documents and credible testimonies.

In particular, it is clear from them that Ribbentrop also did not oppose contacts with the allies, hoping to use them against the Soviet Union. In this spirit, on February 16, 1945, he sent a telegram to the German envoy in Ireland with a directive on the question of concluding a separate peace between Germany and the Western countries. It was also sent to the heads of German diplomatic missions in Portugal, Spain and the Vatican. It was proposed to convey the theses of this document to "high-ranking and influential British and Americans", including through a representative of "the most important British or

American service", that is, through intelligence. The text of the telegram was reported to Moscow by the London residency.

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#### Scientific and technical intelligence during the war years

Throughout the years of the Great Patriotic War, from the "legal" foreign intelligence residencies in the United States and Great Britain, there was a full flow of documentary secret information, a significant part of which was information of a military-technical nature, since these countries used their extensive scientific, technical and industrial the potential for the production of a wide range of advanced military equipment that had high combat qualities.

Scientific and technical intelligence (NTR) entered the Great Patriotic War, relying on its extensive experience by that time and the impressive results of operational and information activities achieved before the start of the persecution that fell upon it in 1937-1938 years.

By 1937, scientific and technical intelligence had an intelligence apparatus capable of extracting information that was sometimes extremely important for the economic development of the country and for strengthening its military power, was able to objectively assess the operational situation, knew its long-term tasks, applied methods of working with "legal" and illegal positions. Information was received from the residencies on a wide range of problems of national economic and defense importance: on oil refining technologies, in particular, for the production of aviation gasoline, synthetic rubber, lubricating oils, dyes, on poisonous substances and means of bacteriological warfare, on various types of modern small arms and means of communication.

The decision-making bodies of the state knew about the possibilities of scientific and technical intelligence. This is evidenced, in particular, by special messages sent to I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov, about fulfilling the tasks of the country's leadership or about acquiring important information. Inform obtained by scientific and technical intelligence

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On the whole, this information met the requirements of domestic science and technology and coincided with the main directions of scientific and technological progress in the defense and national economic industries.

As a result of the repressions, a tangible part of the staff of the scientific and technological revolution was dispersed or destroyed, and only in 1940 it was replenished with young intelligence officers who had just graduated from the School for Special Purposes. They had to assume a significant part of the burden of responsibility for the revival of scientific and technical intelligence and for the solution of the tasks assigned to it by the war. A. Feklisov and A. Yatskov were sent to the USA, in 1943 they were joined by L. Kvasnikov, who headed an independent station of scientific and technical intelligence in New York. V. Barkovsky left for London.

At the beginning of 1941, the proximity of the war with fascist Germany was clearly felt by the NTR intelligence officers in New York and especially in London residencies. In London, the work of the residency resumed in the autumn of 1940, when England had already entered the war with Germany and experienced devastating German air raids. However, this Anglo-German war was perceived by intelligence officers as something that did not affect them personally, although it caused

work inconvenience due to complete blackout in the evening hours. But over time, the blackout began to be perceived as an additional opportunity to disguise intelligence activities. The beginning of the war was met by scouts of the scientific and technological revolution in the USA and Great Britain with the consciousness of their personal responsibility for the fate of the motherland. Residents decided to consider themselves under martial law. They began to deduct part of the salary to the Defense Fund.

For intelligence officers, the illustrations of the successes of the Wehrmacht on Soviet territory were a source of considerable anxiety for the fate of the Motherland. The sight of burned villages, destroyed cities, killed civilians, broken Soviet military equipment, lines of prisoners caused painful experiences. When Germany was defeated near Moscow in the winter of 1941, this gave certain strength and confidence to the scouts. And the situation on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War began to be covered in the foreign press more truthfully and reliably.

As for the work itself, the prospect of using economic ties with the USA, Great Britain and Canada under the lend-lease agreement to obtain scientific and technical information useful for science and industry through Soviet specialists who participated in placing orders, accepting finished products, to establish business and personal relationships with employees of government agencies, defense industry enterprises. Access to such objects was necessary for the performance of scientific and technical intelligence tasks in wartime.

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The order of the State Defense Committee of July 1941 determined the subject of obtaining technical information of a predominantly military nature. The New York and London residencies were asked to focus on obtaining classified information about:

- ongoing research on the use of uranium as a new source of energy, design and operation of uranium reactors;
- radars for the army and navy, the use of the millimeter range, portable radio equipment;
- high-altitude and special aircraft, units and devices for them, aircraft engines with a power of over 2000 hp;
- hydroacoustic means of detecting ships at sea;
- means of conducting bacteriological warfare, poisonous substances and means of protection against them;
- synthetic rubbers and products of basic chemistry;
- oil refining, production of high-octane fuel and high-grade lubricants.

It was also recommended to receive information about theoretical and experimental research in the most important areas of science and technology, especially those that could lead to the emergence of fundamentally new types of military equipment and industrial technologies.

The development of atomic weapons in the USSR was based on a solid theoretical foundation and a high level of research. The Soviet scientist N. Semenov theoretically substantiated branched chemical chain reactions, for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize. Information about N. Semenov's discovery became available to the scientific community after he published his monograph "Branched Chain Reactions" in 1934. His ideas as applied to the fission of uranium-235 atoms were applied in 1940 by the Leningrad physicists Yu. Khariton and Ya. Zel'dovich.

However, few believed in the possibility of creating their own atomic bomb in the foreseeable future. On the eve of the war, the country's best scientific forces were refocused on solving more pressing tasks, as it seemed to the leadership. A. Alexandrov in 1941 was instructed to solve the problem of protecting ships against magnetic mines by demagnetizing ship hulls. Other physicists received their assignments. The work of the Uranium Committee, a body that was created

as an advisory committee at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR froze on its own. There was no unity among our physicists on the question of the immediate creation of such a weapon.

Meanwhile, the development of research in the West in the field of the atom proceeded at a rapid pace. The attention of the scientific and technological revolution was attracted by the discovery by European scientists in 1939 of the fission of uranium-235 atoms, irradiated

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many neutrons, accompanied by the occurrence of a chain reaction and the release of colossal energy. The disappearance of the names and articles of nuclear physicists from the pages of foreign journals made me think. Both pointed to the real prospect of creating an atomic explosive. The threat of a close attack by Germany on the USSR, the fact that the Germans had a strong school of physics increased the danger of a new weapon appearing in the hands of a potential enemy. At the same time, the discovery by Soviet physicists Flerov and Petrzhak of spontaneous fission of uranium atoms and the determination by Khariton and Zel'dovich of the critical mass of uranium necessary for an explosion, and the calculation of the amount of energy released in this case, confirmed intelligence in the opinion of the need to obtain information on these issues.

The situation for intelligence work in the countries of Europe occupied by Germany became extremely complicated and it was not possible to develop work on nuclear topics there. Therefore, Great Britain and the USA became the main centers of application of intelligence efforts, in which, most likely, one should expect significant progress in the creation of atomic weapons.

In the fall of 1940, a directive was sent to these residencies - to identify centers for searching for ways to use atomic energy for military purposes and to provide reliable information about the creation of atomic weapons. The initiator of this directive was the head of the scientific and technological revolution, chemical engineer Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov, at that time the only person in the entire intelligence community who was familiar with the basics of nuclear physics.

As early as September 1941, the London resident A. Gorsky received the first reliable information in the history of intelligence that the idea of creating atomic weapons had taken practical shape in England. The Joint Chiefs of Staff demanded an atomic bomb within two years. Information was obtained about the activities of the special Uranium Committee, about the value of the critical mass of uranium-235, divided into two hemispheres to prevent a premature explosion, about the speed of their collision at least 2-2.5 thousand meters per second in a cannon -th type, about a special initiator for initiating a chain reaction in a bomb charge, about the technology of extracting this isotope from natural uranium by gaseous diffusion, about the leading universities and influential monopolies "Imperial Chemical Industries" scheduled to participate in related work, " Metropolitan Vickers, as well as the Woolwich Arsenal.

The data were reported to L. Beria, who rejected them as misinformation aimed at diverting the human and material resources of the Soviet Union from military efforts. Nevertheless, he agreed to send information to the London residency about the atomic

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weapons for examination to the 4th Special Department of the NKVD, which was a large scientific research center with its own laboratories and production facilities. The author of the response to the London information signed on October 10, 1941, was undoubtedly a physicist, judging by his considerations and terminology. The content of the recall was evasive - the creation of an atomic bomb is not excluded, but it will take a long time, not is still clear.

In December 1941, Georgy Flerov appealed to the State Defense Committee (GKO) with a call to start developing their own atomic weapons, but received no answer. In the same December, one of the well-informed participants in the secret British work to create

of the nuclear bomb prepared, on the basis of ideological motives, a detailed report on the status and results of work on this problem in England and the USA, wishing to pass it on to the Soviet Union through a person close to him. The latter, having contact with the NKGB resident in London, Gorsky, gave him a message and offered to involve the scientist in cooperation. This was done and made it possible to obtain the source of the most important information. More than 2,000 sheets of classified documentary information were received from him alone in 1943-1946. His first message contained information that, together with those previously available, served as the basis for the Scientific and Technical Revolution to prepare in March 1942, signed by L. Beria, a memorandum to Stalin on the development of atomic weapons by our allies in secret from us. The note contained a proposal to form a scientific advisory body under the State Defense Committee to coordinate research and practical steps to create domestic nuclear weapons. However, L.P. Beria, for the above reasons, sent him to Stalin only on October 6, 1942, after the issue of creating a domestic center for creating an atomic bomb was resolved without an intelligence proposal.

In February 1942, front-line scouts found a notebook with incomprehensible calculations in the briefcase of a murdered German officer, which was sent to S.V. Kaftanov. It was found that the Germans were looking for ways to use atomic energy for military purposes. In May 1942, in the name of Stalin, the State Defense Committee received a second letter from Flerov with an urgent appeal to immediately begin work on the creation of domestic atomic weapons, otherwise "the West may get ahead of us," which also goes to S.V. Kaftanov. Kaftanov decided that the time had come to report this problem to Stalin and, together with Academician A.F. Ioffe sent him a memorandum with a proposal to establish a scientific center to solve the problems of atomic weapons in our country.

A meeting with Stalin on this issue was held in September 1942. According to some information, they were summoned from Kazan

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Academicians Ioffe, Semenov, Khlopin and Kapitsa. They were informed that measures were being taken in Germany, Britain and the United States to create atomic weapons. Kaftanov's memoirs about this meeting said: "Reporting the issue to the State Defense Committee, I defended our proposal ... After some thought, Stalin said: "We must do it."

The GKO resolution No. 2352 of September 28, 1942 "On the organization of work on uranium", signed by Stalin, stated: "To oblige the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (Academician Ioffe) to resume work on the study of the feasibility of using atomic energy by splitting the nucleus of the uranium atom and submit to the State Defense Committee by April 1, 1943, a report on the possibility of creating a uranium bomb or uranium fuel." The Presidium of the Academy of Sciences was obliged to organize a special laboratory of the atomic nucleus, which was created under the leadership of I.V. Kurchatov on the basis of the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology evacuated to Kazan. It included such well-known physicists as Flerov, Dzhelepov and others. Among the studies begun were the problems of separating uranium isotopes and, in particular, the development of the gaseous diffusion method.

By February 1943, there were signs that "GKO decisions on uranium were being implemented poorly." Therefore, GKO Resolution No. 2872 of February 11, 1943, signed by V.M. Molotov, which read: "In order to more successfully develop work on uranium: 1. Assign to T.T. Pervukhina M.G. and Kaftanova S.V. the duty to daily supervise work on uranium and provide systematic assistance to the special laboratory of the atomic nucleus of the USSR Academy of Sciences. 2. Permit the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR to transfer a group of workers from the special laboratory of the atomic nucleus from Kazan to Moscow to carry out the most important part of the work on uranium ... ". By order of the Academy of Sciences of April 12, 1943, the special laboratory for the atomic nucleus transferred from Kazan received the code name Laboratory No. 2 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, under which it functioned for many subsequent years. Work in it began essentially from scratch.

In the American nuclear center - Los Alamos - in the meantime, the installation of equipment began and personnel began to arrive. In England, research and production centers were identified, and a working concept for the construction of an atomic bomb was developed. The most important task of the scientific and technological revolution was to assist our scientists and specialists in overcoming the backlog and bringing our work to at least the Anglo-American level.

The secret services of the intelligence countries for a long time remained in the dark about the activities of Soviet intelligence, about its sources of information. All these sources were highly qualified specialists, people devoted to the idea of cooperation with Soviet intelligence.

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for the sake of achieving victory over fascist Germany, and opponents of their governments concealing from their ally the work to create atomic weapons.

It is impossible not to say about the courage of agents. The scout is obliged to go to a meeting even in the midst of a raid on London by German bombers - this is his duty. And what prompted the agents under these conditions to arrive on time at the place of their appointment, when everyone who was caught by the raid tends to hide in some kind of shelter? The material factor did not play any role in the relationship of sources of information with our intelligence. They considered this cooperation as a moral and political duty in the conditions of the war against fascism.

The success of the scientific and technological revolution in the field of disclosing the secrets of nuclear weapons was explained by the fact that it relied on a network of agents, which consisted of about a dozen agents. All information received from the residencies was transmitted personally to I.V. Kurchatov and brought them to his associates in his own interpretation. As a result, according to Igor Vasil'evich, the scientists perceived new points in the research as information coming, probably, from other domestic secret centers. Such disguise corresponded to the interests of intelligence, for it met the requirements of secrecy. This provision existed until the creation in 1945 of the Special Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on Problem No. 1, after which the circle of addressees expanded.

On August 9, 1949, the test of the first sample of the domestic atomic bomb was successfully completed. The whole country hailed this outstanding achievement of its scientists, designers, engineers and workers. The appearance of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union strengthened the defensive potential of the country and led to the formation of parity of atomic weapons. It was also of great scientific and technical importance from the point of view of the development of nuclear physics and the atomic industry.

Realistically assessing its contribution to the creation of domestic nuclear weapons, scientific and technical intelligence never opposed itself to Soviet physicists, designers and production workers, because it did not deal with calculations, experiments, designing its samples, but only brought useful and important information obtained to their scientific colleagues. Its merit has always been the timely reflection of the level of theoretical and applied research achieved in the USA and England and the absence of purposeful disinformation in the information.

Intelligence information began to play its role almost from the beginning of the work of laboratory No. 2. The significance of the very first information that I. Kurchatov got acquainted with was, in his opinion, that they "force us to reconsider our views on many issues."

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dy" and indicate "the technical feasibility of solving the entire problem in a much shorter time than expected. This information was of great importance, because it contributed to the optimization of the program for creating our own atomic weapons and the necessary theoretical research, experiments, design developments, etc."

Intelligence information about plutonium can also be considered a milestone. On March 22, 1943, I. Kurchatov wrote that "in our country, our own work on the study of plutonium has not been carried out... Therefore, information about work with this element is of great importance." In June of the same year, he pointed to the receipt from intelligence of detailed information about the physical properties of plutonium, the nature of fission of atomic nuclei, the half-life, the energy of secondary neutrons, the cross section for fission by slow neutrons, etc.

Academician A. Ioffe believed that the data obtained "reduced the amount of work for many months and facilitated the choice of directions, freed from lengthy searches. I have not come across a single false indication." Needless to say, the intelligence officers were inspired by such reviews.

The main purpose of the scientific and technical revolution was to inform our scientists as quickly as possible and in more detail about the Anglo-American plans for atomic weapons. Among the information obtained are methods for determining the critical mass of a nuclear charge, data on the initiator of a chain reaction in a plutonium charge of an atomic bomb, calculations, a diagram, and a description of the American atomic bomb tested in 1945. Next, one can name detailed data on the design features of the gas diffusion cascade for the production of uranium-235, including drawings of sections of this industrial plant, samples and technology for the manufacture of membranes, and information on a nuclear reactor with a thermal power of 100,000 kW. for the production of 100 grams of plutonium per day, a report on the study of the spectrum of secondary neutrons and the determination of their multiplication factor in the mass of pure metallic uranium, refined nuclear reaction constants, norms for permissible radioactive exposure, behavior of masses less than critical, production of uranium rods in protective shells, a technology for extracting uranium from ore, which was considered so unique that a special plant was built for its application within a year. In April 1945, detailed information was received on the design of the American experimental Fermi reactor, which, it is believed, could serve as a prototype reactor that started operating in Laboratory No. 2 in August 1946.

In the end, it remains to say that the development of the atomic bomb in the USSR became a reality thanks to the joint efforts of scientists, manufacturers and intelligence officers. As for the latter, the consciousness of honestly and unselfishly performed duty is dear to them.

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The successful creation of domestic nuclear weapons in a short historical period was of great military and political significance. First, the country's armed forces received a fundamentally new powerful instrument of deterrence; secondly, the former allies of the USSR, who secretly created their own atomic weapons, lost their monopoly.

Another outstanding achievement of scientific and technical intelligence during the Second World War was the coverage of the problems of radar, which expanded the combat capabilities of all branches of the armed forces. The creation of more advanced radar systems required new technologies. During the war years, our country did not have such opportunities to the proper extent. Therefore, the scientific and technical revolution obtained a lot of useful information on the theory of radar devices, on circuit solutions and element base, instructions on the use and adjustment of radars for aviation, air defense and the navy.

The importance of the extracted materials is evidenced by the response of the Chairman of the Council for Radar, Academician A. Berg, to the information received in 1944 and consisting of 1236 sheets of text, 5383 photographs, 165 drawings, 78 samples of details. The recall stated that, given the urgent need to develop this equipment in our country as soon as possible for the timely equipping of our army and navy with radar weapons and weapons, and protection from enemy radar, the technical information received from intelligence was of great national importance. The work of the First Directorate of the NKGB in this area over the past year was recognized as brilliantly accomplished.

The Second World War was the time of the birth of jet aviation. The problem of overcoming the speed of sound was on the agenda. It required the creation of thin aerodynamic profiles, other methods for calculating the strength of aircraft body parts, and structural materials capable of withstanding large dynamic and thermal loads. The problem arose of creating fundamentally new and efficient jet engines.

The information obtained by the scientific and technological revolution became the property of the domestic aviation industry and helped the transition to the production of advanced aviation technology. For example, in 1945, the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry spoke flatteringly about 68 information transmitted by intelligence on aircraft construction, 43 on jet technology and 14 on engine building; Most of these materials are valuable, and information about jet technology (jet engines, projectiles, etc.) and the aerodynamics of high-speed flights was especially relevant.

Scientific and technical data on the technological subtleties of production processes in such important fields of science and technology for the USSR as atomic energy, aviation, jet technology, radar, chemical

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The use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, oil refining, and the production of high-quality fuels and lubricants, synthetic rubbers, and other materials have greatly helped domestic science and technology save time and money in eliminating the backlog from the capitalist countries and entering the forefront.

The basis of the success of the scientific and technological revolution was that the scouts, with a full understanding of their responsibility for the fate of the Motherland, participated in a just war against the fascist invaders and subordinated their activities to the slogan of the Great Patriotic War: "Everything for the front, everything for Victory!".

The experience that the NTR has accumulated over the years of its activity in military conditions has shown that the success of its work largely depended on the education of intelligence officers in the spirit of high demands on their political, moral, ethical and professional training, on activities in a complex situation in the face of a strong and treacherous enemy.

On the whole, the scientific and technological revolution achieved results that allowed it to operate successfully during the Cold War period, to train experienced intelligence officers capable of solving complex operational and information tasks.

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"Monk" warns Stalin

The day of June 11, 1941 in Helsinki turned out to be extremely fine. After a long winter and cool spring weeks, the inhabitants of the capital Suomi finally poured out together on the sun-drenched streets, experiencing some special feeling of bliss and peace of mind. The resident of the Soviet foreign intelligence in Finland, Elisey Sinitsyn, involuntarily succumbing to the general mood, after dinner also decided to take a walk for a few minutes in the fresh air. He locked the doors of his office at the embassy, but suddenly heard a sharp phone call.

"Return or not? thought Sinitsyn. "If you really need it, they will definitely call back," he decided. The phone call was persistently repeated, and then again, until Sinitsyn finally picked up the receiver. An excited voice with a noticeable Finnish accent said a few phrases from the stipulated password. One of the most valuable sources of the residency called, "Monk", whose information almost always lay down on the form of an encrypted telegram to Moscow.

- I urgently want to see you, Yelisey Tikhonovich! Let's meet "in the same place", at 19.00, - said the "Monk", and the all-clear signal was heard in the tube of the city machine. Sinitsyn understood what was needed



drop everything and immediately go to a quiet, inconspicuous cafe on the shore of the bay. The number 19 meant that it had to be done right now, putting aside everything, even the most urgent.

"Monk", an inconspicuous, scrawny old man in a worn tweed jacket, literally ran out to meet Sinitsyn.

— Trouble! Elisey Tikhonovich, trouble! the old man croaked out in a broken voice. And without taking a breath, he said the following: "This morning in Helsinki, a secret agreement was signed between Germany and Finland on the participation of

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military forces in the upcoming war of Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union, which will begin on June 22, that is, in just twelve days.

"The information is completely reliable and accurate," Monk hurried. It was told to me by my good friend ("Monk" called him), who was personally present at the signing of the document. He has never let me down yet, and I trust him like myself. Please forgive me for violating the secrecy with a direct telephone call to the embassy. But there was no other way out. Every minute counts in this business," the old man muttered in embarrassment, wiping away the large drops of sweat that had formed on his bald head. "And now, my dear Yelisey Tikhonovich, please hasten to convey this information to the Kremlin, to Stalin. Is there anything else you can do..."

An hour later, a telegram marked "out of turn" went to Moscow addressed to Beria. Sinitsyn knew that this was the shortest way to deliver information of such a degree of importance to the main addressee. On the morning of the next day, confirmation came from Moscow that I.V. Telegram sent by Sinitsyn to Stalin. However, in the text of the confirmation, alas, not a word was said about the reaction, no instructions were given.

At his own peril and risk, the resident notified the staff of the residency, and then the command of the Soviet naval base on the Khanko Peninsula, about the Monk's information. Everyone was advised to collect specific information about the preparation of the armed forces of Finland for the upcoming war with the USSR and immediately report intelligence data to the residency.

Moscow was silent, as if it had taken water in its mouth - no answer, no hello. And the days of anxiety and doubt, remaining until June 22, flashed by rapidly. Dozens of questions arose from everyone. What to do with families? Evacuate or not? Should we return children from summer camps, should we start destroying secret documents and encrypted correspondence? ..

These days, in the offices and living quarters of the embassy staff, no one turned off the radios: they listened to Moscow. And she delighted the ear with pleasant music and news about the abundant harvest of the Soviet collective farm field that year. Sometimes the melody of a popular song was heard on the air: "We don't want an inch of foreign land, but we won't give up our own inch ..."

On the morning of June 22, an operational duty officer ran to Sinitsyn's apartment. In his hands was a piece of "Breaking News" news agencies. The bold headline read: "Today at dawn, Germany, together with Finland and Romania along the front from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, attacked the USSR. Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov is expected to speak on the radio at noon.

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The resident gathered the operational staff and announced the incident. "In the next few days," he said, "all Soviet citizens will leave this country. We need to get ready to leave. In order not to get a single document, not a single telegram to the enemy, everything must be destroyed. Don't hesitate a minute and get down to business."

A representative of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who arrived some time later, confirmed his government's decision to expel "in three days" all employees of the Soviet missions in Finland from Helsinki to the Turkish-Bulgarian border. There was to be an exchange for diplomats of the German embassy accredited in Moscow.

A hard and exhausting road to the south began with endless stops and transfers. In the stuffy train car, Sinitsyn had time to collect his thoughts and recall the many intelligence reports that warned the Kremlin about the danger threatening the country. He could only understand one thing: why Moscow, for example, did not react in any way to urgent messages from the residency about the rapprochement between Germany and Finland and about an agreement on the unhindered transfer of German troops through the territory of Finland "in the event of a military conflict" of these countries with Soviet Russia, why she disregarded the information of a reliable and trusted source in the special services of Finland about the activation of German agents in the areas bordering the USSR and, finally, for what reason the report of the "Monk" about the attack on the USSR by Nazi aggressors was shelved and their satellites on June 22, 1941.

Upon arrival in Moscow, Sinitsyn literally rushed to work from the station and was immediately received by his old acquaintance and classmate, the head of foreign intelligence, Pavel Fitin. Here is how Sinitsyn describes this meeting and the issues that were discussed at it in his fascinating book of memoirs "Resident testifies": "He received me cordially, we embraced in a friendly way. I asked him to acquaint me with all the notes sent to the Politburo, drawn up on the basis of materials received by the Center from us over the past four months. I stressed to Fitin that the information of "Monakh" about the attack on the USSR on June 22 and about Finland's entry into the war was fully confirmed. So what's the deal?"

"Your bewilderment," Fitin answered, "I understand, but I can't explain. For some reason, Stalin, to whom in the last month I almost daily compiled and sent information about the impending aggression of Germany against the Soviet Union, did not trust our sources. Your information dated June 11 on the same day, signed by the people's commissar, was sent to Stalin, but there was no reaction. On June 17, the People's Commissar called me early in the morning and offered to urgently prepare all the materials received from the residencies on the preparation of the Germans for a war against us,

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for a personal report to Stalin on the same day. "Taking advantage of the upcoming meeting," Fitin continued, "I collected all the ciphers of the last days, including the message of the "Monk" dated June 11, in order to personally report to Stalin and tell about the sources, if necessary."

"Exactly at 12, the people's commissar and I entered Stalin's office," Fitin recalled. "Stalin, smoking his pipe, walked slowly around the office." Seeing those who entered, Stalin turned directly to Fitin and offered to report only the essence of the information - who are the sources and their reliability in terms of loyalty to the Soviet Union. First, Fitin briefly recounted the content of the materials received the day before from Berlin, then almost textually reported the telegram from Helsinki dated June 11, adding that Finnish troops were already concentrating in a semicircle near our naval base on the southwestern coast of the Gulf of Finland. When reporting information from Helsinki, Fitin told Stalin that Monk was a trusted and reliable source. Stalin did not ask questions. There was silence. Stalin thought. Then, turning to face the people's commissar, he said sternly:

- Check all the information and report back.

The Commissar replied:

- Will be done!

"I asked Fitin a question," continued Sinitsyn, "why the people's commissar did not confirm to Stalin during the course of the message that the devotion of the Berlin sources and the Monk had been repeatedly tested by deeds and

an additional check will not give anything new, except for the loss of time. Fitin replied that the people's commissar stood at attention and was stubbornly silent. To this the intelligence chief added that he was surprised by Stalin's attitude to the report. According to him, Stalin showed some kind of haste, sluggish interest and distrust of the agents and their reports. It seemed that he was thinking about something else, and listened to the report as an unfortunate necessity.

"Who knows, maybe, during the report, Stalin was thinking about his "Pyrrhic victory" over the Finns in the infamous campaign against Finland in 1939-1940, which went down in the history of Soviet-Finnish relations as the "winter war," the head suggested. intelligence.

Relations between the two neighbors have always been difficult. Especially during the 40s, immediately after the peace treaty between the USSR and Finland in March 1940. The enemies of the Soviet Union in Finland cleverly exploited the resentment and anger of the population caused by human casualties, especially among those fathers and mothers in Finland whose sons died on the Soviet-Finnish front. Anti-Soviet sentiments were also strong among the Finnish settlers who left their homes and property in the territories

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marching to the USSR at the end of the "winter war". This allowed such pro-German politicians of the time as Finnish Foreign Minister Witting and Prime Minister Rangel to speak openly at that time about the need for rapprochement with Germany in order to jointly fight against the Soviet Union. And the leadership of the USSR itself then showed obvious political short-sightedness and made a big mistake. It prevented Finland from joining the defensive alliance of Sweden and Norway to jointly protect the Scandinavian countries from possible aggression and to a certain extent prompted many politicians in Finland to seek strong patronage from Nazi Germany. The residency of the Soviet foreign intelligence reported to the Center more than once about all this, emphasizing that before the war the opponents of the USSR managed to arouse in the Finns a clear dislike for their eastern neighbor, and the successes of the Germans on the fronts of Europe created a favorable climate for this. It was concluded that in the event of a German attack on the Soviet Union, Finland would certainly join the aggressor in order to recapture the territories lost during the "winter war". And so it happened.

The absence of business ties and contacts between the USSR and Finland during the war years did not at all mean the cessation of intelligence operations of the Soviet foreign intelligence in Suomi. The theater of such operations against Finland, which was fighting on the side of Germany, was its northwestern neighbor, Sweden. The task that the Soviet leadership set for foreign intelligence officers who worked in Sweden on the problems of Finland also changed. When Yelisei Sinitsyn arrived in Stockholm during the war, the then Soviet Ambassador to Sweden Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontai asked him bluntly: "How long are you going to work here?"

"The time of my stay in Stockholm will depend on how soon the armistice agreement with Finland is signed, after which I will leave for Helsinki to my place of work," the first secretary of the embassy replied. "And now a small team of our employees will make every effort to get FINLAND out of the WAR as soon as possible."

However, no matter how great the desire of diplomats and intelligence officers to achieve their cherished desire and snatch Finland from the German war chariot team, this was done thanks to the successes of the Soviet Army. In June 1944, the Soviet command launched a major military operation in the Karelia region. The troops of the Leningrad Front broke through the long-term defense of the Finns on the Karelian Isthmus and pushed the Finnish units deep into Finland. The military-political situation of the country became critical. Even the most devoted supporters of Hitler in Finland could not help but see the futility of further

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continuation of the war. On the night of September 3, 1944, the Finnish Prime Minister Hakzel was forced to declare that "in view of the change in the military-political situation for our country and the great desire of our people for peace, the Government of Finland considered it its duty to establish contact with So - Veteran Union.

And then the time has come for diplomats and intelligence officers to once again jointly develop the success achieved on the battlefields. Alexandra Kollontai - through the embassy, Elisey Sinitsyn - with the help of agents and connections of influence, prudently and methodically pushed the Finns to withdraw from the war and a truce. The residency in Stockholm was careful to ensure that the secret services of England and the United States did not deliberately lower the level of responsibility of the Finnish government for participating in the war on the side of Hitler in order to gain unilateral advantages in their relations with Finland in the future. And there were good reasons for that. With the help of reliable sources, five operatives of foreign intelligence of the NKGB residence in Stockholm had sufficiently complete intelligence information that back in 1943 the governments of the USA and Great Britain were secretly from the USSR negotiating with the Finnish representatives in Portugal on the cessation of hostilities. , as well as possible assistance from the Finnish authorities in the event of the landing of American military units in Northern Norway.

For employees of Kollontai and the residency of the NKGB in Stockholm, there were truly "hot money."

Early in the morning of February 10, 1944, Kollontai invited Sinitsyn to her place and told him that one of the richest industrialists in Sweden, Wallenberg, had traveled to Finland to convince the Finns to start negotiations with the USSR on the terms of a truce. Upon his return from Helsinki, Wallenberg said that a Finnish representative, Paasikivi, would soon arrive in Stockholm. Finn will be tasked by his government to find out the conditions for withdrawing from the war.

"So," said Alexandra Mikhailovna, "yesterday I received these conditions from Moscow and I want you to get acquainted with them before I communicate them to Paasikivi."

Even the most cursory glance at the conditions suggested that they were extremely unburdensome for the side that lost the war. They included only a few items:

- severing relations with Germany and interning German troops and ships in Finland, moreover, if the Finnish side considers this task unbearable for itself, then the Soviet Union is ready to provide it with the necessary assistance with its troops and aircraft;
- restoration of the Soviet-Finnish treaty of 1940;
- the immediate return of prisoners of war of the Soviet Union and allied states, as well as the civilian population from these

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countries held in concentration camps or used by Finns at work;

— the issue of compensation for losses caused to the Soviet Union by military operations and the occupation of Soviet territory remains open until negotiations in Moscow.

Without waiting for a comment from Sinitsyn, Alexandra Mikhailovna said that she herself did not expect such mild conditions for a truce. After all, one of its main provisions is just the restoration of the Soviet-Finnish treaty of 1940 and the withdrawal of Finnish troops to the border.

"Which victorious country will offer such generous terms to an almost defeated country without its occupation?" exclaimed Kollontai.

But in fact, even these seemingly minimal terms of the armistice caused a sharp political struggle in Finland between the supporters of the continuation of the war and the supporters of the armistice. Hitler's Germany also intervened in this struggle. Through their sources, the NKGB station in Stockholm learned that Hitler urgently sent his Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Helsinki to convince the leadership of Finland of the inevitability of the final victory of Germany over the Allies, to intimidate the gloomy prospects of a separate peace and accuse the Finnish authorities of connivance with "espionage". anti-German activities. Sinitsyn bitterly reported to Alexandra Mikhailovna that the mission of the Hitlerite emissary to Finland was successful and cited the words of the Finnish President Ryti as confirmation: "... I will not make peace with the Soviet Union except by agreement with the German Empire and not I will allow no Finnish government appointed by me to do this!

It seemed that the joint efforts of Soviet diplomats and intelligence officers to achieve a truce with Finland ended in failure. But the Soviet Army again stepped in. She launched a decisive offensive on the Karelian front. Her "arguments" turned out to be weightier. Soon the Finnish politicians themselves requested a truce...

Under these conditions, the residency of the Soviet foreign intelligence began to urgently restore contact with their pre-war sources of information in Finland. However, the nature of the relationship with them has now become different. They were supposed to get involved in the work as sources of influence and promote the establishment of lasting friendship between the peoples of Finland and the USSR. This was a big and responsible task, designed for a long term. There were no trifles in this case. Everything was subordinated to a single goal. Even the release of the prominent writer and public figure of Finland Hella Vuolijoki from hard labor prison was used by the residency to organize a powerful movement of the country's democratic forces in support of the idea of rapprochement with the USSR

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The history of Hella Vuolijoki began at the very height of the war in 1942. Two operatives of foreign intelligence in Moscow prepared a Finnish girl Elvina for transfer to the front line. She was a radio operator and was supposed to transmit information about the situation in Finland to the Center. The young employees did not think of anything better than to lead Elvina to the popular Finnish writer Hella Vuolijoki, who had nothing to do with Soviet intelligence, and is known for her sympathies for the Soviet Union. It was planned that the radio operator, transferred by plane across the front line, would land by parachute near the country house of Hella Vuolijoki, and she would certainly shelter the girl for some time until she found employment, more precisely, cover in nearby Helsinki. However, everything turned out the other way around.

The appearance of an uninvited guest in the house greatly alarmed Hella Vuolijoki. She was seriously frightened by the possibility of searching for a paratrooper in the area of her estate. After all, no matter how you cover Elvina, passing her off as your distant relative, the police can easily find a parachute hastily hidden under a tree, and then find the scout herself. And so it happened. On the fifteenth day there was a persistent knock on the door of Hella's house. To the question "Who?" came the answer: "Police." Four people entered. In their hands was Elvina's parachute. Then the police began to check the documents of the tenants and searched the entire house. Elvina was arrested on the grounds that her documents were "suspicious" and taken to Helsinki. Hella Vuolijoki was warned not to leave the estate without special permission from the city

police.

Interrogations of Elvina continued for several months, and when the investigation was completed, the case of the parachutist-scout was transferred to court. The verdict was predictable. The court sentenced the girl to death. When the death sentence was read to her, she experienced extreme stress and ... went crazy. Elvina was not executed. She was on death row until the armistice was signed. On September 19, 1944, she was handed over to the Soviet representatives...

As soon as Elvina's trial was over, Hella Vuolijoki was also arrested. During the investigation, she was charged with secret communication with the enemy and hiding a Soviet spy in order to transfer secret information through her to the enemy side. During the interrogations of Vuolijoki, she was required to confess that she was a Soviet spy, and information about which of her close acquaintances was spying for the Soviet Union.

The trial of the Finnish writer took place in the spring of 1943. Hella Vuolijoki was sentenced to life imprisonment. The convict was immediately taken to solitary confinement, where she was kept until the day the armistice with Finland was signed. Her moral and physical condition was very difficult. On the day of release

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Hella Vuolijoki from prison at the gates gathered thousands of her supporters and admirers of her talent. The courageous woman again took her prominent place among the Finnish creative intelligentsia and became one of the founders and leaders of the Democratic Union of the People of Finland. Moscow, in its own way, paid tribute to the nobility and talent of this remarkable woman. After the war, one of her plays, *The Stone Nest*, was staged at the Maly Theater in the capital and was a great success. In Lubyanka, they tried not to remember the victims of the mediocre operation. The consequences of this operation "at random" have become too difficult for its direct participants.

Not much time passed, and the "Finnish group" of the Stockholm foreign intelligence station again moved to Helsinki. In parting, Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontai said a few kind words to the staff of the residency. "Your help," she said, "in the preparation and conduct of confidential negotiations with the Finns and Swedish representatives on the surrender of Finland and the signing of a truce with it was truly indispensable ..." Alexandra Mikhailovna knew the value of kind words and never thoughtlessly didn't throw them away.

In the meantime, a new government was formed in Finland. Juho Kusti Paasikivi became its prime minister. In the pre-revolutionary years, he graduated from the law faculty of St. Petersburg University and was known as an adherent of the monarchy. He became involved in politics from a young age.

Many times, as part of the Finnish delegation, he took part in negotiations with the Soviet Union in the pre-war period, and at these negotiations he took a compromise position, quite friendly to the USSR. Several times Paasikivi met with Molotov and Stalin, and they treated the new Finnish premier with respect.

From the very first days of the work of the new cabinet, it became obvious that Finland was clearly changing the course of its policy and orienting itself towards rapprochement with the USSR. Paasikivi became the architect of this policy.

In his speech at a closed cabinet meeting, Paasikivi focused on the prospects for Soviet-Finnish relations. "The main and determining factor in Finland's foreign policy," the Prime Minister said, "should be our country's attitude towards its eastern neighbor, the Soviet Union. This is our main foreign policy problem, which we must solve and on which the future of our people depends. In my opinion, it is in the fundamental interests of Finland to conduct a foreign policy in such a way that it is not directed against the Soviet Union. Peace and harmony, as well as good-neighborly relations with the USSR, based on complete trust, are the first principle that should guide our state activities."

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These statements, which meant a serious step towards the positions of the Soviet side, were reported by Sinitsyn to the Soviet representative in the Allied Control Commission for Finland, Andrei Aleksandrovich Zhdanov. Sinitsyn accompanied them with the following judgment: "Such

A statement could only be made by a person who deeply realized the need for a radical restructuring of Finland's foreign policy. Moreover, these words were not spoken for our ears. One can trust this politician," and continued: "Paasikivi, of course, will not lead his country to socialism. You cannot make a socialist out of an old monarchist. It's unreal! But our sources, realizing this, will nevertheless strive with all their might to help Paasikivi carry out the program he has announced..."

"Well, the question is, perhaps, clear," Zhdanov replied, according to the testimony of the resident. - We must inform Comrade Stalin about all this. Could you, Yelisey Tikhonovich, help my assistant prepare a draft telegram to Moscow in the spirit of your message to me? .. "

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On Yugoslav soil

A hard and glorious fate befell Yugoslavia in the last world war. Its peoples resolutely entered the fight against Hitlerism, raising an uprising in response to the occupation of the country by the Germans and Italians. One million three hundred thousand killed - not a single people of Europe paid such a price for victory. These losses are comparable, in proportion to the size of the population, only with the victims suffered by the Soviet Union.

On March 25, 1941, the government of D. Cvetkovic signed in Vienna a protocol on the accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan. Then the young king Peter P Karageorgievich organized a coup d'etat, which removed from power in Belgrade the rulers allied with the Nazis. Hitler was furious when he learned about the events in Yugoslavia, and within 11 days almost all of its territory was occupied by the Germans. The king, his government, the leaders of the main bourgeois parties fled the country for Egypt. Then the king found refuge in London. A royal government in exile was formed.

The communist party of Yugoslavia became the spokesman for anti-fascist liberation aspirations. She immediately began an armed struggle against the invaders and their accomplices. The method of partisan actions was adopted as a basis. A people's liberation movement was born, and Yugoslavia became one of the first and most active centers of resistance in occupied Europe.

The fighting of the partisan detachments and groups that had arisen began in July 1941. As a result of their unification, regular military units began to form - brigades, divisions, corps.

By the end of 1941, there were at least 80 thousand people in the ranks of the armed forces of the people's liberation movement, in 1943 - 320 thousand, and in September 1944 - about 400 thousand fighters. By the autumn of 1944, more than two-thirds of the entire territory had been liberated.

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countries. Thus, in the battles with the aggressor, the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, the NOAU, arose, led by the main, then after the renaming of the supreme headquarters, headed by the Secretary General of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Josip Broz Tito. It fettered significant forces of the fascist troops. For Germany and her allies, Yugoslavia became an independent, very disturbing front. Such a fact is known. The headquarters of the German occupation units in Serbia already in 1941 began to demand reinforcements to fight the partisans. The German High Command refused: all forces were sent to the Eastern Front.

The war of liberation became a decisive factor in the life of the country. It also determined the line of demarcation of forces in Yugoslav society itself.

Simultaneously with Tito's partisans, armed detachments of the Chetniks, led by Colonel Draža Mihailović, were operating in different parts of the country. Their backbone was made up of officers of the former royal army, officials, individual functionaries of the bourgeois parties. Mikhailovich's detachments numbered at different times from 15 to 30 thousand people. At first, the Chetniks acted under the slogans of opposition to the invaders, but with a clearly expressed goal - the restoration of the former regime. For tactical reasons, they expressed their readiness to engage in some interaction with Tito's partisans, but by the end of 1941, under the influence of their extremist leadership, all contacts were interrupted and the Chetniks switched to an open struggle against the "Titoites" and cooperation with the occupation regime! Such a development of events for a long time became an aggravating specificity of the Yugoslav resistance movement.

The successes of Tito's partisans put on the agenda the issues of reorganization of the existing power structures, the adoption of new legislative acts. The ground for this was fully ripe by the end of 1943. The leadership of the Communist Party decided to transform the Anti-Fascist Veche that was in force at that time into a temporary legislative body of the peoples of Yugoslavia, to create the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia - NKOF with the rights of a provisional government. The committee was headed by Tito, he was given the rank of marshal. Thus, a new people's democratic government was constituted in Yugoslavia.

The countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition were faced with the problem of what line to take with regard to this new state formation, how to treat the Yugoslav emigre government, which was officially recognized by the main world powers.

The British were especially active, who throughout the war were zealous about strengthening their influence on the development of events in southern and southeastern Europe. In the autumn of 1943, they sent a military mission to Yugoslavia, to Tito, headed by General

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Neralom Fitzroy McLean. Somewhat later, Randolph Churchill, the son of the British Prime Minister, joined her. English liaison officers were also at the headquarters of the Chetniks of D. Mikhailovich.

The US government sent a small group of officers to Tito, who at first were part of the joint Anglo-American mission. The positions of the British and Americans with respect to Yugoslavia practically coincided: both sides helped the Chetniks (with weapons, equipment), persistently supported the royal government in exile.

In contrast to the line of the Western powers, the Soviet leadership resolutely supported Tito and his policy. The parties agreed to exchange military missions.

On February 23, 1944, a Soviet military mission arrived at Tito's headquarters in the small town of Drvar, Western Bosnia, headed by Lieutenant General N.V. Korneev. It is important to emphasize that it was accredited not only to the Supreme Headquarters of the NOA, as a mission of Great Britain and the USA, but also to the National Committee, i.e. at the government. This decision was an important support in the struggle to strengthen the new Yugoslavia as part of the anti-Hitler coalition.

Along with military intelligence officers, the mission included a small operational group of the USSR NKGB, which received the traditional name in intelligence - residency. It included G.S. Grigoriev - Head of Cover, Assistant Chief of Mission, V.A. Kvasov is an employee, secretary of the mission, as well as a cryptographer and a radio operator.

The tasks of the group were clearly formulated: to collect information about the activities of the pro-fascist Chetnik formations, to create a base for conducting intelligence work in Germany and the countries subject to it, to obtain information about the activities of the British and Americans in Yugoslavia.



In the first days of March 1944, Tito turned to the Soviet government with a somewhat unexpected request for an additional seconding of "highly qualified workers in the lines: military, financial and counterintelligence with advisory and instructive functions." The desire was expressed to have "one major counterintelligence worker at the Supreme Headquarters of the NOAU and one or two people each in the main headquarters of military districts and corps," as well as experts in encryption.

The necessary decisions were quickly made in Moscow. In mid-April, a new group of NKGB operatives arrived at Tito's headquarters: B.P. Odintsov, intelligence adviser, A.V. Tishkov, counterintelligence adviser, P.E. Goroshkin, encryption specialist, M.V. Zhukov to work as Tito's personal cryptographer at his request.

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At the same time, intelligence officer K.K. Kvashnin, who maintained contact with representatives of British intelligence there. Here he was given a peculiar delicate task - "to divert the attention of the British and Americans from the Odintsov-Tishkov group." In this capacity, he served for about five

months.

Thus, in April 1944, in the rear of the Germans, more than a year before the victory, fruitful cooperation began between the special services of the Soviet Union and the new Yugoslavia.

It is worth mentioning that it was not so easy to transfer Soviet people to Tito's headquarters, which was located in a remote mountainous area and under the constant threat of a German attack. Much later, Pyotr Efimovich Goroshkin recalled: "Our group, together with other advisers, whose task was to organize the future economy and financial system of the country, traveled to Yugoslavia by a dangerous and long road. When flying through the German fortified areas, the aircraft was repeatedly subjected to anti-aircraft fire. Each of us had a parachute, but no one knew how to use it, because there was not enough time for training. We were dressed in Polish military uniforms. Through Tehran, Cairo and Tripoli arrived at the transshipment base of our military mission in the mountains. Bari in southern Italy. From there, by another crew, we were transferred across the Adriatic Sea to a given area of Bosnia. Further to the destination, we reached the partisan paths.

An important document has been preserved in the archive - a task for those departing. Judging by the text, it carried not only an operational, but also a high political load, which is not so common in assignments for operational officers of those years. What is written here clearly establishes the line and limits of the actions of the Soviet special services that were at Tito's headquarters.

Before leaving, these workers were received by People's Commissar V.N. Merkulov, he also approved the task. All members of the group signed the original for familiarization. Here are excerpts from this remarkable document.

"(The pseudonyms of the sentees are indicated. - Note by the author) are sent to Yugoslavia as official employees of the military mission of the USSR under Marshal Tito with the task of assisting him in creating and establishing the work of political intelligence, counterintelligence, as well as organizing a schifrdel in central and peripheral apparatuses and in the military units of Tito.

In the process of fulfilling these tasks, all their actions and relations with Tito and his representatives (they) build in accordance with the line of attitude of our government towards the people's liberation movement in Yugoslavia as the only correct form of people's struggle at the present time and take into account the national independence of the Yugoslav people's liberation movement.

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... In their work (they) should not replace Tito's apparatus and leadership, resort to methods of command and administration and act tactfully, by advising and establishing close personal relationships with Tito's designated representatives, through them necessary measures... Recruitment work for us in Tito's intelligence apparatus, as well as in general in all other institutions of the people's liberation movement, should not be carried out, limited to establishing personal relations with the necessary people. Exercise extreme caution and tact so as not to cause complaints about our interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia and disloyal attitude towards the allies.

Upon arrival at the scene, the operational group began to familiarize themselves with the state of affairs. It turned out that there was no single counterintelligence, as well as intelligence, apparatus in the NOAU. The fight against enemy agents and anti-people elements was not of an organized nature. There was a shortage of qualified and, most importantly, reliable personnel everywhere. In fact, it was about the need to create new security agencies in the new state entity.

After studying the situation, our advisers, in cooperation with partners, developed the structure and regulations for the state security service, which was called the People's Defense Bodies - OZNA. Alexander Rankovich, secretary of the Central Committee of the CPY, became the head of the service, Alexander Stefanovich, former secretary of the Dalmatian regional committee of the CPY, became his deputy.

The central apparatus of OZNA included several departments ("compartments"): intelligence in the occupied territory, counterintelligence among the civilian population in the liberated lands, counterintelligence in the army, accounting and technical service. In one of the "compartments", Zharko Broz, the son of Marshal Tito, served as a second lieutenant.

The fundamental documents on OZNA were personally approved by Tito and sent to the field as a directive. (Looking ahead, we point out that this OZNA structure basically operated right up to the first post-war years.)

The cipher economy of the Yugoslavs turned out to be neglected. Cipher systems belonged to the elementary category. Negligence was allowed in working with cipher materials and in their storage.

At Tito's request, our adviser organized individual training for the cipher workers of the Supreme Headquarters, the main headquarters of a number of divisions and corps. As of May 1944, 16 people had been instructed and trained.

The responsible task of Tito's personal cryptographer was carried out by M.V. Zhukov. The fact is that Tito maintained regular radio contact with Moscow: along the party line with Georgy Dimitrov, who until May 1943 was secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and then

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head of the international department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and on the state line - with the Yugoslav military mission that arrived in Moscow in April 1944.

Later, Mikhail Vladimirovich Zhukov said: "At first, Tito treated me with restraint and some caution, but in the course of everyday work, this mood of his disappeared. He appreciated my diligence, efficiency and complete "disinterest" in internal Yugoslav affairs. Tito dictated telegrams to Moscow in Russian. Since he knew the language poorly, I acted as an editor, making the necessary grammatical and stylistic corrections to the texts. The marshal was pleased with such help, about which he spoke to my superiors more than once.

Let us point out that such work by Zhukov lasted until January 1945 and was terminated at the initiative of Tito, since, as he stated, "my cryptographers have been sufficiently well trained by Soviet specialists and can now work independently."

The unfolding soviet work soon had to be forced to interrupt. Early in the morning of May 25, 1944, Nazi aircraft subjected the city of Drvar to an intensive bombardment. Then two waves of paratroopers from the SS units were thrown out on gliders, with a total number of about 800 people. At the same time, the offensive of the ground troops began. It was the operation "Knight's Move", carefully planned by the Germans, which had the goal of decapitating the leadership of the NOAU. Along the way, the saboteurs were also entrusted with a special task, the code designation "Moscow": the destruction of members of the Soviet military mission.

The city of Drvar is located in a narrow valley, surrounded by mountains on all sides. Tito's headquarters was located on the outskirts, in a cave at a height of about 20 meters from the foot of the mountain, the residences of allied missions were in different parts of the city. The Supreme Headquarters was covered by very small army forces. In the ensuing battles, they held back the superior forces of the enemy with great effort.

Tito and his staff members left the shelter attacked by the enemy and reached the place where the reserve command post had been prepared along the mountain paths. Members of the Central Committee of the CPY Edward Kardel, Alexander Rankovich, Ivan Milutinovic, other leaders, as well as workers from the Soviet and Western military missions also gathered there. The routes of their movement did not become a secret for the Germans. Again bombardment, shelling. The encirclement was shrinking. It was decided to break through in a southeasterly direction, counting on the help of reinforcements called by radio. The further plan is to transfer the Yugoslav leaders to another point in the liberated territory. It was not possible to find a suitable place on the mainland, so they considered it possible to transfer the headquarters

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on a small island in the Adriatic Sea called Vis, liberated back in September 1943. To go there, we first had to get by air to the Italian city of Bari, an English military base.

In the meantime, there was a difficult retreat from the enemy pressing on from all sides and a search on the march for a landing site for a fairly heavy S-47 transport aircraft.

Here are excerpts from the report of our workers on these events: <...In the area of Mount Klekovac, there was an immediate threat of encirclement by German forces, we were attacked by three divisions. We left there during the battle of the units covering us. They organized the shunting movement of the headquarters and allied missions ... walked more than 300 km on foot. Communications in all areas of our movement were occupied by the Germans. On June 1, at night in the forest, we were fired upon by the SS Jaeger Division and the Chetniks. On June 2, they were subjected to mortar and machine-gun fire, pursued by light tanks and German mountain detachments, from which they broke away on June 3 during the ensuing battles ... Tito's headquarters was disorganized by the German combined air strike and mechanized units, command and control was destroyed, the Germans captured the radio communications center ... The forced 10-day march exhausted the people. During the departure from Drvar, instructions were developed on the work of the OZNA to ensure the safety of the supreme headquarters during the movement, and the operational staff was briefed.

Near the city of Bugoino, we managed to find a relatively suitable place to receive the aircraft. There are mountains all around, on a selected site there are crevices, a heap of stones. The entire staff was engaged in its preparation for the meeting of the aircraft, called by radio by the head of the Soviet mission from the base in Bari. On the night of June 4, showing the highest skill, the Soviet crew landed on an improvised airfield, took Tito, his closest associates, part of the military missions and safely delivered them to Bari. On the same night, the crew made another flight, took a new group of encircled and successfully transported them to Italy. Then a number of flights with the same tasks were made by British pilots. About 100 seriously wounded fighters of the NOAU were taken out.

A few days later, Tito was transported to the island of Vis on an English destroyer. Subsequently, all the leadership of the NOAU and other power structures of the new South was carried out from there.

Slavia.

Thus, the attempt of the Nazis to destroy the Supreme Headquarters of the NOAU failed. The decisive role in saving the lives of the Yugoslav leaders belongs to the Soviet pilots.

When leaving the encirclement, none of the Soviet people suffered. Our radio station was only lost, part of

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ciphers. The operational materials of OZNA were buried in the ground in a hiding place near the town of Drvar.

The period from the middle of 1944 until the liberation of the entire territory from the Nazis in May 1945 is characterized by exceptionally extensive and versatile cooperation between our countries - political, military, economic. The same applies to contacts in the area of state security, which have received further development.

The improvement of the OZNA structure continued. After the liberation of Belgrade in October 1944, new units were formed - to control the activities of foreign diplomats and military missions, security services for top party and statesmen. Additional requests were received from the Yugoslavs, and they were provided with advisory assistance in establishing operational accounting, secret office work, and control over the observance of state secrets. In one case, it was necessary to go beyond the limits of competence and respond to the personal requests of Kardelj and Ranković, who were involved in the preparation of laws on the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor's Office. Knowing that A.V. Tishkov, who since January 1945 has become the senior staff of our advisers, has a higher legal education, they asked him to advise them and familiarized them with the drafts of the relevant documents. "They agreed with almost all my remarks," Tishkov reported to the Center.

Let us note here one important circumstance. Having replaced the head of the group of advisers, the Center found it necessary once again to remind the apparatus of the main guidelines on which to build work with the Yugoslav partners. Thus, the directive of the Center to Tishkov of January 18, 1945 contained, in particular, the following orders: "Develop friendly relations with various Yugoslav politicians. In your advisory work, pay attention to the further strengthening of the OZNA apparatus, its qualitative composition, to the strengthening of order and legality in its work. You are an adviser on OZNA issues, not an instructor in this apparatus... Remember that you are a representative of a socialist state in a bourgeois-democratic country."

These instructions convincingly testify to the principled and consistent line of the Center regarding the nature of contacts with new partners in the specific wartime conditions.

In Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Vojvodina and Montenegro, advisers-instructors of the NKGB on intelligence and counterintelligence were sent to provide assistance to OZNA on the ground. Basically, they acted under the guise of liaison officers of the military mission, and in some cases under the guise of volunteers from the NOAU (in this simple way, the overgrown number of people assigned to our military mission was disguised). Almost everywhere in me

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stakh organized training courses for OZNA operatives. Our advisers prepared curricula and teaching methods, consulted teachers. This help was appreciated by the Yugoslavs, as a rule, with great satisfaction. For example, the head of the OZNA of one of the republics at a meeting with Tishkov, naming two of our advisers, said: "They themselves do not know

What a great help they have been. Even in ordinary everyday conversations with them, I draw for myself a lot of new things, which I then use in my work, applying to local conditions.

Important work was completed by the cipher advisor. He organized courses for cipher workers from military formations, republican OZNA and party bodies, which provided communication with the supreme headquarters. 35 specialists were trained in three streams of courses sheets.

In the reporting document of our intelligence for 1944, it was stated: "A strictly centralized counterintelligence apparatus has been created and is operating throughout Yugoslavia, which today is still the only apparatus of the new Yugoslav statehood."

Life has shown that the special services of the Yugoslavs began to act more purposefully, they had tangible results.

It became a practice to train and send agents to the location of large formations of the Nazi troops. To keep in touch with the agents, we handed over to the Yugoslavs, at their request, 10 portable radio stations.

A deeply hidden German sabotage organization was uncovered. She was faced with the task of starting sabotage in the rear of the NOAU after receiving a special signal. According to a plan developed jointly with the Yugoslavs, one of the saboteurs was recruited, and several specially trained agents were introduced into this organization. At the appropriate moment, the German group was routed.

An important object of aspirations of German intelligence was the Supreme Headquarters of the NOAU. This episode has been recorded. In the partisan detachment operating in Dalmatia, a former Soviet prisoner of war, who introduced himself as Alexander R, a major in the Red Army, a doctor by profession, passed from the German unit. Before the transfer, he gave the partisans a significant amount of medicines from the German field dispensary and won their trust. He was sent to the sanitary department of the Supreme Headquarters. After two fatal surgeries he performed, he aroused suspicion. The Yugoslavs interrogated him again, confiscated his documents, arrested him and turned to our adviser for advice. Reporting to the Center, Tishkov wrote: "He was interrogated by me together with the head of the SH "compartments of the OZNA

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and exposed as a German agent recruited while still in a POW camp. R. was not who he claimed to be. He served in the artillery units of the Red Army with the rank of lieutenant, he was never a doctor, but only studied at the 1st year of the medical institute, which he did not graduate from. His real surname was also found out". The traitor got what he deserved.

Documents of half a century ago testify that the cooperation between our special services, which originated in the war years, is notable not only for its scale, but also for the degree of trust. There are many clear examples of this.

We have already mentioned our participation in such a delicate area as encryption. At the beginning of 1945, a six-month supply of materials was handed over to the Yugoslavs for use in two-way cipher correspondence.

The Yugoslavs had a bad time with the personnel of the operational staff. At their request, the first 29 students were trained at the courses of the Higher School of the NKGB in Moscow. Upon their return to their homeland in April 1945, Rankovich arranged a friendly reception in this regard and expressed great gratitude to our side for their useful assistance.

The training of specialists for sabotage activities was led by our adviser I.G. Starinov, who had solid practical experience in this area, obtained during

Spanish Civil War 1936-1939. One of his most capable students was the young Yugoslav Ivan Harisch, a brave fighter, skilled in technical work. Having adopted the necessary knowledge, he became a group commander, and then a senior adviser to a special partisan brigade in Spain. And now a meeting took place in Yugoslavia between a teacher and a student.

Given the scope of the partisan movement, it was necessary to train a large number of specialists, to organize the production of technical means: explosive shells, time bombs, and other equipment. The tactics of combat operations were practiced, taking into account specific local features and the rapidly changing military situation. The main base of the saboteurs was located in the mountainous region of Croatia, and the intermediate ones were in Serbia, Slovenia and even Hungary.

Under the leadership of Starinov, sabotage equipment was constantly improved. For example, a clever incendiary-explosive device was used to ignite fuel in closed standard metal containers.

It is estimated that in 45 months the partisans manufactured about 110,000 homemade mines, committed over 3,100 acts of sabotage behind German lines and on communications, and destroyed about 21,000 enemy soldiers and officers.

Ivan Harish, who was called Ilya Gromoverzhets in the circle of friends in the Russian manner, became the commander of a large special diver

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ion connection. He was awarded the highest military award - the title of People's Hero of Yugoslavia. Starinov enjoyed great respect among the Yugoslavs, they highly appreciated his military merits, awarded him a high military order.

At a meeting with the responsible worker of the Center G.B. Hovakimyan, Tito asked for assistance in setting up a foreign intelligence service in connection with the renewal and staffing of a number of diplomatic missions abroad. Work on the task has begun.

Operational contact was maintained between the Yugoslav residency in Bari and our sub-residency in that Italian city. Here the Yugoslavs intercepted and handed over to us valuable material from the American residency in Romania, which dealt with their work against the Soviet Union.

On the basis of reciprocity, there was an exchange of operational information. We handed over to our partners specific material about the work of the British intelligence station against them. They supplied us with information about the German intelligence agencies and their activities, about their agents from among the former Red Army soldiers who ended up in the German troops, shared information about current events, although they usually showed restraint in assessing the phenomena of domestic political life.

Needless to say, how important was for the Soviet leadership in the closing years of the war reliable information about the true, and not declared, aspirations of the British and Americans for a post-war order in Europe. Not the last place in these calculations was occupied by Yugoslavia.

About the merits to the Soviet intelligence of the "Cambridge Five" all the most important seems to have already been said. Nevertheless, this can be confirmed once again on specific materials on Yugoslavia that came from London in 1943-1945 from members of the Five.

It can be said without exaggeration that in Moscow timely they learned about the most secret plans and secret steps of the British (as well as the Americans) in their attempts to prevent the establishment of a pro-communist regime in post-war Yugoslavia. The information obtained in London covered in detail the key, most acute military

political problems of the region in their constant development. The position of the allies in relation to the movement of Mikhailovich's Chetniks, which was changing due to the successes of the Red Army and the NOAU, was traced in detail, the details of their actions to support the emigre government and desperate efforts to impose a monarchical regime on the new Yugoslavia were revealed. Information was obtained about Churchill's confidential conversations with King Peter. Copies sent circulars to British diplomatic missions abroad with an assessment

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mi positions in Europe. In one of these documents, for example, not without bitterness, it was admitted in December 1943 that "Tito's partisans are becoming the main military-political force in the country and a decisive factor in determining the future of Yugoslavia."

In the reports from London, attention is drawn to the frequent reference of our residency to the opinion of Kim Philby and his interpretation of the reported information. This detail shows how much importance was attached to Philby's judgment and how highly his qualifications were valued.

British intelligence had solid intelligence positions in Yugoslavia and, of course, was aware of the real state of affairs in Tito's camp. According to Philby, for example, in February 1944 alone, the relevant department of the SIS in London received 160 reports from British agents introduced into the Supreme Headquarters, into the main headquarters of the NOAU, into partisan detachments on the mainland and the islands of the Adriatic Sea. The degree of awareness of the British is also evidenced by this fact. The Odintsov-Tishkov group was still on its way from Moscow to Yugoslavia, and the SIS had already received a message from Italy that "a team of General Staff officers, including four GPU officers?, had arrived in Bari to leave for Tito's headquarters." From Philby, additional characteristics of Fitzroy Maclean, the head of the British military mission, became known, and that one of the important tasks of the SIS was to weaken Soviet influence in every possible way on Tito and his closest associates.

Intelligence regularly sent reports to the government on the situation and developments in the Balkans. Here, for example, is an extract from a document dated March 1944. "At present, the British, in full agreement with the Americans, are resorting to various political combinations aimed at discrediting Tito and the liberation movement led by him. The British policy boils down to ensuring that, as a result of the struggle in Yugoslavia, not Tito, but the government of Mikhailovich comes to power there ... Along with the military support of Tito by the allies, British aviation regularly makes night flights to the area of Mihailovich's headquarters and drops weapons for him, the other day he was delivered a large sum of money. With the consent of the Americans, the British instructed Mihailoviĭ not to engage in any active operations, to accumulate forces, to stock up on weapons and to make the most of everything to reorganize the Chetniks into a combat-ready army. These instructions were given to Mikhailovich despite the fact that both the British and the Americans are well aware of his connections with the Germans. Mikhailovich will have to speak out only when the fact of the defeat of the German army is obvious ... At the same time, the British have now decided to use every opportunity to compromise the government and personally Marshal Tito in the eyes of world public opinion.

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A report on the information work of our intelligence in the first quarter of 1945 was found in Warchive. There, in particular, it was stated: "The main information on Yugoslavia and Albania did not come from Yugoslavia, but from London and other residencies ... 32 documentary materials and 7 intelligence materials were sent from London. Used: in special reports - 22, in the NKID - 5.

The available intelligence documents allow us to confidently assume that in the final period of the war, domestic intelligence services carried out significant and effective work to provide the Soviet leadership with the necessary military-political information. An indirect confirmation of this is a telegram addressed to Tito from Milovan Djilas, a member of the Politburo

Central Committee of the CPY, and General Velemir Terzic, head of the Yugoslav military mission in Moscow, after their meeting with I.V. Stalin on May 19, 1944. There, in particular, it was stated: "... Comrade Stalin is following all the events taking place in our country to the smallest detail and is well informed on all issues."

It would be erroneous to assume that cooperation between the special services and the relationship between partners were completely cloudless. Sometimes misunderstandings arose, different approaches to this or that problem were found. For example, our advisers tried in every possible way to induce the Yugoslavs to intensify work on the British and Americans. However, while verbally agreeing, the leaders of OZNA did not take effective steps in this direction. Among them, there was an idea that it was "uncomfortable" to work against the allies. It is true that by the end of the war the situation had changed somewhat, and probably after we gave them information about the anti-Yugoslav activities of the SIS.

In a number of cases, relations did not develop with individual local leaders who, for political reasons, were not disposed to sincere cooperation with Soviet representatives. Sometimes such sentiments came from "above". Thus, Edvard Kardelj's sharp anti-Soviet statements to the party activists of Slovenia were known, essentially calling for reducing contacts with Soviet representatives. There have been signals of a chilling attitude towards our advisers in Croatia. A source friendly to us complained: "The Russians are consulted only on technical issues, although the leaders of the local OZNA do not know the matter, and ordinary workers fight like fish on ice."

From time to time, business contacts were disrupted due to the insufficiently restrained behavior of our employees.

However, it was not these negative aspects that determined the content of cooperation. The main thing remained friendly relations and a common desire to achieve the main goal - victory over fascism.

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...Historians have studied quite fully the circumstances, causes and grave consequences of the July 1948 meeting of the Information Bureau of the resolution "On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia". As a result, in the past, close friendly relations, sealed with shed blood, between our countries turned into sharp conflicts for a long period. This discord also damaged the ties between our special services. Both sides suffered. Nevertheless, close cooperation between the secret services of the Soviet Union and the new Yugoslavia during the Second World War will remain a memorable page in the history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

Until the end of hostilities in Yugoslavia, the Chetniks received support from the British and the émigré government (D. Mihailovich was awarded the rank of general and appointed him Minister of War in absentia), which proclaimed them "the royal army in the homeland" and created around Mihailovich myth as about the largest figure of the Yugoslav Resistance. History has put everything in its place. In 1946, according to the verdict of the court, Mikhailovich was executed as a war criminal.

2 Yugoslav orders and medals were awarded to a large group of

vet people. Among them are all our operatives named in this essay. Unfortunately, the fate of the awarded, and the awards themselves, turned out to be sad. It is a little-known fact that after the adoption by the Cominform in 1948 of the decision on Yugoslavia, which destroyed the former friendly relations between our countries, the participants in the war were instructed, from the very "top", of course: to surrender all Yugoslav awards. However, few cases are known when this order was ignored. For example, this is what the People's Hero of Yugoslavia, Rear Admiral Grigory Nikolaevich Okhrimenko did. Subject to strict discipline, our awarded employees with bitterness and regret (veterans testify to this)



surrendered their Yugoslav orders and medals. Nevertheless, despite all the strictness, there were "violators" of discipline among the employees of the PSU. One of them was a prominent Soviet intelligence officer A.M. Korotkov, who during the war years headed the European department of the service and was directly involved in Yugoslavia. Admittedly, in those days it was an act. The highest Yugoslav military order is now carefully kept in the family of A.M. Korotkov.

3 So in the text of the document.

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## Polish affairs

Fighting died down on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Fascist Germany capitulated. On July 17, 1945, in Potsdam, a suburb of Berlin, the leaders of the three allied powers - the USSR, Britain and the USA gathered to sum up the results of the war and finally work out a joint approach to the post-war order of the world. This approach was already outlined at their meeting in Yalta. It would seem that all that remained was to specify it in joint proposals for the forthcoming peace conference of the countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition.

However, in Potsdam, Britain and the United States took steps to deviate from the decisions taken at Yalta and to impose on the Soviet Union unfavorable decisions on a number of issues of post-war settlement.

Among the issues on which there were the most heated discussions were the problems of post-war Poland, its internal structure, government, and the borders of the future Polish state. In these discussions, two approaches to the creation of a new Poland converged.

Determining Britain's position on the Polish question, Churchill declared at the Crimean Conference of the leaders of the three allied powers: "Great Britain entered the war to defend Poland from German aggression. Great Britain is interested in Poland because it is a matter of honor for Great Britain. Great Britain will never be satisfied with a decision that does not secure Poland a position in which she would be the master in her own house! To this, the head of the Soviet delegation replied that "for the Russians, the question of Poland is not only a matter of honor, but also a matter of security. A matter of honor because the Russians had many sins against Poland in the past. The Soviet government seeks to make amends for these sins. A question of security, because the most important strategic problems of the Soviet Union are connected with Poland.

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states... Throughout history, Poland has always been a corridor through which the enemy attacked Russia. ... The Polish corridor cannot be securely closed from the outside only by Russian forces. It can only be securely closed from within by Poland's own forces. For this, Poland needs to be strong. That is why the Soviet Union is interested in building a powerful, free and independent Poland. The question of Poland is a matter of life and death for the Soviet state.

British diplomacy failed in Potsdam to realize its plans for the revival of pre-war Poland, which, according to the intentions of their authors, should have protected Europe from the influence of the Soviet Union, which increased during the war. Poland received in Potsdam, despite all the tricks of Churchill, vast lands in the west, a government based on the confidence of the people and ready to cooperate with all countries, and became an independent and strong state.

And the plans of British politicians were well calculated. They provided for the use of well-defined political forces inside and outside Poland, traditionally unfriendly towards its eastern neighbor. English diplomacy had such an instrument as the Polish government in London. But the authors of these plans did not know that

they are well known to the Soviet leadership. Foreign intelligence was able to uncover these plans in advance.

The main "kitchen" where the plans of the British on the Polish question were developed was the British Foreign Office. And in it, a responsible post was occupied by one of the best sources of foreign intelligence in those years, McLean. He had the opportunity to get acquainted with the documents on Poland even at their inception, he knew the thoughts and intentions of their authors.

The head of the British Foreign Office, Eden, exchanged basic ideas about policy on the Polish question with the head of government, Churchill, in letters, telegrams, and memorandums—such was the established procedure for the work of the British administration. Part of this correspondence through McLean and other members of the "Cambridge Five" fell into the hands of Soviet intelligence.

An important role in the development of the British policy towards Poland was played by the British intelligence services, where Soviet intelligence had such sources as Philby, Blunt and Cairncross.

Foreign intelligence received information on the Polish issue and, on the other hand, from the Polish. Even before the war, the Polish government in exile in London had a reliable agency both among the members of the government and in its apparatus. Not everyone in this government approved of the anti-Soviet plans of its leaders, many

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others saw the future of an independent and democratic Poland in close cooperation with its eastern neighbor and helped in every way to create such a Polish state.

The British coordinated Polish affairs with their ally - the United States. Roosevelt did not approve of the activities of the Polish government in exile supported by the British in London, especially in regard to the organization of armed struggle against partisan detachments in the temporarily occupied territories of the USSR and units of the Red Army during the liberation of Poland by them. Foreign intelligence had the opportunity to receive information about this, including documentary information, from its sources in Washington.

Soviet intelligence also had access to the communication channels of the Polish government in exile with its emissaries in Poland and the command of the Home Army (a conspiratorial military organization created by the Polish government in exile that operated in Poland occupied by the Germans in 1942-1945 in order to ensure the establishment of power in the country government in exile after the defeat of Germany – ed.) in the field.

The Soviet leadership, therefore, had information both about the policy of the allies in the Polish question, and about the plans and intentions of the Polish government in exile to return with the help of the British to power in post-war Poland. The documents of those years stored in the archives of foreign intelligence make it possible to get an idea of what information intelligence received on the Polish issue and what it informed the leaders of the country.

Already at the beginning of the war, the Soviet government took the initiative to normalize relations with the Polish government in exile in London. To the Soviet Ambassador in England I.M. Maisky was instructed to hold negotiations with the Poles, during which he indicated that the USSR was "for the creation of an independent Polish state, within the borders of national Poland, including some cities and regions that had recently been ceded to the USSR, and the question of the nature of the state regime The Soviet government considers Poland an internal affair of the Poles themselves. On July 30, an agreement was signed between the USSR and the Polish government in exile on the restoration of diplomatic relations and the provision of mutual assistance during the war with Nazi Germany. The Soviet-Polish agreement was based on the Soviet border proposals of 1939.

Such was the external side of the matter. And what was the real attitude of the Polish government to the signed agreement? As early as August 18, 1941, the Polish ambassador in London hurried to meet with Eden in order to "talk about the difficulties that

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we have to meet the Polish government as a result of the conclusion of the Soviet-Polish agreement. In the course of the conversation, he told Eden that "the Poles regard the entry of the USSR into the war as a positive development, not only because this war will place a heavy burden on German resources, but also because the USSR will be weakened as a result of it. ...The transformation of the USSR into an ally somewhat casts Poland and Polish interests into the background. ... The conclusion of the Soviet-Polish agreement weakened rather than strengthened the position of Poland against the USSR in relation to the Polish eastern borders.

In an intelligence report from London, received later from the circles of the Polish government, his true instructions were set out: "Restoration of Poland within the borders of 1921, that is, including Western Ukraine and Belarus; maintaining the anti-Soviet course; renunciation of cooperation and joint actions with the USSR and all Polish organizations supported by it; full and exclusive sovereignty in all Polish affairs of the London government in exile." By signing the Soviet-Polish agreement on cooperation and mutual assistance, the London government in exile had no intention of fulfilling it.

At the end of 1943, intelligence reported to the leadership of the country a secret report by the minister of the Polish government in exile in London and the chairman of the Polish commission for "post-war reconstruction", Marian Seida, sent to the President of Czechoslovakia, Beneš, as an official document of the Polish government. Beneš was also in exile in London at the time. The essence of the report, entitled "Poland and Germany and the post-war reconstruction of Europe," was as follows: Germany should be occupied in the west by England and the United States; in the east - Poland and Czechoslovakia. Poland must receive land along the Oder and the Neisse. The border between Poland and the Soviet Union is being restored under the 1921 treaty. To the east of Germany, two federations are being created - in Central and South-Eastern Europe, consisting of Poland, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania; in the Balkans - as part of Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and, possibly, Turkey. There should be no influence of the Soviet Union on both federations.

Intelligence from its sources in British government agencies also received information about the attitude of the allies towards the plans of the Poles. From it it was clear that the British were basically in solidarity with the Polish émigré politicians. They were especially impressed by the projects of creating the Balkan and European southeastern federations on an anti-Soviet basis. But they understood the unreality of the Poles' plans - the USSR bore the brunt of the war. According to sources who had access to Churchill's immediate circle, the Prime Minister of England did not see a force that could

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to prevent the Soviet Union from enjoying the fruits of its victory. Nor did he fully agree with the proposed solutions to territorial issues. He considered a return to the 1921 treaty to be impossible and believed that a variant closer to the "Curzon line" would be more in line with the realities that had been created. (In 1920, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, proposed, on the recommendation of the Supreme Council of the Entente countries, the border between Poland and Soviet Russia to be drawn along ethnic lines, leaving the Poles in Poland, and the Ukrainians and Belarusians in Russia. In diplomatic practice, this distinction was made the name "Curzon Line."—Author's note.)

Roosevelt was even more skeptical of the Poles' plans than Churchill. Thus, intelligence received information about the visit of Czechoslovak President Beneš to the United States, where he met with Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull and his deputy Welles. During the negotiations

was about the post-war structure in Europe. Roosevelt called the plans of the Poles "harmful and stupid." At these meetings, he spoke in favor of establishing a Soviet-Polish border along the "Curzon Line". Roosevelt also condemned plans to create blocs and federations in Eastern Europe. Roosevelt had his own vision of strengthening the position of the United States in post-war Europe. He was not going to play along with the ambitious Polish projects. In addition, he understood that the British were behind the plans to create such federations.

Information from foreign intelligence about the position of the allies on the Polish question turned out to be very necessary for the Soviet leadership. It was especially important to know that both the British and the Americans are inclined to recognize the passage of the border between Poland and the USSR along the "Curzon Line". This gave Soviet diplomacy a good opportunity to settle the issue of the western borders of the USSR, taking into account its interests and to reject the ambitious claims of the London government in exile. It was also interesting to learn about the different approaches of England and the USA to certain aspects of Polish affairs. The Americans, unlike the British, were not going to defend the interests of the Polish government in exile so zealously. President Roosevelt understood the futility of this government's claims to power in post-war Poland, he saw that Britain's own interests lay behind its support by Britain. All this provided good opportunities for Soviet diplomacy to resolve issues related to the liberation of Poland and the revival of the Polish state, taking into account the interests of the USSR and Poland.

Intelligence received interesting information for the Soviet leadership about the attempts of the Sikorski government to establish cooperation with the Germans. It became known, for example, from German telegrams intercepted by the British, that Colonel Jan Kowalski, a resident of the Polish government in exile in Lisbon, tried to

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to establish contacts with the intelligence of fascist Germany. The Germans, however, were cautious. This attempt was not the only one. Our intelligence received the text of a cipher telegram intercepted by the British from the German envoy in Budapest, Wesenmeier, to the German Foreign Ministry, in which he reported that "the proposal about the possibility of rapprochement between Germany and the Polish government in exile comes from the Polish government in London itself, which used as an intermediary of the emigrant Boruvko ... Boruvko proposes to establish contact with the Polish government through Lisbon. The contact was not destined to take place due to the offensive of the Soviet troops.

Foreign intelligence received important information, both militarily and politically, about the activities of the Polish government in exile in organizing armed resistance to the Red Army units in the territories of Poland and western Ukraine and Belarus being liberated from the German fascists. So, in August 1943, intelligence reported to the leadership of the country a secret document obtained by agents: "Report of the authorized Polish government in exile in London, illegally located on the territory of Poland, on the preparation of anti-Soviet actions by the nationalist underground in connection with the offensive of the Red Army". The document stated that the Polish secret military organization had been re-established on the basis of pre-war dances (cells - ed.) all over Poland. Most of the personnel of the dancers are local residents who have undergone military training.

The secret military organization "Voyskov" in Western Ukraine and Belarus, the report stated, is very concerned about the advance of the Red Army to the West and is planning an uprising in Western Ukraine and Belarus with the arrival of its units there. The representative of the Polish government in exile emphasized in his report that he personally does not believe in the success of such an uprising and knows in advance that it is doomed to failure, nevertheless recommends that this action be carried out "solely for the purpose of showing the whole world unwillingness population to accept the Soviet regime.

The Polish government in exile took a decision on this issue rather quickly. Already on October 12, 1943, foreign intelligence received information that the Polish emigrant

The General Staff in London, with the consent of their government, sent instructions to the Plenipotentiary in Poland to prepare to resist the Red Army when it entered Poland. The armed detachments of the underground Home Army (A.K.), in accordance with these instructions, must "carry on a merciless fight against the pro-Soviet partisan movement in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus and prepare a general uprising in these areas when the Red Army enters there . To fight the partisan movement

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to provide for the use of the Polish police, now officially in the service of the Germans." At the same time, an order was sent to Poland to hide the above instructions from the population, but to excite it in every possible way against the USSR by propagating the thesis that the Russians want to seize all of Poland, close Catholic churches, convert Poles to Orthodox, and send all those who disagree to Siberia.

The Polish General Staff also decided to rename the Polish army into the "Army of National Liberation" and make its main slogan "the fight against communism and plutocracy, for the division of large landowners' estates". The headquarters promised the soldiers after their return to Poland land plots in the amount of 15-20 hectares.

The source of foreign intelligence, who conveyed to her this decision of the Polish government in exile and its general staff, in his message stressed that the adoption of these documents caused a discussion. Not all members of the government agreed with such a line of conduct towards the USSR and the Red Army, which, in their opinion, actually meant preparations for war against the USSR. However, the government in exile declared in response that in its actions it was fully counting on the support of England and the United States, which supposedly knew about these plans and approved of them. According to information available to foreign intelligence, the Polish representatives in London petitioned the British and Americans to put pressure on the Soviet government in order to transfer a number of Ukrainian and Belarusian lands to Poland.

Therefore, the efforts that the Soviet leadership directed in a long diplomatic dialogue with the allies to ensure that a free and democratic post-war Poland was headed by a government consisting of representatives of those social and political forces that waged a genuine struggle for the liberation of their country from the Nazi occupation.

The information received by foreign intelligence indicated that England and the United States were very worried about the Soviet Union breaking off relations with the Polish government in exile in London, which greatly complicated their plans to put this government in power in post-war Poland. It was clear that without the support of the USSR, which liberated Poland from German troops, no government could exist there. Therefore, the allies, primarily the British, did everything possible to force the Soviet leadership to recognize the London government and restore diplomatic relations with it. For these purposes, they, in particular, intended to use the meeting of the "Big Three" in Tehran, which took place on November 28 - December 1, 1943.

Having convincing intelligence information, the Soviet delegation was ready for such maneuvers. When Roosevelt said he would

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to express the hope that "the Soviet government will be able to start negotiations and restore its relations with the Polish government" (meaning the government in exile in London. - Note of the author), Stalin replied: "Agents of the Polish government located in Poland, associated with the Germans. They kill partisans. You can't imagine what they're doing there." Responding to Churchill's statement about England's interest in seeing in post-war Poland a government with which she was bound by obligations that involved England in the war, the head of the Soviet delegation stated that "Russia is not less, but more than others

powers are interested in good relations with Poland, since Poland is a neighbor of Russia. We are for the restoration, for the strengthening of Poland. But we separate Poland from the exiled Polish government in London."

The final point on the question of which government will have power in liberated Poland was put at the Crimean Conference of the heads of governments of the USSR, the USA and England. The Soviet delegation this time was well informed about the plans and intentions of the British and US governments. Literally on the eve of the conference, intelligence reported to the leadership of the country the document it had obtained - a memorandum from the British Foreign Ministry for the Yalta Conference. On the Polish question, the document stated: "To strive for a common government of Poland headed by Mikołajczyk. Link it to the frontier, don't settle the question of borders without resolving the question of government."

The position of the British was to use as pressure the question of the eastern borders of Poland, to achieve a decision on the unification of the two governments and under this flag to dissolve the Provisional Government operating in Poland into the London government in exile.

With this information at their disposal, the Soviet delegation took a flexible position at the conference. She put forward a compromise proposal for the reorganization of the existing Provisional Government in Poland and the creation on its basis of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity by including democratic figures from Poland itself and Poles from abroad. After long discussions, the British and Americans were eventually forced to agree with the formulations proposed by the Soviet delegation, which drew a line under the existence of the Polish government in exile.

Taking into account the interests of the Soviet Union, questions about the borders of Poland were also resolved. At the Tehran Conference of the Leaders of the Three Allied Powers, Stalin stated that the Soviet Union insisted that the Ukrainian lands should go to Ukraine, and the Byelorussian lands to Belarus. Between the USSR and Poland must be restored

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the 1939 border established by the Soviet constitution and roughly following the Curzon Line.

Roosevelt and Churchill agreed in principle with this approach. However, this did not prevent Churchill from trying to press the interests of the USSR in this matter as well. Referring to the fact that the Soviet-Polish border of 1939 in its southern part allegedly did not quite coincide with the Curzon Line, he raised the question of its partial transfer to the east in the area the city of Lvov, so that this city was on the territory of Poland. Having intelligence information, the Soviet delegation was ready for such a demarche of the British. In response to Churchill's statement, Stalin objected that Molotov had an accurate map of the passage of the "Curzon Line" and ordered that it be brought. Molotov laid out a map on the table and read out the text of Curzon's note to the Soviet government of 1920, which stated that "the border line runs approximately like this: Grodno-Yalovka Nemirov-Brest-Litovsk-Dorogusk-Ustilug, east of Grubeshov, through Krylov and further west of Rava Russian, east of Przemyśl to the Carpathians.

Churchill and Eden were unable to object. Addressing Stalin, Churchill said: "Apparently, the conference participants do not have significant differences regarding the western borders of the Soviet Union, including the problem of Lvov..."<sup>6</sup>.

In Tehran and Yalta, the leaders of Britain and the United States agreed with the proposal of the Soviet Union that Poland receive a substantial increase in its territory in the west and north at the expense of defeated Germany.

The decisions of the Crimean Conference were not accepted by the leaders of the émigré government. They tried to defend their claims to power in Poland not so much by political as by force.

your methods.

Foreign intelligence received information that the London government, having agreed to disband the main part of the Home Army subordinate to it, decided to keep small, mobile, well-hidden battle groups. In the order of the commander-in-chief A.K. in this connection it was said:

— to regard the offensive of the Red Army as a new occupation of Poland;

— Do not recognize the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic. The only legal government is the Polish government in London;

- in the changed conditions of the struggle, strive to occupy various posts in the apparatus of the Provisional Government;

- in the conditions of the new occupation, use all legal possibilities, try to take over all sectors of the life of the Provisional Government;

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- Disband the Craiova Army. Release personnel from the oath. Commanders do not legalize. Hide weapons and radio communications. Send compromised persons to other places. Leave well-hidden headquarters underground.

The London government in exile thus adapted the underground structures to the continuation of the armed struggle for power. For this purpose, the underground sabotage-terrorist organization "Liberty and Incorrectness" was formed from the soldiers and officers most devoted to the emigrant government, which operated in Poland until about 1947.

The information that even after the Crimean Conference the London government continued to seek contacts with the German authorities in Poland in order to coordinate the fight against the Red Army was alarming. One of the radiograms of the London government, intended for underground groups, ordered "the cessation of active operations and terrorist actions against the Germans, policemen, officers and soldiers of the SS" and the intensification of "sabotage against the Red Army units".

The Germans agreed to such cooperation. By the end of the war, the fascist leadership of Germany instructed its special services and the military to intensify work on the creation of nationalist formations on the territory of the Eastern European countries to fight against the Soviet troops and state and socio-political structures being created in the liberated countries. To this end, the Germans encouraged the establishment of contacts with underground organizations in Czechoslovakia and Poland, connected with the emigre governments in London. The Germans armed these organizations, in some cases even sent their advisers and instructors to them, pushing them to commit acts of sabotage.

Thus, in February 1944, intelligence received information about negotiations between representatives of the Abwehr, the security police and the SD with underground Polish formations on the provision of German weapons for the "joint struggle against Bolshevism." The Poles expressed the wish that the Polish and German intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies would work in cooperation.

According to military intelligence and SMERSH authorities, there were numerous cases of parachuting of weapons and ammunition by the Germans into the location of underground detachments. Among the prisoners came across and German officers-instructors.

It received foreign intelligence and information about the transfer of weapons and ammunition by the British to the same groups. Their officers were trained in sabotage and subversion in English special schools. The British also sent their instructors directly to combat units. IN

one of the radiograms from the London government in exile contained instructions to keep the presence of

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English officers in the detachments and in no way allow any of them to be captured by the Russians.

The head of the sabotage department of one of the underground organizations, who surrendered, testified that he had been trained in England in two special schools, and then was thrown into Poland on an English plane. In schools, along with training in a sabotage course, he and other students, officers of A.K., were trained in the use of various biochemical preparations and poisons at food industry and water supply facilities.

Another structure on which the Polish government in exile in London relied in the struggle for power was the army of General Anders. This army was created on the territory of the USSR in 1941 mainly from Polish military personnel who were in the Soviet Union after the occupation of Poland by Germany in 1939 in accordance with the Soviet-Polish military agreement signed on August 14, 1941. According to this agreement, the Polish army, whose commander the London government appointed General Anders, was to take part in joint military operations on the Soviet-German front. Financing, equipment and armament of the army were carried out at the expense of the Soviet side. However, the London government evaded its obligations and refused to send parts of Anders' army to the front. In 1942, it insisted on the withdrawal of Anders' army, which by that time numbered more than one hundred thousand people, to Iran and then to Iraq.

Subsequently, this army, under the Anglo-American command, took part in the fighting in Italy. By the end of the war, its number increased to several hundred thousand people at the expense of the Poles who were abroad. Anders declared that he would form an army of a million people. However, the British looked at things more soberly and understood the unreality of such plans. Nevertheless, they hoped that they would be able to obtain from the Soviet Union consent to the repatriation of these military contingents without prior disbandment, which would allow them to exert a significant influence on the development of events in Poland.

The solution of the Polish question, primarily about power and borders, largely depended on what kind of government would be created in Poland, how far it would be possible to fulfill the decision of the Crimean Conference on the establishment of a provisional government of national unity in the country. In Poland, during its liberation by the Soviet Army and units of the Polish Craiova Rada of the People's Army, the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKNO) was created in 1944 - a temporary executive body of people's power in Poland. The committee was formed on a multi-party basis. It included representatives of parties and organizations that took a real part in the struggle

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for the liberation of Poland. The government of the USSR concluded an agreement with the PKNO providing for the transfer of power to it in the liberated Polish territories. Subsequently, the PKNO was transformed by the Craiova Rada Narodova into the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic. His place of residence before the liberation of Warsaw was the city of Lublin. The Allies called this government "Lublin". The Soviet government considered it as a real people's power in liberated Poland and closely cooperated with it on the issues of Poland's life support, taking urgent measures to restore important objects of the national economy, combat crime and banditry, and maintain law and order in the country. The government in exile in London refused to recognize the Provisional Government. In this he was supported for a long time by England and the United States.



Literally the day after the end of the Crimean Conference, Eden sent his ambassador in Moscow, Carr, directive instructions on how to behave when discussing with Molotov the question of the formation of a new Polish government.

The directive stated: "From the point of view of His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States, the main points of the Polish question are as follows:

1. In the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, the various non-Lublin groups of Polish public opinion must be proportionately represented.
2. These groups must be able to exert a real influence not only on the decisions of the new government, but also on the implementation of these decisions.
3. The new government must have the utmost confidence on the part of the anti-Lublin Poles inside Poland and abroad, including, of course, the Polish armed forces under our command, and on the part of the British, American and world public opinion.  
opinions.
4. The new government created in this way must be ensured the existence until the moment of re-elections.
5. Until a new government is set up, the position of the anti-Lublin Poles in Poland must not be damaged in any way."

The directive further stated that Carr "should not hesitate to openly act as a lawyer for other (meaning non-Lublin. — Author's note) Poles located inside Poland and abroad." The directive also named specific names of Polish politicians of the right wing, whom Britain and the United States intended to support. Among them are the head of the Polish government in London, Mikolajczyk, the minister of the same government, Romer, the right-wing politician Grabsky, the leader of the right-wing People's Party Witos, the Polish archbishop, metropolitan

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Krakowski Adam Sapieha and a number of other figures of pre-war bourgeois Poland who were negatively inclined towards the Soviet Union and the Lublin government.

Before the start of the work of the commission, the British, together with Mikolajczyk, prepared a secret list of 35 people, whose candidacies the allies intended to propose during consultations, and seek to include some of these people in the new Polish government. Foreign intelligence, through its agents in London, received this list and sent it to the Soviet government. She gave detailed characteristics of most of the persons included in it.

For the Soviet Union at that time, it was important to achieve the speedy termination of official relations between England and the United States with the London government in exile. Intelligence data on the positions and intentions of England and the United States on the Polish issue allowed Soviet diplomacy, having made a number of reasonable concessions and compromises, to achieve their consent to the creation of a government acceptable to both sides, the core of which was the previously existing Provisional Government of the Polish Republic. .

On June 28, 1945, the Craiova Rada Narodova, following the recommendations jointly developed by the USSR, England and the USA, formed a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity headed by Osobka-Moravsky, in which the main political forces of Poland were represented. Mikolajczyk entered it as a second vice-premier. On July 5, the United States and Great Britain officially recognized the new government of Poland.

The creation of a government of national unity and its recognition by the Western allies was a great success for Soviet diplomacy. It can be said without exaggeration that the

intelligence information played a decisive role here.

The allies, primarily the British, were very concerned about this development in the Polish question. Their plans for a pro-Western Poland were falling apart. On May 11, 1945, Churchill sent a telegram to Truman stating the need to convene a conference of the heads of the three powers to resolve the Polish question. Its content betrays Churchill's extreme anxiety. He emphasized that "it will be easier to solve the Polish problem if it is put in connection with the already numerous, of paramount importance issues that are of an extremely serious nature and require urgent settlement with the Russians. I fear that during the period of the Russian advance deep into Germany, towards the Elbe, terrible things happened. The proposed withdrawal of the American armies to the lines of occupation conditioned with the Russians...would mean a tendency to push the zone of Russian dominance forward 120 miles along a front of 300 or 400 miles. It would be an event (if it happened)

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darkest in history. ... Poland will be completely absorbed and hidden deep in the lands occupied by Russians."

As one of the means to counter the Russian threat, Churchill suggested to Truman not to withdraw troops from their positions until Britain and the United States were satisfied with the question of Poland.

The Berlin (Potsdam) conference of the leaders of the three allied powers - the USSR, Britain and the USA - summed up the allies' debates on the fate of post-war Poland.

Foreign intelligence reported that the London government, with the tacit consent of the British and Americans, was trying to continue its activities. Therefore, the Soviet delegation raised the question of the confirmation by the Western Allies of their recognition of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and the termination of all relations between the Western Allies and the Polish government in exile. England and the United States were forced to assume obligations to protect the interests of the Polish Government of National Unity in relation to property belonging to the Polish state located on their territories, and to facilitate the return to Poland of all Poles who so desired, including members of the Polish armed forces and merchant marine.

The Polish government of national unity undertook to hold free elections in Poland and to give representatives of the allied press the opportunity to cover them without hindrance.'

All attempts by the Western allies to negotiate conditions for themselves to interfere in the internal affairs of Poland were rejected by the Soviet delegation.

At the Potsdam Conference there was a sharp discussion of the question of Poland's western borders. In Tehran and Yalta, Churchill agreed that Poland's post-war frontiers should be moved to the West. At that time, he counted on the fact that the Western allies would eventually succeed in securing the return of the London government to Poland. In Berlin, Churchill had already resisted such transfers of borders. Intelligence data indicated that Churchill would again, as he had done in the Crimea, try to link the issue of borders with the issue of power in Poland and, to this end, would raise the issue of control by the Western Allies of the forthcoming elections of permanent authorities in Poland.

The Soviet delegation made a proposal to invite a delegation of the new government of Poland to Potsdam in order, in accordance with the decisions of the Crimean Conference, to hear the opinion of the Poles regarding the western borders of their state. Churchill long

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and stubbornly objected to such an invitation, but the conference eventually sent him to the Poles.

The Polish delegation at the Potsdam Conference was headed by Bolesław Bierut, President of the Craiova Rada of the Polish People's Republic. It included Mikołajczyk and Grabski, the politicians whose entry into the Polish government was insisted on by Eden in the above-mentioned letter to Carr, the British ambassador in Moscow. Thus, it was difficult for the Allies to accuse the Polish delegation of being one-sided and biased. Speaking on behalf of all Poles, the Polish delegation substantiated the requirements of the national interests of the country for the passage of the western border of Poland along the Oder-Western Neisse line.

In view of the stubborn unwillingness of Churchill, who was also supported by Truman, the conference did not make a final decision on the transfer of Eastern German lands to Poland. In the final resolution on Poland, the heads of the three allied governments only confirmed their opinion that the final determination of Poland's western frontier should be postponed until a peace conference. At the same time, the Soviet delegation managed to insist on the inclusion in this resolution of a provision that until the final determination of the western border of Poland, these lands should be under the control of the Polish state and should not be considered part of the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany.

Such a compromise suited both the Soviet and Polish sides. De facto, he established the passage of the border along the Oder-Western Neisse line.

The Western powers failed to revive pre-war Poland, hostile to our country. A considerable merit in this belongs to foreign intelligence, which during the war years managed to provide the leadership of the country with the information it needed for prompt decision-making.

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## Hungarian motifs on Turkish soil

1943 marked a turning point in World War II. Fascist Germany suffered setbacks in all theaters of operations, but it suffered its main defeats on the Eastern Front. The exit of Soviet troops to the borders of the states of Eastern and Central Europe was only a matter of time. The collapse of the Third Reich was not far off. Under these conditions, the allies and satellites of Nazi Germany began feverishly looking for ways to get out of the war and conclude a separate peace with England and the USA.

Italy was the first to solve this problem, which after a series of negotiations with the allies of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition in September 1943 withdrew from the war. At the same time, representatives of royal Romania tried to establish unofficial contacts with the Soviet government. At the same time, monarcho-fascist Bulgaria became more active, sending one after another its emissaries to Istanbul, Casablanca, Cairo for secret meetings with the Anglo-Americans. The fact that Germany was no longer able to win the war was also understood in the inner circle of the regent of Hungary, Horthy. They decided that it was time to follow the example of Germany's other allies, and began to make persistent attempts to establish secret contacts with representatives of England and the United States to discuss the conditions for Hungary's withdrawal from the war.

Soviet intelligence was given the task of closely following the secret talks between the representatives of Germany's allied states with the Anglo-Americans and comprehensively covering their content.

The aspirations of his allies were, of course, no secret to Hitler either. Entries in the diary of German Propaganda Minister Goebbels speak eloquently about this. He wrote: "The Finnish, Romanian and Hungarian press reported the betrayal of Italy without any

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comments. It is quite clear that Finland, Romania and Hungary have taken a wait-and-see position..." A few days later, the following entry appeared in his diary: "As for the possible betrayal by other states, it is clear that Horthy (Regent of Hungary) definitely wants to leave us. But the Führer has already taken the necessary measures against this..."

In the summer of 1944, German and Romanian troops suffered a heavy defeat during the Iasi-Kishinev operation, in which the armies of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts completely defeated the Southern Ukraine Army Group. 22 German and almost all Romanian divisions that were at the front were destroyed. Romania fell out of the enemy coalition. On August 23, 1944, a popular liberation uprising broke out in Bucharest, and the Antonescu dictatorship was overthrown. The dictator himself was arrested by the palace guards and isolated from his supporters. King Mihai was secretly brought to a safe house of the Communist Party of Romania, where he was provided with security. There he waited for the victorious end of the uprising.

Foreign intelligence timely informed the Soviet leadership about the aggravation of contradictions between the Romanian King Mihai and Antonescu. She reported on the growing discontent of the population in connection with the huge losses suffered by the Romanian army on the Eastern Front, the behavior of the Germans and the actions of the military administration.

Hitler was beside himself with rage, he ordered to bomb Bucharest, to find and save Antonescu, to arrest Mihai, who had betrayed him, but it was too late: the Soviet troops were rapidly approaching Bucharest. On September 12, Romania signed an armistice agreement with the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition and opposed Germany.

On September 19, 1944, Finland's turn came - she severed relations with Berlin and withdrew from the war. Ten days earlier, as a result of a popular uprising, the monarcho-fascist regime in Bulgaria fell, which included the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. The Bulgarian army is

resisted, and the people joyfully greeted their liberators. Bulgaria ended the war on 9 September.

The last vassal of Nazi Germany in the center of Europe was Hungary, whose soldiers continued to fight against the Soviet Army. Budapest still hoped that Hungary would succeed without much difficulty in negotiating a separate peace with the Anglo-Americans, taking into account the common interest in preventing Soviet troops from entering Central Europe. They hoped for W. Churchill, remembering his plans for the landing of the Anglo-American troops in the Balkans.

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The first attempts to establish unofficial contacts with representatives of England and the USA were made by the Hungarians in 1943 in Lisbon, Bern, Stockholm and the Vatican, but they did not give concrete results. At the initiative of Budapest, further steps towards negotiations with the Anglo-Americans were made in Istanbul, the business and financial center of Turkey.

This country as a place for secret contacts was chosen by the Hungarians not by chance. During the war, Turkey, despite its officially declared neutrality, took an openly pro-German position. On June 18, 1941, that is, four days before the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, the Turkish government concluded a pact of friendship and non-aggression with Berlin, clearly directed against the USSR. negotiations on the possible participation of Turkish troops in the war against the USSR and were preparing for it.

The fact that in the end Turkey was still not drawn into the war against the USSR is explained by the defeats of the Germans near Stalingrad and in the Caucasus. Under the influence of the victories of the Red Army and under pressure from the United States and England, the Turkish government on February 24, 1945, just two and a half months before the surrender of Germany, announced that Turkey was at war with Germany and Japan. Turkish President İsmet İnönü frankly admitted on November 1, 1945: "Our entry into the war against the Germans happened only at the wish of the Allies. They must have been interested in it if they demanded it from us."

During the war years, Soviet intelligence stations operated in Turkey in Istanbul and Ankara, as well as an intelligence post in Kars near the Soviet-Turkish border. The Istanbul residency was considered the main one. The center demanded that the forces and means of the residencies be directed to obtaining information about Turkey's military plans and preparations on our border. The Turkish authorities did everything to block the activities of Soviet intelligence, and the conditions for the work of Soviet intelligence were difficult.

In 1941, the "legal" residency in Istanbul was headed by Georgy Ivanovich Mordvinov. He was born in 1896 in Transbaikalia into a poor peasant family, from an early age he worked as an auxiliary worker at a factory, served as a messenger in a shop in Chita. During the First World War in 1915 he was drafted into the army and fought at the front as part of a team of mounted scouts. In 1918 he worked in the Trans-Baikal Cheka, and in 1926 he worked in the Cheka of Crimea. After switching to work in foreign intelligence, he was sent to Mongolia, and then to China. In 1937, he was dismissed from the security agencies for disagreeing with the arrest of one of the employees for whom he vouched. At that time, this was an act that required a lot of

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civic courage. In 1938 he studied at the Institute of Red Professors and worked in the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

In 1940, Mordvinov was again in foreign intelligence. Soon he was sent to Turkey, where at first he experienced considerable difficulties: his lack of knowledge of the Turkish language and local peculiarities affected him. Gradually, he got involved in active work, directed a number of critical operations, and participated in them himself.

In February 1942, according to reports, the German secret services, in cooperation with the Turkish, organized a staged assassination attempt on the German ambassador von Papen. Two goals were pursued: to undermine the official neutrality of Turkey and push the Turkish government to enter the war against the USSR, as well as to compromise the Soviet representatives by presenting them as terrorists.

Recently, in some publications, the version about the involvement of Soviet intelligence in organizing the assassination attempt on von Papen has become widespread, repeating the statements of the Turkish authorities. There are no documents in the archives of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service that testify in favor of this version.

On February 24, 1942, an explosion occurred on Ataturk Boulevard in Ankara, killing a man who was carrying an explosive device. The deceased, who turned out to be a Bulgarian, was found by the police to have a pistol with blank cartridges. At the time of the explosion, von Papen was outside the range of the bomb fragments. Nevertheless, the Turkish authorities immediately announced that an assassination attempt had been made on the German ambassador. Meanwhile, about a hundred meters from the scene of the incident, von Papen was waiting for the car of the German military attaché. The German representatives later summoned to court as witnesses asserted that the car had been there "completely by accident".

Demonstrating unprecedented efficiency, the police detained a student Abdurakhman and a hairdresser Suleiman a day later, who, like the one who died in the explosion, were immediately declared to be communists involved in a terrorist act. Soon the employees of the USSR trade mission Pavlov and Kornilov (resident staff) were arrested. They were charged with being "involved in organizing the assassination". The Soviet Consulate General in Istanbul and the embassy in Ankara were cordoned off by the gendarmerie, a raid was organized on our diplomatic couriers, and a new wave of anti-Soviet hype was raised in the press. Mordvinov was also arrested.

The trial at the Vankar Criminal Court was accompanied by gross violations of procedural norms. The accused were not given the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the materials of the preliminary investigation; the testimony of "witnesses" was not translated into Russian. Thus, the accused Abdurakhman testified in court during

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six hours, and the translation of these testimonies for Pavlov fit in 15 minutes. The prosecutor defiantly ignored testimonies and documents that could be interpreted in favor of Soviet citizens.

The testimonies of Turkish citizens, both those accused in the case and numerous witnesses, were full of contradictions, fabrications and an obvious desire to slander Pavlov and Kornilov. For example, one of the witnesses "identified" Pavlov as the tenant of an apartment, although Kornilov actually rented this apartment, and Pavlov, according to the owner of the apartment, had never been there. The same Abdurakhman claimed in court that he saw Kornilov in Ankara in September 1941, while the latter ended up in the Turkish capital only in January 1942.

In the end, the court did what was required of it, and recognized Pavlov and Kornilov as "the organizers of the assassination attempt on von Papen." They were each sentenced to 20 years in prison. The secondary trial ordered by the decision of the Court of Cassation resulted in the reduction of the sentence to 16 years and 8 months. Mordvinov was sentenced to 6 years in prison.

During the investigation and trial, the Soviet intelligence officers denied the trumped-up charges brought against them, and behaved steadfastly and with dignity. Nevertheless, the provocation with the assassination attempt on the German ambassador and the subsequent trials of Soviet citizens could not but affect the activity of Soviet intelligence in Turkey, and the residencies, with the consent of the Center, were forced to temporarily curtail intelligence activities.

Meanwhile, Nazi Germany on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War suffered one defeat after another, and on August 2, 1944, the Turkish Majlis decided to break off diplomatic relations with Germany. On the same day he approved the decision to release Pavlov, Kornilov and Mordvinov from prison. They spent more than two years in prison. The government of the USSR and the Soviet diplomatic missions in Turkey all this time tried to secure their release!

After Mordvinov's arrest, the residency was headed by his deputy, Mikhail Matveyevich Baturin. He had years of work in counterintelligence agencies in Azerbaijan and Georgia behind him. In 1929 he graduated from the Higher Border School in Moscow, and in 1937 he entered the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, where he studied Turkish and French, and mastered Turkish perfectly. In 1940 Baturin was sent to Turkey.

The experience of serving in the security agencies helped Baturin quickly acquire the skills of recruiting work abroad, and after some time he managed to attract several useful sources of information to cooperate with intelligence.

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Although it was not possible to solve all the assigned tasks, nevertheless, Soviet intelligence in Turkey managed to obtain useful documentary materials and reliable information, including about the connections of Turkish intelligence with the intelligence services of the United States and England, their joint activities against the USSR, about British agents in Turkey, as well as about the secret contacts of the allies of the USSR with the emissaries of the satellites of Germany, who appeared in Istanbul.

The objects of reconnaissance penetration of our residencies in Istanbul and Ankara were, in particular, Hungarian foreign missions. Both the Germans and the Hungarians felt relaxed and free in Turkey. Istanbul was an ideal meeting place that could be hidden from prying eyes. There were simultaneously representatives of the warring parties: the USA, Great Britain, the USSR and Germany, as well as its satellites - Hungary, Bulgaria and other countries. Istanbul was full of foreigners. In the crooked, narrow streets, among the countless shops and stalls of merchants, many offices and various agencies, it was not difficult to get lost in the crowds of the colorful oriental bazaar. True, the Turkish counterintelligence actively used the merchants and artisans of Istanbul to monitor this or that foreigner, if he fell into her field of vision.

The Hungarians chose the Istanbul restaurant "Tirol" for friendly meetings, which was famous for its meat dishes. Here, in a narrow circle of "friends", Hungarian diplomats, businessmen, employees of the Danube shipping agency and visitors who came from Budapest discussed official business, had frank conversations and exchanged views on political issues. The agent of our residency was one of "friends" in this circle and recorded everything that could be of interest to Soviet intelligence. He also visited the Antalya restaurant from time to time, where the wives of those who sat at the table in the Tyrol gathered and chatted in a friendly way. He often received useful information there.

Soviet intelligence learned that the Hungarians had chosen Istanbul as a place for confidential contacts with the Anglo-Americans. One of the agents of the residency, a diplomat of a foreign mission, having finished his business, put copies of the documents that had passed through his hands in recent days into a briefcase, and went out into the street. Istanbul lived its usual life, the port was buzzing, merchants were shouting, inviting buyers, peddlers of newspapers were scurrying between cars and cabbies, the minarets of the famous Istanbul mosques rose against the blue sky. The diplomat leisurely strolled through the malls, went into a cafe to drink a cup of fragrant, Turkish-style strong coffee. After sitting at a table and looking through the evening newspapers, he continued on his way, took a taxi and asked the driver to take him to the other end of the city. At the entrance to the crooked street, the passenger paid and disappeared around the corner.

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Towards him was a foreigner in a hat with the same briefcase as our hero's in his hand. It was an employee of our residency, Sergei, who, not paying attention to the diplomat walking towards him, carefully watched what was happening behind him. Everything was, in professional terms, "clean". Coming level, they accidentally touched each other for a moment. Sergei already had a briefcase of a diplomat with documents in his hand, and he was leaving with a briefcase of a scout, where there was a stipulated amount in British pounds sterling. Turning into a side lane, Sergei got into a car waiting for him and headed to the residency.

Baturin, having read the delivered documents, praised the scout. "There is a serious political game going on, Sergei," he said. — It is important not to miss anything and quickly report to Moscow. Suspicious fuss is being waged behind the back of the Soviet Union, the allies are showing themselves to be double-dealers. We need to make sure that the last German satellite, Hungary, does not agree on a separate peace with them." "Everything is clear," Sergei replied. "I'm sure our source won't let you down. He knows his business, Mikhail Matveyevich!"

The information received spoke about the visit to Istanbul of the famous Hungarian biochemist, Nobel Prize winner Professor Albert Szent-Györgyi in February 1943. He arrived in Istanbul with the consent of the regent Horthy and the head of the Hungarian government, Kallai, and acted in contacts with representatives of England and the United States as an envoy of liberal and democratic organizations in Hungary. During his conversations with them, the professor sounded out the attitude of the Anglo-Americans to the proposal of the ruling circles of Hungary for her withdrawal from the war on certain conditions. Szent-Györgyi informed his negotiating partners that Budapest was ready to start hostilities against the German troops as soon as the Allied divisions were on the southern borders of Hungary. He hinted that he might lead a new democratic government in Hungary.

It soon became clear that the Szent-Györgyi mission was only a trial balloon. In the future, he did not take part in negotiations with the Anglo-Americans. (After the end of the war, the biochemist went to the USA and received American citizenship.)

Of no less interest to the Soviet leadership were negotiations with representatives of the allies of the Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Laszlo Veres, and the Hungarian military attaché in Turkey, Otto Hatz (Hatzegi). Their result was an agreement to come to Istanbul to continue secret contacts with the Anglo-Americans of a group of Hungarian military experts, as well as to establish radio communications between Budapest and Istanbul.

However, time passed, and the allies could not get concrete results in negotiations with the Hungarians, and this began to annoy the British. W. Churchill's plans for the landing of the Anglo-American

landing

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those in the Balkans became ghostly, and the Soviet Army, meanwhile, was approaching Romania and in a short time could reach the borders of Hungary.

This is how the outline of events appeared from the reports of Soviet intelligence. In August 1944, Laszlo Veres unexpectedly reappeared in Istanbul and told the British that he represented Prime Minister Kallai, Minister of the Interior Kerestes-Fischer, Chief of the General Staff of Szombathelyi and Deputy Foreign Minister Masak in negotiations with them. He also said that before leaving for Turkey, he was received by Kallai and Masak, who authorized him to tell his partners that they were sincerely striving to negotiate a separate peace with the allies. The British, however, were wary of the words of Laszlo Veres and double-checked his authority through the Hungarian consul in Istanbul Uzhvari, who was associated with them. The latter confirmed that the emissary from Budapest was in fact instructed to negotiate and that he had a confidential message from the Hungarian government with him.

Convinced that the Hungarian side was serious this time, the British involved the adviser of their embassy, Sterndal, in the negotiations with Laszlo Veres. In the presence of the consul



Uzvari Veres handed Sterndal a message from his government. Hungary, it said, agreed to unconditional surrender, and the Hungarian army was ready to defend the country's borders from a possible German invasion and help the Allied forces enter Hungary. Budapest agreed to provide the Anglo-American troops with airfields and all other military installations that would be necessary during the operation.

On September 9, Councilor Sterndahl delivered the following reply to Veresch:

"1) His Majesty's Government desires to see as representatives of Hungary certain senior and authorized negotiators, whose names may be published when the Hungarian Government considers it convenient.

2) His Majesty's Government expects the Hungarian Government to announce at an opportune moment that it agrees to surrender unconditionally and proceed as soon as possible to the measures proposed by the Hungarian Government in its message.

3) If the Hungarian government considers that the time has not come for announcing unconditional surrender, then it will obviously have to break with Germany in the near future and provide assistance to the allied forces in order to delay the actions of the Germans and prevent acts of sabotage from their sides.

If the Hungarian Government accepts the third paragraph, then His Majesty's Government is ready to communicate the forms and means of its implementation through the Hungarian military representative in Istanbul, as recommended by Veres.

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The message from the British side demanded radical decisions from the Hungarians, and Veres assured Sterndal that he would immediately go to Budapest to report to Prime Minister Kallai and hoped for a positive result. He offered to keep in touch during his absence by radio. However, after the departure of Veresch, there was a pause in the Anglo-Hungarian negotiations. The reason was the dissension in the ruling elite of Hungary, and on September 29, 1944, Veres radioed the British from Budapest that Regent Horthy and Prime Minister Kallay were informed of the content of the negotiations that he was conducting in Istanbul, and "take into account all the possible consequences of their eventual solutions". He also reported that Consul Uzhvari had been summoned to Budapest to discuss the problem as a whole and would return to Istanbul with detailed information. Veres considered it necessary to emphasize in the radiogram that the equipment for radio and telegraph communication was installed in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and was under the personal control of the minister.

However, Uzvari did not appear in Istanbul, and Veres again radioed his partners that the Hungarian representative in Stockholm had informed Budapest about the establishment of contact with the allies. In this regard, he asked, what could this mean? The British realized that the Hungarians were playing for time and that their fear of the entry of the Red Army into Hungary was intertwined with the fear of retaliatory actions on the part of the Germans if the secret negotiations came out.

On October 6, Veresch informed the British partners that Uzhvari's return to Istanbul was scheduled for October 15, and stressed that "things are progressing with difficulty" due to hesitation in Budapest, where they fear harsh measures from the Germans, and also take into account the striving - a solid offensive of the Russians and the slowness of the allies in Italy. Moreover, Veresch's radiogram contained a hint of a possible conclusion of peace between the Nazis and the Russians. It was clear that the Hungarians would like to hasten the Anglo-Americans with a decision on a separate peace without declaring an unconditional surrender on their part.

The next day, the British sent a reply to Budapest: "Your kind message shows that the situation is serious. We have repeatedly informed London that Budapest must now make a choice between the Allies and Germany. If Budapest suddenly refuses now, then London may reject all attempts in the future, and we will never

no longer be able to convince London of the seriousness of Budapest. If Uzhvari loses time, then we are afraid that London will break all ties. These actions of Callai and some of his friends may cause damage to Hungary from which it will not recover for generations. Personally, you have performed your task boldly and admirably." The British reinforced their threats

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In a nutshell: a few days later, Anglo-American aircraft dropped tons of high-explosive bombs on the cities of Hungary.

Information obtained by intelligence about the Anglo-Hungarian secret negotiations on October 13, 1944 was reported to Stalin, Molotov and Beria. As for Laszlo Veres, he was in Soviet captivity and during interrogations claimed that he had always been an opponent of the war and "sympathized with the entry of the Red Army into Hungary."

Along with confidential contacts with the British, as early as September 1943 the Hungarians began secret negotiations with the American representatives in Turkey. For this purpose, the Hungarian military attache in Bulgaria, Otto Hatz, arrived in Istanbul from Sofia.

"Gentlemen," he said to the assistant US naval attache and the officers accompanying him, "I am not authorized to conduct political negotiations. I can only report the conversation with you to my superiors. If I am instructed to continue negotiations, I will soon return to Istanbul to renew contact." The Americans asked Hatz some follow-up questions about the German forces in Hungary, and suggested that the Hungarian keep in touch with the portable radios they were willing to provide.

The chief of the Hungarian military intelligence was informed about the content of the conversation with the Americans, who approved of Hatz's actions and recommended to continue contact. After some time, Hatz was transferred from Sofia to Istanbul. During negotiations with the Americans, he was given the task of asking them to convey to him the demand for Hungary's withdrawal from the war in writing, and also to ensure the presence of a representative of the American intelligence leadership at further meetings with him.

During another meeting with the Americans, Hatz told them that Hungary was looking for a way out of the war, but at the moment it could not break with Germany, since the Allied forces were far from its borders, and the Nazis would immediately occupy Hungary when the situation worsened. To recall the Hungarian divisions from the front to counter the Germans is now impossible for objective reasons.

The Americans, however, demanded that Hungary decide to break with Germany and come out against her. They refrained from making any promises to the Hungarians. This caused disappointment in Budapest, and there it was considered best to gradually wind down the secret negotiations with the Americans.

The Abwehr became aware of the informal contacts between the Hungarians and the Americans in Istanbul, and its boss Canaris "chided" his Hungarian colleagues "for their naivety", he recommended them to "leave empty ideas so as not to provoke negative consequences." For their part, the Hungarians justified themselves, emphasizing in a conversation with Canaris,

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that "they only wanted to find out in negotiations with the Americans the plans for an Anglo-American invasion of Hungary."

Undoubtedly, the meeting with Canaris influenced the position of the Hungarians, and Hatz told the Americans that further contacts with them were becoming "extremely risky" and that henceforth negotiations should be carried out through diplomatic channels. The reaction of the Americans was unequivocal: "This means that you have decided to break with us. Keep in mind that the bombing of Hungarian cities by our

aviation will follow immediately." Hutz flinched at this, but what could he do? He was just following orders.

In November 1944, he crossed the front line and surrendered to representatives of the Soviet Army. After the war, Hatz served on the general staff of the new Hungarian army and died in the mid-1970s.

Despite the changed situation and the failure of the negotiations in Istanbul, the Horthy leadership of Hungary did not abandon attempts to negotiate with the Anglo-Americans until the last moment. In September 1944, Colonel-General Nadai, Horthy's confidant, made contact with representatives of the headquarters of the allied forces in Europe. But he was told: "The Red Army is fighting on Hungarian territory, and it is now expedient to conduct any negotiations with its command." This advice was accepted, and a few days later, behind the backs of the Germans, Budapest sent a Hungarian delegation to Moscow, headed by the former military attache of Hungary in the USSR Gabor Farago. She tried to negotiate optimal conditions for the Hungarians to get out of the war. Moscow, of course, understood that the Hungarians were bargaining in order to gain time: they wanted, under the guise of negotiations, to withdraw their troops with minimal losses, which fell into the "Transylvanian Sack" thanks to the joint actions of the Soviet Army and the Romanian troops who had gone over to its side. parts.

The Hungarian delegation was unequivocally stated that it could only be the surrender of the Hungarian army and the withdrawal of its divisions from Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. At the end of September 1944, troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front entered the Hungarian border town of Mako.

In the winter days of late 1944 - early 1945, there were fierce battles in the area of \u200b\u200bLakes Velence and Balaton, where our troops withstood three powerful enemy counterattacks. In total, the fighting on Hungarian soil lasted about six months. The encircled Hungarian-German group was given an ultimatum with a proposal to lay down their arms in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed.

Years later, Marshal of the R.J. Malinovsky recalled how parliamentarians went to the headquarters of the blockaded enemy troops with an appeal from the Soviet command: from the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Captain I.A. Ostapenko, from the 2nd Ukrainian Front - Captain Miklos Steinmetz. "With Miklós Steinmetz," said Marshal Ma

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Linovsky, - we met back in Spain. He is a Hungarian by nationality, but lived with his father in the Soviet Union. And he fought as a citizen of our country in Spain just like Mate Zalka... And then they fought together on his native Hungarian land... I myself saw him off with an appeal, I myself shook his hand for good luck. He left cheerful, jubilant, grateful to us for the commission."

The Nazis and their Hungarian henchmen rejected the ultimatum: I.A. Ostapenko and Miklós Steinmetz were vilely shot in the back. Retribution was not long in coming: a flurry of artillery fire fell upon the Hungarian German positions.

Despite the armistice agreement signed on January 20, 1945 between the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and Hungary, the enemy grouping in Budapest continued to put up fierce resistance. After the liberation of Budapest on February 13, the double game of the Hungarians was put to an end. A separate peace did not work out.

As a result of additional study of archival materials of the SVR, it was established that Mordvinov and Pavlov are one and the same person, since Pavlov is the surname under which Mordvinov worked in Turkey.

Behind enemy lines - Ferenc Pataky

On the evening of August 18, 1943, a PE-8 bomber took off from the runway of an airfield near Moscow and began to fly into the darkening sky, heading southwest. In addition to the crew, there were seven reconnaissance paratroopers on the plane, aged from twenty-four to thirty years old, only the eldest of them, Yan, looked to be about fifty. Several state security officers accompanied the paratroopers. The youngest of the scouts tried to tell, apparently, something funny to his neighbor, but he did not respond to the joke. Almost everyone was silently focused, many thought about what awaited them at the place of release. Yang carefully looked at his comrades, once again wondering if he was mistaken in them and how they would behave in emergency situations. Jan had no doubt that he had made the right choice, but what surprises did fate have in store for them?

The navigator looked out into the cabin and gave a sign: the plane was over the target - the slope of Mount Menchul (Transcarpathia). The senior lieutenant of state security opened the side door. A powerful jet of air hit my face. Yawning Darkness Yang stepped first. The rest of the paratroopers followed him one by one. The Chekists accompanying the scouts threw cargo containers through the open door, and the plane was empty at once.

The carefully prepared operation of Yan's group did not start quite as expected, although such a possibility was not ruled out. A gusty wind scattered the group, and threw some of the reconnaissance paratroopers onto the pine trees above a rocky cliff. Special dexterity was required, so that, freeing the parachute lines, not to break into the gorge. After losing a lot of time, the group finally gathered around Jan. Everything was in order, except for one thing: an officer included in the sabotage and reconnaissance group, the Slovak Vaclav Cemper, broke his leg.

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- Hurts badly?

"I'll break off the branch and get better, comrade chief."

Yang shook his head doubtfully. Zemper was supposed to infiltrate Bratislava (Slovakia) and there, acting on his own, proceed to carry out a special mission. But is he good enough now?

Jan thought that the group would be lucky if they managed to get to a safe house in one of the surrounding villages, where Vaclav would receive medical assistance and he could wait for his recovery.

It also turned out that one container with clothes, equipment and a walkie-talkie was taken to the outskirts of a nearby village, where gendarmes kept scurrying about. As soon as they find the cargo bag, they will organize a pursuit and try to surround the mountain where the troops landed. Jan ordered to leave the dangerous area along a barely noticeable rocky path.

The gendarmes arrived when there was no one else on the mountain, but this did not mean that they had stopped searching. An urgent message was sent to Budapest about the discovery of an enemy landing and that the gendarmerie would organize its pursuit.

Walking ahead and looking back at the fighters who supported the limping Vaclav, Jan - this is how the intelligence coded Ferenc Pataky - remembered his far from simple life, which led him to the Carpathian mountains in his sixties.

He was born in 1892 in a small town near Timisoara (Romania) in the family of a carpenter. At the age of six he was left an orphan. He was sent to an orphanage, later assigned at the expense of the municipality to a teacher's seminary, which he successfully graduated from. However, he failed to find a position as a teacher in Budapest, and Ferenc entered the factory as a laborer.

From the beginning of the First World War, he was called up and sent to officer courses, after which he was sent to the front line with the rank of ensign. Near Przemyśl, where the troops of General Brusilov broke through the position of the Austro-Hungarian defense and developed the offensive, Pataky was captured and was sent to a prisoner of war camp near Krasnoyarsk. There he worked at a local factory and became close to the Bolsheviks. After the revolution, in 1918, F. Pataky accepted Soviet citizenship and became a member of the RCP(b). Soon he was elected a member of the Bureau of the Foreign Communist-Bolshevik Section of the Krasnoyarsk Provincial Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Chairman of the Joint Executive Committee of Foreign Workers from former prisoners of war.

Captured by the Kolchak White Guards, Pataki, along with other Krasnoyarsk activists, fell into the "echelon of death", slowly moving east. The choice of those arrested was not great: either death from hunger, cold, illness, or execution at the final station of the route. But Pataki was lucky. At the Zabitui station, not far from Cheremkhovo, Siberian partisans liberated more than two hundred

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prisoners. The headquarters of the partisan movement was formed, headed by Pataki.

As soon as Soviet power was restored in Cheremkhovo, Ferenc Pataki became chairman of the new revolutionary committee. Later, he joined the Irkutsk Gubchek, was transferred to Moscow as deputy head of the department for combating banditry, and then appointed head of the border guard department.

By order of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, F. Pataki was sent to administrative and economic work in the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) of the USSR. For several years he worked at large construction sites in Uzbekistan, after which he returned to Moscow.

In 1938, Pataki was expelled from the party on slanderous accusations of having links with the Trotskyists. He was blamed for the fact that he "failed to recognize in a timely manner the true political faces" of some of his acquaintances.

Pataki had to go through a lot in the following years. There is no information in this regard in the file, except for a brief mention of his filing an appeal in 1941 with a request to reconsider his own business.

Ferenc Pataky met the war of 1941 while working in the planning and economic department of the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition. The Soviet Union has long become a new homeland for Pataki, attachment to which could not shake the bitterness of an unjust decision. He was full of energy and decided to defend the Fatherland with weapons in his hands, using his life experience, knowledge of German, Hungarian and ROMANIAN LANGUAGES.

Pataki made a statement to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Ministry of Defense, proposing to use its capabilities for sabotage and reconnaissance work behind enemy lines. Previously, Pataki believed, he should have been placed in a prisoner of war camp in order to strengthen the skills of foreign colloquial speech, to study the behavior of captured soldiers, to learn about the order in the Nazi army and the mood of its servicemen.

Pataky was impatiently waiting for the answer, which was somewhat delayed. From the archive raised his personal file. There was an interdepartmental correspondence: Pataki's statement got to the intelligence chief P.M. Fitin, and then from him to experienced scouts A.M. Korotkov and P.M. Zhuravlev.

Having studied the materials on Pataki, Zhuravlev reported to Korotkov: "We should enroll in intelligence and begin preparations for being thrown into the rear." "Invite him, I want to talk to him personally," Korotkov suggested to Zhuravlev.

On a frosty February morning in 1942, the Pataki were waiting at the Lubyanka. After introducing himself and shaking hands with Pataki, Korotkov asked him a few general questions and got to the heart of the matter.

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— How are you, Ferenc Vladislavovich? Are you still eager to fight?

“Russia is more to me than the Motherland. Here I found myself, met love, my children were born here. If not me, then who will protect her at this hour? Give any task, and you will be convinced that the old Chekist Pataki can still come in handy.

- I do not doubt that. But what do you say, Ferenc Vladislavovich, if we expand the scope of the assignment?

- What do you mean, comrade chief?

- We suggest you lead a reconnaissance group. We will clarify the composition and area of \u200b\u200bits action.

- I agree. I would only ask you to introduce me to the members of the group in advance.

- It's decided, start preparing the task.

Korotkov and Pataki shook hands once more.

Intensive training began, in particular, training in parachuting, conducted in the unit of Colonel Serebryansky Fourth Directorate of the NKVD. Yang's group needed clothes and underwear, weapons and equipment, medicines and foodstuffs of foreign production, taken from the warehouses of the same Fourth Directorate. In addition, the group was given four walkie-talkies: two of the NABLA 2 type, powered by an alternating current network and batteries with a radius of up to two thousand kilometers, and two of the BELKA 44 type, powered by batteries with a range, as they were assured in Moscow , up to 800 km. Documents were prepared with which scouts could go on a mission.

The management of the department, in agreement with the head of intelligence, selected five people for Yan's group. They were natives of Transcarpathia - Rusyns, Transcarpathian Ukrainians, fluent in the local language, as well as in Hungarian and Slovak. Some of them, as members of the International Brigades, were fired upon in the Spanish Civil War, went into exile in the coal mines of Belgium. In general, people gathered hardened and experienced.

Further study of the candidates for Yan's group showed that the most mature fighter, the internationalist Shugai, had organizational skills, and he was trained for the role of deputy head of the group. This was all the more necessary, since in the future it was planned to leave part of the main group in the Carpathians - a deputy, a radio operator, two signalmen - and Yan himself with one of the radio operators to leave for Budapest.

The need for intelligence information was enormous, and intelligence sought to use this opportunity to somehow satisfy it.

The task for Yan, coordinated by Fitin with People's Commissar Merkulov, provided, for example, obtaining information about

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the political course of the Hungarian government and the changes outlined in it due to the complication of the general military-political situation, data on the activities of political parties, groups and prominent public figures of the country, including their attitude towards the government. Facts of manifestation of dissatisfaction of the Hungarian population with the policy of the government and its activities. The assessment by the population of the cooperation of the Hungarian authorities with the fascist

Germany and growing dissatisfaction with this alliance due to the deteriorating military situation. Fermentation in the country among national minorities. Hungary's relations with neighboring states, especially Romania. position in the country's economy.

Even under the most favorable conditions in peacetime, the work of an effective, proven agent network would be required to answer all the questions posed. What did Jan have to count on? In intelligence, they could not help but understand that his task was difficult, but they decided not to reduce the requirements. It was assumed that he would use some of the connections of the Budapest residency to obtain the necessary information, having previously made sure that they had not failed, and also acquire new sources of information, using his previous acquaintances for this purpose.

Having settled in the area of Uzhgorod-Mukachevo-Sevlyusha (Vinogradovo) - Khust, Jan's group was replenished by local partisans and soon made itself felt. The first echelons flew downhill, in particular, with materials and equipment intended for the construction of a defensive rampart on the path of the Red Army.

Then Jan and the radio operator went to Budapest and settled in safe houses. Jan made inquiries about persons of interest to him, got acquainted with the Hungarian military. He looked with interest at the city from which he left more than thirty years ago. Once familiar houses and streets looked different, and he hardly recognized his native places.

Meanwhile, the gendarmes in the Carpathians stepped up to stop the activities of the sabotage reconnaissance group. A gendarme agent in the village of Khust drew attention to the fact that in a house on the outskirts of the village the door was often opened and closed. Unknown people came to the house. "No other than partisans," thought the spy. "We must warn the chief of gendarmes." Closer to midnight, when the partisans washed in the bathhouse and went to bed, the gendarmes attacked those surrounded in the house, a shootout broke out, and hand grenades flew. Part of the partisan scouts was killed, the survivors were taken to the district gendarmerie department. Mass arrests of the local population, suspected of having links with the partisans, were immediately carried out.

The beatings and torture of the gendarmes snatched from the arrested people information that he led the anti-fascist underground in the territory of Transcarpathia

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In the ancient Ukraine, someone "Feri-Bachi" (Uncle Fedya), "Fyodor Vladimirovich", "Popovich" ~ the names under which Pataki acted. However, none of his contacts gave out his address in Budapest. At best, the gendarmes knew his approximate verbal portrait. They were alert, although the information received was not enough to capture Yang.

Chance helped the gendarmes. In March 1944, by order of Hitler, the Wehrmacht troops occupied Hungary as a punishment for the separate negotiations between the Hungarians and the Anglo-American allies. Mixed German-Hungarian checkpoints were set up on the roads. Mikhail, Jan's radio operator, was returning to Budapest after another fruitless radio session with the Center outside the city, but was detained at the outpost. He was in the uniform of a Hungarian soldier, with a properly issued leave certificate that did not arouse suspicion. The radio was placed in an ordinary-looking suitcase. To the demand of the gendarmes to open the suitcase, Mikhail replied that it belonged to an officer, he had forgotten the key at home and, if necessary, immediately went for it. The gendarmes took away the suitcase: let the officer himself appear.

A day or two passed quietly, and Pataky invited the Hungarian Jozsef Sukich, one of his contacts. Circumstances forced them to take extremely risky actions, unacceptable in other conditions.

"Here is a power of attorney with a signature and a seal, according to which you need to pick up personal belongings packed in a suitcase from the commandant's office. The matter is simple, but requires special care.

"Understood, Feri Bachi.

The scout underestimated the enemy and paid for his mistake. As soon as he entered the commandant's office, Sukich saw an open suitcase on the table and a walkie-talkie in it. The reaction was instant: without hesitation, he broke the window and jumped out. Pataki, who was watching the commandant's office from around the corner, rushed in the opposite direction. He was noticed and soon caught up.

He was placed in the Maramorosh prison, known for the fact that no one came out of it alive. The captured scout was tortured every day, they promised mountains of gold if he embarked on the path of betrayal, they put him in the cell of provocateurs and tortured again. But everything was in vain: the investigators found out that his name was Fedor, that he had been abandoned from the Soviet Union, led the underground, and nothing more! On August 30, 1944, the court sentenced Fedor to death.

Under the blows of the Red Army, the German-Hungarian troops rolled back to the west. All the surviving prisoners of Maramoros were evacuated to Sopron, a city on the Hungarian-Austrian border.

In prison, Ferenc Pataky became close to the prison doctor, whom he inspired respect with his restraint, directness, intelligence and honesty.

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with a look. At his request, the doctor assisted one of the prisoners, who was in serious condition. condition.

"She is expecting a baby, they won't dare to execute her. And the baby must grow up healthy in order to continue our struggle and live in a free, happy country.

The doctor, whose name has not been preserved, complied with the request of "Fyodor Vladimirovich", facilitating the birth of a young woman.

Shortly before the execution, a priest appeared in the prison. He looked in surprise at Pataki and asked if he was of the clergy class. "You have a handsome appearance," he explained his question. "Especially the beard and mustache." Pataki answered in the negative, although he admitted that he had studied at a teacher's seminary in his youth and dreamed of becoming a teacher. Gradually speaking, Pataki ventured to turn to the priest with a request: "Holy father, could you promise to fulfill my last will and bow to the ground to my wife and children?"

After some thought, the priest agreed and brought an envelope and paper to Pataky.

The scout assumed that hundreds of eyes might see his letter on the way to the addressee, and not all of them would be benevolent. This means that it should be written in such a way that it does not cause harm to anyone, and relatives, if the letter nevertheless falls into their hands, felt how deeply and devotedly he loved them until the last minute of his life. Using Aesopian language, hints, omissions, Pataky said that his group was actively operating, carrying out the assigned tasks, that the radio was low-power and did not provide communication with the Center. The fact that everything turned out this way is not his fault, the intelligence agent wrote, his relatives will not have to blush for him. "I loved you and will always love you. Papa Ferenc," he concluded his dying message.

The brave intelligence officer was executed on November 4, 1944. Some facts of his detention and death became known immediately, others were clarified for many years.

Ferenc Pataky was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner. The memory of the scout was immortalized in the Soviet Union and People's Hungary.

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Our intelligence in Bulgaria



In difficult conditions, Soviet foreign intelligence had a chance to carry out a mission in Bulgaria that was so necessary for the overall victory over the enemy during the Great Patriotic War. Being an ally of Nazi Germany, this country was its strategic and economic rear in those years. German troops and special services units were stationed there. Communications, railways, airfields and ports were widely used by Germany for military purposes. From Bulgaria, the Germans exported almost everything that could be used in the interests of the military machine of the Third Reich: raw materials, food and even sheepskin coats for German soldiers and officers who fought on the snowy fields of Russia.

The modern reader may have a question: how so? A country where previously there were traditionally strong good feelings towards Russia, which liberated the Bulgarians from the centuries-old Ottoman yoke, and suddenly an ally of Hitler? But these are the facts - on March 1, 1941, Bulgaria signed a protocol in Vienna on joining the pact of the Axis countries and three months before the German attack on the USSR, it became its satellite. The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry on the same day informed the Soviet ambassador of the consent of the Bulgarian government to the entry of units of the Wehrmacht into the country. On November 25, 1941, Bulgaria joined the Anti-Comintern Pact.

The Germans would feel at home in Bulgaria if its people, freedom-loving and fraternal towards the Soviet people who fought the enemy, did not put up staunch resistance.

Germany has long considered Bulgaria as one of the main strongholds in the Balkans, and in accordance with this built its policy. After the liberation of Bulgaria by Russian troops from the Ottoman yoke, Germany and Austria-Hungary did everything possible to weaken Russia's influence in this Slavic country.

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Not. As a result of long political maneuvers, in 1908 a descendant of the German princely family of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Austrian army officer Ferdinand of Coburg, was elevated to the Bulgarian throne. Being a Catholic, he converted his son Boris, the future Bulgarian tsar, to Orthodoxy, inviting the Russian Emperor Nicholas II as his godfather. During his reign, German influence in Bulgaria increased. Through the efforts of the Germans, the country was involved in the First World War and, together with Germany, was defeated.

According to the peace treaty signed on November 27, 1919 in Neuilly, a suburb of Paris, Bulgaria suffered large territorial losses - over 11 thousand square meters. km. Southern Dobruja remained entirely with Romania. Quantitative restrictions were imposed on the size and armament of the Bulgarian army, and the country was heavily indemnified. The consequences of Bulgaria's participation in the war on the side of Germany gave rise to revanchist sentiments in the country, especially among the military and politicians.

The last Bulgarian Tsar Boris, who ascended the throne in 1918, inherited a heavy legacy. He did not enjoy the confidence of the Bulgarian people, he remained for them a German, alien to the culture and traditions of the Slavic peoples. Lacking the support of the population of the country, Tsar Boris saw ways to strengthen his power in the establishment of a strict dictatorship of the military obedient to him and in alliance with Germany and Italy. With his knowledge, the military elite, headed by A. Panov, carried out a fascist coup in 1923.

The processes that took place in a country located in close proximity to the borders of the USSR could not remain outside the field of view of its intelligence. They directly touched on the security issues of the Soviet Union.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Bulgaria in 1934 made it possible to start systematic intelligence work on the territory of Bulgaria from a "legal" position. In January 1935, the leadership of the NKVD decided to create a residency in Sofia under the guise of a plenipotentiary representation consisting of three people - a resident, his assistant and a technical worker. Worked in the Bulgarian capital and

GRU residency. Moscow was primarily interested in the development of Bulgarian-German relations, since the monarcho-fascist regime in Bulgaria increasingly tied its territorial claims to Hitler's plans to establish a "new order" in Europe. To obtain the necessary information, the residency sought to create agent positions in the entourage of Tsar Boris, the General Staff, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and in political parties.

The first resident of foreign intelligence in Sofia in 1935 was the experienced Chekist Vasily Terentyevich Yakovlev. Although

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Since 1921, he has been working in the bodies of the Cheka-GPU-NKVD, and this is the first time he has been on intelligence work abroad. The situation in Bulgaria was difficult. As soon as the Soviet diplomatic mission opened in Sofia, the Bulgarian secret services put its employees under surveillance. The teachers of the Bulgarian counterintelligence officers were the Gestapo. Most of all, the Bulgarian special services feared contacts between the employees of the Soviet embassy and the local Communist Party and therefore tried to control all their unofficial communications.

Yakovlev worked in Bulgaria until 1938 and was constantly the object of not only surveillance, but also provocations. The center decided to replace the resident, although it highly appreciated his work. In three years, he managed to acquire a number of sources of information, created an intelligence apparatus that made it possible to cover the domestic and foreign policy of Bulgaria, and to resolve issues of organizing communications with local progressive forces.

B.P. arrived to replace Yakovlev. Osokin. On the eve of the war, A.K. Trenev. Both of them had no experience in intelligence work, and it was not easy for them. Nevertheless, on the eve of the attack of fascist Germany on the USSR, the Sofia residency, along with the GRU residency, regularly informed the Center about the deployment of German military units, about the transit of German military equipment and cargo through Bulgaria towards the USSR. Messages were sent in advance to Moscow about the rumors circulating among the Gestapo and German staff officers about the impending German attack on the Soviet Union. It was a great achievement that the residency obtained the keys to the Bulgarian ciphers through undercover means, and this allowed the Center to control some communication channels for a long time.

In the difficult international situation of the pre-war years, the residence timely and correctly informed Moscow about the process of drawing Bulgaria into a military-political alliance with Germany and Italy. After the German attack on Poland and the entry into the war of England and France, Bulgaria declared its "complete neutrality". This "neutrality" was in fact a complete fiction. Remaining formally neutral, Bulgaria actually became an ally of Nazi Germany.

The information obtained by intelligence on the eve of the war both in Bulgaria itself and in Berlin, London, Istanbul and other residencies unambiguously testified that Hitlerite diplomacy skillfully used the revanchist moods of the Bulgarian ruling elite as an instrument of its policy. The leadership of Nazi Germany ordered a series of actions to support the territorial claims of Bulgaria, both with the help of open propaganda and through the channels of the special services. In particular, it was meant to support the slogan "Dobruja is a Bulgarian country", although

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this could damage Germany's relations with Romania, which the Nazis also considered as their ally.

In turn, England, pursuing on the eve of the war a policy of collusion and partial concessions to Germany in order to direct its aggression to the East, tried, in line with this policy of "appeasement" of the aggressor, to tear Bulgaria away from rapprochement with the "axis" countries. English you-

advanced the idea of creating a "neutral Balkan bloc" consisting of Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania, assuming, of course, to take a dominant position in this bloc.

Reliable information on this score was received from London. It also followed from it that the Bulgarian leadership expected to use the clash of Anglo-German interests in the Balkans and extract the maximum benefit for themselves, preventing Bulgaria from being drawn into a major war. When German troops occupied almost all of Western Europe in 1940, Bulgarian Prime Minister Filov was quick to declare that only Berlin and Rome would help Bulgaria regain the lands that had previously belonged to it. These moods of the Bulgarian elite were well known to Hitler, whom Filov met personally.

Our sources in Berlin, London and Sofia reported that the Germans were hard at work persuading Bulgaria to join the triple alliance of the Axis countries. The Bulgarians, agreeing in principle to join the union, nevertheless refrained from promising to fight on the side of Germany.

The Soviet leadership decided to take countermeasures against Bulgaria's joining the Axis pact, and in November 1940 the Soviet Union proposed to Tsar Boris and Prime Minister Filov to conclude a non-aggression and mutual assistance pact. The USSR promised Bulgaria in the event of an attack on it any help, including military. This was exactly what A. Sobolev, General Secretary of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, who had specially arrived in Sofia, informed the Bulgarian leadership about this. The proposals of the Soviet government provoked a strong reaction in Bulgaria. Rallies and demonstrations were held in the capital and other cities in support of the conclusion of an agreement with the USSR. Many political parties, including bourgeois and agrarian ones, turned to the government with a demand to accept the proposal of the USSR. The answer was the cynical statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, Popov, when discussing this issue: "It is not the business of the crowd to interfere in such important problems of foreign policy." On November 30, 1940, Popov informed the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Sofia A. Lavrishchev of a negative response to the proposal of the Soviet leadership.

After the attack of fascist Germany on the USSR, work in Bulgaria acquired special significance for foreign intelligence. It was the only country allied to Hitler in Europe in which

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la "legal" foreign intelligence residency. The USSR and Bulgaria, which declared its neutrality, had their embassies during the war, respectively, in Sofia and Moscow.

However, I had to work in a country actually occupied by the Germans. Bulgaria was dominated by the German secret services. The State Security Directorate of Bulgaria and the military counterintelligence, cooperating closely with them, in fact were in their possession. subordination.

A German "legal" residency worked in Sofia, headed by the secretary of the German consulate Mayer, the Germans also had a network of illegal residencies in Bulgaria, covered by various private firms, offices, trade missions. One of these residencies later became known and entered the history of the war years under the name "Doctor Delius' Bureau". She was engaged in political investigation, identified participants in the Bulgarian resistance and the underground. She has the blood of many Bulgarian patriots on her account.

With the help of a provocateur, the Gestapo managed to reach the reconnaissance group of the national hero of Bulgaria, General Vladimir Zaimov, who collaborated with Soviet military intelligence and transmitted valuable information about the German army and the plans of the Wehrmacht. The Gestapo arrested a woman who was going to Zaimov and under torture forced her to give out a password to contact him. Instead, the experienced German counterintelligence officer Florian came to the general's apartment and uttered a conditional phrase: "Greetings to you from Karol Michalczyk." Then the Bulgarian police came and Zaimov was arrested.

On May 27, 1942, the trial of General Zaimov and members of his group began. At the trial, Zaimov made a vivid exposé, accusing the monarcho-fascist regime of betraying national interests. On June 1, 1942, he was shot at the training ground of the school of reserve officers. Before being shot, Zaimov shouted: "The Soviet Union and the Slavs are invincible! Thousands follow me! Death to the traitors of Bulgaria! Long live the invincible Red Army - the defender of the peoples! Long live free Bulgaria!" The soldiers lowered their rifles and refused to fire on the general. He told them: "Thank you warriors. This is the best reward for me at my hour of death..." An officer ran up to Zaimov, who was tied to a concrete pole, and unloaded his pistol point-blank.

Later, the following words were heard on the air: "Moscow is speaking... Moscow is speaking... Bulgarians, on your knees! Today, the glorious son of Bulgaria and the Slavs, Major General of Artillery Vladimir Zaimov, was executed in Sofia..." And hundreds and hundreds of people in cities, villages and partisan bases in the mountains knelt down in mourning. The name of Vladimir Zaimov is sacredly kept in the memory of the Bulgarian people. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

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As early as the summer of 1941, a wave of protests against government policy swept through Bulgaria, and in a number of regions of the country it turned into armed clashes with police forces. In Varna, three trains with German military equipment were burned; in Ruse, Bulgarian patriots organized sabotage at an oil refinery and set fire to gas storage facilities. In some rural areas, local uprisings broke out against the pro-German orientation of the government. In response, they were bombed by the German

aviation.

Such a situation in the country greatly complicated the work of foreign intelligence. It was necessary to strengthen the Sofia residency, which was still small in number, but this could not be done for a long time due to the quota introduced after the start of the war for the quantitative composition of Soviet institutions in Bulgaria.

The most important sources of information were forced to go underground due to severe repressions, and the residency lost contact with them. And yet she was not inactive. This is evidenced by the yellowed folders of archival documents. Intelligence information from Bulgaria was coming. And it was up-to-date information, although the number of messages was limited. Information was collected bit by bit, for which the residency used every opportunity.

One of the contacts was "Mentor", a bright and colorful personality. This man was received at the court of Tsar Boris. His published speeches always attracted attention, he was known as a patriot and Slavophile, who saw the future of Bulgaria in cooperation with other Slavic states. A liberal by conviction, the Mentor saw the threat of fascism for the peoples of Europe, as well as for the Bulgarian people.

Foreign intelligence established a trusting relationship with him back in the mid-1930s. He was far from sympathetic to communist ideals, but the belief in the historical necessity of the cooperation of the fraternal Slavic peoples was the natural basis of his relations with the representatives of the Soviet Union. Especially important was the information that he received from members of the royal family and in palace circles.

At court, the Germanophiles concentrated around Empress Joanna, daughter of the Italian King Victor Emmanuel. She was alien to the national interests of Bulgaria and its people. She was worried about only one question - how to keep the Coburg dynasty in power and ensure hereditary rights to the throne to her son Simeon. Ioann was supported by influential people: the tsar's brother Kirill, Prime Minister Filov, General Mikhov, the future head of government Bozhilov and others. They pushed Boris to deepen military-political cooperation with Hitler, sought his decision on the direction

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sending Bulgarian divisions to the Eastern Front to take part in combat operations against the Red Army.

However, Tsar Boris, according to the Mentor, did not dare to take this step, rightly fearing that sending troops to Russia might cause general discontent. These fears were shared by the king's sister Evdokia, who had a noticeable influence on her brother. She did not get along with the queen and occupied a special position at court. She even lived separately - in her own palace on the outskirts of Sofia. A smart, educated and insightful woman, Evdokia understood that Germany would lose the war and its collapse would inevitably lead to the fall of the royal throne in Bulgaria. She was surrounded by representatives of the liberal-minded intelligentsia and patriotic military circles. They saw the salvation of the country and the royal throne in Bulgaria's withdrawal from the war and the conclusion of a truce with England and the USA.

The "mentor" reported that Tsar Boris was deeply impressed by the German defeat at Stalingrad, and began to look for opportunities to enter into unofficial contact with the British. According to the information of the London residency, the adviser of the Bulgarian embassy in Berlin, at the direction of Boris, went to Lisbon in July 1943, where he met with Jan Kowalski, a resident of the Polish government in exile, and asked to find out if the Anglo-Americans would agree in case of leaving from the war of Bulgaria to preserve the monarchy and the independent status of the country without joining any Balkan conglomeration.

The British and Americans, however, had no intention of saving the Bulgarian monarchy. In a letter received by the secret agent of England, Eden, to his ambassador to the United States, Halifax, dated July 27, 1943, it was said: "England is against the preservation of the Saxo-Coburg dynasty, since it considers Boris responsible for the alliance with Hitler and territorial annexations. Any attempts to act through Boris will only compromise Great Britain, create difficulties in implementing plans for the formation of South-Eastern Europe.

For negotiations with representatives of England and the USA, Tsar Boris sent emissaries to Ankara, Istanbul, Cairo and Casablanca, the activity of Bulgarian diplomacy especially intensified after the defeat of the German troops on the Kursk salient. Backstage negotiations between the Bulgarians and the Anglo-Americans were no secret to Hitler. The Fuhrer continued to demand from Boris the direct participation of the Bulgarian troops in military operations against the Red Army. In August 1943, the tsar was summoned to Hitler's headquarters. The conversation was difficult: Hitler insisted on the immediate dispatch of Bulgarian units to the Eastern Front. Boris frankly told him in response that the Bulgarian army would not fight against the Russians and would go over to their side after the first combat contact. He promised the Fuhrer only to replace his

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troops of German and Italian units that occupied Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania. Hitler was beside himself with anger.

After a visit to Germany, Tsar Boris died suddenly at the age of 49. The circumstances and exact causes of the death of the king have not been established. According to one version, he was poisoned on Hitler's orders, and he became ill on the plane, according to another, he "disappeared" from the train somewhere.

By the time of the death of the king, his son Simeon had not yet reached the age of majority, and with the direct participation of the Germans, the Regency Council was formed. It included pro-German people. The king's sister Evdokia was isolated and ceased to influence the policy of the court. The Mentor also lost his opportunities, he began to appear less and less frequently at official receptions, and it was not safe to hold meetings with him in the city.

Despite the difficult operational situation in Sofia, the residency continued to work with its contacts from among the employees of foreign diplomatic missions who were in Bulgaria. Among them were diplomats of states allied with Germany, with whom foreign intelligence maintained contacts even before the war.

One of them was the reliable source "Gray", who, representing a German allied power, maintained close relations with the German military attaché in Sofia and received important information from him. In March 1942, Gray reported on the strategic plans of the Wehrmacht command for the summer campaign on the Eastern Front: "The main blow in the summer of 1942 will be delivered by the German army on the southern sector of the front with the task of breaking through Rostov to Stalingrad and the North towards the Caspian Sea. By this route, the Germans hope to reach the sources of Caucasian oil and subsequently through Iran and Iraq to reach the rear of the British troops operating in the Middle East. In the event of a successful outcome of the operation with access to the Volga and Stalingrad, the Germans intend to launch an offensive to the north along the Volga in order to disrupt communications between the central and eastern regions of the USSR and deprive the Soviet command of a possible supply of food and reserves to the front. Obviously, there is no need to explain the importance of this information.

The same "Gray" regularly informed intelligence about the strong pressure of the Germans on the Japanese leadership. The Nazis insistently demanded that Japan enter the war with the USSR. Japanese Ambassador Yamaji sent a telegram to Tokyo after a meeting with the adviser of the German embassy, in which he indicated that if Japan did not immediately start a war against the USSR, then Germany's situation would become extremely difficult in the near future. The ambassador advised attacking the USSR without delay and destroying its naval bases in the Far East.

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After the Battle of Stalingrad, and especially after the defeat of the German troops on the Kursk Bulge, it became clear that a turning point in the war had come and the Nazi hordes rolled back to the Soviet borders.

Scattered anti-fascist actions in Bulgaria in the first years of the war grew in 1943 into a partisan movement that engulfed the whole country. An extensive and organized network of resistance to the monarcho-fascist regime and the Nazis was gaining strength everywhere, significant forces were thrown against it - punitive units, the tsarist secret police and the Gestapo. The underground and partisans suffered heavy losses, but the struggle flared up.

Even in the initial period of the war, special reconnaissance and sabotage groups were thrown into the territory of Bulgaria, which for the most part consisted of Bulgarian political emigrants who were in the USSR. They were secretly delivered to Bulgaria by submarines, aircraft and warships. Sometimes our scouts, mainly radio operators, were also included in such groups. The first landings, having no prepared support bases in Bulgaria, were ambushed and died in unequal battles.

The main leader and organizer of the Resistance, the underground and the guerrilla war was the Foreign Bureau created by the Bulgarian Communist Party, headed by Georgy Dimitrov, which was located in Moscow. Foreign intelligence, fulfilling the instructions of the country's leadership, was engaged in establishing communications between the Foreign Bureau and the Bulgarian underground. It was essentially another front in the fight against German fascism, and he demanded from his fighters high professionalism, courage, courage and dedication.

Life put on the agenda the issue of reorganizing the Sofia residency and improving its quality in the new conditions, when the collapse of fascist Germany was not far off. In June 1943, People's Commissar for State Security V.N. Merkulov approved the Action Plan for Improving Intelligence Work in Bulgaria, presented by the head of foreign intelligence, P.M. Fitin. First of all, it was envisaged to achieve a qualitative strengthening of undercover work. It was also required to ensure deep intelligence penetration into the main objects of the country. The meaning of the plan was to prepare the residency and its intelligence apparatus for the upcoming events - the liberation of the Balkan states from the German fascists.

An experienced intelligence agent Dmitry Georgievich Fedichkin (1902-1991) was sent to Bulgaria as a resident. By the time he arrived in Sofia at the end of 1943, he had a wealth of experience behind him, including participation in the underground and fighting as part of the partisan detachments of Primorye during the Civil War in the Far East.

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He miraculously managed to escape from the White Guard death camp on Russky Island near Vladivostok, where he was thrown when he was captured in a state of frostbite during one of the battles. Having escaped, Dmitry Georgievich ended up in a partisan detachment and until the end of the war he was a reconnaissance officer of the detachment headquarters in the rear of the Whites. There he created an intelligence group that obtained serious military information.

In 1922, Fedichkin became a staff member of the GPU and devoted his life to foreign intelligence. For two years he was a resident in Manchuria, where he acquired several important sources of information. But he almost died there: he was identified by the Chinese governor-general, who for some time was in Soviet captivity after the armed conflict on the CER in 1929 and met with Fedichkin. I had to illegally cross the border and return to my homeland.

In 1931, Fedichkin was in Moscow, and in 1932 - in Tallinn, where he conducted active intelligence work against the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS), then he was sent to Warsaw. With the help of a provocateur, Pilsudski's counterintelligence managed to arrest the intelligence officer and imprison him. In the Polish dungeon, Fedichkin behaves with dignity, the jailers could not break his will. For a month and a half, he was interrogated "with passion" and promised all sorts of benefits if he agreed to "help" the Poles. In the end, he was exchanged for a Polish "diplomat" - a scout who was detained in Kyiv.

In 1936-1940, Fedichkin worked in Italy, since 1938 he headed the residency in Rome. It was then that a document was received from the Italian Foreign Ministry, from which it followed that the Deputy Foreign Minister of Nazi Germany, Weizsäcker, asked the Italian ambassador in Berlin to warn Mussolini that the attack on the USSR would take place on June 22, 1941. A message about this was immediately transmitted to Moscow. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, Fedichkin was appointed to the post of head of a department of the Fourth Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, created specifically to lead reconnaissance and sabotage detachments and groups in the Soviet territory temporarily occupied by the Nazis.

Fedichkin got to Sofia in a circuitous way - from Moscow to Stalingrad, then to Tbilisi, then to Leninakan, then through Kars, Erzerum and Ankara to Istanbul, from there to the capital of Bulgaria by rail. There was only one task - to activate reconnaissance work in this country before the Soviet troops came out fighting to Eastern and Central Europe and approached the borders of Bulgaria. By this time the Balkan question had acquired particular urgency and political significance.

In December 1942, the former British ambassador to Sophia Randle, in his report to the British Foreign Office, wrote, in particular: "Questions concerning

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The people of Bulgaria are central to the Balkan problem... Pro-Russian sentiments among the masses and the influence of the Communist Party in the hour of the Russian victory will demolish everything in their path and establish a national communist regime in Bulgaria." Randle cannot be denied insight. W. Churchill persistently sought Bulgaria's exit from the war and hoped to give it the status of a "war criminal", which would allow the British and Americans to bring occupation troops into the country, establish themselves in the center of the Balkan Peninsula and dictate their will. He could not allow Bulgaria to be in the sphere of Soviet influence, and the USSR would have access to the Aegean and Adriatic seas. That is why he is in contact with I.V. Stalin returned many times to the option of opening a second front just in the Balkans.

By the time Fedichkin arrived in Sofia, there was only one operational officer, Trenev, who was assisted by a cryptographer and a radio operator. The center was not satisfied with their work, although it took into account the tough operational environment, which complicated the conditions for the successful operation of the residency. The Center stated that the connection with the previously existing agents was lost, and a new full-fledged agent network was not created.

After the war, the archives of the tsarist political police of Bulgaria fell into the hands of our intelligence. It can be seen from the documents that surveillance of the mission staff was total, no exceptions were made for anyone. The results of external observation were scrupulously analyzed. The itineraries of Soviet citizens were methodically plotted on specially printed outline maps of Sofia and its environs. All the places in the city that they visited were noted, the exact coordinates and time of any meetings in the city were recorded, the frequency of visits to the city by the mission staff was analyzed, etc.

The German school was felt in everything: for example, the amounts of money spent by embassy employees in restaurants and shops were meticulously taken into account, then comparative tables of income and expenses were compiled. As a result, the Bulgarian, as well as the German secret services - we must give them their due - had a fairly accurate picture of the life of our colony in Sofia.

The Sofia residency under the leadership of Fedichkin intensified its work and gradually managed to acquire sources in the royal court, the government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, special services, the army and political parties. Of course, the change in the operational situation in the country - the Soviet troops were approaching the border of Bulgaria - could not but affect the mood in society, and this contributed to the success of the residency. By the beginning of 1945, as evidenced by archival documents, there were 30 agents in contact with the residency, 13 of which worked most productively and obtained important information. Good

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giving them to the residency, it was known about the attempts of the Bulgarian leadership to negotiate behind the back of the USSR with the Anglo-Americans on the preservation of the anti-Soviet regime in the country and preventing the Red Army from entering its borders.

Before leaving for Sofia, Fedichkin had a detailed conversation with Georgy Dimitrov, head of the BKP Foreign Bureau. With his characteristic clarity and efficiency, G. Dimitrov described Fedichka's situation in the country and the prospects for its development. He stressed that in connection with the successes of the Red Army, the question of how Bulgaria could get out of the impasse into which it had been led by the pro-German rulers would soon inevitably arise. "Trust the Bulgarians," G. Dimitrov said, "and you will certainly find people who are ready to fight against fascism for our common cause." "The Bulgarian people," the Bulgarian leader emphasized, "treat the Soviet Union with sympathy and have feelings of friendship for the Soviet people."

In the conversation, G. Dimitrov clearly revealed the meaning of the position of W. Churchill, which he stated to I.V. Stalin during the Tehran Conference, when he stubbornly insisted on opening a second front in the Balkans. Later, Fedichkin became convinced how far-sighted G. Dimitrov was in his forecasts, how correct his analysis was. A large place in the conversation was given to the question of restoring the connection between the Foreign Bureau and the anti-fascist Resistance in Bulgaria. Moscow knew that the partisan movement there was gaining strength and scope, and therefore ensuring reliable communication between the Foreign Bureau and the illegal Central Committee was of paramount importance. G. Dimitrov regretfully told Fedichkin that he could not recommend to him the necessary persons on whom he could rely and with whom he could make contact. In 1941-1942, the Politburo and the Central Committee of the BKP were defeated by the German and Bulgarian special services, 6 people were shot, others were thrown into concentration camps and prisons.

At the end of the conversation, G. Dimitrov turned to Fedichkin with a personal request: he asked, if possible, to find out about the fate of his mother, to meet with her and hand over some money. Son



was worried, knowing that the city of Samokov, where she lived, was bombed by Anglo-American aircraft. Needless to say, fulfilling this request in the conditions of a tough operational situation in Bulgaria was far from easy, and even dangerous. But Fedichkin, of course, could not fail to fulfill it either.

With great precautions, our scout reached Samokov. Fedichkin described this episode in his memoirs in the following way: "I was greatly impressed by the behavior of the inhabitants of the city of Samokov, or rather, the neighbors of grandmother Paraskeva, as G. Dimitrov's mother was called in Bulgaria. Not knowing where her house was, I asked the boys about it, and then a man. After a long wandering, I found her house. It turned out that her yard and neighboring yards  
are full

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some people armed with stakes, pitchforks and axes. I assumed that while I was looking for a home, the residents had taken the necessary steps to protect Georgy Dimitrov's mother, should the need arise. They let me into the house only after they made sure from my passport that I really was a representative of the Soviet mission. This is how ordinary Bulgarian people guarded Grandma Paraskeva."

Establishing a connection with the underground proved to be a very difficult task. It was impossible not to take into account the omnipresent Gestapo and the State Security Directorate, which literally besieged the Soviet embassy from all sides. It was necessary to look for a cardinal solution in order to be able to carry out reconnaissance operations in the city and quietly disappear from the embassy. And an extraordinary way out was found. We paid attention to the fact that after the defeat of the fascist troops on the Kursk Bulge, the Bulgarian counterintelligence officers began to show much less zeal in the performance of their official duties.

Taking advantage of a convenient moment, the residency staff made acquaintance with the head of the surveillance brigade serving the embassy. Soon he was attracted to cooperation with Soviet intelligence. He literally risked his head, but decided to help the Soviet Union. With its help, our intelligence officers were able to quietly leave the territory of the embassy and work in the city with agents and trusted ties. After the war, this Bulgarian was awarded the medal "For Military Merit" by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The main role in establishing the first contact with a representative of the underground was played by a teacher of the Bulgarian language, who worked in our embassy before the war, and her address was known to the residency. G. Dimitrov gave the go-ahead to involve this woman in the matter of restoring ties with the illegal Central Committee, and Fedichkin took over this work. The underground fighters made a turnout, and an hour after the announcement of the air raid alarm, our intelligence officer set off on a dangerous path. Surveillance officers, who were "guarding" the embassy, rushed to their cars at the first alarm signals, they had no time for surveillance.

Through the streets of the city, darkened by blackout, destroyed by bombardments, a middle-aged man was walking quickly, no different from rare passers-by, who, like shadows, glided between the ruins of houses. Entire blocks of Sofia were leveled to the ground after massive Anglo-American air raids. There were almost no surviving buildings left in the center of the capital, the streets were covered with pieces of brick, concrete, broken glass. After the curfew, it was not safe to walk around the city even with

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have special passes. The police had orders to shoot without warning: looting and looting had become commonplace.

At some distance from Fedichkin, behind and on the sides, several people followed, holding their hands in their pockets, where there were weapons. At any moment they could set it in motion if there was

danger. These were Bulgarian underground workers who accompanied the Soviet intelligence officer. Together with them, he walked along the outskirts of the city for more than an hour - the route was chosen so as to exclude any surprises. The meeting took place at a safe house near Orlov Bridge, in the center of Sofia. The underground workers observed increased caution.

Fedichkin handed over to the representative of the illegal Central Committee the directive of the Foreign Bureau dated March 28, 1944, where it was clearly stated: "The way to save the country is an armed uprising. The forces for such a nationwide action are evident: these are the people, the army and the partisan detachments..." If something unforeseen happened on the route and the directive ended up in the hands of the then pro-fascist rulers of Bulgaria, then one can imagine what an ecumenical noise - an adviser to the USSR embassy carries a directive from the Foreign Bureau of the Communist Party on the immediate tasks of anti-fascist resistance in Bulgaria! The fact that the document was signed by G. Dimitrov's pseudonym did not change matters: the directive spoke for itself.

Fortunately, everything turned out well, but unexpected obstacles lay in wait for Fedichkin on the way back. The curfew was approaching, and a policeman suddenly appeared right at the safe house. He would certainly have stopped our scout and demanded to show a pass. There was a serious threat that the turnout would fail: the policeman could well see where Fedichkin came from, and establish his identity from the documents. The decision came instantly, rescued by ingenuity and speed of reaction: Fedichkin played a German out of himself, although he did not know the German language. "I knew," our intelligence officer later recalled, "that in such cases, the one who takes the initiative wins." He beckoned a policeman with an authoritative gesture and began shouting isolated German words and curses. He saluted in confusion and apologized that he did not understand what the "dear sir" was talking about. The policeman stood with a guilty and puzzled look, wondering why this German was so angry. With a last curse in Bulgarian, Fedichkin continued on his way, leaving the policeman convinced that he had met some "important bird."

He was greatly helped in his work in Bulgaria by his childhood studies at the parochial school in Vladivostok, where he mastered the Church Slavonic language, close to Bulgarian. Upon arrival in Sofia, Fedichkin soon spoke fluent Bulgarian and had no difficulty in communicating with the Bulgarians. Basic knowledge of law

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Slavy and church order helped him develop and consolidate his acquaintance with the Sofia Metropolitan, Bishop Stefan.

He was a well-known clergyman in Bulgaria, he headed the Church Synod and at the same time was a permanent member of the Council of Ministers. Metropolitan Stefan was a smart, cunning, ambitious man with inflated self-esteem, but at the same time he was a real-minded politician who did not tolerate the Germans. He understood very well that the defeat of fascist Germany was only a matter of time, and therefore it was important to change political orientation at the right time so as not to risk a future career. Otherwise, he, as a member of the pro-fascist cabinet of ministers, will have to answer to the new authorities. The metropolitan, moreover, knew that among the church hierarchs there were many who could compete with him in claims to supremacy in the Church.

It must be said that Metropolitan Stefan once graduated from the Kiev Theological Academy and was, like many Bulgarian intellectuals, a Russophile, but he was far from the ideas of socialism. By the way, as an adviser on Russian affairs, he kept with him Archpriest Shavel'sky, who was once the confessor of Emperor Nicholas II and General Wrangel. "His Beatitude," as it was required to call the metropolitan, dreamed of becoming a patriarch of the Bulgarian Church, and this facilitated the development of acquaintance with him. In short, a cooperation agreement was reached quickly. The metropolitan put the question this way: he is ready to help, provided that the Soviet representatives, in turn, help him retain the place of the metropolitan bishop, and possibly take the post of patriarch of the Bulgarian Church, which should separate from

Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople. Such help was promised to him. Metropolitan Stefan, who was well aware of the political intrigues of the Bulgarian elite, began to regularly inform Fedichkin about the plans and actions of the Bulgarian authorities hostile to the USSR and their German allies.

The Metropolitan was a prominent figure, and it was not easy to maintain personal contacts with him: any oversight could turn into big trouble. In the end, we decided to keep in touch through the priest of the Russian Church, located next to our embassy, and use the pulpit of this church as a hiding place. Fedichkin asked the Metropolitan if this would not be sacrilege? He replied: "If God knows that this is serving a holy cause, he will forgive and bless!" And since then, the Holy Gospel in the pulpit has regularly served as a container for the transfer of secret information. The Metropolitan's messages typed on a typewriter could be mistaken by ignorant people for prayers. In a word, "His Beatitude" was not so simple.

Due to his position, he enjoyed ministerial privileges. At his disposal was a car with the government

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military numbers, which all police posts in Sofia and its environs were allowed to pass without checking. It was an impressive black Cadillac, the windows of which were covered with dark curtains with crosses embossed in gold, and on the roof of the car there was a half-meter-high gilded cross. The driver was Stefan's own nephew, whom he completely trusted, and he, in turn, was devoted to "His beatitude." And in such a chic limousine, Fedichkin, a resident of foreign intelligence, often drove around, and besides, even before the trip he received the blessing of the metropolitan metropolitan.

After the liberation of Bulgaria, Stefan really became, however, not a patriarch, but an exarch of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, since it left the subordination of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and entered the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Moscow. Fedichkin in the presence of the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Colonel General (later Marshal of the Soviet Union) S.S. Biryuzova solemnly presented the Metropolitan with a Letter addressed to the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Church, in which the consent of the Moscow Patriarch was stated to accept the Bulgarian Church into the bosom of the Russian Orthodox Church. Taking the Diploma with excitement, Stefan fell to his knees and began to earnestly pray, cross himself and repeat: "God! Finally, the age-old dream of the Orthodox Slavs about reunification has come true!"

In January 1944, almost daily Anglo-American air raids began on Sofia and other cities in Bulgaria. A high-explosive bomb exploded right in the courtyard of the Soviet diplomatic mission, located in the very center of the capital. Fortunately, there were no casualties, but the embassy buildings were badly damaged and all cars were mangled. The embassy was left without transport, and the Bulgarian side, demonstrating loyalty, provided him with a motorcycle that previously belonged to the pro-fascist youth organization Brannik, which was an analogue of the German Hitler Youth.

Coincidentally or not, but in the luggage bag of the motorcycle there were documents issued to some Brannik officer, and an officer's overalls uniform with a car helmet. This was very useful, and the residency used the uniform of the Brannik officer more than once. The scouts changed into it in secluded places in the city, and the police let the "officer" through without hindrance, raising the barrier at the checkpoints in advance. The uniform helped the Soviet people to travel beyond the "Pale of Settlement" without problems, bypass the slingshots of police posts and carry out operational activities.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, under the pretext of concern for the safety of the mission staff, several times offered them to leave the embassy and settle in the suburbs of the capital, Pancherevo. The meaning of this "concern", of course, was clear: the special services wanted to

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align our mission and limit opportunities for informal contacts. The embassy refused to evacuate. Many Bulgarians specially came to the embassy to find out if there were Soviet people left there. After the liberation of Bulgaria, the former partisan told Fedichkin that a messenger had been sent from his detachment to Sofia to see if the red flag was flying on the embassy building.

The Bulgarian people for the most part treated the Soviet people with great sympathy and warmth. General V. Zaimov, mentioned above, said at the trial: "I do not admit that I maintained criminal connections with the Soviet mission. It existed and exists with us legally, and if you lift the blockade, then thousands of Bulgarians will come to it with joy to express their ardent love for the great Soviet people and our Russian liberators.

Fedichkin recalled: "We brought water for domestic needs from Pancherevo (a suburb of Sofia), and bought groceries from the surrounding villages. It was touching to see how the attitude of the peasants changed when they found out that we were Soviet people." Many have tried to help everything you can.

Under the blows of the Soviet Army, the Germans retreated, and echelons with troops, equipment and goods stolen in Russia went through the territory of Bulgaria. Trains with Soviet prisoners of war and civilians driven into forced labor also arrived in Sofia. Once it became known that several such echelons had accumulated around Sophia. Through the embassy, official representations were made to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry with a demand to delay their dispatch and to intern Soviet citizens. The Bulgarian authorities, however, got off with evasive answers and excuses, citing their neutrality. This happened several times. Then Fedichkin, as an adviser to the USSR embassy, in a conversation with the director of the political department of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, Altynov, made a sharp introduction to him, declaring that, hiding behind talk of neutrality, the Bulgarian authorities, in essence, continue to provide all possible assistance to Nazi Germany in the war with the USSR.

Through reliable assistants of the residency among the employees of the railway, the Soviet people who were in the German echelons were advised at the first opportunity to scatter in all directions and make their way to the mountainous regions, where the Bulgarian population would cover them and help contact the partisans. There was already an agreement on this score with the leadership of the Resistance. Hundreds of Soviet people took refuge in Bulgarian villages or went to the partisans. They took part in the fighting and in the popular anti-fascist uprising in September 1944.

of the year.

Foreign intelligence closely followed the secret negotiations between the representatives of Bulgaria, England and the United States. lead

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Filov, a member of the Regency Council, an ardent hater of the Soviet Union, admonishing one of his parliamentarians before a meeting with the American representative in Turkey, said: "Bulgaria could become a fortress against Bolshevism, provided that the regime existing in it at the present time is strengthened and the unity of the country is ensured. In the event that the Bulgarian people have to endure another disappointment in their struggle for unification, they will fall into despair and succumb to Bolshevism. The Bulgarian elite wanted to bargain with the Anglo-Americans for support for the plans to create a "Great Bulgaria" in exchange for anti-Sovietism. In turn, American and British intelligence officers and diplomats did everything possible to save Bulgaria from the impending collapse of the regime and the coming of the people to power.

Soviet intelligence received information about secret negotiations both in Sofia and in London, Istanbul, Ankara and other capitals of the world. The last attempt by the Bulgarian ruling circles to conclude a truce with England and the USA was made at the end of August 1944, when the Soviet troops were already in Romania. Negotiations were held in Cairo, they were attended by

British Ambassador Hugen, British and American high-ranking diplomats and intelligence officers.

On September 5, 1944, the USSR declared war on Bulgaria, and this confused the maps of both the Bulgarian leadership and England and the USA. An urgent cipher was sent from London to the British ambassador in Moscow, which said: "Eden is surprised by the declaration of war on Bulgaria by the USSR and asks to find out the reason why the Soviet government chose this particular moment for declaring war, that is, then when Bulgaria seemed to be striving to make peace with the allies of the USSR. They also asked "to find out what the USSR intends to do next: invade Bulgaria or present conditions in return for the cessation of military operations." Meanwhile, the goals of the Soviet leadership were quite obvious: it was impossible to remain a "party not at war with Bulgaria" on the eve of negotiations on a post-war arrangement in the Balkans, which have long been known as the "powder keg of Europe". It was important to prevent the allies from colluding separately with Bulgaria and to interfere with their plans to deploy their troops in this country.

Late in the evening of September 5, 1944, Fedichkin, who by this time had become the embassy's chargé d'affaires, handed the Bulgarian Prime Minister Muraviev a note declaring war. All cabinet ministers were present. They listened to Fedichkin standing in tense silence. The note said: "Bulgaria has so far refused to break with Germany, is pursuing a policy of so-called "neutrality", and in fact is providing direct assistance to Germany, saving its retreating military forces from the persecution of the Red Army. The Soviet government no longer considers

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possible to maintain its relations with Bulgaria and declares that not only is Bulgaria in a state of war with the USSR, which, in essence, it was before, but the Soviet Union will also be in a state of war with Bulgaria. Attempts by the Bulgarian leadership to propose a truce with the USSR were rejected.

With amazing naivete, the Bulgarian elite believed until the last hour that the course of events could change. The same Muraviev, referring to the brother of Tsar Boris - Kirill, insisted that "events should develop in the same way as in 1918", that "allies will come to us, a truce will be concluded, "farmers" (a moderate bourgeois party of agrarians. — Note auth.) will take power, and Prince Kirill will become the savior of Bulgaria. And one more thing: "I believe in British diplomacy, in Churchill, and I am convinced that he will not allow the Red Army to enter Bulgaria." No wonder that Muraviev did not believe the Chief of the General Staff T. Trifonov when he informed the Prime Minister on September 2, 1944 that the Soviet troops were ready to enter Bulgaria. When the USSR declared war, Muraviev cried and said: "The tragedy begins ..."

Here is how G.K. Zhukov his conversations with Georgy Dimitrov on the eve of the crossing of the Bulgarian border by Soviet troops: "Georgy Dimitrov impressed me as an exceptionally modest and sincere person. In all his reflections and judgments one could feel great strength of mind and political far-sightedness.

G. Dimitrov said: "Although you are going to the 3rd Ukrainian Front with the task of preparing troops for the war with Bulgaria, there will certainly not be a war. The Bulgarian people are impatiently waiting for the approach of the Red Army in order to overthrow the tsarist government of Bagryanov and establish the power of the People's Liberation Front with its help. "You," G. Dimitrov continued, "will be met not with artillery and machine gun fire, but with bread and salt, according to our old Slavic custom. As for the government troops, they are unlikely to risk engaging in battle with the Red Army. "According to my information," G. Dimitrov said, "a lot of work is being done by our people in almost all parts of the army. In the mountains and forests there are significant partisan forces. They do not sit idle and are ready to come down from the mountains and support the popular uprising."

At that time, the Bulgarian army numbered 450 thousand people in its ranks, reduced to five armies and two separate corps. The air force had 410 aircraft, and the navy had

more than 80 combat and auxiliary German and Bulgarian ships...

On the morning of September 8, everything was ready to open fire, but we did not see any targets from our observation posts ... Not even half an hour had passed before the commander of the 57th Army reported that one of the infantry divisions of the Bulgarian army, having formed up near the road, met our

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parts with unfolded red banners and solemn music. After some time, the same events occurred in other directions. The commanders reported that there was a spontaneous fraternization of Soviet soldiers with the Bulgarian people.

I called Headquarters at once. I.V. Stalin said: "Leave all the weapons of the Bulgarian troops with them, let them go about their usual business and wait for the order of their government."

This simple act on the part of the Supreme High Command expressed full confidence in the Bulgarian people and the Bulgarian army, who fraternally welcomed the Red Army, seeing in it their liberator from the German occupiers and the tsarist pro-fascist regime.

Assessing the work of the residency in Sofia in 1944-1945, the Center, as evidenced by the archives of foreign intelligence, noted that "it is in a satisfactory condition." It was especially emphasized that the head of the residency, Fedichkin, is distinguished by "high qualifications, erudition, energy, great experience" and "takes a significant share in the specific work with agents and connections." Such an assessment of the usually stingy Center was worth a lot. The facts, however, spoke for themselves: from January to August 1945, 845 information messages were sent to Moscow from Sofia, of which 240 were documentary. 40 special messages were reported to the leadership of the USSR. By that time, the residency had positions in all the main facilities of the country. In fairness, it should be said that the situation in Bulgaria in 1944-1945 differed sharply from the situation in the first years of the war, and the conditions for the activities of foreign intelligence during this period were more favorable.

In a difficult and responsible time, in the rear of Nazi Germany, of which Bulgaria was an ally, the work of our intelligence officers in this country became a tangible contribution to the approach of victory, to the struggle of the fraternal people for freedom and independence.

' Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. - M., 1970. - S. 553-555.

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The ninth wave of the war. Victory over Japan

At the end of November 1941, the ships of the formation of the Japanese admiral Nagumo concentrated in Hitokappu Bay, near Iturup Island, from where a passage opens through the Kuril Islands to the Pacific Ocean for large ships. On the evening of November 25, Nagumo received an order from the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet of Japan, Yamamoto, to proceed to Hawaiian waters and attack the main forces of the American fleet.

On December 2, 1941, on the aircraft carrier Akagi, a confirmation was received from Yamamoto's headquarters: "Start climbing Mount Niitaka," which meant attack Pearl Harbor, the main US Pacific naval base. In the early morning of December 7, Fuchida, one of the planners of the surprise attack, led 183 aircraft of the first wave. In addition, more than 20 Japanese submarines were deployed around Pearl Harbor in advance. Confident of success, Futida gave the prearranged signal: "Tora, tora, tora!" (Tora means tiger in Japanese). This must have meant that the Japanese attack was indeed sudden. Four battleships and two destroyers were sunk, many ships were damaged. 188 aircraft were destroyed, more than three thousand American soldiers died.

On the morning of December 8, Japan declared war on the USA, England and Holland. The Japanese "tiger" rushed to the south of the Pacific region - to Malaya, the Philippines, Burma and Indonesia, New Guinea. Thus, the dilemma of Japanese expansion was resolved - south or north, that is, the Soviet Union.

The choice of the direction of the main attack of the Land of the Rising Sun was of great importance for the Soviet Union, which was attacked by the Nazi divisions, hoping to defeat the Red Army in a few weeks. A desperate situation developed

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in the battles near Moscow. But despite the danger to Moscow, the command was forced to keep up to forty divisions in the Far East in case Japan chose the northern direction of its aggression. There was a lot to be said for this option. After the attack on China, the capture of Manchuria, where the puppet state of Manchukuo was created, the Japanese concentrated a huge army on the borders of the USSR. The Japanese were well-armed, had experience of intervention during the Civil War, clashes with the Red Army and units of the Mongolian People's Army friendly to the Soviet Union on the Khelkhin-Gol River in 1939, and the year before, at Lake Khasan. These attacks were decisively rebuffed, but the Japanese units also demonstrated high combat readiness.

On April 13, 1941, the Neutrality Pact was signed between the USSR and Japan for a period of five years. But it could be violated, as well as the corresponding agreements between the USSR and Germany. Moreover, Japan had its own pact with Germany. It was signed on September 27, 1940 in Berlin, with the participation of Italy. And the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Matsuoka, giving him an assessment soon at a meeting of the Privy Council in Tokyo, stressed that "Japan will help Germany in the event of a Soviet-German war, and Germany will help Japan in the event of a Russo-Japanese war.. ." The minister noted that, despite the improvement in relations with the USSR, they would be revised, as he said, "in two years."

In fact, the "revision", that is, the attack on the Soviet Union, could have taken place soon after Hitler's aggression. Already 10 days after it began, at the imperial conference in Tokyo on July 2, 1941, the National Policy Program was adopted, which stated that Japan would not yet intervene in the German-Soviet war, but would secretly complete military training against the Soviet Union. . "If the German-Soviet war develops in a direction favorable to the empire, it will solve the northern problem by resorting to armed force..." In this regard, the Kantokuen plan was developed, according to which the Kwantung Army was to invade the USSR and take over the Far East.

This task was devoted to the efforts of the Japanese military mission in Harbin, which acted under the guise of the information department of the Kwantung Army. It had branches in Hailar, Sakhalyn, Jiamusi and other cities. In the Jiamusi branch, which worked against the Khabarovsk Territory, there were 7 branches, 19 reconnaissance points, 40 residents. Until 1945, 149 people worked in the branch.

Branches and departments of Japanese intelligence continuously sent their people to Soviet territory. During the war years, about 1,500 Japanese agents were deployed. Most of them were identified and arrested.

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The main base for recruiting agents against the USSR by the Japanese was the Russian counter-revolutionary emigration. The fight against the infiltration of agents, against their penetration into military units and Soviet intelligence agencies was an integral part of the great work that was carried out by state security agencies in the Far East. At the same time, Soviet residencies in Harbin, Seoul, Shanghai, and border branches regularly monitored the picture of the state of the Kwantung Army, the movement of its units and equipment, the construction of military installations, and so on. Among the information obtained by these routes was information that to the south

There is a chemical and bacteriological station in Harbin, which conducts experiments on humans and animals, preparing for bacteriological sabotage against the USSR.

As far as Japan's strategic plans are concerned, the Center was flooded with data from a variety of sources. It was hardest of all in Japan itself, where the work of all Soviet representatives was taken under increased control by surveillance services. Added to this were the factors associated with the weakening of Soviet intelligence as a result of repression. In contrast to the military intelligence, which successfully operated an illegal residency in Japan headed by Richard Sorge, the intelligence of the state security agencies did not have a strong position.

In January 1940, a new station staff arrived in Tokyo, consisting of resident Artem and two technical workers. They were abroad for the first time, none of them spoke foreign languages. Nevertheless, in 1940-1941, three foreigners who worked in Japan were recruited. Soon, access was obtained to information about the direction of intelligence activities against the USSR from the Japanese military and political circles. The most important was the information that if the leadership of the land army of Japan is in favor of entering the war with the USSR on the side of Germany, then the representatives of the navy, which have a significant influence on determining the course of the country, are in favor of a war with the United States and aggression in the South East Asia.

In total, in 1941-1942, more than 30 reports were received on the question of whether Japan would start a war with the USSR in the coming months. 15 of them were sent during the critical period of the first months of the war!. This refers to messages that were considered paramount and were sent to the State Defense Committee (GKO), the leadership of the USSR. Their sources, in addition to Tokyo, were in London, Washington, Sofia, as well as Shanghai, Harbin and other cities of China.

One of the first messages after the start of the aggression was the telegram from the British ambassador in Tokyo to Foreign Minister Eden on June 24, 1941:

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"The German ambassador puts strong pressure on Matsuoka, trying to get Japan to actively enter the war on the side of Germany. He promises the Japanese the Maritime region and everything he can think of.

On July 4, 1941, the same ambassador recounted to Eden the contents of a conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who asserted that the Berlin Pact of the "Three" "did not impose on Japan an obligation to take the side of Germany in the Soviet-German war." At the same time, the neutrality treaty with the USSR will not prevent Japan from taking actions that "may be required to preserve Japanese interests." Under these conditions, Japan retains "freedom of action."

On July 17, a message was sent to the GKO that a message from the Japanese had been intercepted and deciphered in London to the effect that on July 2, at the imperial conference in Tokyo, a decision had been made on the southern direction of Japanese actions, but that Japan at the same time was "preparing to all probabilities in relation to the USSR. "The Japanese government always has in mind the need to intensify military preparations in order to deter the USSR from taking any steps in the Far East."

At the same time, the Japanese statement to the German ambassador in Tokyo emphasized that "Japan is conducting constant surveillance in the Pacific Ocean in order to deter the United States and Great Britain." However, further it was admitted only that "Japan decided to acquire a base in Indochina."

Japan's intentions were revealed in a telegram from Halifax, the British ambassador to the USA, received by our intelligence through agents in London. After a conversation with Undersecretary of State Welles, Halifax reported that the Americans were aware of Japan's agreement with



partners in the Berlin Pact regarding their consent to the seizure by Japan of bases in India, China and Siam, "followed by an action against Siberia and, first of all, Vladivostok."

Thus, the tension did not subside. "Freedom of action" could mean for the Japanese "tiger" and a jump into Soviet territory.

Disturbing news came from Tokyo. The residency reported that from July 12 to August 18, 1941, a general mobilization of about 4.5 million people was carried out in Japan. A printing house has been set up in Harbin to print leaflets in Russian.

On November 20, Soviet intelligence officers intercepted a Japanese telegram from Bern to Ankara, from which it followed that at a moment of crisis, Japanese radio would include code words at the beginning of its broadcasts that would mean either an attack on the United States ("higashi" - east) or on USSR ("kita" - north), or to England - ("nisi" - west).

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Our sources in Manchuria reported that the Japanese were preparing to bring groups of three to five people into the territory of the USSR for sabotage and reconnaissance at railway and military installations.

From London came a transcript of a telegram dated November 27, 1941, from the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to his ambassador in Berlin. In response to increased German pressure, the ambassador was asked to "explain to Hitler that the main Japanese efforts will be concentrated in the south and we intend to refrain from deliberate action in the north."

After a series of masking measures, among which were negotiations with the United States (they were conducted by the Japanese ambassador to the United States Nomura and US Secretary of State Hull) to lift the American embargo on oil exports to Japan and freeze its assets, the Japanese sent Hull a memorandum to end the negotiations. It was presented on December 7, an hour before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Japan's large-scale aggressive actions in Southeast Asia somewhat weakened the danger of an immediate attack on the USSR. In addition, the Nazis suffered their first major defeat near Moscow. It became clear that the "blitzkrieg" had failed and the war was becoming protracted. However, the Japanese supporters of aggression against the USSR pinned their hopes on the spring and summer offensive of the Nazis and insisted on a move against the Soviet Far East. In addition, Hitler increased the pressure on the ally. This was evidenced by Chinese intelligence data from February 25 and March 4, 1942. The Germans promised to resume a major offensive on the Eastern Front. The grouping of the Japanese military, headed by General Araki, stood for the satisfaction of Berlin's demands.

In mid-February 1942, the Japanese leadership discussed the demands of the Germans and considered it premature to attack the USSR. First, the main operations in the Pacific had to be completed. Nevertheless, the data of our residencies in Turkey, China, England, the Czechoslovak military mission in London agreed that as soon as Hitler's spring offensive began, Japan could attack the USSR. This was also indicated by a telegram from the Italian Foreign Ministry addressed to its ambassador in Tokyo, which stated that "now, when Japan is fully confident in the final victory in the south, it may begin to think about the north as well."

In fact, southern expansion met with considerable difficulties. Yes, and the messages of the Japanese representatives who were in the USSR also forced them to wait. Yamaguchi, the Japanese naval attaché in the USSR, received a letter from the General Staff, which admitted: "It seems that the gentlemen of the Kwantung Army have finally begun to understand what difficulties the fleet has to experience when conducting operations on such a large scale as it is now."

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The chief of Czechoslovak intelligence in London, Moravec, informed our resident: "Japan will oppose the USSR only if the German offensive on the Eastern Front proceeds successfully." And taught by the failures of the Germans at the turn of 1942, the aforementioned attache Yamaguchi in September, although the Germans are conducting their offensive in the south of the USSR, remarks to those who insist on Japan's immediate entry into the war: "<... no hurry - you still have to wait until the Germans slap them again. In general, it will come after next summer."

But Stalingrad and the Battle of Kursk demonstrated the power and fortitude of the Red Army and were a turning point in the war. In this regard, Japanese diplomats were forced to change the tone of their statements. And the Japanese ambassador to the USSR, Sato, had already advocated that "the Americans should agree to conclude peace on an equal footing" (data from January 10, 1943). And at the beginning of the summer, information about the development of Japan's "peace initiative" came from the residence in Chongqing. On June 5, 1943, a trusted Chinese intelligence officer said that he had talked with the commander of Japanese troops in North China, General Okamura, and a number of other responsible persons. He reported to Chiang Kai-shek the following proposals of the Japanese: China and Japan should stop hostilities and concentrate their efforts in the fight against communism, the USA and England. Manchuria will remain with Japan, and in return for this, China will receive Indochina.

Soon, the Japanese at various levels began to actively talk about the desirability of extending the Japanese-Soviet non-aggression pact and the possible conclusion of a peace treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union. This idea was conveyed to attache Yamaguchi when the General Staff of the Japanese Navy wrote: "There is only one way out of the impasse in which we found ourselves - a German-Soviet truce, and then peace." Ambassador Sato, in a conversation with Japanese correspondents in Moscow, also began to show heightened peacefulness, declaring: "We must strive for a complete settlement of all issues with the Soviet Union and for separating it from the Anglo-American bloc" (GKO report of December 21, 1943 ).

The practical line of the Japanese government was far from peaceful. From the summer of 1941 until the end of 1944, the Japanese detained 178 Soviet merchant ships. Large ships were sunk - "Angarstroy", "Kola", "Ilmen", "Perekop", "Maikop" and others. Japan retained a combat-ready and powerful potential in the form of the Kwantung Army on the borders of the USSR, forced to keep up to forty divisions of the Soviet Army in the Far East and thereby directly contributed to the military efforts of Germany.

The USA and Britain fought difficult battles with the Japanese aggressors in Indo-China, in the expanses of the Pacific Ocean. Japan still maintained a strong position both at sea and on land. This first in time and second

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in terms of power, the hotbed of world conflict could be extinguished only by great efforts. Otherwise, the war would have dragged on and claimed many hundreds of thousands of victims.

That is why at the Yalta Conference on February 11, 1945, the Soviet Union, together with the leaders of the United States and Britain, signed an agreement on its entry into the war against Japan two or three months after the defeat of Nazi Germany. In fulfillment of this obligation, on April 5, 1945, the USSR denounced the neutrality treaty with Japan of April 13, 1941. And on July 26, the governments of the United States, Britain and China issued an ultimatum to Japan in the Potsdam Declaration, demanding its surrender. Two days later, Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki replied, "We ignore her. We will relentlessly continue to move forward for the successful completion of the WAR.

Peaceful ways of settlement in the East were cut off. On August 8, the Soviet government joined the Potsdam Declaration and declared war on Japan. The troops brought up from the west went on the offensive and in the shortest possible time - from August 9 to 14, 1945 - surrounded and liquidated the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, the stronghold of Japanese expansion. Clear action became possible thanks to the high awareness of the deployment of its parts and

mandate, which was the result of the work of both Soviet military intelligence and foreign policy. Many of the scouts directly participated in hostilities. With their help, deep breakthroughs and landings were carried out behind enemy lines. The Chekist operational groups helped to capture a large number of leading Japanese military officers, as well as intelligence and counterintelligence officers of Japan, their White Guard agents, and managed to seize secret archives.

In addition to Emperor Pu-Yi, appointed by the Japanese at the head of Manchukuo, and members of the local government headed by Prime Minister Zhang Jikui, the commander of the Kwantung Army, General Yamada, the chief of staff of Hata, the head of the intelligence department of the Assad army, were taken prisoner. the White Guard ataman Semenov and his deputy Baksheev, the leadership of the "Russian Fascist Union" headed by Rodzaevsky. Among the prisoners of war, 693 Japanese intelligence officers were identified. Another 142 intelligence officers were subsequently arrested, according to captured intelligence archives. Indeed, Japan had one of the most densely manned espionage networks. In total, about 600 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers were taken prisoner.

The defeat of the Kwantung Army and the successful actions of the allies in Indochina and the Pacific Ocean led to the defeat of militarist Japan and forced her to capitulate.

September 2, 1945 was the day for Japan to sign the act of surrender. By order of the Japanese government to sign

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it was to be given by Minister of Foreign Affairs Shigemitsu Mamoru and a representative of the Headquarters, Chief of the General Staff Umezu Yoshijiro; they were accompanied by nine people (three representatives each from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Navy).

These representatives were delivered on an American destroyer to board the US battleship Missouri, which was anchored in Tokyo Bay. On the deck of the battleship, the representatives of the defeated side, who were not even allowed to take edged weapons with them, stood silently in front of the representatives of the allied forces. The signing ceremony began at 9:00 am. At 0904 hours, Shigemitsu was the first to sign the act, followed by Umezu.

Shigemitsu signed the act "on behalf of the emperor and the government and by their order", Umezu - "on behalf of the Headquarters and by its order." At 0908 hours, as the party accepting the surrender, the act was signed by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General MacArthur.

The Wakte stated that Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, announced the cessation of hostilities and the unconditional surrender of the General Staff, all Japanese armed forces and all armed forces under Japanese control, regardless of where they were located. The act also stated that the Japanese government and its successors would honor the terms of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith.

At the end of the ceremony, the Japanese representatives were taken ashore on an American destroyer. Returning to Tokyo, at 13:15 they reported to the emperor on the completion of their mission. After that, an imperial decree on surrender was immediately announced. Its publication was demanded by the Allied Powers.

The act of surrender of Japan, in addition to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, was also signed by representatives of the United States, China, England, the Soviet Union, Australia, Canada, France, Holland and New Zealand. The general order determined the procedure for the surrender of the Japanese armed forces and the transfer of weapons and military installations.

Thus ended the Second World War, which had lasted six years.

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After the Battle of Stalingrad, the military leadership of Japan actually abandoned plans to attack the USSR.

## Conclusion

The last page of the fourth volume of the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence, dedicated to its activities during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, has been turned over. Many years have passed since the capitulation of Nazi Germany and Japan. However, the interest in how the victory was achieved, how certain bodies of state power worked, is also great in our

days.

Victory did not come by itself. She got it at a high price. The entire Soviet people, all structures of the state mechanism, including foreign intelligence, led from a single center, which during the war years was the State Defense Committee, each worked in his own area to bring victory closer. The essays offered to the reader in the volume make it possible to get an idea of what foreign intelligence did to win.

The declassified materials of the SVR archive, the memoirs of intelligence veterans who survived the years of the war, allowed the authors of the volume to supplement the already known picture, and in some ways take a fresh look at the activities of foreign intelligence in those harsh years, at the contribution that it made. contributed to the common cause of the Victory over fascism, as well as to the creation of a post-war system of international relations that provided our country with the much-needed conditions for peaceful coexistence, and the countries of Europe - peace over the next decades.

During the war years, foreign intelligence, figuratively speaking, had to pick up a rifle and join the ranks of the defenders of the Motherland in one of the most difficult and dangerous sectors of the fight against German fascism: behind enemy lines, in underground conditions, in partisan and reconnaissance and sabotage detachments . And she fulfilled this mission with honor and dignity.

But providing the country's leadership with the information necessary for decision-making remained the main task of intelligence during the war years. Moreover, the significance of this information and responsibility

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for its timely receipt and reliability have increased. Information was required for conducting military operations, for assessing the situation in the enemy camp, for the correct building of relations with the allies, for strengthening the ranks of the anti-Hitler coalition and separating its allies from Germany under the "Axis" pact, for building the interests of the Soviet Union post-war world.

The essays contained in the volume show how foreign intelligence coped with the solution of these multifaceted and responsible tasks.

Despite wartime conditions, the loss of contact with valuable agents and the arrest of many sources, foreign intelligence managed to cover the political and military situation in Germany and allied countries. She promptly drew attention to the depletion of Germany's human and material resources, her inability to wage a protracted war; reported on dissatisfaction with Hitler's policy in the military, political and business circles of the country, on the desire of various political forces in Germany to get out of the war by concluding a separate peace with England and the USA; about the attempts of the Nazi leadership of Germany to provoke a split in the ranks of the anti-Hitler coalition and thereby save themselves from inevitable collapse. This information helped the Soviet Union to build its relations with its allies more correctly and prevent Hitler's plans.

Foreign intelligence also received information about the military-strategic plans of the Nazi leadership, about the preparation by the Germans of individual military operations on the Eastern Front.

Of great importance were the data received by foreign intelligence on the degree of enemy awareness of the plans of the high command of the Red Army, the work of individual headquarters, and the redeployment of troops. It helped the military counterintelligence agencies to identify German agents, stop the channels of information leakage, and more reliably organize work to protect state and military secrets. In the fight against the intelligence agencies of Nazi Germany, primarily with the Abwehr, intelligence did a lot, and this was a contribution to the common cause of victory over the enemy.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the information obtained during the war years by foreign intelligence about the plans and intentions of the allies of the USSR ~ England and the USA, their real attitude towards the Soviet Union, views on the post-war structure. The Soviet leadership had to conduct its foreign policy during the war years in difficult conditions. Already in the first months of the war, intelligence reported information from which it was clear that the ultimate goals of the war for England and the United States were different from those of the Soviet Union. They counted on the maximum exhaustion of both the USSR and Germany during the war in order to establish an order in the world that would be beneficial to them after the war, and above all to limit the influence of the Soviet Union. proceeding

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From these goals, our allies decided the issues of providing material and military assistance to the USSR, opening a second front, the fate of post-war Germany, Poland, and other countries of Eastern Europe.

Thanks to the efforts of its agents, acquired back in the prewar years, primarily the "Cambridge Five", foreign intelligence received almost complete data on all these plans and intentions of the allies, which allowed the country's leadership to pursue a flexible policy, and at meetings with leaders allied states to firmly defend the interests of our country. It is no coincidence that such a venerable intelligence specialist as Allen Dulles assessed the information received by Soviet foreign intelligence during the war years as "the ultimate dream of any intelligence service in the world."

A truly outstanding achievement of foreign intelligence during the war years should be considered its work on atomic problems. Through its agents, who collaborated with Soviet intelligence on the basis of a common interest in the fight against fascism, including members of the "Cambridge Five", foreign intelligence managed to obtain information and inform the country's leadership about the start of work in England and the USA to create atomic weapons, which made it possible to start similar work in the USSR. Intelligence regularly informed Soviet scientists about almost all stages of the implementation of the atomic project by our allies, who kept it a strict secret from the Soviet Union. She was able to obtain data on the theoretical calculations of the atomic bomb made by Western scientists, the most fundamentally important technological solutions for its creation. Long before the first test explosion of an atomic bomb, intelligence reported the timing of its implementation and accurate data on the design of the bomb made by the Americans.

The information received by foreign intelligence during the war years revealed the main directions of the policy of the Western powers in relation to the USSR and for the post-war period. Intelligence warned in advance what awaits our country after the end of the war, what pressure it will experience from yesterday's allies, who set as their goal to surround the USSR with a new cordon sanitaire, to minimize the authority and influence gained by it during the struggle with fascism.

By the end of the war, foreign intelligence increasingly began to receive information that testified to the concern of the ruling circles of England and the USA about the strengthening of the political weight and authority of the Soviet Union as a result of the defeat of Nazi Germany.

In one of Churchill's cipher telegrams to the newly elected new US President Truman, the British Prime Minister wrote in almost panicked terms

the danger allegedly posed for Western democracies by the advance of Soviet troops deep into Germany, their liberation of Poland, Czechoslovakia

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Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. He recommended the American president not to withdraw the Allied troops from their positions beyond the line of demarcation of the occupation zones established in Yalta, and to take a firm line of conduct against the Russians. According to intelligence data, the Allies deliberately delayed disarming the capitulated German military units, including the SS, increased in numbers and armed the Anders army, although Poland had already been liberated and there was a legitimate Polish government operating in it, which was recognized by the Allies. .

In June 1945, shortly before the opening of the Potsdam Conference of the Leaders of the Allied Powers, the Committee of Chiefs of Staff of the British General Staff sent a report to the government entitled "The Security of the British Empire." Foreign intelligence received this document.

The authors of the report officially declared the Soviet Union "the main adversary of Great Britain and the entire Western world" in the post-war period and recommended that the British government take a series of foreign policy and military measures directed against the USSR. Among them: establishing "special" relations with the United States and connecting them to the defense of Western Europe, the creation of military-political blocs and a network of military bases around the USSR with the active participation of the United States, its isolation through the creation of a system of regional organizations, the use of the UN and other regional organizations in the interests of the West. Such were the plans of the Western allies of the USSR obtained by intelligence at a time when the results of the Second World War had not yet been summed up. And soon their practical implementation began, and foreign intelligence had to concentrate its efforts in this direction. But this will be discussed in the next, fifth volume of the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence.

Summing up the fourth volume, we can summarize: during the Great Patriotic War, Soviet foreign intelligence made a significant contribution to the common cause of the victory of our people over Nazi Germany and its allies. On the battlefields and in the secret struggle behind enemy lines, she fulfilled her patriotic duty, defending the freedom and independence of our Motherland.

## APPLICATION

Declassified documents from the archives of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service relating to the activities of foreign intelligence during the Great Patriotic War. Published for the first time

(Documents are published with the preservation of the style, spelling and punctuation of copies stored in the SVR Archive.

Editing of the first copies of published documents sent to addressees may be differ somewhat.

Surnames of intelligence officers, pseudonyms of sources, as well as data related to the operational activities of intelligence,

omitted. )

#1 Top Secret MESSAGE FROM THE TOKYO RESIDENCE, JUNE 26, 1941

A residency source reports: "In connection with the Soviet-German war, Japan's foreign policy will be as follows: Japan now has no active intentions against the USSR somehow: to declare war and stand on the side of Germany. Although it is not known how this policy will change in the future, but at least at present there are no such intentions. Also, a firm policy towards the USSR will not be adopted, that is, no demands will be made and no

its definite relation will be declared. Japan wants to keep silent about the development of the war and international relations. Such a policy of Japan at the moment is explained by the fact that: Japan is not ready to fight with the USSR. The country's leadership believes that one should not rush into war; the later Japan has to enter the war, the fewer victims it will suffer. There has been a lot of talk in the leading circles of Japan lately about reconsidering the military alliance of the three powers in connection with the increased fear of war with America. May 30 Matsuoka! in his speech on foreign

politics

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acknowledged that this opinion is quite widespread in Japan. If Japan starts a war against the USSR, then America will declare war on Japan and Japan will be forced to fight on two fronts. Japan is now reconsidering its entire foreign policy, and therefore the attitude towards the USSR has not yet been determined either.

No. 2 Sov. secret MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE IN HARBIN DATED JULY 15, 1941

According to information received from a reliable and trusted source, the Kwantung Headquarters developed a plan to create a buffer state in the Far East within the framework of the former Far Eastern Republic, the implementation of which is conceived as follows: with the occupation of Moscow by the Germans, units formed from Russian emigrants, mainly Cossacks, under the command of Baksheev? rush to our side, raise an uprising and, regardless of the size of the occupied territory, proclaim anti-Soviet power. Baksheev operates under the slogan "Soviet power is on the eve of the fall, another Russian government is being created in the center, Ataman Semyonov is the temporary governor in the Far East"<sup>3</sup>. After that, Semyonov should immediately turn to Japan and the Kwantung Army for help and ask for support for the anti-communist movement in the Far East. Whether such a government exists in the center or not, Semyonov must act in this way and the Japanese will send troops to the Far East, starting together with Baksheev actions against the Red Army. This way the Japanese will avoid declaring war. The center of the buffer is conceived in Chita. In connection with this plan, the Russian department of the Japanese military mission has the following task: to find out the deployment of Soviet troops in the Far East, unit numbers, whether units are withdrawn to the German front, what kind of mechanical units are available, whether they are sent to the west, what kind of aviation and whether means of bacteriological warfare. In addition, the department was instructed to fabricate an appeal to the Russian population of the Far East calling for an uprising.

No. 3 Ovl. secret MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE FROM SHANGHAI DATED JULY 17, 1941

The residency source indicates that no final decision regarding the Soviet Union was made by the Japanese government. However, at the government level, it was decided:

- 1) Facilitate the solution of operations against the USSR without direct intervention in the war, at least in the near future.
- 2) To prevent (as in the text of the document - Ed.) an increase in American influence in the Far East, which may occur as a result of America's decision to help the Soviet Union.

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- 3) Put the armed forces on full alert, and if the Soviet Union shows a sign of general weakness, then use this weakness to take control, whether through diplomatic pressure in order to obtain benefits in the Far East or through a quick military action against certain regions of the Soviet Far East .

One of the government reports notes that if the USSR enters into an alliance with England and the USA, then there will be no possibility for Japan to have any independent aspirations against the USSR. Especially if the resistance of the USSR to Germany turns out to be long and successful.

#4 Copy Top Secret

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE vols. STALIN, MOLOTOV, BERIA

NKVD USSR. MERKULOV August 16, 1941

We are reporting an excerpt from a summary of British intelligence materials for the period from 3 to 10 August this year. The excerpt was received by the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR from London through undercover means.

"In the first week of August, the following message was received in Stockholm from the Swedish military attaché in Berlin:

- 1) Concern is growing in the German General Staff due to unanticipated Soviet resistance. The German plan for the rapid destruction of the Red Army has been thwarted.
- 2) According to his calculations, by July 20, 6 armored and 20 German infantry divisions were completely destroyed. Losses of military materials, especially tanks, are colossal.

The Germans are now forced to use tanks of the old K.2 model.

- 3) The Germans are experiencing exceptionally great difficulties in providing their troops with supplies.
- 4) Soviet tanks turned out to be first-class, and their armor is much better than the Germans expected.
- 5) The delay in the campaign gave the Russians time for a full mobilization, which should be completed by August 15th.

"The source, who usually gives us accurate information about German plans, reported at the end of July that the decision of the German high command to advance to the Urals, in addition to military considerations, was based on the importance of acquiring rich sources of mineral oils, especially in the Orenburg region. , which until now has not been fully exploited by the Russians.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (Fitin)

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#5 Copy Top Secret

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE vols. STALIN, MOLOTOV, BERIA

NKVD USSR. MERKULOV August 28, 1941

We report the content of the telegram of the British Foreign Office dated August 18 of this year, addressed to the British Ambassador to the USA. The content of the telegram was received by the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR from London through undercover means.

"To paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 3708 of August 8.

1. Our attitude towards the Russians is entirely based on a strict reciprocal basis, in order to force them to show our representatives in Russia their military plants and other objects in which we are interested. So far, the Russians have seen almost nothing with us. In the near future they will be shown factories producing standard products, but they will not be admitted to the experimental facilities.
2. The Chiefs of Staff have established a procedure, as a general principle for the management of all departments, according to which the Russians can only be given such information or messages,



which, even if they fell into the hands of the Germans, would not give them anything.

3. On the other hand, we have already sent some secret materials to the Russians. It is clear that there are some factories where they can be safely admitted.

4. The foregoing may be used as general guidance in the event that the proposal to which you refer in paragraph 1 is implemented.

We hope that the American authorities will not go beyond the limits that we currently observe."

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (Fitin)

No. 6 Copy of the Soviet. secret

comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV, comrade BERIA, comrade MERKULOV August 28, 41

We are pleased to announce the recording of the conversation between British Foreign Minister IDENA and the Polish Ambassador in London dated 18 August this year. The recording of the conversation was obtained by the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR from London through undercover means.

"1. This afternoon, on behalf of General SIKORSKY, the Polish ambassador in London came to me to talk about the difficulties that the Polish government has to face as a result of the conclusion of the Soviet-Polish agreement and recent events.

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2. He said that since, probably in the near future, he would be entrusted with the leadership of Poland's foreign policy, he would now try to give me a detailed description of these difficulties. Polish public opinion, both here and in Poland, was undoubtedly alarmed by the conclusion of the Soviet-Polish agreement. In general, the Poles regard the entry of the USSR into the war as a positive development, not only because this war will place a heavy burden on German resources, but also because the USSR will be weakened as a result of it. The Poles understand that the transformation of the USSR into an ally somewhat casts Poland and Polish interests into the background. To be frank, the Poles had the general impression that the conclusion of the Soviet-Polish agreement weakened rather than strengthened the position of Poland against the USSR with regard to the Polish eastern borders. On top of all this, a joint Anglo-American declaration was published which, by its emphasis on the principle of self-determination, would disappoint the Poles in regard to their western frontiers as well. Danzig is no doubt a German city, but on economic grounds it is important to Poland and as long as the Germans are in East Prussia, the Polish western frontier is, from a military point of view, almost impossible to defend. The morale of the Polish population is still not broken, but for the first time there are signs that German propaganda is beginning to take a line that may find some success with the Poles, that is, that the Allies want to make a Russian slave out of Poland.

3. The Ambassador suggested, although he did not at present wish to press the point, that His Majesty's Government should make any public statement or make representations to the Polish Government, in the sense that it had no intention of insist on the strict application of the principle of self-determination, at the expense of other considerations such as economy and defence. He is compelled to state frankly that the joint Anglo-American declaration aroused misgivings in Polish public opinion.

4. I told Count RACHINSKY U that we are always glad to hear everything he has to say about the views of the Polish government.

In my opinion, it is unlikely that the President and the Prime Minister, when drawing up their declaration, had the Polish borders in mind. His Majesty's Government will find it very difficult

now to put some gloss on the declaration, in the sense desirable for the Polish government, with the possible exception of interpretation in the most general terms; nevertheless, I am always ready to explore this issue in more depth with the Ambassador.

5. Count RACHINSKY then touched on the topic of the Polish internal crisis, which General SIKORSKY hoped to resolve very soon. It has now become clear that it is impossible to include members of national-democratic parties in the government. General SIKORSKY is still in trouble with some of his colleagues as a result of the Times article of August 1, and if I were to agree to issue the communiqué the draft of which Count RACHINSKY handed me, it would help the general.

6. I told him that although I agree with everything that is written in the draft, I find it not entirely convenient to raise the issue of the article in The Times in an official public statement. However, I can write to the ambassador

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letter of approximately the same content as the project. I can also try to convince The Times to publish another article that will satisfy the Polish government. I may also consider whether, in the speech which I am to give in the provinces on August 30th, I should say something to offset the impression made by the Times article. After that, I dictated and gave him my letter, a copy of which is attached ... ".

Attached to the record of the conversation is a draft communiqué and a copy of the secret letter given to SIKORSKY by IDEN. Both documents state that The Times is not a government body and does not reflect the official views of the British government.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (Fitin)

No. 7 Owls. secret MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE FROM ANKARA DATED AUGUST 30, 1941

A reliable source said that Germany and Turkey are negotiating a military agreement and that they consider it quite likely that a Turkish military delegation will travel to Berlin in the near future. The straits and the independence of the Caucasus are a subject of special discussion between the two governments. The Germans demand that British forces, in the event of a final agreement between England and the USSR, should under no circumstances be allowed through Turkey and the straits, and that the Turks take an active role in organizing the movement for the independence of the Caucasus and especially Azerbaijan.

Ismet (meaning Turkish President Ismet İnönü. - Ed.) is looking for a reason and reasons to violate the alliance treaty with England. One day, in the presence of Chairman of the Majlis Rend, Chairman of the Independent Group Ran Tarkhan, former Chief of the Cabinet of Prime Minister Vedit Uzgoren, Ismet expressed the following thought: any matter, and we, using this pretext, would terminate our contract.

No. 8 Copy of Sov. secret

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV, comrade BERIA

NKVD USSR - comrade. MERKULOV September 7, 41

We are reporting the contents of telegram No. 3893 from the British Ambassador to the United States of August 22 this year, addressed to the British Foreign Office. The content of the telegram was received by the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR from London undercover.

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"In addition to our telegram No. 3892. The following is about the content of the second memorandum handed by ROOSEWELL to the Japanese ambassador.

First, the possibility of a meeting of responsible members of the government to discuss means that could improve relations between the two countries is mentioned. This issue was raised by the Japanese Ambassador on August 8 during his conversation with the US Foreign Secretary. Discount is also made for the wish expressed by the Japanese Ambassador during his visit to the US Foreign Minister on August 16 of this year. The meaning of this desire is that the informal discussion, which was successfully conducted by both governments and aimed at establishing the existence of a basis for negotiations on a peace agreement resolving the entire Pacific situation, should be resumed.

When the Japanese ambassador made these proposals, HELL! reminded him that the US government had shown great patience and was prepared to continue to be patient until the Japanese government showed a willingness to pursue a peaceful policy.

It was pointed out to the ambassador that during the time that the US Government had consistently pursued its policy, it had received a message clearly indicating that the Japanese Government held views quite opposite to those declared by the Foreign Secretary during recent conversations with Japanese ambassador. It was also pointed out to the ambassador that the Japanese press was being systematically inspired in the direction of accusing the US of encircling Japan in order to arouse public opinion.

HELL has made it clear that he sees no way to successfully continue such conversations between the two governments or discuss emerging proposals while Japanese speakers and the press continue to campaign against America and accuse the US of encircling Japan.

On two occasions, officials of the US Department of Foreign Affairs, following the instructions of the Minister, visited the Japanese Ambassador in order to point out to him US concerns about Japan's intentions to acquire military and naval bases in French Indochina through the use of force or threat.

Subsequently, on 21 and 23 July, the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs brought before the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Ambassador the question of Japanese intentions regarding French Indo-China and stated that the US Government would consider the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China or the seizure of military and naval bases or territories within the sphere of US interests, as Japan's first preparatory step for further seizures in the Pacific Ocean. He went on to say that this first move by Japan is detrimental to the process by which the United States acquires the necessary raw materials and to peace in the Pacific, including the Philippines.

Accordingly, the US government had no choice but to inform that, in its opinion, the actions taken by the Japanese government had eliminated the grounds for further discussions regarding the peaceful resolution of the Pacific problem. In informal discussions between the governments of the United States and Japan, directed to you

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clearing the grounds for negotiating a peace agreement that would completely solve the Pacific problem, questions of a progressive program carried out by peaceful means could indeed be considered. Needless to say, plans or proposals affecting the rights or privileges of the United States or Japan will not be considered unless they are in accordance with the principles expressed by the United States and which the United States has adhered to for a long time. The program considered during such informal discussions would include the application of the principles of equilibrium, commercial

favoring and so on. It would give any economic system access to raw materials and all other essential resources.

Such a program would consider the cooperation of all nations in the Pacific on the basis of voluntariness and peace, with a view to utilizing every possible resource, means, technical skill and progressive economic leadership to build not only the own economy of these nations, but also the economy of the regions, in which industrial production can be improved. The result of this could be an increase in the purchasing power of nations, the emergence of peoples' interest in raising their living standards and the creation of conditions conducive to the preservation of peace. If the above program, based on peace and constructive principles, could be adopted for implementation in the Pacific Ocean, and if, after its application, the countries located in this basin were under threat of attack, then the American government would continue to pursue a policy of assistance nation repelling aggression and would cooperate with other nations in extending aid to any threatened country.

In accordance with this program (for the Pacific basin), Japan, in the opinion of the United States, will achieve all the goals to which it aspires. This program does not allow any country to extend its military or political control over other peoples or quickly acquire monopolistic or preferential rights. In cases where the production or distribution of essential goods is based on the statute of a monopoly, the US government will offer to use its influence so that other countries are given a fair share in the distribution of the products of these monopolies at fair prices.

The US government declares that if the Japanese government wishes to achieve what it considers its goal, then the above program is the only means by which Japanese needs and legitimate aspirations can be counted on, with much more certainty than any another program.

In the event that the Japanese Government believes that Japan is in a position to abandon its expansion and agree to adopt a new peace program in accordance with US principles, the US Government will be ready to resume the informal discussion that was interrupted in July and will gladly offer the right time and place for an exchange of opinion.

In light of the circumstances leading to the suspension of informal conversations between the two governments, the US Government considers that

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Before steps are taken to resume such conversations, it would be helpful to both parties if Japan made a clear statement of its attitude to these issues and plans, just as the US government has repeatedly made similar statements to the Japanese government.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (Fitin)

No. 9 Owl. secret MESSAGE FROM TOKYO, SEPTEMBER 8, 1941

According to the source, on September 2 this year. Minister of Trade and Industry Sakonji hosted a dinner during which he said the following: September 1 of this year. A telegram was received from one of the Japanese military attaches, in which the contents of Ribbentrop's top-secret telegram about Germany's further intentions in the European war, sent to them by the German military attache, were transmitted. Ribbentrop's telegram says: 1) On the Ukrainian front, the losses of the Red Army reach 5 million people, which is three-quarters of the entire army. 2) The Germans intend to capture Leningrad and Moscow by the end of September. 3) Refrain from further offensive inland. 4) For the final victory, the main thing

the direction of the strike to capture Ukraine and then the Caucasus. 5) If there are extra forces, they will go further to Iran, Iraq. 6) In the spring of 1942, they intend to attack the British Isles.

The Japanese government believes that neither Germany nor Britain will be able to carry out active offensive movements. Under such circumstances, it is possible to conclude peace between them. In this case, Japan will be left alone and will be forced to confront both England and the United States at the same time.

Japan is currently looking for possible ways to resolve this issue through diplomacy.

Concerning Japan's policy towards the Soviet Union, Sakonji stated that the most acute period, which was at the beginning of the German-Soviet war, had already passed.

"With such a critical relationship that Japan has with the United States, she will probably keep peace with the USSR."

No. 10 Sov. secret

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE vols. STALIN, MOLOTOV, BERIA

NKVD USSR. MERKULOV September 22, 1941

According to intelligence data available to us, the British command of the Middle East Army, shortly after the start of the Soviet-German war, received the sanction of the British War Ministry to organize

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special mission. This mission was given the task of destroying our Caucasian oil fields in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Germans, in case such a danger turned out to be real.

This mission, code-named "Mission No. 16 (P)", settled in northern Iran, where it is in full readiness for transfer at the right time by aircraft to the Caucasus.

In their correspondence on this issue, the British repeatedly emphasized the need for maximum caution so that even the very existence of such a mission would not become known to the Soviet government, as this could seriously compromise the work of KRIPPS \* and MAC-FARLAN?.

KRIPPS had already raised with Comrade STALIN the question of cooperation in preparing for the destruction of Soviet sources of supply that could be used by the Germans, but received the answer that the Soviet government itself would decide when exactly the time for such cooperation would come.

Somewhat later, at the direction of London, KRIPPS again returned to this question in a letter to Comrade STALIN, but again to no avail.

After that, CRIPPS made a proposal (with which London agreed) that the solution of this issue could be accelerated if it was allowed, at the appropriate moment, to promise the USSR compensation for the destruction of the Caucasian oil fields. As a result of numerous meetings of the special committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Hankey (?) (the last name is illegible. - Note ed.) and with the participation of a member of the British economic mission in the USSR - BERTRUD, the following draft English declaration was drawn up, now already sent to KRIPPSU:

1. In the event that the Soviet Government, in order to prevent the capture of oil fields by the Germans, destroys them, the British Government undertakes to supply the USSR during the war

and two years after its completion, oil in an amount equal to that received by Great Britain from its empire.

2. The British Government undertakes to provide the USSR with an oil tonnage equal to that which she herself will have in the same period.

3. The British Government undertakes to assist the Soviet Union in acquiring drilling equipment to replace the destroyed one.

To give this declaration more weight and real significance, BERTRUD traveled to Washington, where, at the direction of ROOSEVELT, the State Department dealt with this issue. One of these days BERTRUD was supposed to return to London with an American draft declaration requiring, after London got acquainted with this draft, only the signature of ROOSEWELL. Is it now supposed that BERTRUD will go to Moscow together with the BEaverbrook mission? and will take with him everywhere the coordinated and approved texts of the British and American declarations to the Soviet government on this question.

At the same time, in the appropriate circles in London, the opinion is being expressed that since the Soviet government will still be forced to destroy the oil fields, one should not rush to hand over these deeds.

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declarations, since they impose certain obligations on the English, which it may be possible to avoid. On the other hand, the opponents of this course point out that, being unsure of the future supply of oil, the Soviet government will not decide on the timely destruction of the oil fields and, in the end, they will pass intact to the Germans. In any case, now the question of whether such declarations should be handed over to the USSR or whether it can be dispensed with is essentially left to the discretion of CRIPPSA.

Head of Intelligence

NKVD USSR (Fitin)

No. 11 Copy Top Secret

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE vols. STALIN, MOLOTOV, BERIA

NKVD USSR comrade MERKULOV September 22, 41

According to intelligence information we have, the British Foreign Office, by telegram No. 4922 dated September 6 of this year, suggested that the British Chargé d'Affaires in Washington inform the State Department and, if possible, the President, that the USSR, being in a very difficult position, repeatedly asked England to exert appropriate pressure on the Finns in order to force them to conclude a separate peace. The only thing the British can do is tell the Finns that if they continue to advance after they have reached the 1918 frontiers, England will be forced to declare war on them.

In the opinion of the British, such a step, in addition to having a very weak effect, is inconvenient for England for some reasons related to the lease of Finnish tonnage. Based on all this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed to the British Chargé d'Affaires to seek the assistance of the American government in exerting appropriate pressure on the Finns.

On the same day the English chargé d'affaires delivered this memorandum to Atherton, who promised to report the case to HELL?.

According to Atherton, HELL considers the use of strong pressure on the Finns undesirable, as this may show them that the United States is retreating from the principle of impartiality.

On September 8, the British Chargé d'Affaires, by telegram No. 4132, announced that HELL was now studying the question of applying appropriate pressure on the Finns. HELL considers it appropriate to speak on this issue with the Finnish ambassador, who is favorable to this idea, but is afraid to do anything. In this regard, HELL is likely to give appropriate instructions to the American envoy in Helsinki.

To the questions of the British charge d'affaires, HELL replied that he had not yet informed the Soviet ambassador, since he had essentially nothing to say.

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On September 9, the English Chargé d'Affaires in Washington sent the following telegram, No. 4156, to the Wanglian Foreign Office:

"1. According to the information I have just received from Mr. ATERTON, yesterday afternoon Mr. HELL had a conversation with the Finnish Ambassador on this matter and believes that he made a strong impression on him. Thereafter, the State Department informed the American envoy in Helsinki of the content of this conversation. As far as I understand, the American envoy in Helsinki was also instructed to make a general introduction to the Finns and to indicate that if they continue the war with the Russians, after achieving their goals, they will no longer be considered as pursuing an independent policy, but as supporters of Germany. If the actions of the Finnish government give any evidence of the correctness of such suspicions, the feelings of the free democratic countries towards Finland will undoubtedly be affected, etc."

Note: ATERTON is the head. European Division of the US State Department.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (Fitin)

No. 12 Copy of Sov. secret

comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV comrade BERIA, comrade MERKULOV September 30, 41

We report the content of the general directive for the British delegation at the Moscow Conference, drawn up personally by CHURCHILL and handed to Beaverbrook before leaving for Moscow.

The content of the directive was received by the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR from London through undercover means.

"1. In accordance with the results of the BEVERBROOKE-HARRY-MANACH negotiations set forth in Lord BEVERBROOKE's report dated today, we must consider ourselves bound to fulfill our share in the supply of tanks and aircraft promised to Russia. Lord Beaverbrook should be given the right, at his discretion, to determine and offer Russia at the Moscow Conference the necessary amount of other equipment and materials.

2. Russia must be assured of an increase in quotas from July 1, 1942, to June 30, 1943. The output of the British military industry will reach its highest point during this period, and the output of the American military industry in the third year of its development. It would be better not to be bound by hard numbers based on optimistic forecasts of Anglo-American production. It is also dangerous to promise the Russians a certain percentage of British and American production, since they may immediately demand an increase in it. We must not give them the estimated figures of our combined productivity unless they give us their data.

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The Russians should be asked to provide information about their available reserves, in accordance with the various rear lines they hope to hold. Lord Beaverbrook is given the right to encourage Russia to continue to resist by giving the Russians appropriate reasoned statements regarding the more distant prospects.

3. It is necessary to draw the attention of the Russians to the current situation with steamships and to the difficulties of sea transfers from accessible ports. Particular emphasis must be placed on the rapid destruction of steamships now taking place, on the effort required to replace those that have been destroyed, and on the vital needs of Great Britain.

4. In agreement with the Americans, the preservation of the open Vladivostok route and a firm line with respect to Japan, IN THIS REGARD, should be encouraged.

Special emphasis should be placed on the need for the widest possible and most energetic development of the route from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea using railways and dirt roads. The practical limits due to time should be explained - the need to increase traffic on the Trans-Persian railway and the construction of a highway. It should be pointed out the need to link the transport of supplies and troops, in any given period, with the maintenance of this road.

The Russians will undoubtedly give their views on the throughput of the port of Arkhangelsk, on its capabilities and on the railway connection with central Russia, taking into account winter conditions and probable enemy actions.

5. The conference should work on the premise that the United States is not a belligerent country. Britain's manpower resources are now fully utilized, although further demand for them, from 1942 onwards, will increase. We are obliged to feed ourselves by keeping in constant motion a vast commercial fleet. We must defend the British Isles against invasion, for which the enemy can at any time muster a superior army and from the most dangerous forms of air raids by the main force of naval aviation, which at any time can be quickly transferred from east to west. We must maintain our army in the Middle East and hold the line from the Caspian Sea to the Western Desert. During 1942 we hope to assemble on this front some 25 British, Indian and Dominion divisions, numbering about one million men, including all logistics and air forces. The burden on the shipping companies to transport these troops, principally around Africa, and the time required to sail the ships there and back, must be explained, if need be, in detail.

6. For the defense of the British Isles we have an army of some more than two million men, supported by about a million and a half of our armed militia. We have only about three and a half million rifles, and in 1942 we will be able to get about 100,000 rifles. Of this army of two million, 900,000 are in the field and consolidated into 20 mobile divisions, 9 less mobile provincial or coastal divisions, 6 armored divisions, of which only three are fully formed, 5 tank brigades, of which only one is fully formed.

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The colossal aviation we are creating will require about one million people, of which there are already 750,000 people.

The navy has half a million sailors and marines. Adding to all this shipbuilding, aircraft building, the munitions industry, food processing and other civilian industries, although reduced to a minimum, it is not difficult to understand that the human resources of a country of 44 million people have already been used up. or will soon be used to the limit.



7. The remaining 1,100,000 men, net of field units, are required for air and coastal defense, for the protection of airfields and the protection of the most vulnerable points, for garrison duty in Northern Ireland, for staffing training centers, and so on. So a very small amount remains unused.

8. We are unable to increase the size of the field army at home (there are less than 40 divisions) and will have to make the greatest effort to maintain the figure already reached, in connection with the sending of reinforcements to the Middle East, to India and other foreign garrisons, as for example to Iceland, Malta, Aden, Singapore and Hong Kong.

9. To repel an invasion of Great Britain we must have at least 25 infantry and 4-5 armored divisions. It should be noted that the enemy can transfer his troops along the European railways incomparably faster than we can withdraw our divisions from abroad. In connection with this, the number of divisions that we can allocate for offensive operations abroad is very small.

10. In addition to the 25 British, Indian and Dominion divisions which we propose to concentrate in the Middle East in 1942, we are forming an expeditionary army of 7 to 8 divisions, including 2 armored divisions. This is the maximum that can be provided.

For the transfer and maintenance of larger forces abroad, we do not have transport, even if it were possible to allocate more divisions. All ideas about landing 20-30 British divisions on the western shores of the continent or sending them to the Russian front have no real basis. This must be stated quite definitely.

11. Next spring we intend to start operations on the mainland, if it will be possible to do so. We are exploring all possible options, including options on the northern and southern flanks of the Russian front. The expedition to Norway will cause a revolution and, if successful, may bring Sweden into our camp.

This issue is being studied in detail.

We do not see, however; how can the Russian army help us here, because its intervention will cause the strongest antagonism in Sweden, and the hostility of Finland is already known.

12. At any moment we may face open hostility from Spain and German penetration into Morocco, Algeria and West Africa. If the French resist this in Africa, all the troops we can muster can be sent to help them. In both these cases, the sea routes - the transits of the Germans - cannot be compared with the very long route around Africa.

13. On the southern flank of Russia, we intend to use the large forces mentioned above.

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After clearing the western desert and Cyrenaica of our and German armies operating there, our Middle Eastern troops will be able to choose a theater of operations.

Our country will increase its assistance to the Russians in the Caucasus or east of the Caspian. There is no doubt that supplying them will load the Persian route to the limit. On the other hand, Turkey, if it could be obtained, is a big prize.

In this case, the road for the Germans to Egypt and Syria would be closed by powerful Turkish armies, and the defense of the Black Sea, and hence the Caucasus, would be facilitated.

Turkey's position can be determined in the near future by promising to send tanks, aircraft, anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery, troops, and so on.

The Russians must be told in no uncertain terms that most of these weapons and troops will be taken from what we propose to give them.

Britain and Russia must reconsider their plans in order to win Turkey over to their side.

14. We are very interested in the formation of the Polish and Czech armies in Russia and would be happy to help them in obtaining weapons.

It should be pointed out that the Poles and Czechs have influential colonies in the USA, and if part of the weapons sent will be allocated to the Polish and Czech troops, this will have a good effect.

15. The Russians will undoubtedly ask how we intend to win the war, what should be answered:

"Continuing to fight until the National Socialist system collapses, just as happened to the Kaiser system in the last war."

For this purpose, we will fight the enemy wherever we can meet him in favorable conditions. We will undermine their propaganda, choke them with a blockade, bombard them relentlessly and mercilessly.

In the last war, we also could not say how and where we would win it, but without yielding or hesitating, we ended it victoriously. We did not hesitate last year alone to oppose Germany and Italy, for the determination of the British people to destroy the strength of the National Socialists is colossal. The phrase "tyranny of the National Socialists" and "Prussian militarism" is used more as a goal than as a condemnation of the German people in general. We started with the hopes of the Russian government to split the Germans and to isolate the criminal National Socialist regime.

16. We certainly cannot predict the future actions of the US. Measures already sanctioned by President Roosevelt and his government could, at any time in the near future, involve the United States in war, declared or undeclared. In this case, we can hope for a general offensive against Germany in 1943.

If the morale of the Germans and their unity are seriously damaged, and their oppression of the conquered European countries is weakened, it may be possible to land large armored forces simultaneously on the shores of several conquered countries and raise a broad insurrectionary movement. Corresponding plans are now being studied by the British headquarters.

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Our note: On September 19, these instructions were considered and approved by the Defense Committee under the chairmanship of CHURCHILL. The Committee agreed to Beaverbrook's suggestion that they be shown to Harriman, but not shown to us. Beaverbrook was asked to use these instructions as a basis for negotiations with us.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate

NKVD of the USSR (Fitin) No. 13 Sov. secret STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION S.S. to comrade STALIN December 8, 1941 SPECIAL MESSAGE

We inform you about the content of the especially urgent telegram No. 6424 dated November 24 of this year. British Foreign Minister IDENA to the British Ambassador to the USA HALIFAX.

The content of the telegram was received from London by the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR undercover.

"To your telegrams Nos. 5352 and 5353 of November 22 about Japanese-American talks in Washington:

1. The Japanese proposals are very characteristic and confirm the view that the aim of the Japanese is to free themselves as soon as possible from the use of economic pressure against them, but not to quickly resolve other issues. Do we agree with Mr. HELL's comments? on this proposal and would like to supplement his remarks with the following.

2. The first paragraph of the proposal refers only to the "armed" advance, leaving the Japanese full opportunity to continue their infiltration (which is, in any case, very difficult to regulate) and may be interpreted by them as precluding further strengthening of the Philippines and other outposts of democratic powers. .

3. Paragraph 3 of the proposals suggests that the Dutch East Indies should be regarded only as a warehouse and have very little regard for Dutch sovereignty.

4. Paragraph 4 of the proposal places particular emphasis on oil, which Japan needs mainly for military purposes.

5. Briefly, the Japanese proposals are as follows: not only will the freezing of Japanese funds be canceled, but in addition, Japan will be further assisted in the acquisition of certain commodities, including oil, while aid to China will be terminated. The only concrete proposal that Japan makes on its part is the transfer of its troops from one part of Indochina to another.

6. It is clear that these proposals are completely unacceptable and the only way out that arises is to either reject them

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(having hinted at the same time that the conclusion of a limited treaty is not ruled out) and give Japan the opportunity to make better offers or to make its own counteroffers.

7. We are quite confident in the correctness of the conduct of these negotiations by Mr. HELL and he can best judge which of these two paths is tactically more suitable. We are also quite sure of their full understanding that Japan will try to force a hasty decision by exaggerating the danger of further delay.

8. However, the prediction of Dr. HORNBECK (Political Adviser to the US State Department), reported in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 5189, made an impression on us. He is very cautious about the type of agreement that the Japanese are proposing. It must be ensured that this kind of characterization cannot be given to any agreement that we eventually agree to.

9. It seems to us that the Japanese proposals should be seen as an initial step in the "trade" process. Japan tries to realize the maximum of its requirements at the minimum price. If our counter-proposals are to be made, then we assume that the process should be reversed and our own demands should be met at no cost to us.

10. Mr. HELL's counter-proposals, reported in paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 5352, in our opinion, cannot justify easing economic measures against Japan. The withdrawal of only the bulk of the Japanese troops from Indochina leaves too much of a loophole. It is doubtful whether we can in any way justify our acceptance of this formulation as satisfactory, or, even more doubtfully, support it. Considering it undesirable to overestimate our counterproposals, it seems to us expedient (from the Chinese point of view)

draw them up in such a way as to prevent the possibility of an insidious attack on Kunmen during the operation of the interim agreement.

11. On this basis, we would propose the following provision for consideration by the US government: any counterproposals should stipulate the complete withdrawal from Indochina not only of "troops", as the Japanese themselves propose, but also of naval, military and air forces with their weapons and the cessation of further military advance into Indochina...

...As compensation, a partial mitigation of existing economic measures may be offered, so as to allow a limited amount of goods to be imported into Japan to ensure the welfare of the Japanese civilian population, not including, of course, goods that have a direct impact on the country's military potential, especially oil. These easings will become effective only when the movement of Japanese military forces ceases and we can hope to receive goods of this kind from Japan if we need them.

12. Mr. HELL has made it very clear to the Japanese that any interim agreement is only the first step towards a broader solution of problems, which must be in accordance with basic principles acceptable to the United States. In order to prevent the Japanese from distorting the true meaning of what is happening, we consider it necessary to

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explicitly state that any interim agreement is temporary and will only be concluded to facilitate negotiations on a final agreement on fundamental issues acceptable to all parties concerned.

13. All of the above is our direct editorial and is sent without consulting the Dominion Governments, who, like the Dutch and Chinese Governments, may have other proposals.

14. There remains only the question raised by you in paragraph 8 of your telegram No. 5352 concerning the extent of the powers which may be submitted to the representatives of the Powers concerned in Washington. Of course, we want to facilitate by all means the difficult task of Mr. HELL. But our economic structure is so complex (particularly due to the need to consult with representatives from other parts of the empire) that we do not currently find it practical to give diplomatic representatives unlimited powers. If the US government approves the above proposal, then it will be necessary to determine more precise distinctions between goods essential to the well-being of the Japanese civilian population and those important to its military potential, and to decide whether the economic pressures will be alleviated through financial measures, or through commodity exchange operations. After that, we will be ready to reconsider the issue of empowerment."

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (Fitin)

No. 14 Copy of Sov. secret

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE vols. STALIN, MOLOTOV, BERIA

ZAM. PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER INTERNAL. OF THE USSR comrade MERKULOV

December 10, 41 SPECIAL MESSAGE

We report the contents of the telegram dated November 27 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin. This telegram was intercepted and partially deciphered by British political intelligence.

The content of the telegram was received by the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR from London undercover.

"Negotiations with the US have stalled and the Japanese government is facing a major decision. Meet with HITLER and RIBBENTROP and secretly explain the situation to them. The democratic powers behave in the East in a monarchical manner. They move their troops and force Japan to do the same. These transfers can

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lead to an armed conflict, probably much sooner than expected ... (a number of groups not deciphered in the original) in the event of a war with the democratic powers, Japan will continue to pin down Russian forces in the Far East, and if the Russians unite with the democracies in an attack on us, Japan will put up a strong resistance!. However, explain to HITLER that the main Japanese efforts will be concentrated in the south and we propose to refrain from deliberate action taken in the north ... "17.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the Union of S.S.R. (Fitin)

No. 15 Copy of Sov. secret

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE USSR comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV, comrade BERIA

NKVD USSR - comrade. MERKULOV December 14, 41

We report the content of telegrams Nos. 214, 215 and 216 dated 6.KhP of this year. British Ambassador to the USSR KRIPPS to the British Foreign Office.

The content of the telegrams was received by the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR from London undercover.

"1. This morning I saw General SIKORSKY, he told me the contents of his negotiations with STALIN and asked me to convey it to you as soon as possible. He confirmed that my preliminary outline of STALIN's probable views, which I had given him even before his arrival in Moscow, turned out to be more accurate and better than any he had received here and that his negotiations were completely successful in terms of turning the unstable relationship between these two countries into those that will be held in an atmosphere of trust and cooperation. At times these negotiations were difficult and required great perseverance on the part of the general. When he first raised the issue of the withdrawal of Polish troops from the USSR to other nearby countries, STALIN interpreted this as a plot between the USA, Poland and us and told the general that the whole world would be above him (STALIN laugh if such an event occurs. In connection with this, SIKORSKI asked STALIN to give his alternative proposal (0 which see below).

2. At dinner, STALIN made a very friendly speech and the general is sure that STALIN, as he said, agreed with the idea of creating a strong army in Poland after the war. STALIN declared his agreement with every word of the speech given by Sikorsky on the radio. He saw the text and made this statement before the transmission. The already signed declaration was adopted almost without changes in the wording proposed by the Poles.

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3. STALIN strongly insisted on the release of all Poles and declared his determination to accelerate this. He was so angry about the lack of food for the Polish troops that he was told that he told General ANDERS that the Poles had to intervene in his conversation with the Soviet officer in order to moderate his anger. He told his quartermaster general that the latter could not feed the troops by directives and orders alone.

decrees. Those Russian officers who had sympathized with the Poles even before, in this connection declared their satisfaction and expressed confidence that the state of affairs in the future will change.

4. The result of the negotiations is that, according to STALIN's proposals, the Polish military forces and the civilian population should be concentrated in Uzbekistan, mainly between Tashkent and the Persian border and partly east of Tashkent. The Russians talk about the possibility of supplying the Poles with food, but for armaments they rely mainly on us and the USA.

SIKORSKY saw the last telegrams and understands that arming the Polish troops by us can only be carried out for quite a long time, but he hopes that by May 1942 this will be carried out. SIKORSKY also hopes that the food situation will now be satisfactory and, as far as I can judge, he does not at all count on our help in this direction. (Nevertheless, corresponding demands may well be made at a later date if the Russians are unable to keep their promise.) I drew his attention to the difficulties of supply and specifically asked him if he had in mind the last telegram concerning the carrying capacity of the Persian roads. (I, of course, told him even before he left for Moscow the essence of telegram No. 53861 of the War Ministry of November 24). He assured me that he knew about it. SIKORSKY considers it necessary, for the sake of future Soviet-Polish relations, to accept STALIN's proposal and not to insist on the departure of the Poles from Russia.

5. STALIN agreed to the departure of 30,000 Poles. The additional 5,000, I believe, includes the aviation and naval personnel that SIKORSKY included in his original memo. Now SIKORSKY speaks of his desire to have up to 9,000 Poles in the Middle East and the rest in England. STALIN agreed to the creation of 5-7 divisions in the USSR, which would make up the army.

6. In accordance with my suggestions, SIKORSKY asked STALIN to appoint two of his advisers to visit the Polish camps together, which apparently pleased STALIN, and he appointed General Panfilov and VYSHINSKY for this purpose.

7. General SIKORSKY will return and meet with STALIN on December 12th.

8. STALIN spoke very frankly about the military situation and said that the Soviet troops were fighting well on the Moscow front, and the complete defeat of General KLEIST's group had eliminated the threat to the Caucasus at the present time. A huge number of trophies were captured, especially vehicles (11 thousand). General von Bock disappeared from the Moscow front, either killed or removed from command. Now in his place is General LIST. STALIN is fully aware of how dangerous such an adversary is.

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9. Around Moscow, STALIN has 70,000 cavalry in reserve and hopes to soon be able to use them in operations against the Germans.

10. According to SIKORSKY, there is no doubt that the Russians will continue to fight regardless of the fate of Moscow. According to STALIN, winter conditions began to affect the German troops. The German superiority in tanks is still great, but they have very little air superiority.

11. SIKORSKY was greatly impressed by the attention that STALIN paid to a large extent to the military in comparison with the civilians in his entourage. The general is quite sure that there is no danger of the collapse of the regime at the present time.

12. SIKORSKY informed me of the possibilities for improvement in the treatment of the Poles. For example, in Tashkent, the order to evict Poles from this area was canceled and now the Poles have

access to the city.

13. He fully understands the possibility of certain practical difficulties in the future, especially in the matter of the liberation of the Poles in the far north, but assumes that sincere efforts will be made to resolve this problem. He also understands that some local authorities may be stubborn even after receiving appropriate instructions from Moscow.

14. The Polish embassy received permission to send its representatives to various parts of the country with sufficiently broad powers to study the conditions in which the Poles find themselves and to provide them with possible assistance.

15. It was decided to provide the Poles, wherever possible, with work in accordance with their qualifications. For example, an inventor of a tank and an eminent chemist, now busy cutting trees and clearing roads, will get jobs in their specialty. The General is now considering the question of sending these highly qualified persons to England: either to the south, or, if possible, through Arkhangelsk.

16. During dinner, STALIN began to talk about the eastern borders of Poland, however, SIKORSKY refused to discuss this issue on the grounds that if he returned from Russia, having established new borders, "the whole world would laugh at him."

STALIN greeted this situation humorously, saying that there were no difficulties that could not be overcome at a peace conference and expressed the hope that even before such a conference was convened, they would come to a mutual understanding. STALIN used strong language against HITLER, calling him crazy and a rabbit imitating a lion. However, he said that HITLER had a few good people around him from a military point of view.

17. I asked General SIKORSKY if he had any opportunity to judge Stalin's feelings towards His Majesty's government.

The general, under especially great secrecy, said that on the basis of everything he had heard, he was absolutely sure of STALIN's deep distrust of the British government. In his opinion, this was partly due to the failure of attempts to harmonize military plans. He thinks that the tactics (mainly allied press speeches) that were used at the recent conference did not help, and therefore it is necessary to abandon

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pleasant and laudatory phrases, be able to use the real possibilities of existing relationships and frankly discuss the difficulties that arise if they must be overcome.

18. SIKORSKY told me about his attempt to explain what a great and versatile help we have already rendered and how practically it is difficult for us to do anything to create a second front. He avoided all references to northern Persia and the Caucasus, as he saw too much danger in touching on such a topic. He also explained that there was nothing more we could do to increase industrial output, while America was lagging behind us in this respect, in connection with which the Russians themselves must make every effort to get America to more serious results.

19. As an example of distrust towards us, he cited STALIN's assumption about our desire to use Polish troops in Singapore. SIKORSKY rejected this assumption, declaring that even without the Poles we have a large number of our own troops there.

The General made STALIN understand his complete loyalty to Great Britain, after which there were no more conversations on this subject.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the Union of S.S.R. (Fitin)

No. 16 Copy of Sov. secret

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF S.S.R. comrade Stalin, comrade Molotov, comrade Beria, comrade Merkulov

January 25, 1942

We are transmitting the contents of an intelligence report received by the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR from London about the negotiations between CHURCHILL and ROOSEVELT in Washington.

The report was compiled by a verified source based on familiarization with documents and conversations with various employees of the US diplomatic and other missions in England.

According to the source, the main issues of the negotiations were the following:

"1. CHURCHILL's main goal was to prevent the redeployment of American weapons and especially naval forces to the Pacific Ocean. CHURCHILL feared that the US War Department would insist on changing previous plans in order to pay more attention to ongoing events in the Pacific. For this reason CHURCHILL, trying to forestall possible changes, hastened his departure for Washington. His mission was carried out with success, and the reports he brought about the new aggressive plans of the Germans played an important role in this. The British assumed that the fascist army would begin a new campaign immediately after the accumulation of the necessary funds and would carry out

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on a large scale with the participation of sea, land and air forces. This campaign will have three phases:

a) Providing transportation to Gibraltar and massing a large army on the European side. The crossing of troops across the strait will begin immediately after air superiority is achieved. The Germans have already deployed the necessary personnel at Spanish airfields, built coastal batteries, enabling them to control navigation in the strait. Gibraltar itself will be bypassed and temporarily ignored.

6) On the very first day of hostilities, a simultaneous air and sea attack will be carried out against Casablanca, Marrakech and Dakar. The Germans assume that the French traitors in these ports will facilitate their occupation and provide real support.

c) A rapid strike by mechanized units, aimed at eliminating French resistance, if any, in order to secure lines of communication leading to the indicated ports. Previously sent small garrisons, flotillas will have to repel attempts by the allies to restore the situation.

The second part of the German plan involves the capture of Madeira, the Canary Islands and Cape Verde in order to distract the Allied navy and inflict a heavy defeat on it in its attempt to capture these points. Basically, the Germans want to get at their disposal the coastal bases of the navy, the lines of communication to which they can fully provide.

According to existing British government opinion, this plan was shelved only because the Germans were unsure of the role to be played by the French fleet and the people of North Africa. It is now assumed that the Germans feel completely confident of success, regardless of the cooperation of the French, in which they are not at all interested in achieving.



As American diplomacy had been playing with the French for several years and successfully keeping Germany in the dark, CHURCHILL insisted on taking appropriate countermeasures, even at the risk of alienating modern France and throwing her wholly into the arms of the Germans. Finally, CHURCHILL wanted guarantees that military units destined for the occupation of certain North African points and the Atlantic islands would not be transferred to the Pacific Ocean. In November 1940, the United States created suitable shock troops specifically for this purpose, the task of which included the occupation of Iceland, the Azores, Cape Verde, the Canary Islands, Dakar and even Casablanca. These troops received special training and were reinforced, especially the groups destined for the capture of Dakar. Churchill feared that, due to the suitability of these troops for waging war in America's Pacific possessions, they would be transferred to the Pacific Ocean.

Did de Gaulle's troops seize the islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon to prevent the possibility of US diplomatic hesitation on the issue of determining the attitude towards France? the result was a notable change in the views of the State Department. Events have shown that, despite the American assurances given by Vichy with regard to the French West Indies and Atlantic possessions, no serious

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there was no big gap, and the Vichy government would willingly take the side of the one who acts faster.

2. CHURCHILL spoke of the great danger to Atlantic communications posed by German naval bases on the African coast. Noting the extreme importance of the sea routes across the South Atlantic and Cape Town, CHURCHILL insisted on maintaining this route in order to maintain economy, security and concentration of horse forces, as a result of which the entire eastern part of the Pacific theater could remain in a defensive position and not require massive forces. . He also emphasized the importance of preventing the Japanese fleet from contacting the German naval forces to attack ships going to the Far East, which could happen if the Germans managed to establish bases on the African coast.

CHURCHILL succeeded in persuading ROOSEWELL and the Commander-in-Chief not to yield the shock troops destined for operations in the Atlantic Basin to be used in accordance with the plans of the military and naval leaders in the Pacific Ocean. On the contrary, these units will be strengthened numerically and materially.

3. The announced figures for the increase in industrial output, exceeding by 10% the original figures of the War Production Administration plan, express confidence that these figures could be met by the relevant branches of industry, with the exception of some of them, especially the automobile industry. , which, not wanting to rebuild its peacetime production on a war footing, proposed an independent construction scheme

special military factories.

Deputy Chairman of the Office of War Production KNUDSEN objected to this scheme, and CHURCHILL with the help of BEAVER-BROOKE?! succeeded in crushing the opposition. The result was the announced program. However, during the first six months no strong increase in industrial output is expected, and only in the last three months of 1942 will the announced program be fulfilled by 40%.

4. In view of the fact that the planned program will not be carried out during the first six months of 1942, why not all requirements for the supply of military materials can be met, the question of their further redistribution was brought up for discussion. Then a number of possibilities for realizing this problem arose:

a) Reducing the supply of England.

6) Decrease in deliveries of the USSR.

c) Postponement of offensive actions, for example, in the Pacific Ocean and reduction of shipping even at the expense of the loss of existing territories and positions. A compromise solution was reached on this issue on the basis of all the possibilities presented.

CHURCHILL agreed to some reduction in supplies to the USSR if the German offensive began to develop in North Africa or the Middle East, because then the Germans would be forced to take up defensive positions on the Russian front and the danger of any breakthrough there would be small.

The decisions taken have already had their effect, consisting in the fact that the Australians and the Dutch resisted this scheme of CHURCHILL and openly condemned it. However, the Americans found a compromise

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The other solution is to send the Australians and the Dutch their fully equipped and armed troops and some war materiel. The same decision was made with regard to England, where American troops would be sent to replace the trained British troops, which in this case could be transferred to the active military theaters for joint operations with the American Atlantic strike units.

5. The latter is closely related to the decision to put strong pressure on Ireland and force it to hand over the Irish naval bases to the US. First, American troops will land in Northern Ireland, where several bases have already been set up thanks to the efforts of the Americans themselves. The implementation of this plan will ensure the passage of England's sea convoys across the Atlantic Ocean. In addition, American forces will be ready to enter Ireland either in the event of a German attack on her, or in the event of her decision to end her neutrality. American troops will be trained in England and the latter undertakes to use its troops first.

6. It was decided to organize bases located at the following points along the line of communications: Trinidad, Dakar, Cape Town, Falkland Islands, Delhi, Madras and Rangoon, where American naval and ground forces would be located.

7. Decided also to open final negotiations with Portugal, guaranteeing her the preservation of her empire and former frontiers after the end of the war, and a number of minor concessions, if she agrees to enter into a secret alliance with the allied governments. Portugal will have to guarantee the dispatch of her troops to her colonies in order to reinforce their garrisons in order to prevent a surprise attack and save a large part of the army in the event of a German invasion. In addition, negotiations were underway to create a flank threat to the Germans in Portugal if they tried to advance through Spain to Gibraltar. Although the British doubt the advisability of this, the Americans attach great importance to such a movement. The reaction of Portugal to the proposal made was favorable and the necessary plans were drawn up, the effectiveness of which the future will show.

8. Finally, it was decided that America would put final pressure on the Vichy government and obtain guarantees from it that resistance would be organized in North Africa in the event of a German advance into Spain. Despite the great opposition in Vichy circles, the Americans are confident that they have strong enough support among them to achieving the desired. In particular, the change in the mood of Vichy circles is explained by the success of the Soviet resistance and the final establishment of a world coalition. On the other hand, the Germans are pushing for drastic changes in the French army and navy, to which DARLAN?? apparently agreed.

One of the points of confusion in the Allied strategy is that the Americans cannot but expect a German attack in North Africa, although the British claim that the initiative of surprise and speed will be lost as a result. All this is still in the process of great controversy”.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (Fitin)

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No. 17 Copy of Sov. secret

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV, comrade BERIA

NKVD of the USSR - t. MERKULOV February 20, 1942

We report the content of the secret memorandum of the British Foreign Office dated January 15 of this year, which was sent out for familiarization to members of the government.

The content of the memorandum was received by the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR from London through undercover means.

“Memorandum on the situation in Germany.

Since mid-December, many articles have appeared in the British press about the plight of the German army, about internal divisions and about the deterioration of morale in Germany. Therefore, not without obvious reason, the British public begins to think about the imminent German defeat and even about the end of the war in Europe before the summer. This way of thinking is very dangerous. In general, printing is based on the following principles:

1. Conflict between HITLER and the generals, culminating in the removal of BRAUCHITZ? 21 December.
2. The retreat of the German army under strong pressure from the Russians.
3. Collection of winter things along with extremely gloomy Christmas and New Year performances by HITLER, GOEBBELS and company.
4. Information about the unrest in Germany, about the establishment of patrols armed with machine guns at the crossroads of streets, about the transfer of HITLER of his headquarters on the Eastern Front, about the withdrawal of SS units from the Eastern Front and about the establishment of a cordon sanitaire between the army and Eastern Germany.
5. Information about the increased number of deserters from the army, about the deplorable physical and moral condition of the units withdrawn from the Eastern Front for replenishment and reorganization, and about the executions of German soldiers in Besançon, Constanta, Belgorod, and so on.
6. Message about the spread of typhus.

Of course, the picture presented in this way is drawn favorable, but, unfortunately, many facts have not been verified and their interpretation is in many respects over-optimistic.

Let's consider all these provisions in order:

1. Undoubtedly, there have been differences of late between HITLER and his generals regarding the conduct of the Russian campaign, and relations between the army and the party are unhealthy. But how dangerous it is, we do not yet have enough data to make a conclusion.

2. Having failed in their main objectives, the German army began a planned retreat, and the degree of Russian success can only be judged by the degree of disorder they bring to the German retreat.

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By next spring the Germans will probably be in a position to launch an offensive which, once launched, will probably have considerable success. However, one can get the impression from newspaper reports that the German army is in great difficulty, that the Russians have already broken through the Nazi defense line of Vyazma-Bryansk and are seizing a large amount of military material (for example, a recent report on the seizure of military materials sufficient for 14 armored and 10 infantry divisions) and that the Germans are experiencing an acute shortage of oil.

3. As for the gloomy speeches of HITLER and GOEBBELS before the new year and Christmas, this is probably due to the fact that HITLER came to the conclusion that it was impossible to hide the situation on the Eastern Front any longer, hoping by this to make the collection of winter clothes more successful ( they say that more than 60 million warm clothes have already been collected). This can only serve as proof of the remarkable confidence in the good morale of the German civilian population. According to most of our best sources, there are no tangible signs of a decline in the morale of the population or any organized opposition in the country. Undoubtedly, as a result of the eastern campaign, there is a certain decline in the morale of the German soldier. As regards the civilian population, apathy may have given way to uncertainty and even doubt. There is no doubt that depression and war weariness have intensified among the elderly, but the discipline and fanaticism of people under 35, in our opinion, remain unshaken.

Therefore, it remains a controversial question that when the morale of the German people really begins to crack, it will happen, as in 1918, immediately, and not gradually.

4. The message about the withdrawal of SS units from the Eastern Front is not true. For rest and replenishment of the SS units, no more was allocated from the front than other active units. Already a few months ago, HIMMLER moved his headquarters to the Eastern Front, which he periodically visits. So far, there have been no serious unrest, except for occasional riots that have flared up (for example, in lines for food) and information about the installation of a company of patrols with machine guns in the street has not been confirmed at all.

5. In fact, there is no significant increase in the number of deserters from the army. Naturally, with an army of 286 divisions, the German military authorities must from time to time act a little more severely with respect to the overblown soldiers in the occupied territories. German soldiers returning from the Eastern Front may say that they would prefer not to return there, but there is no evidence that the orders given to return to the Russian front would not have been carried out. The troops withdrawn from the front for replenishment are often in a pitiful state, but if it were otherwise, they would continue to remain in the FIRST LINE.

With regard to the spread of typhus, forty cases have so far been confirmed in the western regions as far as Frankfurt/Oder. However, it must be remembered that typhus is an epidemic disease in Eastern Europe and it is natural that as a result of ongoing military operations, the spread of typhus will increase even more.

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Typhoid intimidation has been enthusiastically used by our propaganda in Germany and in the occupied territories, and therefore we must be careful not to fall into a trap set by ourselves.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (Fitin)

No. 18 Sov. secret February 27, 1942

Message from London

Text of Eden's secret memorandum dated January 28, 1942, sent out for information to government members. Obtained through agents.

Given without abbreviations.

"Policy towards Russia.

Since my conversation with Stalin in Moscow? I have been researching the following questions:

1. Principles on which post-war cooperation between Russia and England can be built.
2. The best course of action in connection with Stalin's demand to recognize the borders of 1941 for the Soviet Union.

Paragraph: 1. If we assume that Germany is defeated, German military power is destroyed and France remains a weak power for at least a long time, then there will not be a single state in Europe that could resist Russia. However, it may be necessary to cooperate further with Russia, firstly because otherwise she may be tempted to cooperate with Germany, prompted to do so by historical trends and economic necessity; secondly, in order to restore in our own interests such a balance of power in Europe, destroyed by the defeat of France, which could prevent the rebirth of Germany; and thirdly, in order to militarily encircle Germany. True, France, whose greatness we promised to restore, may also become a powerful power in Europe thanks to her material resources and the destruction of German military power.

Thus, the balance of power in Europe can be partly restored through the rebirth of France, but this is highly problematic and certainly will not yet take place in the immediate post-war period, which we must now think about.

2. Any assessment of the possibility of the course of the policy of the USSR must depend on the course of the war, how it affects Russia, the state in which the Soviet Union will emerge from the war and the circumstances under which the war will end. If the defeat of the German armies takes place mainly due to the action of the Soviet troops and before the military power of Great Britain and the USA is fully developed, the position of Russia on the European continent will be impregnable. Russian prestige will be so great that it will facilitate the establishment of communist governments in a number of European countries and, naturally, the Soviet Union will be tempted to work in this direction. Moreover, the Russians will then be able to take equipment from German factories,

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which they will need to restore Russian industry, regardless of the needs of Great Britain and the United States. As a result, the Soviet Union may become completely independent of the help that under other circumstances it would be forced to turn to us and America and, as such, will no longer want to adapt to the policy that England and America may wish to pursue.

This possibility in itself is an argument for establishing close relations with the Soviet Union now, while its policy is still vague, in order to have the greatest possible influence on the formation of its policy in the future.

3. But if Russia is completely exhausted by the war, then, needing Anglo-American help to restore the country, Stalin will be forced, at least temporarily, to follow

the most acceptable policy in such a less monopoly position of the USSR. If we could be sure that events would unfold in this way, then we could express that we do not need to make concessions and sacrifices at this stage and consider that we can ensure that Stalin inevitably equalizes his policy on the policy of Great Britain and America, for he would depend on these two countries at the end of the war. But, obviously, we cannot risk counting on this, and simple prudence requires that we proceed in our plans from the premise that if we want Russian cooperation after the war, we must be ready to make this policy profitable for them. Moreover, the application of such a policy will be a difficult and unreasonable process, and if we want to follow it, we must begin to conduct it now, without waiting for the end of the war.

4. Of course, in practice it will be difficult to coordinate Anglo-Russian cooperation with Anglo American: Soviet policy is immoral; American policy is exaggeratedly moral, at least as far as non-American interests are concerned. There is still widespread mistrust and dislike for Russia in America, which intensified after the signing of the latter pact with Germany and the Russian attack on Finland. But as American opinion takes a more and more real direction under the influence of the war, this attitude may gradually change, especially because the Russians can provide valuable assistance to America in preventing the resurgence of Japanese militarism in the Far East. The issue of the Baltic states is the first example of a clash of principles between the USSR and the USA: did the Soviet government approve the Atlantic Charter?, but at the same time tries to circumvent one of the principles of the Charter, while the USA, at least for the moment, considers them sacred. If it comes to a direct political conflict and we have to choose between the USA and the USSR, we will undoubtedly decide the issue in favor of Anglo-American cooperation, as more necessary, more natural, based on a broader and more ancient base than Anglo-Russian cooperation. .

5. On the other hand, we will have to refrain from any action that might increase the Soviet Government's already existing suspicion that we intend to view peace only as an Anglo-American affair, where Russian interests may be ignored or not taken into account.

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6. In practice, this means that in order to successfully reconcile the most vulnerable points of American and Russian policy and to coordinate our policy with the policy of both countries, it is necessary to consult with the American government on all points of our negotiations with the Soviet government and obtain his approval, or at least consent to all Anglo-Soviet measures. Where possible, we will resort to discussion and decisions involving all three parties.

7. When considering point 2, namely, the best course of action in connection with Stalin's demand that we recognize the borders of 1941 as the USSR, difficulties arise, arising from our own interests:

a) At first glance, Stalin's demand seems moderate, if we think that he could demand much more, such as control of the Dardanelles, a sphere of influence in the Balkans, the unilateral imposition of the Russian-Polish border on Poland, access to the Persian Gulf and to Atlantic Ocean with the provision of Russian Norwegian and Finnish territory. Of course, it may be objected to us that we have no reason to believe that Stalin's present demand is final and that other demands will not follow in due course. But even if this is so, our satisfaction with this demand does not mean that we will not resist further demands that may follow. By doing so, we will only strengthen our position.

6) From a purely strategic point of view, it is precisely in our interests that Russia settles again in the Baltics, in order to be able to better dispute with Germany

dominance in the Baltic Sea than it could do since 1918, when only Kronstadt was available for access to the Baltic Sea.

c) Of course, one cannot make this or any other concession to Stalin without demanding a favor in return.

In his Eastern way of thinking, he would have interpreted it as a sign of weakness if we had not demanded it. In addition, by insisting on this, we establish the rules that mutual concessions to us are a necessary condition, which will make it difficult for the Soviet government to put pressure on us for further concessions, that is, to push us onto a "slippery slope".

A list of possible counter-claims that we might submit is included in the appendix.

d) It cannot be denied that Stalin's demand for the Baltic states, and, to a lesser extent, the demand for Finnish and Bessarabian territories, is hardly in line with the principles set out in the Atlantic Charter, which states that the allied states - you do not seek territorial or other expansion and such territorial changes, which may go against the freely expressed will of the people themselves, that they want the restoration of sovereignty rights and self-government where they have been forcibly taken away. Satisfying Stalin's demands also contradicts the condition set out in the Charter that the Allies will respect the rights of all peoples to choose their own form of government.

On the other hand, Stalin may object that he:

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1) demands the return only of what was already Russian territory before the war and what is now occupied by the Germans; 2) that the Baltic states themselves voted for joining the USSR, in accordance with the principles set out in the Atlantic Charter; and 3) that the Finnish and Romanian territories were granted to the USSR under treaties legally concluded with Finland and Romania.

e) If we agree with the need for close cooperation with the Soviet Union after the war, which I outlined in the first part of the report, then I think that the arguments in favor of satisfying Stalin's demands are convincing, were it not for the serious embarrassment created by the Atlantic Charter and fear in America of everything that has the character of sacrificing the freedom of independent nations. We must also bear in mind that the American government is likely to be very dissatisfied with our concessions to the Soviet government on what it considers to be major issues of principle.

8. It is not at all easy to decide what Stalin's true intention was when he insisted on precisely this demand under such circumstances. Our consent or our refusal cannot in one way or another affect the Russian post-war borders: neither we nor America will be able to force the USSR to withdraw from the territory it occupied at the end of the war. However, it is possible that Stalin's demand is intended to test how far His Majesty's Government is ready to make unconditional concessions to ensure post-war cooperation with the Soviet Union, in other words, to see what importance we attach to this cooperation and how much we are ready to sacrifice our own resources to achieve it. principles. If this is indeed Stalin's goal, then it must be assumed that he will not agree to anything less or to replace this demand with another.

Sir Cripps?\$, whom I consulted after his return from Russia, is of the opinion that the question is all or nothing, and our failure to satisfy Stalin will mark the end of any prospect of fruitful cooperation with the Soviet government in our mutual relations. interests, Soviet policy will turn to the path of pursuing its own, selfish interests, which may have incalculable consequences for the post-war period. In the meantime, I promised Stalin that I would put this question up for discussion before

His Majesty's Government and the Governments of the Dominions. And I don't think we need to put off discussing this issue with President Roosevelt any longer.

9. Even if we have little hope that Stalin will agree to any reduction in his demands, I would suggest that the whole question be submitted to Roosevelt for consideration, as it appears to us.

One side of this question relates quite directly to the American immediate prospects for war: our response to Stalin's demand may, under certain circumstances, influence the decision of the Russians to declare war on Japan, or to refrain from doing so. If, as we suppose, the President objects to our satisfaction of wholly Russian demands, I would suggest that the President consider whether, under special circumstances, we can offer Stalin, in return, one or another project that should satisfy him. if his present demand is indeed in the interests of security,

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not to see how far he can make us sacrifice our principles and jeopardize our relationship with the US. It is necessary that the president not only agree to this, but also take part in such proposals, because Stalin, perhaps, will sooner accept from the USA and England what he would refuse to accept from England alone.

10. Any proposal we make must be based on the demand for Russian "security" which the Soviet Union has been striving for since 1917, that is, the creation of a strategic position that would help the Soviet government to complete the social economic corporation within Russia without fear of foreign intervention and war (on the basis of which we could offer Stalin at least two alternatives:

a) Russian bases in the Baltic states. We could tell Stalin that while we see no reason now to restore the 1941 borders, Great Britain could give guarantees now that, in the interests of Soviet security, we will, at the right moment, support the demands of the Soviet governments on the creation of Soviet bases in the territories adjacent to Russia, especially in the Baltic and the Black Sea, from where the security of the Soviet Union could be threatened. The acceptance of such a guarantee by the Soviet Government will not prevent it from putting forward at a peace conference a demand for the absorption of the Baltic States, Bessarabia and part of Finland, while His Majesty's Government will meanwhile be able to refrain from a preliminary acceptance or to satisfy such a demand if one is put forward at the meeting. peace negotiations.

The creation of bases by one country on the territory of another was also used by the United States and it must be assumed that America will meet this proposal favorably. It is very likely that we ourselves will also resort to this method after the war, and besides, the Soviet government was the first to implement the idea in 1939 in relation to the Baltic states.

6) The establishment by the Soviet government of control over foreign policy and defense in the Baltic states. I am indebted to the British Ambassador in Washington for the formula, according to which, while leaving the internal autonomy of the Baltic states as if untouched, in fact, all control over these countries necessary for the Russians from the point of view of their security is transferred to the Soviet government. This formula is as follows:

"We wish and intend to work together with you thereafter and believe that close cooperation is essential for both parties and for the maintenance of peace in Europe. We understand the importance you attach to the borders of June 1941 for your own safety. We don't object to this frontier you have established with Finland because the Finns allowed themselves to be used by Hitler as a tool in his hands and we are certainly not defending Romania. However, we proceed from the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which you,



Mr. Stalin, joined also because of what it can mean for our position in a firm solution of the question of the Baltic states.

In order to reconcile your demand for security and our common obligations under the Atlantic Charter, we will support you in making peace if you demand that foreign policy and defense matters in the Baltic States be transferred to the Soviet Union,

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who for this purpose will be able to establish on their territory all the necessary leadership and control. By this formula, it will be possible to reconcile the desire of the Soviet government, our obligation under the Atlantic Charter, and the American painful perception.

11. We must not forget the question of Lithuania. The Polish government has expressed the desire that we should not enter into any negotiations regarding the future transfer of Lithuania to the Soviet government without consulting it and it must be assumed that its intention is to create a Polish-Lithuanian alliance after the war. This plan is, of course, completely opposed to the Soviet plan to annex Lithuania, and even contradicts the proposal for Soviet control of the foreign policy and defense of the Baltic states.

On the other hand, this can legally be linked to a compromise solution, according to which the Soviet government will have only bases in these states. If Stalin insists, as he undoubtedly intends, on accepting the "Curzon Line"? as a new Polish-Russian border, then Poland will not have a common border line with Lithuania, unless she annexes East Prussia (for which, as Stalin said, he is ready to agree). Therefore, from a geographical point of view, Polish intentions towards Lithuania can become a practical policy only if it receives from the Soviet Union either a border with Russia significantly east of the Curzon Line or permission to annex East Prussia.

12. In conclusion, I would like to request that Lord Halifax be authorized to explain the situation to the US Government and, if possible, to President Roosevelt personally, and ask him whether, in view of the extraordinary circumstances, he would not agree to our satisfaction of Stalin's demands in the form in which they are, or, in the case of a negative answer, to support us when we put forward this or another counter-proposal mentioned in my report. This must be done as soon as possible, since Stalin was promised that the decision of the British government and the governments of the dominions would follow three or four weeks after my return to the country. Ministry indel January 28.

Addendum: Demands we could make to the Soviet Union in connection with the proposed agreement:

1. We must ensure that the Soviet government recognizes the right of Great Britain, on the basis of security, to establish bases on the European continent, based on what Stalin told me on December 16, namely:

"I think that if France is not restored as a great power in the near future, it is in your interest to have military and naval bases on the French coast, such as at Boulogne and Dunkirk. Belgium and Holland should be in open military alliance with Great Britain, who should enjoy the rights to have military and naval bases in these countries, and also to keep troops, if necessary.

I consider this very important for Great Britain and also for the purpose of guaranteeing the independence of Belgium and Holland. The Soviet Union will be ready to support you in these plans, which it considers important from the British point of view."

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2. We must demand that the Soviet Union accede to paragraph 5 of the British draft /RKAET ASVEEMMT/ agreement of December 16, 1941, namely: politics, the principles set forth in the joint declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of England that they "do not seek territorial or other expansion" and Stalin's statement in his speech of November 6, 1941 that the USSR does not interfere in the internal affairs of other peoples.

3. We also ask the Soviet government to formally approve the principles of federation in relation to the weak countries of Europe, especially the Balkans, and also in relation to Poland and Czechoslovakia.

4. To ask the Soviet government to cooperate with the American and British governments and other European countries in preparing the reorganization of Europe on the basis of Article 4 of the draft agreement proposed to Stalin by Minister Indel, which reads: "Both contracting parties begin joint work on the reorganization of Europe after the war, in full respect of the interests of each side and in accordance with the principles not to expand its territory and not to interfere in the internal affairs of other peoples.

The scope of this reorganization includes:

a) maintaining and strengthening the economic and political independence of the European countries, as well as of the united and federated states;

6) the reorganization of the industrial and economic life of those countries whose territory was captured by the Germans or their allies."

No. 19 February 28, 1942 Message from London

The report of the head of the Russian department of the English Ministry of Information, Smollett, is transmitted about his conversation with Benes?, which took place on January 29, 1942.

THE REPORT IS RECEIVED BY THE LONDON RESIDENCE BY AN AGENCY

"Today I visited Mr. BENES to get acquainted with his views on relations with Russia and on Russia's post-war intentions. I told him that I came to him as an old personal friend and former compatriot, and not as an official employee of the ministry, in connection with this our conversation was informal and confidential.

I report briefly everything BENESCH said during this conversation:

"1. There is no doubt that Russia will defeat Germany this year and that the war in Europe will come to an end around November. Under the existing conditions, this will be a complete victory for the Russians.

2. It is of the utmost importance to Europe that the victory won be a common victory for the Allies, and therefore I urge the British statesmen to reconsider their plan for the invasion of the Conti.

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ent in 1943, because then it might be too late. The Russians are undoubtedly occupying East Germany, but in contrast to this it is necessary that British troops enter German territory in time through Holland and Belgium. I am sure that the Russian attack on Berlin will come from the northeast, and the Russian-Polish one from the east, and I hope that the Czech troops, together with the Russians, will enter southeastern Germany. At the same time, I would not want Czechoslovak troops to enter Austria against the Prussians, so that Austria could then, in one form or another, join the Polish-Czech federation.

3. The purpose of the Polish-Czech federation is to provide a strong barrier against Germany in Eastern Europe, but such a barrier that would be fundamentally different from the cordon sanitaire in the pre-war sense of the word, since in the past this idea was always justified by anti-Soviet arguments. Either there will be friendship between the Polish-Czech federation and Russia, or there will be no Polish-Czech federation at all.

4. I am absolutely convinced that the goal of Soviet foreign policy is the further development of communism in Europe. Soviet foreign policy will set itself first and almost exclusively the task of ensuring the military and political security of the USSR, so that the country can finally devote itself to activities aimed at creating a higher standard of living for its people, under - vowing like that

hard trials.

No. 20 Copy of Sov. secret

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE USSR - comrade. STALIN comrade. MOLOTOV comrade. BERIA

NKVD of the USSR - vol. MERKULOV March 8, 42

On January 19, 1942, British intelligence released a secret special report based on Polish intelligence information allegedly received from a well-connected source in well-informed and influential German circles.

Here is a summary of this message, received by the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR from London through undercover means:

"German plans on the Eastern Front are aimed at holding out until spring on the lines currently occupied by the Germans. A breakthrough of the front by the Russians may lead to the retreat of the German army to the line of the Dnieper. The German command considers this possible, but in its opinion, such a retreat will still not mean the defeat of the German army.

A spring offensive along the entire front is ruled out due to the depletion of fuel supplies. But as soon as the meteorological conditions improve, a strong blow will be delivered in the southern sector, towards Rostov and the Crimea, with the aim of capturing the Caucasus. By this time, Bulgaria will have to

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declare war on the USSR and oppose the USSR on the Black Sea, with the help of the German and Rumanian fleets.

If the attack on the Caucasus fails, the Germans will attack Turkey.

The German General Staff believes that this attempt would be tantamount to suicide. The final decision on this matter must be made by HITLER The attack on England is supposedly postponed at the present time.

Information about Bulgaria's intentions to oppose the Soviet Union has been received for the first time.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (Fitin)

No. 21 Copy of the Soviet. secret

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE comrade. STALIN, comrade. MOLOTOV comrade.  
BERIA

NKVD USSR - comrade. MERKULOV March 14, 42

The resident of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR in London, based on the data of a verified source with connections in the American embassy in England, reported the following:

"American circles are very concerned about the departure of the German warships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prince Eugene from Brest. According to the Americans, this is a partial fulfillment of the fascist plan to cut off communication with Murmansk and Arkhangelsk at the very moment when most of the American military materials promised to the Soviet Union will be on their way to the USSR. It is believed that these ships will operate together with the Von Tirpitz and two other newly built battleships to prevent the transfer of large military supplies to the Soviet Union. Americans remember the successful Nazi attacks on caravans in the summer of 1940. They do not believe that the Nazis intend to attack Iceland, or that they are preparing an invasion of England.

This point of view was communicated to the British and the Americans declared that it was necessary to rectify the situation at once. The Americans doubt that all three ships were seriously damaged. They refer to the experience of the bombing of ships in Brest and say that photographs of ships in Wilhelmshaven and Hamburg may be fake. The British, on the other hand, say that when the ships passed through the canal, a period of very bad weather began in the North Sea. Fog, snowfall, rain, hail and storms meant that, a week after the departure of the ships, visibility was so poor that it was barely possible to see anything from submarines and ships at a distance of 200 yards.

The Admiralty believes that a torpedo hitting the Prince Eugene from a submarine under these conditions is simply a miracle.

Nevertheless, the Americans assume that the Germans staged a skilful staging in the canal to divert the attention and forces of the British from the Germans.

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the coast of May and allow their other large naval formations to pass from Oslo north to Trondheim and possibly even further to Narvik, Harstad and Tromsø, where final preparations are made to attack caravans and to establish a blockade of northern Russians' ports. The Americans therefore propose to concentrate naval forces in this area in order to accompany the forthcoming shipments to Russia with an appropriate convoy.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (Fitin)

No. 22 Copy of Sov. secret

STATE COMMITTEE OF DEFENSE OF THE UNION OF S.S.R. - comrade Stalin, comrade Molotov, comrade Beria

NKVD of the USSR - t. Merkulov March 21, 42

We are reporting separate excerpts from the review of British political intelligence for the week ending March 1, received by the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR from London through undercover means.

"Germany

The morale of the population and the army. In a letter dated January 13, 1942, a Baltic officer in Berlin informs the Japanese military attaché of one of the European countries: "It is obvious that the morale of the German troops is not very high, and in the rear it is even worse. The German population has been spoiled by news of incessant victories and cannot

bear the news of defeats. Due to failures on the Eastern Front, the morale here is poor, no one believes that the war will end soon...>

A source who arrived in Germany four weeks before the beginning of January and who had the opportunity to receive information reports: "The morale of the troops on the Eastern Front has noticeably deteriorated, and as a result, fighting qualities have declined, especially due to the ever-growing conviction in superiority of Russian troops over the Germans.

The irregular supply of foodstuffs, the lack of warm clothing, and the absence of winter quarters also have a great influence on morale. There were cases when slightly wounded soldiers, leaving the front line, threw their weapons and equipment. However, there are no cases of open uprisings or mass desertion, and the fresh units, consisting of young people, arriving at the front, are still full of enthusiasm."

Although, perhaps, one should not attach serious importance, it is nevertheless interesting to note what the officials of Wilhelmstrasse are talking about among themselves. Data refer to mid-January.

According to them, a crisis should be expected in Germany around April. Differences within the party are growing stronger. Relations between

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Himmler and Goering have deteriorated, and the SS has recently stepped up espionage in the army. Von-BRAUCHITSch's resignation? frightened many. Some of these officials think that HITLER does not go into all matters as much as before, and that the indecision of some circles may affect the possibility of a crisis. The Baltic officer, whose letter we quoted above, also mentions that the left wing of the party is pursuing its policy with the aim of reaching an agreement with the Russians. He also says that the prestige of the party has fallen in the eyes of the population.

Finland

Eastern front. We have received information that the Germans are partially replacing the Finnish troops on the Southern Front, since part of the Finnish troops must return to agricultural work, and part is sent to the Northern Front. From the Finnish staff officers, we know the following version: the Finns told the Germans that the Finnish troops should be withdrawn from the front to carry out agricultural work. The Germans agreed to send their troops to the Svir on the condition that in March the Finns would launch an offensive to secure access to the White Sea, after which they could withdraw their troops.

Preparing the Axis countries for a compromise peace. In mid-February, information was received from the French embassy in Berne that since the beginning of February, the diplomatic circles of the Axis countries in Berne had begun intensive activities related to the plans for a compromise peace. Fascist diplomats emphasize that if Russia is not defeated by the summer of 1942, then Bolshevism will spread throughout the continent. Germany exerts strong pressure in this direction on Switzerland and France, and also on almost all neutral countries through their missions in Switzerland. The Germans declare that the Vichy government is willing to act as an intermediary in Washington. There is also an indication that Switzerland intends to discuss with Portugal a plan for a peace campaign.

Italy

The Romanian Prince Nicholas, upon his arrival in Switzerland, reported his impressions of Italy as follows: The Duce still enjoys personal popularity, although he is looked upon as the Gauleiter of Germany. However, the fascist regime is hated by the masses and the intelligentsia. The entire population is weary of the war, but the possibilities of revolution are still remote.

10,000 Sicilians were evicted to Piedmont in order to free houses in Sicily for German aviation personnel, and also because of their anti-war sentiments (these reports

coincide with the available reports from other sources).

## Germany and the Baltic States

Possible change in German policy. Lithuanians and Estonians received permission to celebrate Independence Day on February 16 and 24, and even

to express some national feelings on this occasion. This may be a sign of an emerging change in German policy towards the Baltic states. The recruitment of the labor force among Estonians for Germany takes place in various ways. Until the beginning of February, about 700 Estonian workers left for Germany (earlier it was reported that by mid-January 6,000 people had left).

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Bulgaria German secret agents report that the Communists recently

made unsuccessful attempts to blow up the house of the Bulgarian Ministry of War. The attempt was also directed against the German press attache, who lived in this house.

## Türkiye

Turpia\_and the German offensive being prepared. The Bulgarian military attache reported to Sofia the following:

1. Anticipating the possibility of a German attack and the subsequent attempt by the Russians to save their fleet by seizing the straits, using land and sea forces for this, the Turks are preparing to take appropriate measures, namely:

a) as soon as the Germans begin the offensive, the Turkish army will be regrouped and the troops on the Caucasian border and on the Black Sea coast will be significantly strengthened;

6) Turkish foreign policy will gradually be guided by friendship with Germany.

2. The newly appointed Turkish ambassador to England is an Anglophile, but not to the same extent as the AR AU, which was considered too pro-British and was recalled for this reason.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (Fitin)

No. 23 Copy of Sov. secret

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF THE SSR to comrade STELI NU, comrade MOLOTOV

April 19, 42

We are sending intelligence data received by the NKVD of the USSR from London as a result of a conversation between a source from the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR and the Chief of the US General Staff, General MARSHALL.

"General MARSHALL considers it possible that the United States will do something in Southern Ireland, since the German intelligence agents stationed there inform Germany of absolutely everything, from the weather to the most important secrets of England, and in particular about the number American military units and weapons in Ulster (Northern Ireland).

According to MARSHALL, the Americans are interested in Ireland being actually neutral, but if it does not remain neutral, the US will be forced to take some action.

MARSHALL was interested in how much military material the British had at their disposal, since, referring to the lack of weapons, they stubbornly declared that they were not in a position to undertake offensive operations this year. He knows that the British continue to receive the maximum number of planes from the USA.

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In MARSHALL's opinion, even assuming that the British did not have enough weapons for a full-scale offensive on the continent, they could carry out separate offensive operations using strike units.

According to MARSHALL, America wants to end the war as soon as possible. MARSHALL believes that England will not be able to win the war by pursuing defensive tactics and believes that the British should go over to offensive operations with the means they have, since not a single command, starting offensive operations, had the same number of people and military materials it would like to have.

MARSHALL considers it extremely important that tanks and aircraft continue to enter the USSR. According to his assumption, Japan will come out in the spring against the Soviet Union, and then the USSR will encounter great difficulties in the field of manpower reserves, military materials and transport.

The Americans do not know the exact number of military units, tanks and planes that the command of the Red Army transferred from the Far East in order to stop HITLER. According to MARSHALL, only a few armored divisions were transferred from the Far East to the Caucasus. MARSHALL does not think that the Red Army alone could defeat the Germans, but if the Soviet Union, by continuing to receive guns and planes, can contain the Germans and thereby ensure their defeat, if the British can hold their positions in the Far East and the United States keep the Japanese and Germans from invasion of India, there will be no doubt about the final outcome of the war.

When asked by a source to MARSHALL whether this year is not decisive for the outcome of the war, the latter answered in the affirmative. In his opinion, almost everything depends on whether the Red Army will continue to surprise the world, whether it will be able to continue to push the Germans in the future, and also on whether the British will take active steps in the west.

MARSHALL doubts the effectiveness of the participation of the American army in military operations in Europe this year, since the United States will be able to send no more than 100,000 people to Europe by the end of the year. However, they can send tanks, planes, and war materials. The British, according to MARSHALL, can be sure that they will be sent a sufficient number of people to make up for the losses they suffered in offensive operations. The English must therefore not fear that their offensive operations will weaken the defenses of the island.

Did the source also have a very brief conversation with Harry Hopkins?!. When asked by a source whether CHURCHILL had received a personal message from ROOSEWELL with American recognition of the right of the USSR to include Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in its composition, Hopkins replied that, in his opinion, this had already been taken care of. He stated that if the Russians want to get the Baltics after the war, they will get it. However, he does not think that the Americans would publicly declare this (that is, the right of the USSR to the Baltic states).

Hopkins also stated that the agreement with the United States on the supply of military materials to the USSR had already been fulfilled on many points. If Murmansk is not cut off, then the agreement will be fully fulfilled, and possibly over-fulfilled by August 1942.

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Are the above statements about MARSHALL's sentiments corroborated by another source, obtained from a conversation with the secretary of the HARRIMAN mission? in London -

Winthrop Brown: "The main purpose of the arrival of HOPKINS and MARSHALL in England is to open by any means in the same year (no later than 6 months) a second front in northern Norway and North Africa. ROOSEVELT and the American government came to the conclusion that it was necessary to end the war not in 1943-1944, but in 1942, otherwise the Anglo-American industry would not be able to compensate for the losses incurred, especially the increasing losses in the courts. . ROOSEWELL sent HOPKINS and MARSHALL to England to:

got acquainted in detail with the possibilities of the British in opening a second front in the current year and, having agreed with the British on a policy aimed at ending the war by any means in 1942. In Brown's opinion, if the Allies fail to make decisive military gains this year, the American people may develop distrust of the government and the President, which will lead to a decline in the morale of the American people and will affect the implementation of the armaments program.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (Beria)

No. 24 Copy of Sov. secret

STATE COMMITTEE OF DEFENSE OF THE UNION OF THE S.S.R. - comrade. Stalin "Molotov Beria NKVD USSR - comrade Merkulov

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April 20, 42

The resident of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR in London, on the basis of information from a source with connections in the American embassy in England, reports the following:

1. "By June of this year, i.e. By the time the rains stop in Australia, the Americans plan to deploy up to 500,000 soldiers there. The Americans believe that until that time the Japanese will not risk attacking Australia. Australia currently has 80,000 soldiers, not counting the aircrew.

2. The American military mission in North Africa, together with the British and the American technical personnel available there, is completing all arrangements for the reception and maintenance of 8 American divisions. The technical staff of all branches of the military there is still insignificant.

3. About four weeks ago an American division arrived in Equatorial Africa and is stationed around Brazzaville. Along with this, American instructors take part in the training of non-American troops stationed there. All these troops, including the American divisions, are destined for the occupation of Dakar by land.

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4. American troops and ships are concentrated in South Africa for the occupation of Madagascar. It will take 20 hours to move these troops from South Africa to Madagascar.

5. The Americans also concentrated troops and ships to occupy the island of Martinique. It will take six hours to move these troops to the island.

6. All the activities of the Americans to concentrate troops in these areas have a twofold target:

a) To intimidate the Vichy government and thereby force it to refrain from further concessions to the Germans;



6) if the Vichy government still makes significant concessions to the Germans and thereby finally aggravates, and possibly under pressure from the Germans and breaks relations with the Americans, then the latter will take all measures to occupy the indicated territories.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the Union of S.S.R. (Fitin)

No. 25 Copy of Sov. secret

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE comrade. STALIN, comrade. MOLOTOV

April 21, 42

We report intelligence data received by the NKVD of the USSR from London as a result of conversations between the source and an employee of the American Embassy in England, GILBERT, and a number of members of parliament:

"1. About the second front.

From the conversation of an employee of the American embassy in London, GILBERT, with members of parliament HORABIN, STOKES and ROBERTS, it turns out that, with the exception of obvious anti-Churchillists who claim that CHURCHILL is sabotaging the opening of a second front because of his political hostility to the USSR, the postponement of the opening of a second front is considered with two sides:

a) The political side: There is disagreement within the government as to when a major offensive should be launched. KRIPPS, before leaving London, expressed the opinion that major offensive operations could not be launched until the summer operations in Russia were fully developed. The same opinion was unofficially expressed by an employee of the Executive Committee of the Labor Party, ANTIKSON, and is in full agreement with the propaganda emanating from the Executive Committee of the Labor Party, from Minister of the Interior MORRISON and from Ellen WILKINSON, who also refer to the danger of a separate peace between the USSR and Germany. . This is especially emphasized when discussing the question of lifting the ban on the communist newspaper The Daily Worker. For example, a prominent member of the Lasky Labor Party directly asked a source: "What will be the position of the Daily Worker if the Russians make a separate peace."

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6) Military side: Persons close to CHURCHILL assert that the question of the practical preparation of a second front has been referred to the committee of chiefs of the general staff, and thus now everything depends not on the premier, but on the general staffs. The Prime Minister will accept any decision they make.

In fact, the situation is as follows:

In 1941, the cabinet was hostile to the idea of opening a second front. This year, thanks to pressure on the government, and also due to the deterioration in the morale of the army as a result of its inactivity and defeats in the Far East, it has become politically impossible for any groups in the government to openly oppose the need for a second front. About eight weeks ago, CHURCHILL, defending himself against attacks, declared that the question of the future front had been referred to the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff. With this statement, CHURCHILL wanted to give the impression that there were no political differences on the question of the need to act in Europe.

Lloyd George\* in private conversations compares CHURCHILL's dependence on the military to his dictatorial attitude towards the latter during the war of 1914-1918.

Many who know CHURCHILL, including Lloyd George, say that he is constantly haunted by the memory of the unsuccessful campaign in the Dardanelles, when he was blamed for the Gallipoli tragedy only because he did not heed the advice of military experts. According to Labor

LASKY, CHURCHILL declares to the British that no matter what happens, after the war no one will reproach him for the "new Gallipoli".

According to Gilbert, the American General Marshall was sent to England precisely because of the presence of this kind of sentiment here. ROOSEWELL knows that the issue of a second front has been referred to the military experts, who endlessly discuss technical details and argue about trifles, especially about the details of transportation on ships, about training, etc., arguing the need to postpone the speech. This vicious circle, according to the Americans, can only be broken by MARSHALL.

## 2. On the preparation of the army for the invasion of the continent.

According to GILBERT, an Indian bank official of a certain THOMPSON and head of one of the sectors of the British broadcasting company HARLONG, unlike the strike units of the "commandos", only 4 British divisions received special training for the invasion of the continent. Training began four months ago on the coast of Scotland. The training consisted of practical training in loading and unloading troops from landing barges, operating them, as well as loading and unloading division equipment from barges and boats. Each division trained for one month. The fourth division is currently completing its training. The training course is designed for one month for only one division. However, it is not known how many troops are undergoing other special exercises that are preparatory to basic training. In this regard, it is difficult to establish whether other military units are being trained in parallel, except for a small number of divisions specially trained for the invasion of the continent. Parachute units are specially trained. Notice of forthcoming special training for the invasion, which allegedly takes place only in Scotland, received

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a number of other divisions. When organizing special training for the invasion, the British command took into account the lessons of the invasion of Norway, when it was impossible to defend against an air attack when unloading heavy equipment only because anti-aircraft guns were under cranes. As a result, the aircraft damaged the cranes before the guns were installed.

Special training in invasion tactics is one of the most important military factors that the British command reported to General MARSHALL, who had come specially to familiarize himself with the ability of British troops to conduct offensive operations on the continent in order to give a number of tips on speeding up preparations.

In a conversation with a source, a correspondent for the United Press agency, RUSSELL, who is closely associated with HARRIMAN?, said that MARSHALL came specifically to see what "prevents the British from taking action" and that MARSHALL can easily refute all the arguments of the British. According to RUSSELL, MARSHALL will demand offensive action from the British. Of particular importance is the fact that Lord Louis Montbatten, a famous sea captain and former naval aide-de-camp to the king, was one of the first to have a meeting with MARSHALL. According to GILBERT, the American troops that arrived in Northern Ireland and the UK consist mainly of technical units and are not a separate military unit capable of conducting independent operations.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs

USSR (L. Beria) No. 26 Sov. secret May 12, 1942

## REPORT OF THE LONDON RESIDENCE ABOUT THE ATTEMPTS OF THE GERMANS TO ENTER SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ENGLISH

A reliable source from the residency reported that an employee of the German embassy in Sweden flew to England on a Swedish civilian plane from Stockholm. He allegedly accidentally sat on

airfield, served by a Czech pilot. He said that he had come on behalf of Papin. This German was in Stockholm connected with the representative of the Sudeten-German Social Democracy, Paul, who a few months ago had flown from England to Sweden. The German received from Paul the address of a certain Czech Yaks, who allegedly has the best connections with British statesmen, mainly with the leadership of the Labor Party. The pilot connected the German with Yaksh by phone. In conversation, the German said that he had a recommendation from Paul. The British authorities interned him. He is interrogated by English and Czech officers. To date, it is known that the German arrived with the following peace proposals:

1. England as an empire remains intact.
2. The Germans agree to withdraw their troops from Czechoslovakia and restore the regime in Czechoslovakia that it was before Munich.

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3. Leave Poland as it was, with the exception of the Polish corridor, Danzig and Kattowitz, which will have to go to Germany.
4. All Eastern Europe will be restored to its former borders.
5. The Baltic countries will also remain independent.
6. After England accepts these conditions, Germany, together with England, will come to an agreement with the USSR.

Beneš and Max endured the impression that this German was a representative of some German group whose goal was Germany without Hitler, but which would be ruled by a military clique.

According to the source, Churchill's speech of May 10 was a direct response to the proposal. The British government will not negotiate with the Germans, because it is convinced that the situation in Germany is so critical that it is not worth it to negotiate with the Germans now, as soon there will be a collapse.

No. 27 Sov. secret MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE IN TEHERAN DATED MAY 28, 1942

We obtained from the English mission drafts of a memorandum of the mission worker with the following content:

"To the counselor of his royal majesty's embassy, Mr Hankey. Count Stefan Tyszkiewicz, an old British friend from Lithuania, now in charge of Polish military transport and who claims to be the only representative of General Anders<sup>3</sup> in Iran, informed me today that during a conversation he recently had with the Iranian Minister of War , the latter told him that he would like to see the entire Polish army in Iran.

The Iranians trust the Poles because they know that, unlike some others, they will show no personal interest and can be trusted to maintain order in the country and protect it from German or Russian invasion. The Poles are being evacuated from Iran upon the cessation of hostilities. The count, who asked to keep this message in the strictest confidence, not to inform either the Iranian, or his ambassador, or the general, added that recently the shah also spoke to him in similar terms ... "(the draft ends here). This document fully confirms the data previously received by the residency about Polish activity in Iran.

In particular, the Polish envoy to Iran, Sedlevsky, is actively working in Iranian government circles to replace our troops in Iran with Polish ones. Sedlevsky seeks the support of the British and American ambassadors in this. The British have already been persuaded to concentrate all Polish forces in Iran, so that in post-war Europe

use them as a gendarme. In the near future, Polish troops from Palestine and Egypt will be transferred here.

Active work aimed at replacing the Red Army units with the Polish army is being carried out by prominent figures in Iran.

General Anders is negotiating in London on the issue of allowing a 300,000-strong Polish army from the USSR to Iran. He also intends to seek the replacement of our troops in Iran with Polish.

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Anders was appointed commander-in-chief of all Polish troops in the Middle East and in the USSR Iran became the main base of Polish troops. Polish troops from Palestine and Egypt will soon be transferred to Iran.

No. 28 Sov. secret

MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE IN STOCKHOLM DATED MAY 31, 1942

Both according to the observation of the residency and the reports of the agents, the tension in Sweden has noticeably defused lately. The Swedes feel more or less at ease and have achieved this by making further concessions to the Germans. In addition, the beginning of active hostilities on the eastern front gives the Swedes confidence that the Germans are not in a position to allocate a sufficient number of troops against Sweden now. Swedish concessions and assistance to the Germans are as follows:

- 1) Recent repressions against political emigrants, systematic confiscation of the journal Die Welt, confiscation of a number of Swedish newspapers for anti-German articles, official opening of a German propaganda center attended by representatives of the Swedish government, intensification of anti-Soviet propaganda in the press, confiscation of supplements to our bulletin, the prohibition of distribution of Comrade Molotov's notes (more on that below), all this characterizes the Swedish political concessions.
- 2) Strengthening the transit of German military materials to Norway and, especially, to Finland.
- 3) The Swedes provide their ships to the Germans for the transport of coal.
- 4) Repair by the Swedes of German military vehicles arriving from Finland.
- 5) Sending fish to Germany and 18 thousand tons of food to the Finns (rye, wheat, flour, meat, canned food) with a continuing reduction in food distribution rates in Sweden itself.

In addition, military metals and dressings, plantar leather and wooden barges are sent to Finland.

- 6) The Swedes are building 38 different ships by order of the Germans with a displacement of 2,400 to 8,200 tons, with a total tonnage of 57,800 tons. 9 ships have already been handed over to the Germans, and the rest will be delivered in 1942 and 1943.

- 7) By order of the Germans, the Bolinderay company manufactures 8 thousand pieces of gas generators for trucks. Some of them have already been sent from Stockholm to Riga. Delivery is made in batches of 600-900 pieces per month. Negotiations are underway with the Germans on the manufacture of another 30,000 gas generators.

The British express their indignation at Sweden's pro-German neutrality. Assistant to the British commercial attache Barber, in a conversation with us, said that, according to their calculations, Sweden

now provides the semi-annual production of German military factories with its high-quality ore.

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In this regard, London believes that it would be more profitable if Sweden even joined the Axis powers, in which case the British bombing would deprive Germany of Swedish ore.

With regard to us, the Swedes have been behaving defiantly lately. The press bureau recently established that Comrade Molotov's note on April 27, sent to the press bureau on May 17, was delayed at the post office. In response to our inquiry, the Foreign Ministry explained that the Swedish government considered it undesirable to distribute this document and offered to take it back from the post office. At the same time, it turned out quite by chance that since February, more than a hundred thousand packages with Comrade Molotov's note, Comrade STALIN's report and order had been secretly confiscated.

Despite the fact that the post office regularly received money for sending, all packages were added to basement.

The mission and other joint institutions are being clearly monitored. There have been cases when visitors to the mission are immediately arrested upon leaving.

No. 29 Sov. secret

#### June 1942 MESSAGE FROM THE STOCKHOLM RESIDENCE

A trustworthy source reported that several senior officers of the German army, including General of Infantry D. Wetzel, the former chief of the General Staff at Ludendorff, addressed Hitler with a memorandum in which they sharply criticize the position of the German army and propose that immediate measures be taken in the interests of saving Germany. steps towards peace. All these officers are currently under arrest, as it has been established that they managed to smuggle a copy of this memorandum abroad (probably to Switzerland). The Memorandum states that despite the high tactical training of individual parts of the army, the excellent training and interaction of infantry and aviation, as well as the successful concentration of political and military leadership of the war in one hand, the fatal mistake of the last war was repeated in this war. This error lies in the fact that strategic tasks were entrusted to the army without real consideration of its capabilities, and thereby Germany has now fallen into the position of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This mistake is aggravated by the fact that in the rear of the belligerent army there is not enough confidence, the people do not know what awaits them tomorrow, and such a situation will inevitably lead to the collapse of Hitler Germany. Therefore, officers who went through the school of the last war, driven by love for the motherland, consider themselves compelled to turn to Hitler and ask him to take steps to save Germany before it is too late. The officers see the salvation of Germany in the conclusion of a compromise peace. If such a peace is offered to the enemy even before the summer and the decisive battles, then there is hope that Germany will come out of this war with honor.

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No. 30 Top Secret

July 8, 42

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV

We are sending the contents of the report of the head of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the United States, DONOVAN, made by him at a secret meeting of the staff of the American embassy and

correspondents of American newspapers in England.

The content of the report was received by the NKVD of the USSR from London through undercover means.

"The failures of the 8th Army in Libya brought the greatest disappointment to British public opinion and aroused great discontent. In turn, this led to the emergence of a wide discussion of these failures by American public opinion and increased dissatisfaction with England in the United States. It must be borne in mind that this kind of disappointment may repeat itself more than once in the next few months. In order to answer the question of why the 8th Army showed itself on such a bad side, it is necessary to consider the general strategy of the war as a whole. It is possible that we tried to defend widely separated areas with fragmented forces, unable to effectively repel an attack on any territory they defended. This point of view is the starting point in our analysis. The question is this: would it not have been better to develop a general strategic plan, to outline strong points that must be held at any cost and deliberately sacrifice, in the event of an attack on them, some intermediate points that do not play a special role in protecting the main points? , giving them to the enemy without thinking about prestige, about the loss of troops and weapons, as was the case during the battle for the Dutch Indies. Perhaps, for example, it would have been much wiser to sacrifice points like Tobruk and Malta, instead of risking excessive losses of merchant ships, warships and people trying to defend them, which could be used to build up forces in those strongholds where general superiority could be ensured and from where offensive operations could be launched in the area. The outcome of the battle for Libya, for example, was decided not in the process of hostilities, but many months ago, when the solution of the main problems of the Far East attracted everyone's attention. The most important shortcomings of the 8th Army do not relate to the field of military materials and manpower, which, quantitatively and qualitatively, was approximately equivalent on both sides. A large number of American tanks of the Grant type were thrown directly to the front, while many of these vehicles, unprepared for battle, remained in the rear.

However, this active force was supported by a number of Matilda and Churchill tanks and other types of British vehicles in order to balance the force of fire and the maneuverability of Rommel's formations. Grant tanks are clumsy and too big a target in the desert. The production of this type of tanks in America was

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discontinued and replaced by a new model that has undergone significant changes. Some types of English tanks also did not stand up to scrutiny compared to the German types of tanks. However, the forces of the opponents were in general almost equal. The human composition of both sides, both quantitatively and qualitatively, was approximately equal, and the British for a certain time had, perhaps, even an advantage.

Some shortcomings in weapons technology, in addition to those mentioned above, also affected the outcome of hostilities. So, for example, the German 88 mm gun turned out to be a much better type of multi-purpose weapon than the British 75 mm or even 25-pounder. In addition, the absence of dive bombers and torpedo bombers was especially felt. However, the main shortcoming was the lack of coordination in the actions of military units, which would have to have previously trained in joint actions and learned all the practical problems of transport, supplies and combat operations so well as to adapt to any type of military operations. and find a way out of any situation as quickly as possible. While Rommel had troops that he constantly replenished and trained, the British, on the contrary, gradually withdrew their best military units and disrupted the connection of new reinforcements with the old units that remained in place. Thus, for example, the Australian units were transferred back to India, while the South African units were used to carry out

operations in Madagascar, they were replaced with great haste by other units that had no experience of military operations in the desert and had never been trained as a single unit. whole.

All of the above are among the main shortcomings that played a role in the loss of the Libyan campaign. Such a situation can be avoided in the future only on the basis of completely new principles of warfare, which are to concentrate all attention on strong points and to prevent any dangers threatening these strong points, or in a revision of the provisions of the general strategy. This must be done in North Africa just as it is in the rest of the British Empire.

Both in America and in England the question of a second front has become a topic of the day. Particularly acute controversy on this issue arose in England. Newspaper editors in America, in turn, are noisily demanding news that could fuel the issue of a second front, thereby forcing people to change their attitude towards this issue against their conviction. Most assume that the opening of a second front in the near future is very problematic, and the reaction of British and American public opinion to the Libyan events, of course, is that a second front cannot be opened immediately. The Libyan campaign showed that the allied forces were still only on the defensive and would have taken too great a risk if a second front had been opened. Yet the political pressure has entailed certain commitments on which public opinion will insist and which may result in premature action. The opening of a second front on the continent this summer is not expedient from a military point of view, since in order to prepare and accumulate human and material resources

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resources will take a number of months. The spring of next year is undoubtedly a more favorable period, since additional time will allow for the necessary training of the troops and the necessary preparations, especially the training of units in the complete coordination of their actions, which is the basis of coordinated troop operations. However, the commitments, or rather the military predicament of the Axis, may make the opening of a second front both possible and necessary. It is not expedient to give wide publicity to the question of a second front, for publicity presents a certain danger, because it instills too high hopes in the minds of public opinion. General MARCHALL and other no less responsible persons emphasized that a second front would be opened in France. They did not lie or try in vain to disturb the enemy.

This goal was seriously planned and accepted by all, but the question of time has not yet been decided. During the coming months a large and fully armed force will be concentrated in England. In a month's time, heavy air raids on Germany would begin, and shortly thereafter enough troops would be concentrated to create the possibility of an attack on the coast.

A huge influx of people is expected. This attention to Europe means that other possible points of attack must be left unattended.

Maritime transport issues are such a problem that severely limits all possibilities. Thus, for example, significant forces were to be transferred to Australia, which in recent months has enjoyed a monopoly on the majority of industrial production, maritime transport and manpower reserves. In the battles in the Coral Sea, the expediency of this was proved, as a result of which Japanese attempts to continue their previous successes and quickly end the occupation of Australia were thwarted. However, now the main task in this area has been completed and further transfer of materials to this part of the globe will be irrational, since the accumulation of resources for attacking the Axis countries should be directed against the most vulnerable spot of these countries. Due to the release of a large number of ships involved in the above task, large convoys can be sent to other

directions, the main of which will be Britain. What took place in Australia will take place in England, however, it takes a long time.

The arrival of the Expeditionary Force will improve morale and facilitate the stationing of troops in six important strike bases, allowing an attack in several directions at once and creating reserves of men and war materials, which will ultimately mark the end of the period of defense and open up opportunities for transition. to the offensive.

Another equally important area is Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, which have become very important in the last few weeks. It has now become known that Japan has concentrated, in particular, at least 30 divisions on the Soviet-Manchurian border, and transport ships are still continuing to bring in reinforcements, possibly from the Philippines or from areas located further south.

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The naval battles at Midway Island and the Aleutian Islands were, as it turned out, an attempt to divert the American fleet from strongholds intended for strikes against Japan or operations in other directions.

It is possible that the Japanese attack on the USSR will be carried out before the end of this summer, since it will take considerable time to capture and hold positions on Baikal and Amur, provided that the USSR can hold out in a war on two fronts.

On the other hand, the Germans are counting on joint operations with the Japanese and at the present time they have obviously concentrated the necessary materials and weapons on the Eastern Front and their offensive may begin in the near future. A similar offensive by Japan can also be expected at any moment, and the military forces and their deployment should be taken into account accordingly. This kind of speech, no doubt, opens up new perspectives.

As far as Sevastopol is concerned, like Tobruk, it is a point of secondary importance, but at a certain risk and the loss of a certain amount of military material and personnel in order to divert the attention of the enemy and help broader strategic intentions.

American planes that landed in Turkey carried out raids from bases located in Syria and Iran. The usefulness of these raids was rather limited, but they were of great value from a moral point of view. It is difficult to imagine that these raids could have been reflected in the German attacks on the Eastern Front.

North Africa is a particularly important area, and the state that owns this area has in its hands the center of all communications. It is known that Africa is a convenient springboard for modern mechanized warfare. Africa is a kind of key to several continents, and if the Allies can concentrate all their attention on this territory, keep in their hands the line of communication of the Atlantic with Suez, then, if this is not followed by an immediate threat to the continent itself, they will receive a vital line that will help keep the enemy in one confined space where he can gradually be pinned down and weakened to such an extent that a subsequent attack can lead to his destruction. Later, allied troops could be landed from here in Italy, France, the Iberian Peninsula or the Balkans.

These operations must be preceded by the complete expulsion of the enemy from North Africa, which requires the concentration of the main forces. However, before any effective offensive can be launched, American troops will need to gain experience and discipline in joint operations, and North Africa is just the springboard that can

help in this regard.



Effective aid to China can only be organized through Alaska and Kamchatka, which can only be done if the USSR and Japan are at war. In case of such a possibility, it is necessary to reach a preliminary agreement with the USSR and work out joint military plans. The defeat inflicted on the Japanese

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fleet in the naval battle at Midway Island, very seriously and took away from the Japanese fleet a significant part of its offensive forces for operations in the Pacific Ocean. However, the strength of the Japanese navy is still sufficient to carry out successful operations in the western part of the Pacific Ocean and, possibly, in the Sea of Okhotsk.

The question of an invasion of Northern Norway was rejected on the grounds that a sufficiently large number of ships would be required to carry out this task. In addition, the coastline of Norway is heavily fortified and armed. It is still unclear how many aircraft carriers Germany will be able to deploy, but it is now absolutely certain that the Graf Zeppelin is almost ready for operations. Other important German maritime formations occupy defensive positions in the North Sea and off the Norwegian coast. Thus, at the moment, the question of invading Norway is out of the question for the time being.

The British pay tribute to the successes of the Russians in the fight against fascism and feel indebted to them. It is known that in America these sentiments are not so strong, although it is possible that in the event of a war between the USSR and Japan, the mood of American public opinion will change. Europe is the decisive factor in the war against fascism, and it is in Europe that this war will be won. There is no doubt that America, now more secure in the Pacific, will base its main strategy on resolving European problems, including the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (Beria)

No. 31 Copy of Sov. secret

July 13, 42

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF THE SSR to comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV

Our resident in London reports the following intelligence information received from a source connected with the circles of the American embassy in England:

"As a result of the negotiations in Washington, CHURCHILL and ROOSEWELL came to the following conclusions:

1. The American military forces in England within the next two months should be increased to 350,000-400,000 men and in Iceland to 250,000 men. There are currently about 150,000 people in Iceland.

2. It was decided not to send more troops to Australia, but to send only certain types of military materials. All troops in Australia will be used not for defensive, but for offensive operations, for which they will be ready in about a month. Offensive operations will not be carried out until Japan enters the war against the USSR. The same applies to offensive operations in Burma.

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All military preparations by the Americans and the British in the Pacific are based on their assumption that Japan will attack the Soviet Union, withdraw its troops from the Pacific, and thus create a favorable environment for the Allies there. The Americans and the British

there is complete certainty that the Japanese will attack the USSR this summer or, at the very least, autumn. All the strategic plans of the Americans and the British in the Far East are based on this assumption.

3. CHURCHILL and ROOSEVELT consider that the main operations of the British and Americans against the Axis countries should be carried out in North Africa. Therefore, it was decided to take all measures to maintain control in the Mediterranean and prevent the Vichy government from placing French possessions in North Africa at the disposal of the Germans and Italians. In the opinion of CHURCHILL and ROOSEWELL, until the situation in North Africa is decided in favor of the British and Americans, there can be no question of opening a second front.

It is possible that the Americans and the British will try to organize a landing in Northern Norway, but the question of when and where exactly this landing will be has not yet been decided.

Despite all the failures of the British army in Libya, the British and Americans are less concerned about the prospects of the Libyan campaign than the fate of the French possessions in North Africa, and most importantly, the possible military operations of the Germans against Syria or Turkey.

4. CHURCHILL and ROOSEVELT decided not to undertake any operations in the area of the Aleutian Islands, except for the actions of the air force, since large-scale operations there can be very expensive in terms of casualties, and the value of the islands themselves is now not for the Americans

great.

5. It was also decided to help China by all possible means and send there as many aircraft as possible so that the Chinese continue to stubbornly resist Japanese aggression.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of S.S.R. (L. Beria)

No. 32 Copy Top Secret

July 28, 42

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF THE SSR to comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV, comrade BERIA

Comrade NKVD USSR MERKULOV

Our resident in London reports the following data obtained through undercover means.

"Recently, most officials have indicated that the second front will not be opened this year. People such as, for example, the informant agent of the executive committee of the Conservative Party, Lady Colfax, head of the political salon, Minister of Information Bracken and others,

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those who formerly opposed the second front are now also declaring with almost complete certainty that the second front will not be opened. Those circles that used to favor operations on the Continent have now begun to doubt the possibilities of a second front and are repeating the arguments of its opponents. The former parliamentary vice-minister for aviation, the liberal ROBERTS, who is determined in favor of opening a second front, is quite depressed by the situation. Frederick KU, a well-informed American correspondent, is not only convinced that a second front will not be opened in 1942, but even suggests that raids on Germany will be reduced, since England and America will concentrate all their attention on the fight against submarines in the Atlantic Ocean. According to the CU, most of the aircraft during the summer months will be used to lay minefields and bomb submarine bases.

boats. The KU also claims that the majority of the commanding staff of the American army not only never counted on the opening of a second front this year, but did not even consider it possible. As for General MARSHALL, he, according to KU, simply believed that the mention of a second front was a tactic that would help pin down as many German troops as possible in Western Europe.

The most dangerous argument of the opponents of the second front is the assertion that the Russians supposedly themselves agreed with the impossibility of creating a second front in 1942. This argument is based on the fact that the Americans also came to this conclusion, which was supposedly finally accepted during CHURCHILL's last visit to the USA.

The FUT Parliamentary Secretary of Economic Warfare, the Conservative MP Ronald TREE, the New York Herald Tribune's regular Republican PARSONS editorialist, and others speak in the same spirit. Parliament member Victor CAZALET said on July 16 that a second front was impossible and would not be opened this year. Frank DARVELL, head of the American section of the Information Ministry, said the same thing. According to him, the second front will not open until the spring of 1943, since there are still no weapons and uniforms for soldiers and it is necessary first of all to eliminate the threat to navigation in the Atlantic Ocean. Darwell stated that the worst outcome for the Russians in the ongoing battles would be a retreat to the Urals.

Nevertheless, the British troops, who have been training for a long time, are armed and ready to go. The decision on the timing of the opening of the second front became a political issue. The fact that public opinion in England expects the opening of a second front and presupposes the existence of a precise agreement on the time of its opening, saves the British Government from presenting demands to it for the opening of a second front at the present time, and may even prevent it from making such demands at that time. the moment when the voice of the English people could be decisive in this matter. Lord Mountbatten, the head of the Special Forces, in an interview with The Times, spoke out not only against the opening of a second front before the spring of 1943, but also against the organization of large-scale raids on the European coast in the near future.

A number of prominent Englishmen are of the opinion that a second front cannot be opened until Eng.

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the millionth army from the USA will not be transferred to the leu. Some 20,000 American soldiers have recently arrived in Northern Ireland. The total number of American troops in England does not yet exceed 200,000. With the current scale of the transfers, a very long period of time will be required before the required number of American troops will be concentrated on the British Isles. An American armored unit stationed at Salisbury is currently stationed in England, conducting maneuvers there. In addition, American air formations are located in High Wycombe, which took an insignificant part in British air raids. The first major sortie of the American air force is expected at the end of July or at the beginning of August.

The British are converting commercial steamships into landing barges for the transfer of troops. At a number of airfields located in the southern part of England, fighter aircraft are being replaced by bombers.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the Union of S.S.R. (Fitin)

No. 33 Copy of Sov. secret

July 3, 42

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE comrade. STALIN comrade. MOLOTOV

Our source in London talking to Lord Beaverbrook? found out the following:

CHURCHILL really offered Beaverbrook a post of Minister in the War Cabinet, but Beaverbrook evaded this offer.

In his opinion, there is only one person in the whole cabinet - IDEN, who speaks in favor of the creation of a second front and close Anglo-Soviet cooperation. (Lord CRANBORNE is also a supporter of this policy, but he never openly expressed his views on this issue.)

Thus, having entered the Cabinet, Beaverbrook would have remained in the minority and would have been forced by virtue of "collective responsibility" to abandon the idea of a second front.

At the same time, his taking the post of minister might give the English people the erroneous impression that Beaverbrook, who is known for his intention to immediately create a second front, decided to enter the cabinet, being sure of the agreement of the cabinet to open, when this is not the true intention office.

CHURCHILL is seeking Beaverbrook's return to office precisely because he wants not only to impose "collective responsibility" on him, but also to strengthen his own position in the eyes of public opinion.

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Beaverbrook considers it his task to do everything in his power to persuade the British government to open a second front as soon as possible and declared that he would not join it until the question of creating a second front was resolved positively.

Beaverbrook remarked that if the second front had been opened last year, Germany would have already been defeated.

With regard to the Anglo-Soviet treaty, Beaverbrook considers that its main shortcoming is the statement that both contracting parties recognized the need for a second front. This statement gave the British people reason to believe that the British government agreed to the opening of a second front, and even more than that, agreed with the Soviet government on the place and time of its creation. BEVERBROOKE considers it necessary to induce public opinion to a more resolute presentation of demands for the opening of a second front.

Beaverbrook noted that as early as the beginning of 1942, he proposed sending an additional (in excess of the promised amount) 500 tanks and 500 aircraft to the Soviet Union, when it was convenient to do so in the conditions of the Arctic night, and pointed out the current difficulties with sending convoys. At that time, only IDEN supported his proposals. At the same time, BEaverbrook emphasized Littleton's boasting about the supply of 2,000 tanks to the Soviet Union, pointing out that such an amount represented only 5% of the total Soviet demand for this type of weapon. Beaverbrook expressed the opinion that Britain should send all the necessary weapons to the USSR in a continuous stream.

Beaverbrook stated that some vice ministers, military experts and a number of politicians are very strongly opposed to the second front and concludes that only a few really want the destruction of a strong German state. Beaverbrook admitted that until recently he himself lived in the world of old ideas, but now he has come to the conclusion that it is necessary to create a new world, realizing that the old world has completely outlived itself. In his opinion, all plans currently existing in England for resolving post-war problems are nonsense, and if in Germany people with insufficient mental abilities consult astrologers, then in England such people are now busy creating their own schemes for the "post-war world" .

Currently in London are the newly arrived ROOSEWELLG Secretary Steve EARLEY, General MARSHALL and Harry Hopkins? According to Beaverbrook, Hopkins is a second front and the best friend of the Soviet Union among all Americans in positions of influence. EARLI, although a hard-nosed conservative, can still exert some pressure in favor of the creation of a second front.

In addition to these persons, there is also BULLIT® in London, who is an enemy of the USSR and England, from whom nothing good can be expected. He meets frequently with CHURCHILL and the Chiefs of Staff.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of S.S.R. (L. Beria)

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No. 34 Sov. secret 2 August 42

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF THE SSR to comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV

In addition to our No. 1256/B of July 13, 1942, we report the following intelligence data coming from the circles of the American embassy in England:

"During the Washington talks between ROOSEWELL and CHURCHILL, the following main decisions were made:

1. Suspend the sending of large convoys of troops to Australia and work out with the Australian government a plan for the reorganization of Australian industry so that the army stationed there is supplied with everything necessary, if possible, from local resources.

It was recognized that American forces were already in Australia in a size sufficient to ensure not only the defense of Australia, but also the opening of offensive operations in the event of a Japanese attack on the Soviet Far East.

2. To bring the American military forces in India up to 250 thousand people, concentrating them on the border of Burma, to send large parts of bomber and transport aircraft to this area; direct Indian industry to meet the needs of the army to the maximum and reduce the number of convoys sent to India.

3. The armies in Australia and India, with the support of large air forces concentrated in these areas, do not conduct offensive operations until Japan attacks the USSR, after which they take offensive operations against Japan in the Dutch Indies and on the islands of the South Seas, and for Chinese troops to begin operations against Burma.

4. Recognize the main strategic areas of England and the Middle East (the zone between the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf):

- a) send 400,000 American troops to England at the same time with a significant number of aircraft and ships. For this purpose, return to the Atlantic Ocean the bulk of the convoys bound for Australia, so that they arrive in England within the next two months. (Over the past three weeks, these convoys have been observed arriving in English ports. It is noted that the defense of these transports is so well organized that not a single ship was sunk). Deploy British military forces throughout England, while creating a strong mechanized strike group of 3 to 4 mechanized divisions in the Northern Ireland area. If these troops are not used to invade the continent, they will be destined to occupy the whole of Ireland at the necessary moment. (While it is decided to intensify diplomatic negotiations with Ireland

and, if possible, reach an agreement with the Irish government). It is planned to train American troops in amphibious operations. Special strike units will be created in each division. The purpose of the training should be to prepare for an invasion of the continent at certain points, in particular in the Le Havre region,

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as well as in Spain. The final time and place of the invasion will be set by the strategic committee.

During the negotiations between CHURCHILL and ROOSEWELL, it was decided that no serious invasion of the Continent would be attempted until the spring of 1943;

6) to concentrate American forces in the area of the Suez Canal, with a view mainly to strengthening the security of supplies to this area from French Equatorial Africa and the Belgian Congo. This line of supply requires a great development of the system of airfields, highways and railways, and river transport. These measures will also strengthen the strategic possibilities for the occupation of French and Spanish North-West Africa. It is planned to carry out thorough preparations for these operations.

5. To achieve the elimination of all potential strongholds of the "axis" countries on the North African coast. Take all measures to drive ROMMEL back to Tripoli and reopen communications in the Mediterranean. It is planned to take all measures to organize an uprising in the French African colonies and, if the necessary forces are available, to use every opportunity to occupy the French West African ports.

Naval vessels in the area must be ready to destroy any French ship attempting to return to France in the event of a break between the Vichy government and the United States, or in the event of major operations by the countries in the Mediterranean. These measures are also planned in connection with the expected concentration of German troops in this area during the winter.

6. To increase the permanent garrison in Iceland to 100,000 men, to concentrate ships there and to improve the airfield. In Iceland, it is planned to conduct training of military units with a view to their possible use for the invasion of Norway. Northern Norway was noted as an important potential invasion point, but no decision was made to open a second front there.

7. Increase military assistance to the USSR in connection with the proposed joint operations of Germany and Japan against the Soviet Union. To carry out the dispatch of weapons mainly through the Persian Gulf, since this route is less dangerous for convoys and who is closer to the most important sector of the front.

8. Send a certain amount of military materials to China from the ports of the Persian Gulf through the USSR, if possible, by air through Alma-Ata. To increase the supply of military materials to China, mainly old weapons located in the USSR, in exchange for which it is planned to provide the Soviet Union with new British and American weapons. It is planned to create a concentration of air forces, using the development of air lines from India, and thereby significantly strengthen the offensive capabilities of the Chinese armies. It is planned to hold the bases of the coastal regions, from where attacks can be made against the ports of North China and even possibly against Japan.

9. Conduct a concentration of coastal ships in England for a possible invasion of the continent.

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Carry out an additional allocation of ships for escort operations in order to combat submarines. The escort service in the Caribbean Sea, where attack from submarines is most threatened, will be organized only from new naval units.

In the future, it was decided to focus on only one or two strategic areas, which will ensure the concentration of the main strike forces there.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (Beria)

No. 35 Copy of Sov. secret

August 4, 42

STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE UNION OF THE S.S.R Comrade Stalin, Comrade Molotov

The resident of the NKVD of the USSR in London, on the basis of undercover data, also confirmed by a source from the circles of the American embassy, said the following:

"On July 25, the War Cabinet of England, at its meeting, decided not to open a second front this year."

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (Beria)

No. 36 Copy Perfect. secret

August 4, 42

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF THE SSR to comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV, comrade BERIA

NKVD USSR Comrade MERKULOV

Our resident in London reports the following intelligence information received from a source with connections in the circles of the British General Staff.

1. On July 21, 1942, a conference was held on the question of a second front. The meeting was attended by: Prime Minister CHURCHILL, Chief of Combined Operations Lord MOUNTBATTEN, Chief of the General Staff of the American Army General MARSHALL and others. General MARSHALL spoke out with a sharp criticism of the position of the British on the issue of opening a second front. In his speech, MARSHALL insisted on opening a second front in 1942 and warned the British that if they did not,

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The US will be forced to reconsider the question of sending reinforcements to Great Britain and "concentrate its attention on the war in the Pacific." MARSHALL went on to say that the United States was in a position to compensate the British for any loss of equipment they might suffer and considered sending a major military expedition to the Continent not only necessary but technically feasible.

CHURCHILL responded to the statement made by General MARSHALL by saying: "No general in high position advises the opening of major military operations on the Continent."

2. On July 22 or 23, 1942, a meeting was again held on the question of a second front, which was attended by:

From the side of the British - CHURCHILL, MOUNTBATTEN; chiefs of staff of the fleet, army and air force: POUND, BROOKE and PORT ALL and from the side of the Americans: MARSHALL, EISENHAUER and

other.

The meeting discussed the plan for the invasion of France by the Allied army developed by Anglo-American military specialists. According to this plan, the invasion was to be carried out in mid-August 1942, and only the troops now in England were to participate in the operations. According to US military representatives, this plan is practical and quite feasible. At the meeting, the Americans voted for the adoption

this plan.

The British Chiefs of Staff voted unanimously against and were supported in this matter by CHURCHILL, who then declared: "I cannot vote against my own Chiefs of Staff."

3. The main opponent of the opening of a second front in 1942 is the British General Staff. The leading employees of the General Staff - the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral POUND, the Chief of the British Imperial Staff, General BROOCK, the Commander of the British Metropolitan Forces, General PAJET and others - by all means are resisting not only the opening of a second front, but also the holding of any or major military operations on the Continent, such as the landing of a Canadian division whose personnel had been specially trained for this purpose on the Isle of Wight. Preparations were carried out in such a way that the division, after landing on the continent, would stay there from 20 to 36 hours.

Despite the persistence shown in this matter by the commander of the southeastern military district of the British army, Lieutenant General MONTGOMERY, this operation failed to be carried out due to the opposition of the British General Staff.

4. There is evidence that until the British War Cabinet takes a firm position on the issue of opening a second front, the existing British General Staff will continue to show inaction on this issue, which in turn not only does not eliminate differences among command of the British army, and further deepen these differences.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (Fitin)

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No. 37 Copy of the Soviet. secret

August 12, 42

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE Tov. STALIN, comrade. MOLOTOV

Our resident in London reports the following data obtained through undercover means:

"CHURCHILL went to the USSR in the midst of a worsening internal political crisis and a further deterioration of the situation on the Soviet-German front, which has a great influence on British public opinion.

According to Secretary CRIPPS\*® OWEN and others, CHURCHILL's trip temporarily delayed the internal political crisis in the country. The decision to travel came directly from CHURCHILL, and CHURCHILL hardly consulted CRIPPS on this matter in its entirety.

According to information coming from the British ambassador to the USSR, Soviet-British relations have worsened in recent weeks.

The British were greatly impressed by Maisky's speech in the House of Commons about the disruption of supplies to the USSR and his statement that "the British naval escort left the last caravan of ships going to the Soviet Union to the mercy of fate."



According to the source, CHURCHILL went to the USSR with the intention of making concessions to the Soviet Union on a number of issues.

With regard to the opening of a second front, CHURCHILL is unlikely to do anything other than open military operations of a partial nature.

An employee of the Intelligence Department of the British Ministry of Aviation, STRACHY, who is considered sufficiently informed, asserts that this year England can only intensify aviation operations and strengthen military assistance in other areas of military operations. According to STRACHY, the British used during air raids on the continent at the end of July of this year. the following number of aircraft: July 25 - 313, July 26 - 404, July 27 - 168, July 29 - 291, July 30 - 629.

As for the last caravan of ships in the USSR, according to intelligence data, the head of the POUND naval headquarters was opposed to sending it. In accordance with the directive of CHURCHILL, POUND was forced to prepare an escort, however, he sabotaged this order all the time, in particular, according to the instructions of POUND, the number of escorting ships was reduced. He also instructed not to take battle in the event of an attack on the convoy, which was done.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (L. Beria)

No. 38 Copy Top Secret

August 27, 42

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV

Our resident in London reports the following information obtained through undercover means:  
"Recently, at a narrow operational meeting, leading

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Chief of military intelligence Arnold FOSTER made a presentation to British intelligence officials.

In his speech, Arnold Foster announced the intention of the Anglo-American command to conduct major military operations in North and Northeast Africa, which, in the opinion of the command, should be a second front. The American General Eisenhower is allegedly scheduled to be the commander-in-chief of these operations.

At the same time, troops will be landed in Casablanca, Oran, Algiers and Bon (Bon is located on the territory of Algeria, near the Tunisian border). Military operations will be carried out by an army consisting of 11 divisions, of which 5 are American and 6 are British. Only American units consisting of 3 divisions will land in Casablanca. Mixed units of two American divisions and British units will land at Oran, British units will also land at Algiers and Beaune.

These operations are scheduled for October 7, 1942. The US troops who will be involved in the operations will arrive directly from the US in two convoys: a slow one and a fast one.

According to the plan of the command, the slow convoy will leave the USA in the second half of September this year. The joint command hopes that within two weeks after the landing, the Anglo-American units will be entrenched in Tunisia.

Arnold Foster believes that the above Allied plan is the real intention of the British and American commands, regardless of Churchill's promises in Moscow.

In order to disorganize the enemy, the British intend to spread false rumors about the alleged Allied attack on Sumatra, the Spanish and Portuguese islands in the Atlantic, Norway and so on until the moment of the planned landing of troops.

In addition, Arnold Foster stated that the Anglo-American command does not intend to open a second front in France in 1942. It is quite possible that military operations of a sabotage nature will be carried out there."

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (Fitin)

No. 39 Copy of Sov. secret

November 21, 42

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE comrade. STALIN comrade. MOLOTOV

The resident of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR in London reports the following information obtained through undercover means: "The events that unfolded

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in North Africa, revealed the difference in the points of view of the United States and England on the French question. While the British support de Gaulle's committee in every possible way, the Americans continue the policy of non-recognition of it and assert that victory can and must be won, and the future fate of France must be determined by the French themselves.

American propaganda and numerous American representations in France (consulates, representations of the Red Cross, etc.) carried out work in the direction of impressing the French with the idea that real and extensive assistance could only be provided by the United States of America.

This difference in points of view already reveals some details that testify to the lack of coordination in the actions of the allies.

Combination with the appearance of General GIRO" and Admiral DARLAN? was prepared without the participation of the British and came as a surprise to the latter. Secret negotiations between the Americans and DARLAN took place three months ago, but only now the British have become aware of this.

Thus, the Americans openly pushed de Gaulle out of participating in the North African events, despite the fact that shortly before these events, a secret agreement was concluded between him and the Americans, according to which the latter recognized de Gaulle's right to command and control over Equatorial Africa and put forward General GIRAULT, who, in their opinion, is a larger figure than de Gaulle and is known for his resolute resistance to the invasion of German troops in France, his escape from German captivity.

DARLAN does not enjoy the sympathy of the British. The Americans, while negotiating with him, did not reckon with this and proceeded from the consideration that DARLAN, having authority among the officers of the French fleet and a reputation as an anti-fascist, would prevent the unification of the French navy with the Italian one to fight against the American naval forces. .

At the present time in North Africa the main leading French forces are under the influence of the Americans.

The British vigorously promoted de Gaulle to the role of political leader in North Africa, which caused sharp friction between the American and British Foreign Ministries.

In recent days the question of de Gaulle has undergone some changes. During the last meeting, CHURCHILL promised de Gaulle support, but asked him to agree to become subordinate to the general

GIRO.

In response to attempts by the British and de Gaulle to resist the intentions of the Americans, the latter forbade entry into the territory of the North. Africa to everyone, including the British, without the permission of the American embassy in London.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (L. Beria)

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No. 40 Copy of the Soviet. secret

STATE COMMITTEE OF DEFENSE OF THE UNION OF S.S.R. comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV

November 27, 42

The resident of the NKVD of the USSR in London reported the following intelligence information:

"In a telegram addressed to the British Ambassador to the USA, HALIFAX, does Eden suggest that he talk to HELL? on the question of DARLAN". The telegram indicates that the British Government considers it desirable to eliminate DARLAN and stop all negotiations with him. Eden suggested to HALIFAX that he should tell HELL that Anglo-Soviet relations, which had improved somewhat of late, might worsen again because of DARLAN. At the same time, HALIFAX should point out to HALL that the population of the German-occupied countries would be unpleasantly shocked by this kind of attitude towards one of the "Quislings", that the use of DARLAN would undoubtedly give reason to suspect the Allies of the intention to similarly negotiate with other "Quislings" and that General de Gaulle, with whom the British government is connected by a certain agreement, will never agree to cooperate with DARLAN.

According to the source, the general tone of this telegram is that the British government is trying to convince the United States to stop using DARLAN, since he cannot be trusted at all. Referring to a number of other documents, the source concludes that the British government did not know at all about the negotiations between the US government and DARLAN before the latter's arrival in North Africa.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of S.S.R. (L. Beria)

No. 41 Copy of the Soviet. secret

December 12, 42

Report of the London residency dated December 5, 1942, on the situation in North Africa, compiled on the basis of information received by agents:

"The question of the leadership of the French liberation movement is directly dependent on the Anglo-American contradictions in North Africa.

The events in North Africa show that not only most of the territories of the French empire, but also all the commanding heights in Algeria, Morocco and Equatorial Africa were in the hands of the United States. The Americans control territory, ports, and productive forces; they supply the population with food and "master" the acquired economic resources, as evidenced by the arrival of economic missions there and

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suppliers of the largest American firms. The Americans retained the French administration of the country, army and navy, which they inherited thanks to DARLAN.

Thus, the British turned out to be only "symbolic co-owners", while the true masters of the situation are the Americans, who have the sympathies of a certain part of the French population on their side, which is a consequence of the policy of the US State Department. Thus, the British are forced to reckon with the intentions of Washington.

From the moment DARLAN appeared in Africa, the British took a passive position in relation to him. There is no doubt that DARLAN is a reactionary, hating the British, who in France took the position of cooperation with Germany, trying to maintain his position. Thanks to him, the French fleet increased anti-British sentiment. These moods, and especially the resistance of the French fleet at Dakar, after the conclusion of the armistice, caused the strongest dissatisfaction of the British, expressed quite clearly when DARLAN came forward as one of the potential leaders of the French movement and as a rival of de Gaulle. According to the Americans, DARLAN plays a significant role in facilitating the resolution of tasks to strengthen their positions in the French colonial possessions.

The sinking of the French fleet at Toulon was carried out in accordance with the order of DARLAN, which he had given to Admiral LABORDE earlier. The fleet did not fall into the hands of the Germans, but it did not fall into the hands of the British, which only increased the hostility of England towards DARLAN. The death of the French fleet played a positive role for Darlan in the sense that he gained the sympathy of a certain part of the pro-English-minded French. In particular, a well-meaning article by BARTLETT (Member of Parliament, correspondent for The News Chronicle), who is a spokesman for the opinion of influential circles in England, is explained by the open dissatisfaction of some of the rank and file de Gaulle, in whose eyes the act of Admiral DARLAN, who remained, in their opinion, primarily by a Frenchman, he atones for the crimes incriminated to him by the British. This change in the attitude of the British press towards DARLAN may also be based on the reluctance of British conservatives to aggravate relations with the Americans. In fact, DARLAN, who relied on right-wing elements in North Africa, is beginning to find support from the French abroad as well.

In this regard, de Gaulle's position seems not to be favorable enough, despite the fact that he enjoys the support of the British, as the only political candidate at their disposal to lead the entire French movement. The American stake on DARLAN and GIRO makes the British very cautious about de Gaulle, not even considering his prestige. So as not to irritate the Americans, who did not like de Gaulle's candidacy at all, CHURCHILL forbade his speech on the radio. The task of de Gaulle's representative in Washington, Philip, is now to try to persuade the Americans, if not to recognize de Gaulle's leading role in North Africa, then at least to give him a place in the sun.

In Philip's conversation with ROOSEVELT on this matter, the latter declared his deep indifference to the question of the identity of who could expel

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Germans from France, even if it be LAVALLA himself, after which he agrees to leave the decision of the fate of France and its leaders to the French themselves. ROOSEVELT allegedly declared: "If LAVAL can hand over Paris to us, we will make an agreement with LAVAL." In short, ROOSEVELT confirmed the policies of the State Department. As a result of this conversation, it became necessary for de Gaulle to travel to Washington to ascertain the intentions of the Americans regarding his own position. However, the success of the steps taken by de GOLLEM is doubtful, as evidenced by the attitude of the American representatives in England towards him. Thus, the representative of US naval intelligence, Admiral STARK, stated bluntly that the Americans do not take de Gaulle into account and are only annoyed by the fact that

that behind him allegedly very often and clearly stands the shadow of the Soviet ambassador BOGOMOLOV. In addition, the attitude of Moscow towards de Gaulle, which appears in Soviet radio broadcasts, does not make a good impression on the Americans. The Americans do not take into account the role of the Soviet Union in resolving the future of France and its colonies, and therefore the attitude of the USSR towards de Gaulle at the present time may lead to a deeper alienation between the Soviet Union and the USA.

No. 42 Top Secret NKID UNION S.S.R.

1 control com. DEKANOZOV

December 17, 42

We have received the following information from Chongqing:

1. The head of the personal office of CHANG KAI-SHI HE YAO-ZU allegedly submitted a memorandum to CHANG KAI-SHI on the question of relations between China and the USSR.

In the introductory part of the memorandum, HE YAO-ZU indicates that it is impossible to continue the current line towards the USSR, since it does not give a clear answer to the question - does China consider the USSR a real friend, or sees it as a future enemy.

HE YAO-ZU believes that the USSR, in any possible outcome of the war, will emerge from it so exhausted that even if it has aggressive intentions against China, they will be excluded for the next 20 years. China will also be weakened to the same extent. In this regard, HE YAO CZU proposes:

1. Conclude an agreement with the USSR on friendship for a period of 20 years. Negotiations on the conclusion of this agreement will begin in the near future.

2. In the agreement, stipulate the creation of a government border commission to regulate the border line.

3. Demand from the duban of Xinjiang SHEN SHI-TSAYA (head of the provincial government of Xinjiang. — Ed.) an end to anti-Soviet attacks, give him a probationary period for one year. If duban does not refuse provocations, then replace him with another person.

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In explaining the last point, HE YAO-ZU supposedly writes that after Molotov's letter addressed to CHANG KAI-SHI, which exposed the double-dealing of SHENG SHI-TSAI, the latter lost support from the USSR and began to flirt with the Chinese government. In this regard, SHENG SHI-TSAI, under the pretext of his loyalty to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, began to carry out arrests in Xinjiang, repress communists and pro-Soviet individuals, as well as allow other anti-Soviet acts and attacks. Before the USSR, SHEN SHI-TSAI covers this activity with a reference to supposedly received instructions about this from Chongqing.

HE YAO-ZU believes that SHENG SHI-TSAI deliberately seeks, in his own interests, to pit the USSR against China, while he himself balances on this contradiction. According to He Yao Zu, today it is still premature to remove SHENG SHI-TSAI, because the position of the central government in Xinjiang is still too weak to decide on such an event.

Transfers in the leadership of the Chinese government and Yumindan made on December 7 of this year. at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, were the result of the struggle of the "political science" group with the groups of CHEN LI-FU and KUN SIANG-SI (Minister of Finance of China. - Note ed.), in which the group of "political sciences" suffered a strong defeat .

Before the end of the Tenth Plenum of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, a secret meeting of the leadership of the Kuomintang was held, which was attended by CHANG KAI-SHI. At this meeting, the question of the Chinese Communist Party was discussed, and the speakers who took the floor held two different views.

A group led by Minister of Education CHEN LI-FU and Minister of War HE YING-CHIN put forward a proposal to annul the rights of self-government of the special region, disband the 18th Army Group and include it in the Chinese army. According to the opinion expressed by the members of this group, the existence of a state within a state can no longer be tolerated. If the Chinese Communist Party refuses to comply with this proposal, then it is necessary to use armed force and crack down on the Communists.

A group of more moderate leaders of the Kuomintang (surnames have not yet been established), although they spoke out for the inadmissibility of the existence of a state within a state, however, proposed to go along the line of gradually limiting the armed forces and the rights of a special region.

In his speech at this meeting, Chiang Kai-shek declared that, however desirable it may be to put an end to the question of the Chinese Communist Party, any solution that could lead to an armed clash between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang is unacceptable now, because internecine the war will only play into the hands of the Japanese. CHANG KAI-SHIK suggested stick to the line of compromise.

In the spirit of Chiang Kai-shek's speech, the plenum of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang adopted a declaration promising not to touch the Communists if they remain loyal. Declaration published in print.

DEPUTY HEAD OF THE FIRST DEPARTMENT OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR

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No. 43 Copy of Sov. secret

December 19, 42

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV

The resident of the NKVD of the USSR in London reported the following intelligence information:

"On December 4, HALIFAX® informed the Foreign Office in detail about the content of his conversation with Welles®, who, after expressing admiration for Churchill's speech of November 29, noted that he was somewhat disturbed by its conclusion, suggesting, in his opinion, that once - the solution of post-war issues will be postponed until the end of the war. According to WELLES, this is very dangerous, because if the American and British governments do not reach an appropriate agreement between themselves before the end of the war, then this will be tantamount to a catastrophe. In particular, WELLES noted that if the German war machine disintegrated now, in 1943 or in 1944, then the Allies would see the persecution of the Germans by the Red Army far to the west and could witness the entry of the Red Army into the Baltic states, Romania, Finland and some other countries. In this case, the American and British governments will be physically unable to exert the necessary pressure on the Soviet government and delay the Red Army. Such a spread of Bolshevism would have an extremely adverse effect on American public opinion, not to mention that it would disrupt European reconstruction. According to Welles, it is essential that the American and British governments reach an agreement with the Soviet government before such a moment arrives. Russia is still dependent at this stage of the war on the Anglo-Saxon powers in the sense of receiving certain materials from them, and this dependence will help to achieve now the necessary agreement. It is impossible to postpone this matter, because then it will be too LATE.

Halifax replied that, as Welles knew, the President had already discussed all these matters with Littleton and had given him a personal letter on the subject for delivery to the Prime Minister.

Halifax went on to report his conversation with General Sikorsky, who was in the US, who told him that Roosevelt had discussed a number of issues with him and had paid special attention to the need for establishing satisfactory Russo-Polish relations. Roosevelt allegedly told Sikorsky that, in his opinion, Litvinov did not enjoy great prestige in Moscow, and if Sikorsky wanted to achieve something, then it would be better for him to raise such questions directly with Stalin. Sikorsky replied that, if necessary, he would, of course, do so.

Roosevelt then announced that Stalin would be satisfied with the acquisition of Estonia, Latvia and Bessarabia, the transformation of Petsamo into a Russian port, and the creation of a neutral zone in Karelia. Lithuania and Bukovina should not go to the USSR. Without saying anything definite about the establishment of the Russian-Polish border, the president, however, indicated that, in his opinion, the

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Lin will agree to leave Vilna and Lvov as part of Poland. According to Sikorsky, he replied to the president that he regrets the fate of Estonia and Latvia, but Poland does not intend to quarrel with Russia over them. With regard to Lithuania, Sikorsky categorically stated that the Poles cannot be indifferent to its fate. Sikorsky noted that on this basis he was ready to conclude an agreement with Russia at any time.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of S.S.R. (L. Beria)

No. 44 Copy of Sov. secret

December 26, 42

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE comrade. STALIN, comrade. MOLOTOV

The resident of the NKVD of the USSR in London reported the following intelligence information:

"December 9 Lord HALIFAX? reported to the Foreign Office that SIKORSKY<sup>3</sup> had informed him of his conversation with the President, during which ROOSEVELT stated that, in his opinion, East Prussia and Danzig should be incorporated into Poland after the war. HALIFAX asked SIKORSKY whether this was so. SIKORSKY replied that Danzig, of course, after the war should belong entirely to Poland.

SIKORSKY also expressed his views on the post-war structure and stated that after the war a federation should be organized consisting of Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia and, possibly, Hungary. This federation will have to work closely with the grouping of Balkan countries, including Greece. Germany must be divided into its component parts, which will be independent.

According to the information available at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SIKORSKY is leaving for a visit to Mexico in the coming days.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (L. Beria)

No. 45 Copy Top Secret

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV

February 11, 43

We are sending the contents of the top secret report of the English envoy to Sweden, VALLETT, addressed to Eden, No. 557 of November 30, 1942, received by the NKVD of the USSR from London undercover.

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"Stockholm, November 30, 1942.

I had a lengthy conversation with a well-informed Swede with excellent connections in German circles. He had recently returned from Berlin, where he was on official business and met in private not only with German representatives, who usually negotiate with the Swedes, but also with numerous persons, many of whom hold responsible posts, such as Dr. Schacht" and General von Falkenhausen - Commander-in-Chief of the German troops in Belgium. In this way he was able to form a fairly accurate picture of the views in Berlin expressed outside of the Nazi cabal.

Below is my summary.

1. Himmler and the "SS" occupy an exceptionally strong position and represent a great danger. High-ranking German figures opposed to the Hitler regime are increasingly afraid of the possibility of Hitler organizing a bloody putsch with the aim of destroying them in order to prevent a possible anti-Hitler speech.

2. Despite the dismissal by Hitler of many leading representatives of the generals for disagreeing with his policy of waging war, in Germany there are still many prominent generals and a large number of young generals who are purely military specialists, and not party leaders, who under certain circumstances can become the leaders of the uprising with the aim of overthrowing the Nazi regime. The entire responsibility for the failure of the strategic leadership of the last summer campaign falls entirely on Hitler. Hitler continues to assert that the General Staff is not in a position to help him with its advice, since it (the headquarters) understands only purely military matters, while Hitler, in determining his strategy, also has to take into account political factors. So, in November 1941, when, based on common sense, from a military point of view, it was necessary to refrain from continuing the offensive against Moscow, Hitler insisted on carrying out this operation, since he believed that this was the only way to draw Japan into the war. Well. Japan entered the war, Hitler became less interested in capturing Moscow, but by this point he had gone very far and the German army had suffered such a colossal defeat that the whole campaign was close to failure. The colossal material losses suffered in Russia forced Hitler to spend the entire summer period on the rearmament of the German army. Hitler was convinced of reaching the Persian Gulf this summer and linking up with the Japanese armed forces. On this basis, instead of throwing all his forces against Stalingrad, he insisted, despite the protests of von Bock and Halder, on splitting the forces at his disposal and sending part of them to the Caucasus. In this case, political considerations again prevailed over military strategy. As a result, Hitler did not take Stalingrad and did not get any oil areas, except for Maykop, a field so effectively destroyed by the Russians that the Germans extracted only the smallest amount of oil there. Rommel, who, according to the source, was in Berlin a week ago, foreseeing the offensive of General Alexander's army, recommended that the armies under his command be withdrawn from El Alamein to the rear, but Hitler did not want to hear about it,

just as he did not want to hear about

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what a retreat near Stalingrad. Hitler issued an order forbidding any retreat. This order states that he would rather make every effort to send reinforcements to Rommel and the Stalingrad front than retreat. So Hitler again



parted ways with his generals, perhaps out of fear that the retreat would adversely affect the morale of the German troops. Nevertheless, there are suggestions in Berlin that all African territories will soon be lost to the Germans.

3. Italians, of course, are despised in Germany, but the Germans are worried that Italy would not try to conclude a separate peace. Therefore, whole divisions are now hastily sent to Italy, with the result that the railways connecting Italy and Germany are so jammed that the normal trade of Italy with the rest of Europe, including Sweden, has actually ceased than Mussolini, as they say in Berlin. , extremely dissatisfied. Mussolini explains his absence from Munich at the meeting with Hitler and Laval two weeks ago by illness, due to which he allegedly had to send Ciano in his place. However, the Germans believe that his illness was just a fiction.

4. My informant suggests that only a series of serious military defeats can shake the Nazi regime and notes that the events in Russia at the present time are interesting enough to suggest that such a defeat could be inflicted on Germany already this winter. . Although the German press covers the situation on the Russian front with great restraint, the far-sighted Germans still know how to read between the lines of official communiqués and are fully aware that the German army on the Eastern Front is on the eve of a particularly dangerous crisis.

The population of Berlin imagines the horrors of Russian reprisals against Germany if the latter loses the war. These fears, more than anything else, keep the opposition of the Nazi Party from active action. The leaders of this opposition, as is known, agreed in principle that Hitler and his band of robbers, as they themselves put it, should be destroyed, and most of the Nazi criminals responsible for the atrocities in the occupied countries should be sentenced to death. . These Germans want to carry out reprisals against Hitler and his gang themselves, without waiting for the Allies to do so. They also foresee that it will be necessary to completely evacuate the troops from the occupied countries, although they do not see how this can be done before the conclusion of peace, for a premature evacuation will open Germany to a simultaneous invasion from all sides. The military and civilian leaders of the opposition are fully aware that there can be no question of concluding any kind of truce between the allies with Hitler or with any of the members of his gang. They understand that the United Nations cannot make any statements about their future policy until they are convinced of what kind of democratic government will be formed in Germany and how reliable it will be. The difficulty these persons encounter is that they are fully aware of the impossibility of establishing in Germany any democratic government formed for the purpose of making peace, if the conditions

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of the forthcoming peace will contain commitments to the complete disarmament of Germany and the occupation of its territories by the forces of the united nations, because, in their opinion, this will mean that Germany is handed over to the Russians for merciless execution. They ask themselves whether Germany can transfer her air forces to the Allies and thus expose the German cities to the risk of complete destruction by Russian aircraft. In order not to be exposed to such a danger, they rather agree with the only possible way out for them, namely, to continue the fight to the end and perish. They also believe that if the result of this struggle is anarchy and communism, then this will not be a greater evil than the prospect of Russian massacre or occupation.

5. Dr. Schacht is the most prominent figure among the elements opposed to the Nazi regime. He is full of physical energy and is an intelligent person. He is well-disposed, as he foresees the imminent fall of the Nazi regime. He does not believe that Hitler will be able to hold out during 1943. Schacht is ambitious and dreams of rising to prominence

during the reconstruction of Germany on a democratic basis. His future activities may be hindered by the fact that, as a banker and aristocrat, he will come into conflict with the leaders of the working class, who (as he admits) must play a certain role in any future German government.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (L. Beria)

No. 46 Copy of Sov. secret

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF THE SSR to comrade STALIN, MOLOTOV, BERIA

NKID USSR - comrade. MERKULOV March 5, 43

We direct the content of the order of the southern German army group, intercepted by British military intelligence.

The content of the order was received by the NKVD of the USSR from London undercover.

"The First Panzer Army must capture Barvenkovo and, having secured the right flank, advance on Slavyansk and to the north on Izyum and Petrovskaya.

The Fourth Armored Army should attack up to the Mechebilovka-Krasnopavlovka line, after which it should prepare to turn north with the main group of troops (deployed?) west of the Donets and move north towards Kharkov.

Artu AVT Ketre (as in the text. - Note ed.) without a change ... to tie down large enemy forces on its front, and also to prevent the enemy from advancing through Krasnograd to the Dnieper and in both directions to Poltava.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (Fitin)

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#47 Copy Top Secret

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV, comrade BERIA

NKVD USSR - Comrade MERKULOV March 9, 43

We are sending the contents of telegram No. 55 of February 16, 1943, from the Japanese ambassador to Turkey, sent to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in copies to the Japanese ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, Vichy and Madrid.

The content of the telegram was deciphered by the British on February 21, 1943 and received by us from London undercover.

"1. At the risk of being wordy, I give my impression on the question of the assessment by the British of the existing situation and their plans for the further conduct of the war.

My impressions are based on data I received in a conversation with the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs on the occasion of the Aden conference. This conversation emphasized CHURCHILL's point of view on the inevitability of the collapse of Germany and the need to take measures to prevent the Bolshevization of Europe (see my telegram No. 41).

This message is also confirmed by my telegram No. 44 on the question of England's intentions to make peace with Germany and by the last report of CHURCHILL in the House of Commons. All this I supplement with my own considerations.

a) The goals and aspirations of the British are determined primarily by the hope that both Germany and Russia in the process of struggle will be greatly weakened and perish. England proceeds in her policy precisely from these considerations.

Guided by this policy, Britain will act at various stages in accordance with the situation.

6) While recognizing that the German spring offensive will be serious and significant, the British are still absolutely certain that this offensive will not decide the fate of the Russian armies, at least during 1943. Thus, for the time being, the British will obviously observe the development of this offensive and, while taking special measures against the conclusion of a separate peace between Germany and Russia, will wait for the mutual weakening of both sides.

c) If the Soviet armies find themselves in a critical situation, the British will do everything in their power to prevent Germany from winning a decisive victory, in particular, to delay the German offensive, the British will intensify their offensive operations in North Africa and on other fronts. and pretend that they are going to invade Europe.

d) If things turn out badly for the German armies and there is a danger that they will not want to fight anymore, then, assessing the existing situation, there can be no doubt that England will hasten to conclude peace with [Germany, in order to prevent the danger in this way Bolshevization of Europe. There is no need to emphasize the complexity of such a demarche, but it is not difficult to guess that the British in their post-war policy proceed before

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all from the need to prevent the danger of the Bolshevization of Europe, which must inevitably happen in the event of the defeat of Germany, and it is on this basis that they develop their official post-war plans.

Thus, for example, as far as I understood as a result of the negotiations in Aden, CHURCHILL told the Turkish Foreign Minister that he was going to create a Central European bloc consisting of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which, with the support of England and the United States, would prevent the spread of Soviet influence on west. During these negotiations, special attention was paid to the role of Turkey, which should be a serious link in the post-war structure of Europe. There is no doubt that Britain intends to arm Turkey and turn her into a British outpost in order to prevent the spread of Soviet influence in a southerly direction - to the Balkans and the Middle East.

2. While the foregoing propositions may seem somewhat arbitrary to you, there is no doubt that British attitudes towards Russia are becoming colder as prospects for Russia itself improve. In this situation, England begins to actually reduce the supply of Russia. There is also growing distrust of England on the part of Russia (see my telegram No. 25).

Observing Turkish-Soviet relations, it is also easy to see that Anglo-Soviet relations are becoming more restrained, especially after the Aden conference. The fundamental friction between England and Soviet Russia is the main weakness of the enemy and emphasizing all the above facts in connection with the negotiations in Aden may further incite unrest in his ranks.

The task of CHURCHILL's Jesuit policy today is to incite other countries to fight among themselves to the point of complete exhaustion of each other. With this in mind, we should be even more on our guard, otherwise the situation may change in accordance with British plans.

3. I have no special data to which I could refer in characterizing the position of America, but as far as the European question is concerned, there is reason to assume that

The US will coordinate its policy with England and use its position in North Africa to secure the right to have a say in itself (this idea was expressed by the Turkish Foreign Minister).

The main attention of America, of course, is concentrated on the war in Asia, and it can be fully assumed that mutual understanding has been reached between the United States and England, the result of which, after the restoration of peace in Europe, will be the direction of all the forces of the British against Japan, however, the dominant position in Asia, including Australia, after the war will be recognized for America.

4. As regards Turkey, it is noteworthy that, by giving Turkey unconditional assistance, CHURCHILL succeeded in bringing her completely under British influence, pretending that he had no other aim than to strengthen Anglo-Turkish relations. It is clear that in doing so, CHURCHILL used Turkey's geographical position and its unquestionably anti-Russian sentiments, meaning to turn this country into an outpost of England and use it after the war as a powerful (omitted word. - Note ed.) against Bolshevism.

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In connection with the adoption at the conference in Aden of a decision to strengthen the Turkish defense, an Anglo-Turkish committee of military experts has already been created. As a result of reaching such an agreement, Anglo-Turkish relations will naturally improve, and with help from the British and Americans, the construction of airfields and roads will be significantly accelerated. Apparently, the number of airfields will be significantly increased in connection with the arrival of supplies and modern weapons.

Thus, I believe that Turkey, from a strategic point of view, fell into the sphere of British influence. The logical consequence of this would be that, as a British ally, Turkey would serve as a pawn in the diplomatic game of the British. This, of course, does not mean that Turkey is going to enter the war. The Turks are still determined to stay out of the conflict and I do not admit that there could be a significant change in the Turkish policy of neutrality even in connection with the events on the Eastern Front.

5. Finally, considering the Anglo-American military strategy, all information boils down to the fact that at the Casablanca conference it was decided to make the Dodecanese Islands and Crete strongholds for the invasion of Europe in order to attack Greece from there at the first opportunity. The ongoing propaganda, especially from Anglo-American sources, is aimed at convincing that the North African campaign will be completed by the beginning of April at the latest, after which the British and Americans will immediately move on to other operations. As a result of this propaganda, an atmosphere of certain tension is being created.

However, as noted above, the Anglo-American strategy is extremely complex and it is therefore difficult to imagine for the time being that any sudden changes in the situation in this country could occur in the near future, especially in view of the upcoming German general offensive.

Note of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD to paragraph 5:

In our special report dated March 8, No. 28/RU, it was indicated that, in accordance with the decision of a special interdepartmental committee, the British are spreading a version about the preparation of an invasion of the Balkans and Crete in order to misinform the enemy.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (Fitin)

No. 48 Sov. secret MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE FROM NEW YORK DATED MARCH 10, 1943

Reliable source from government circles. The US Department of State reported that, according to the information available to the Americans, Germany insists to Japan that she attack the USSR. Germany is trying to prove to the Japanese that the defeat of Germany will also be an inevitable defeat for Japan. In response, Japan invited Germany to look for opportunities to conclude peace with the USSR.

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The leadership of the State Department has no doubt that Germany will be defeated, and expresses concern that the real winner may be the USSR, as a result of which a Soviet regime may be established in some countries. State Department officials are wondering if the US is helping the future spread of communism? The State Department fears the future role of the USSR in Europe. They believe that in the event of the defeat of Germany, in all likelihood, a Soviet regime will be established in Poland, the Balkans, Czechoslovakia and Germany.

No. 49 Sov. secret MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE FROM ALGERIA DATED MARCH 28, 1943

The source said that "the British, in full agreement with the Americans, are carrying out various political combinations around the Yugoslav question, which come down to compromising Tito and his liberation movement. British policy boils down to ensuring that in the end of the struggle in Yugoslavia, not Tito and his government come to power, but the government of Mikhailovich, which should ensure the triumphant entry of King Peter II. Along with the formal military support of Tito, the British have their own liaison officers at Mihailovic's headquarters. British aviation regularly makes night flights to Mikhailovich's headquarters, dropping weapons for him, and the other day a large amount of money was delivered to him. In agreement with the Americans, the British instructed Mihailoviĭ not to engage in any active operations, to accumulate forces, armaments, and to make the most of everything to reorganize the Chetniks into a combat-ready army. Help is provided to Mikhailovich despite the fact that both the British and the Americans are well aware of his connections with the Germans. Mikhailovich will have to come out openly only when the fact of the defeat of the German army is obvious. Tito's army will be supported as long as it is fighting the Germans and pulling the German divisions over. At the same time, the British have already decided to use every opportunity to compromise the government and personally Marshal Tito in public opinion. For this purpose, in particular, the neutral Swiss press is used. The same work in London will be carried out by the associates of Peter II, who completely became at the service of the British.

No. 50 Sov. secret April 3, 1943

MESSAGE FROM THE LONDON RESIDENCE

Statement of the secret memorandum of the British Foreign Office on British policy towards the future of Germany. The memorandum is dated March 17 and sent for information to the heads of departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In the introductory part of the memorandum, it is noted that "earlier, in its past history, Germany has repeatedly faced the need to

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deciding whether it should cooperate with the West or the East. Both of these policies had powerful supporters in the post-World War I period. During Stresemann's negotiations? in Locarno? Germany decided to cooperate with the West. In the future, it must be taken into account that Germany has always bowed before might, and it cannot be ruled out that she may again cooperate with the East in order to create a kind of bloc with Soviet Russia to conquer the West. When considering this memorandum, it must be borne in mind that in our policy towards Germany we must hope for her return to the family of Western European nations. The memorandum goes on to discuss the likely

the sequence of events that may precede the German appeal for an armistice to the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, or with any one of these countries. Also, the possibility of receiving any peace proposals from HITLER or any other fascist leaders and regime should hardly be considered, since it is certain that such proposals will be unconditionally rejected by all three powers. Peace proposals coming from a social democratic or communist government are also unlikely, since the German army will not allow the formation of such a government. If the German army comes to the conclusion that further continuation of the war is useless, then there is no doubt that it will overthrow the fascist leaders, establish its own dictatorship and make peace proposals in its own name, or else form some non-fascist government beforehand. Such a government, led for example by von PAPEN® or SHAKHT®, would include conservatives, liberals and Catholics. In carrying out such a maneuver, the German army can count on the support of leading German capitalists and Catholics.

The next paragraph of the memorandum lists the various policy options that are possible if the allies agree to a truce. The memorandum states that Allies can:

1. Occupy all of Germany with your troops.
2. Refuse to have any dealings with any German government and communicate directly with local authorities.
3. Establish as the main residence of the armistice commission not in Berlin, but in Dresden or some other provincial center.

After that, the memorandum highlights the future fate of Germany after the end of the period following the conclusion of the armistice. The memorandum rejects the idea of a complete fragmentation of Germany into three or four separate states. At the same time, the memorandum expresses the idea of the impossibility of dividing the territory of Germany between other powers and, as confirmation, refers to the unsuccessful experience of managing the Ruhr by France after the last war. The memorandum also rejects the expediency of all attempts to force the creation of any kind of federation of German states. The Memorandum recommends that British policy towards the future of Germany adhere to the following basic principles:

1. Austria must be restored to the state in which it existed before the Anschluss. It is entirely possible for Austria to enter as a member of a confederation of Danubian or other non-German states.

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2. Czechoslovakia must be restored within the pre-Munich borders, and some settlement along the border in the Jäger region is quite possible.
3. Alsace-Lorraine must be given to France.
4. Poland should receive East Prussia, Danzig and the Opeln region.
5. If it is found desirable, the Kiel Canal should be transferred to a unified nations.
6. All German heavy industry, especially in the Ruhr, must be placed under international control.
7. Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg must be restored to their former borders.

8. It will be necessary in every way to encourage in Germany any natural tendency to go over to a federal structure.

No. 51 Sov. secret April 23, 1943

#### MESSAGE FROM THE LONDON RESIDENCE

The text of the Halifax telegram! dated March 28, 1943 on Eden's talks with the Americans in Washington. Obtained through agents.

"The following is for the Prime Minister from the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

1) His Majesty's Ambassador and I had a lengthy conversation with the President yesterday, @ Hell®, Wynant, Welles® and Hopkins were present. The interview was carried out according to the plan that we had drawn up in advance.

2) The President first of all raised the question of the structure of the various organizations of the United Nations after the war. He believes that there should be three organizations in total:

1. General Assembly, where all United Nations will be represented. This assembly should meet approximately once a year. The task of this organization will be to provide opportunities for small powers to discharge themselves somewhat from the problems that concern them.

2. Parallel to this, an executive committee consisting of representatives of the four powers should be set up. This organization will make the most important decisions and direct the exercise of the political functions entrusted to it by the united nations.

3. Between these two organizations there should be an advisory board composed of representatives elected on the basis of the district-territorial principle. Approximately, in this council there may be one representative from Scandinavia and Finland, one or two representatives from a group of Latin American states, and so on. The Council will meet from time to time, as the need arises, to settle various international questions that may be brought before it. The main technical head of all these three international organizations will be called, for example, "moderator" (the president prefers such a title, for example, to the title of general secretary). The "Moderator", if necessary, will convene a meeting of the various international organizations of the United Nations. However, his main

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it will be his duty to maintain contact with all four members of the executive committee of the united nations.

3) The President emphasized the special need to include China among the four powers and to create organizations of all the united nations on a world scale, and not on a territorial basis. He made it clear that the only way to convince US public opinion of the need for the American government to take responsibility in international affairs would be precisely the organization of various international bodies based on a worldwide representation. The American people will be very suspicious of any organization created only on the basis of the district-territorial principle.

We are left with the very definite impression that the President is trying to persuade his people to agree to international commitments by exploiting American sentiment towards China.

4) The question of the establishment of an international trusteeship (TCOSTEESHIP) for certain areas of the world was then raised. This issue has been discussed mainly in three different aspects, namely:

a) Contested territories in Europe;

6) Colonies;

c) Countries not in this category, such as Korea, and some of the Pacific Islands.

5) Nothing significant was said about the contested European territories. In discussing colonial problems, I suggested that the question of a colonial declaration be considered. During the conversation, it turned out that this made some changes to our draft declaration, which had already been approved by the president.

We got the impression that Hell, in his version of the draft, spoke out against interference in colonial affairs by third powers. He promised to hand over his draft to me before I left the USA.

6) The conversation under point "B" of paragraph 4 turned into a lengthy discussion, during which we touched upon the fate of certain territories in the Far East, some Pacific islands, and also some parts of the French empire. In the Far East, policy will have to be carried out on the basis of the "Japan for the Japanese" attitude. Manchuria and Formosa should be returned to China, and South Sakhalin to Russia. The Pacific Islands, over which the Japanese had mandates, should be placed under the guardianship of the United Nations. All other Pacific islands (with the exception of the two groups indicated below) will have to remain in the possession of those powers that are their sovereignties at the present time - Great Britain, France, etc. At the same time, for all these islands, a common economic policy should be pursued, similar to that which is now carried out in the West Indian Islands. The French islands of MACOMESES and TOAMOTO will go over to the United Nations to be used as intermediate air bases on the Northern and Southern air lines across the Pacific Ocean from the Caribbean to Australia and New Zealand. Korea and French Indo-China should be placed under international tutelage. The USA, the USSR and China can be guardians for Korea. Timor is essential to Australia and the issue of its

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fate must also be decided. I suggested that if the practice of Anglo-French joint administration (Condominium) in the New Hybrid Islands could be used as an example, the system of international administration as opposed to national administration, even under international trusteeship, would undoubtedly give rise to a number of difficulties.

In my opinion, it would be preferable to entrust the management and control to someone to one guardian. The President stated that, in his opinion, a great deal would depend on the personal qualities of those officials who would be entrusted with the exercise of the functions of guardians in the field. In this regard, he stated that Murphy and Macmillan worked together and were performing their functions very well. Here, in passing, he remarked that points such as Dakar and Bizerte, for example, were of the greatest importance from a defensive point of view for the United States and the Mediterranean region. In his opinion, the United States should, on behalf of the United Nations, take over police functions in Dakar, while Britain would do the same in Bizerte.

7) I indicated to the President that France would categorically object to this. The President agreed to this, but declared that France would undoubtedly need help from the United Nations. In exchange for the provision of this aid, France could be required to place some part of her territories at the disposal of the United Nations. Welles reminded the president that the US government had pledged to return all of France's possessions. The President replied that, in his opinion, this obligation applied only



to North Africa. Welles said that there was no such clause in the commitment. The President stated that, in his opinion, with the settlement of all these circumstances after the war, this provision could be changed.

8) When discussing the question of Germany, the President again raised the question of her dismemberment, which, he is inclined to think, will contribute to the security of Europe. The President acknowledged that certain circles in Washington objected to this circumstance, and Hull made it clear that he himself had not yet made any final decision on the matter. I stated that we are also studying this issue, but in general I agree with the need for the dismemberment of Germany, since you yourself have repeatedly spoken in favor of this. The President remarked that a united Germany had not existed for very long and it was quite probable that there might be tendencies to split into a number of separate states. Such tendencies, according to the President, should be encouraged.

9) In discussing the political questions connected with the military occupation, the view was expressed that the civilian representatives of all governments should work in contact with the joint military headquarters in Washington, North Africa and London. This question will be worked out more deeply with Welles in developing the problems of the administration of the Italian territory.

10) When asked whether we should allow the emergence of a dictatorship in any European country after the war, the president said that, in his opinion, the answer to this should be no. At the same

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time it is essential to define what we mean by dictatorship. There is also a dictatorship in Portugal and South America. In his opinion, one of the elements that determine the nature and essence of a dictatorship should be the establishment of a fact: whether the constitution of a country contains permission to hold free elections.

11) We also touched on the issue of civil aviation and transport.

12) When discussing the issue of civil aviation, the President stated that, in his opinion, the main principle should be the prohibition of countries to own or operate air communications in the territory of another country. At the same time, he does not object to the fact that one country could send qualified air personnel to another. Aircraft should be granted the right to land at the airfields of other countries, but they should not be engaged in the transport of passengers or cargo from one air port in a foreign territory to another foreign airport. The President expressed the hope that when the British and American experts worked through the issue thoroughly enough, they would be able to exchange views with each other, as well as with experts from other interested governments. He expressed confidence that this would be done as quickly as possible.

13) In the course of the conversation, we also touched upon the situation in such countries as, for example, Norway, which by the time the war is over will probably lose a significant part of its commercial tonnage. Countries of this kind will be entitled to compensation for the lost fleet, and this must be done on the most favorable terms. I noticed that in all likelihood we ourselves would be in the category of such countries.

14) Hopkins recommended that the President authorize the State Department to consult on this and other technical issues with other interested parties.  
government agencies as soon as they are appropriately  
prepared.

The President agreed to this proposal.

15) At the end of the conversation, Hopkins expressed the opinion that it is extremely important to keep in mind the following three provisions:

a) Any attempt to create a kind of "European Council" (A ECOREAM COOMSP.) must be abandoned, since such an attempt would be extremely encouraging to the isolationists, who will no doubt jump at the slightest chance of creating a similar council for the American continent.

6) Negotiations should not look like Anglo-American attempts to settle the future of the whole world.

c) In all our future policy towards China, any possibility of its exploitation for profit should be ruled out in advance.

16) Under paragraph "B", I stated the need for the US government to inform the Soviet government about our negotiations, since it would be extremely undesirable if the message about them came to Moscow only from the British government.

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No. 52 Copy of Sov. secret

April 24, 43

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE comrade. STALIN, comrade. MOLOTOV comrade.  
BERIA

The resident of the NKGB of the USSR in New York reported the following intelligence information:  
"One of ROOSEVELT's advisers, Thomas CORCORAN, and the former secretary general of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs LEGER, in an interview with our source, stated:

1. As a result of IDENA's visit, a complete agreement was reached between Britain and the USA on the French question. The governments of both countries are unhappy with de Gaulle's position because of his growing desire to play a greater political role in post-war France. Both sides trust more GIRO, devoid of political ambitions. Britain and the USA decided to achieve an agreement between Giraud and de Gaulle, having in mind, however, not to give the latter the opportunity to play a dominant role in this agreement. General CATRU is gaining more and more confidence on the part of England.

2. Britain is concerned about the existence of hidden differences between the US and the USSR and would like to influence the US to eliminate them. This was one of the main problems in IDENA's negotiations with ROOSEWELL.

Eden insisted on the need to open a second front as soon as possible and on the desirability of starting right now with the USSR to discuss the question of its European borders, but he did not achieve success in this and agreed with the arguments of ROOSEWELL, who allegedly stated that "the question of a second front is difficult solvable problem. The General Staff of the American Army objects to the opening of a second front due to the insufficient preparedness of the American army and large losses in tonnage as a result of the submarine war. The Russians would like to open a second front in Belgium and France, but the General Staff believes that the state of communications in Western Europe will allow Germany to quickly transfer reserves. The landing of the allies, with the means at their disposal now, threatens with defeat. The General Staff also abandoned the idea of a second front in Italy and Greece. According to the General Staff, the best place for the invasion is the Danube Valley - Romania, Hungary, Austria. However, such an operation would require prior consultation with Turkey, and would also require the ability to control the Mediterranean. Any discussion of the question of European borders is premature, as it will put forward such difficult problems as Poland and the Baltics.

According to our source, ROOSEVELT and the General Staff, as well as the British government, are dissatisfied with the fact that the USSR does not sufficiently inform them about the experience of the Red Army's war with the Germans, their tactics and weapons.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR (Merkulov)

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No. 53 Copy Top Secret

June 5, 43

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV, comrade BERIA

We are reporting the contents of telegram No. 423 of May 23 of this year, received from London undercover from the British Ambassador to the USSR. to the British Foreign Office.

"1) Having discussed here the decision to dissolve the Comintern, we are inclined to believe that this was due to considerations of both domestic and foreign policy.

2) It should be borne in mind that in the past the Comintern was used both as a weapon of defense and offensive. This weapon was dubious and unclean, but for foreigners it seemed strong enough anyway. It is quite possible that the need to abandon this dubious and worn-out weapon arose as a result of the growth and strengthening of the Red Army and its outstanding successes. The decision to dissolve the Comintern can be explained by the need to deal with something that has become extremely inconvenient for the Soviet government in international relations. This may be partly due to the increasingly marked trend towards nationalism. The Comintern, whose headquarters had long been removed to the provinces, was dead for a long time, but pride did not allow it to be recognized. Only now, apparently, the impossibility of the continued existence of such a situation was recognized and it was decided "to organize a decent funeral for the corpse."

3) It is likely that the dissolution of the Comintern was due to the timely recognition of the fact that the activities of this organization were the cause of the existence of a number of suspicions abroad, in connection with which the Soviet government is now trying to correct this situation, at least in the face of those sections of public opinion Great Britain and America, who did not hide their displeasure at the existence of the Comintern. It is also likely that one of the reasons was the need to win over the waverers, by eliminating the "Bolshevik scarecrow", that is, giving the British and other Communist parties the appearance of freedom from Moscow dependence and strengthening the newly acquired independence of the American Communist Party. In any case, the Soviet government can come to the peace conference clean and unsullied.

4) In taking the decision to dissolve the Comintern, the relationship between the British Communist Party and the Labor Party apparently played a very small role, although it is possible that the time for publishing the decision was chosen taking into account the interests of the English Communist Party.

5) The disappearance of the Comintern, although it still has to be approved by the Central Committee of the party, nevertheless came as an unpleasant surprise for the members of the party, who lived only in current events.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR (Merkulov)

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No. 54 Soviet Secret July 1943

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE Comrade BERIA

We are reporting the contents of a telegram from the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs received by agents from London and sent on June 27 of this year. to the British Resident Minister in Algiers. Copies of the telegram were sent to the British diplomatic representatives in Washington, Moscow and Kuibyshev:

"The Soviet government instructed its ambassador to the allied governments in London, Mr. BOGOMOLOV, to leave immediately for Algiers for ten days to get acquainted with the situation on the spot.

Mr. MAISKY explained to us that since the Soviet Government did not have its representative in Algiers, it would like to receive information from there from the original source. Mr. BOGOMOLOV will go only for this purpose, and his visit will not mean recognition by the Soviet government of the French National Committee in Algiers.

The Soviet embassy has already approached Mr. Veino (representative of the National Liberation Committee in London) and the US Ambassador on this issue. Weino replied that he should refer the matter to Algeria for consideration, and Mr. WAINANT asked for my point of view. I replied to WINENANT that in our opinion, this issue should be decided by General Eisenhower, and we, for our part, are ready to support any decision of the US government, both in favor of this visit, and against it.

A possible line of reaction could be to give an answer in the sense that we, of course, agree to the trip of Mr. BOGOMOLOV, however, for reasons of a military nature, the present moment is not quite suitable for a visit and we hope that the Soviet government will agree to postpone this trip, since the allied headquarters are now very

busy."

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR (Merkulov)

No. 55 Sov. secret 14 September 1943

#### LONDON RESIDENCE SOURCE MESSAGE ABOUT QUEBEC CONFERENCE"

1. The purpose of convening a conference in Quebec was to discuss military questions. One of the main tasks set by the British, in particular by the Chiefs of Staff of the British Air Force, was to obtain commitments from the Americans that they would adhere to the decisions made at the Casablanca conference and strictly implement them. The British feared that the Americans in the current international situation

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ke, will not make efforts to implement the decisions of the Casablanca conference regarding the concentration of forces for conducting operations against Europe, but will try to intensify preparations for waging war against Japan. CHURCHILL's presence was especially desirable at this conference in order to give political support to ROOSEVELT in making a decision on the conduct of military operations in Europe in the first place. CHURCHILL's support for ROOSEVELT on this question played a significant role in the adoption by the Americans of the British point of view, since among the most reactionary circles in the USA CHURCHILL enjoys much more prestige than ROOSEVELT. The resolution of the question of the use of Anglo-American air forces against the continent was especially successful. According to the decision of this conference, the main efforts of the American air force will be made in the direction of the bombardment of Europe. Currently, 85 percent of US bomber aircraft are in the European theater of operations. At the conference, it was decided that this proportion of the distribution of American air forces would remain in force until spring.

2. After the capitulation of Italy, the Allies receive a significant number of air bases, which will mainly be used by heavy American bombers.

The British from the bases of Italy will use only their medium bombers. British heavy night bombers will continue to operate only from British bases. Relations between the command of the British and American air forces were good at the conference. The command of the American Air Force supported the British point of view on the need to continue the concentration of allied forces against Germany, in contrast to the point of view of the American army command, which strongly defended the point of view that the concentration of allied forces was necessary primarily for the war against Japan. Eisenhower supported the British point of view.

No. 56 October 12, 1943

#### COMMUNICATION FROM A SOURCE OF THE LONDON RESIDENCE ON THE DECISIONS OF THE POLISH OF THE GENERAL STAFF

1) The Polish General Staff, with the consent of the government and the president, instructed the representative of the Polish government in Poland to prepare to resist the Red Army when it entered the territory of Poland. The Polish Armed Forces, by virtue of these instructions, must wage a merciless struggle against the pro-Soviet partisan movement in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus and prepare a general uprising in these areas when the Red Army enters there. The Polish government and military circles are confident that Britain and the United States will not agree to the reduction of Poland's territory. Therefore, these circles are actually preparing for a war against the USSR, counting on the support of the United States and England. The English do not know about these instructions to the authorized Polish government

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and tacitly approve of them. The instructions provide for the use of the Polish police, now officially in the service of the Germans, to fight the partisan movement and the Red Army. There was no unity in the Polish government in resolving this issue...

An order was sent to Poland to hide these instructions from the population, but to excite the population in every possible way against the USSR by propaganda that the USSR wants to seize all of Poland, close Catholic churches, convert Poles to Orthodox, and send all those who disagree to Siberia.

2) The Polish General Staff made decisions:

a) Rename the Polish army into the "ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION";

6) Apply Hitler's demagogic trick and make the main propaganda slogan of the army "FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNISM, PLUTOCRACY AND DIVISION OF LARGE LANDED ESTATES .. Promise soldiers after returning to Poland land plots in the amount of 15-20 hectares.

#57 Top Secret October '43

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV, comrade BERIA

The NKGB of the USSR reports the following intelligence data concerning the Moscow conference of foreign ministers?? obtained through intelligence in London.

On October 12, 1943, Eden telegraphed to Moscow the British Ambassador Clark KERR that he had received the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Allied governments on October 7 and had informed them of the aims of the Moscow conference as follows.

The British delegation will not attempt to reach definite agreements, but it is quite possible that an interim agreement will be reached on a number of questions concerning the cooperation of the three powers during and after the war. It is also quite possible that

a communication is published rejecting the principle of allocation of spheres of influence and an agreement will be reached regarding the principles of management of the liberated territories.

The British delegation hopes to determine the scope of work and functions of the Military-Political Commission, in particular: whether its functions should be expanded; whether in this case it will be transferred from Algeria and whether other powers should be involved in its work. IDENA's personal point of view is that other Powers should participate in the work of the commission when discussing questions of special interest to them.

The conference will also discuss Polish affairs, the situation in the Balkans and Iran.

IDEN stated that the question of the future of Germany was on the agenda of the conference, but the British point of view on this matter, in particular whether Germany would be dismembered, was not yet definitively determined, except for such questions as the complete disarmament of Germany. and evacuation

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German-occupied territories. Eden considers it unlikely that the three Powers will come to any firm agreement on the German question.

The situation in Italy, according to IDENA, is difficult, due to the fact that there are not enough anti-fascists there who can take part in the government of the country. The project of using GRANDI is assessed negatively, and IDEN considers the question of the influence of Count SFORZA in Italy unclear. According to IDENA, Great Britain recommends to Marshal BADOGLIO the expansion of his government, but it is not easy for the latter to find men suitable for this purpose. Eden believes that after the occupation of Rome the situation will be somewhat eased.

People's Commissar for State Security

Union of the SSR (V. Merkulov) No. 58 Top Secret October 27, 1943

USSR STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV, comrade BERIA

The NKGB of the USSR reports the following information concerning the Moscow Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, received by undercover agents in London.

On October 15, a telegram No. 1932 was sent from IDENA to CHURCHILL from Cairo to London with the following content: "This morning the king of Yugoslavia was talking to me"? asked whether the Yugoslav question would be discussed in Moscow. I replied that in my opinion it was extremely important to work out a common policy, if that were possible. The king agreed to this. I explained that our difficulty lay in the fact that the Russians would no doubt claim that while TITO was fighting the Germans, MIKHAILOVICH was not.

I asked the king if I could assure the Soviet government that MIKHAILOVICH would undertake any major operation against the Germans, such as the destruction of the Belgrade-Nish railway or the Bor mines. I explained that I mean giving such an assurance in the event that, for example, we and the Russians could agree on a common policy and would try together to convince TITO and MIKHAILOVICH not to fight each other, but to concentrate their efforts on the war with the Germans and not to invade on the territories respectively occupied by TITO and MIKHAILOVICH. The king replied that such an assurance could be given.

At this point, the Yugoslav Prime Minister intervened. He tried to assert that MIKHAILOVICH was holding down more German divisions than partisans, but I replied that this was not supported by the information we had. In conclusion, after further discussions, the Yugoslav Prime Minister agreed that we give such an assurance,

concerning MIKHAILOVICH, if necessary. However, the Yugoslav prime minister expressed the opinion that the Russians were unlikely to agree

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participate in such a plan. I replied that at the very least we should try to reach an agreement with the Russians. The civil war in Yugoslavia, which we seem to be rapidly approaching, will only benefit the Germans.

It seems to me that the Yugoslav Prime Minister was mainly concerned with the need to conserve the reserves at the disposal of MIKHAILOVICH for the period when the Germans were expelled from Yugoslavia.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR (V. Merkulov)

No. 59 Sovereign Secret MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE FROM ANKARA November 19, 1943

The source said that on November 16, Turkish Foreign Minister MENEMENCIOGLU reported to the foreign commission of the Majlis about his meeting with IDEN, which informed him that the main and main issue at the Moscow conference was the question of opening a second front, put forward by the Soviets and which was the main subject of discussion, and the allies made a firm promise to open it in the near future. All other decisions of the conference, according to MENEMENDJIOGLU and according to the information he received from IDENA, were secondary.

Eden put before MENEMENDZHIOGLU the questions of providing England with bases, passing her fleet through the straits for more effective assistance to the USSR, joining the allies and entering the war against Bulgaria. According to the Minister, the following answers were given to these questions:

The submission of bases and the passage of the fleet was denied on the grounds that, firstly, Turkey does not have any confirmation that the allied operations against the Balkans coincide with the wishes of the USSR, and secondly, this could lead to German aggression against Turkey.

With regard to Bulgaria, it was answered that it is possible that Bulgaria, like Italy, may withdraw from the war and become an ally. In addition, it could also lead to a clash with Germany. Bearing also in mind the fact that due to the employment of the British in another theater, Turkey cannot count (so in the text) on the help of the British in this case, this is the proposal of the British

also rejected.

For its part, Turkey declared that it agreed to enter the war immediately after the Allies opened a real and successful second front against Germany, or if Turkey itself became the object of aggression from Germany or Bulgaria. MENEMENCIOGLU further stated that one could be firmly convinced that the Allies would not open a second front before the end of March, and therefore Turkey's entry into the war, at least until then, was out of the question. In addition, according to him, by that time the situation will become even clearer, and if Turkey still has to enter the war after this period, then it will be more prepared for the fight.

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Speaking about the trip of the German ambassador to Turkey PAPEN to Berlin, MENEMENGIOGLU said that before his departure PAPEN had a conversation with him and, in view of all the above, he told PAPEN that Germany could be firmly convinced that Turkey would remain neutral and that there would be no military does not intend to open any other actions against the Balkans.

No. 60 Sov. secret November '43

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE to comrade STALIN, comrade MOLOTOV, comrade BERIA

The NKGB of the USSR reports the following, received from London and New York, intelligence data on the preparation of the Anglo-American armed forces for an invasion of French territory.

The invasion operations are supposed to start in March 1944. The ratio of the Anglo-American armed forces destined for military operations on the territory of Europe is defined as 70% American and 30% British, except for Norway, for which 90% British and 10% % of US troops.

First, it is planned to capture Normandy and Brittany with the direction of the attack on Caen (Normandy). For this operation, it is planned to allocate 100 divisions (70 American and 30 British). The initial landing is supposed to be carried out with the help of 20 divisions, from which a strike group of 8-9 divisions will be allocated.

Simultaneously with the main invasion operation from the West, it is planned to carry out a distraction operation with the help of 6 divisions at the mouth of the Rhone River. In addition, the allied command has planned another ground operation, for which it is planned to allocate 26 American divisions.

At present, the troops necessary for these operations are being concentrated on the territory of England, in particular, significant contingents of American troops are being transferred from North Africa.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR (V. Merkulov)

No. 61 Top Secret

Comrade STALIN I.V. To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV Comrade BERIA L.P.

April 12, 44

The NKGB of the USSR reports the following data characterizing the attitude of leading Anglo-American government circles to the question of civil administration in France.

According to our source close to the British Foreign Office, ROOSEVELT prepared a secret directive for Eisenhower on the question of civil administration in France.

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According to this directive, Eisenhower is granted the right to maintain contact in France not only with the French Committee of National Liberation, but also with other local authorities, however, it is forbidden to carry out any activities that can be regarded as recognition of the French Committee , or other administration, by the Government of France.

The State Department has requested the opinion of the British Foreign Office on this issue, but has not yet received a response.

This directive will be discussed at the Joint Operations Headquarters in Washington, and if approved, the Department of State intends to start negotiations with J. MONNE, the representative of the French National Liberation Committee in Washington.

In addition, we received in London, undercover, copies of the texts of the following two secret documents on this issue:



a) Telegram No. 337 dated 24.Sh. 1944 by the Resident Minister in Algeria, MACMILLAN, addressed to the British Foreign Office.

"To your telegram No. 296.

Taking advantage of your invitation to give my opinion on the question you have raised, I must state that, in my opinion, the secret directive of ROOSEWELLG to General Eisenhower is deliberately intended to insult the French National Liberation Committee, which was recognized by him and to which he accredited his representative with the rank of ambassador. I am not surprised that the American representative refused to return to Algiers.

In addition, it should be noted that the French Committee has some advantages over all other allied governments, which have received full recognition.

The French Committee is located on French territory, governs a large empire, directs the army, navy and air fleet, participating in the struggle on the side of the united nations. The French Committee also has the support of the majority of the French people represented in the Consultative Assembly, which has recently been working on measures to create a truly democratic system for the future of France.

Despite all this, the French National Liberation Committee is treated with less respect than the so-called governments of Poland, Greece and Yugoslavia.

If the content of Roosevelt's directive becomes known to the French, then the prestige of the Americans, already undermined in North Africa and France, will finally fall. Since the views of His Majesty's Government are usually assumed to be those of the President, there is a danger that the prestige of Great Britain will also be undermined by this.

If the Soviet government takes advantage of the situation and fully recognizes the French Committee, the result will be very unpleasant.

b) Telegram No. 75 dated April 1, 1944, from the British Ambassador in Washington, HALIFAX, addressed to the British Foreign Office:

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"I briefed DUNN (HELL's aide?) and MCCLOY (aide to Secretary of War STIMSON).

DUNN agreed with our reply to the Soviet Ambassador and stated that the directive on the civil administration in France should not be communicated to EISENHAUER until the matter had been clarified with the Soviet government in the European Advisory Commission.

DANN reported that the State Department understood the Russians' reluctance to take any other questions in the European Advisory Commission until the final terms of Germany's surrender were accepted. However, he suggested that the Russians would not strictly adhere to this position.

DANN attaches great importance to the nature of the information to be conveyed to the French Committee and to the psychological approach to it in the most friendly manner. He considers it necessary to negotiate with the French Committee through its representative in Washington, J. MONNAY, who can be advantageously used for the best interpreter in Algeria through his connections in London (apparently through the representative of the French Committee of VIENAURE), where negotiations with EISENHAUER will take place. Whichever option is adopted, relations with the French Committee should be based on our offer to appoint a mission of the Committee to Eisenhower and our declaration of desire to maintain close and friendly cooperation with the Committee with which we intend

resolve the issue of civil administration in France in an atmosphere of trust and cooperation.

We could openly declare that although we cannot at the moment bind ourselves to keep no contact with any other French (other than the Vichy government), we do not intend to do so, and in any case on such matters we will consult with the French Committee.

DUNN added that he assumed that the French in London received a copy of the ROOSEWELLG directive, which he deeply regrets.

DUNN's remarks I did not intend to record, but it must be taken into account that on the basis of his words it can be assumed that the United States intends to address a warm letter to the French Committee as a recognized government.

People's Commissar

State Security of the USSR (V. Merkulov) No. 62 Sov. secret May 6, 1944

#### COMMUNICATION FROM THE LONDON RESIDENCE SOURCE ON THE ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITIES OF THE POLISH EMIGRANTS GOVERNMENT IN LONDON

1. Recently, the Polish government arranged for two representatives of the Polish illegal movement to visit England in order to convince the British opinion that the Poles in Poland were opposed to the Union of Polish

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patriots and the Soviet Union and do not want the Red Army to enter Polish territory.

During their stay in England, they were received by Churchill and other members of the British government and tried to convince the British that the Polish government in exile had full support in the country. These persons on April 17, while flying over England, on the eve of returning to Poland, died during the disaster.

2. Polish intelligence is carrying out the most dangerous provocative work in the newspapers by spreading absurd provocative rumors among the British in order to spoil relations between England and the USA with the Soviet Union. For example, rumors are now circulating in the newspapers proving to the British and Americans that, according to their intelligence data, the Soviet Union, allegedly in exchange for rubber, is transferring weapons and tanks received from England and the USA to the Japanese and that the Japanese are killing the British and Americans. - sky soldiers with their own weapons and so on. This provocation is designed not only to worsen relations between the Soviet Union and the Allies, but also to induce the Allies to reduce the supply of weapons and thereby contribute to the weakening of the Soviet Union in the fight against the Germans.

3. The Polish officers here dream that the German army will recover from the defeat, take the initiative and defeat the Red Army.

4. Polish Protestant organizations in England, such as the Association of Polish Protestants and the Silesian Association, are involved by the Polish Ministry of Information in anti-Soviet propaganda work and receive large sums for this purpose. These organizations are led by a member of the Polish National Council, Dr. Kozutchnik.

No. 63 Sov. secret MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE IN CAIRO DATED JUNE 1, 44

The British Colonel DESBRICH, former secretary of the embassy in Belgrade, now chief of military propaganda at the headquarters in the Middle East, told a station source that

British policy towards TITO remains the same, despite CHURCHILL's statement: his military capabilities will be used, but he will not get the political leader of Yugoslavia with the help of the British - they will prevent this. Until now, the British were forced to yield to the Russians in a number of issues, in particular, Italian, Greek, Yugoslav, since military successes were on the side of the Russians, but now the situation has changed: the initiative has passed into the hands of the Allies, and therefore the British political policy towards the USSR, in particular, in the Balkan questions will be more firm.

Colonel POPOVIC of the Yugoslav army, associated with the British, said that "the British decided not to let the Russians south of the Danube, even if this would ever have to use force."

First of all, the British will solve the Yugoslav question.

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No. 64 Sov. secret

MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE FROM WASHINGTON, JUNE 14, 1944

DULLES, a representative of the Office of Strategic Services in the American Embassy in Bern, who is in Switzerland, told the State Department that General von BRAUCHITSch personally came to him from Germany, who said that on behalf of a group of military men he was offering peace on the following terms:

1. They will overthrow Hitler.
2. They will create a military government that will accept unconditional surrender.
3. Soviet troops must not participate in the occupation of any German territory whatsoever.

The Secretary of State replied to DULLES that the Americans would not conduct any negotiations with the Germans without the participation of other allies.

At the end of May, DULLES reported that representatives of a group in Germany, consisting of prominent military men, including ZAIZLER?, industrialists, and right-wing Social Democrats who remained in Germany, had approached him with a proposal for peace under conditions of cleansing by German troops. occupied territories in Western Europe and freedom of action in the East to continue the war against the USSR

No. 65 Sov. secret MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE IN ITALY OF JULY 30, 1944

"The American representatives SPELMAN and TAYLOR arrived in Rome at the request of the pope. Here in the Vatican they meet with the German ambassador to the Vatican, WEIZSÄCKER, who allegedly represents the military group in Germany of BRAUCHITSch and KEITEL. WEIZSACKER is regarded as the best diplomat uncompromised by Nazism and staunchly anti-communist.

The Germans allegedly put forward the following peace conditions to the allies: the Rhine region goes to France; Austria is singled out as an independent state; Poland gets the old borders with Germany, but without the corridor and Danzig; in return for this, Poland receives Memel with the district. A military government will be made up of uncompromised generals. The Allies protect the integrity of Germany."

No. 66 Sov. secret MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE IN CAIRO DATED NOVEMBER 7, 1944

In Arab government circles, the declaration of war on Bulgaria is considered an inevitable consequence of the dual policy of Bulgaria, which, on the advice of the Germans, intended to hide behind

neutrality from responsibility for the assistance provided to the Germans against the USSR. In addition, the USSR wants to

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other grounds with the allies to resolve the Balkan affairs. At the headquarters of the main command of the British army in the Middle East, they do not hide their irritation and dissatisfaction with this act of the Soviet government, since it violates all the plans of the British in the Balkans and proves that the USSR wants to ensure a decisive role not only in the Romanian question, but and in the affairs of other Balkan countries.

No. 67 Sov. secret MESSAGE FROM THE LONDON RESIDENCE December 14, 1944

E data.

Letter of transmittal from Eden dated November 27, 1944 to the memorandum of the British Foreign Office "Confederation, federation and decentralization of the German state and the dismemberment of Prussia", addressed to the members of the committee on armistice and post-war problems.

"I hope soon to submit to the Committee a revised document on the question of the partition of Germany. At the same time, I considered other possible ways of weakening Germany through constitutional reorganization. I am now studying a document drawn up by the Foreign Office, which discusses the positive aspects and possibilities for the implementation of confederation, federation and decentralization, as well as the dismemberment of Prussia. I do not want to draw conclusions, but I think that my colleagues will find this document a useful contribution to the study of the question of the future of Germany.

Confederation, federation and decentralization of the German state and the dismemberment of Prussia.

If the dismemberment of Germany is considered unfeasible for various reasons, this does not mean that it will not be possible to weaken Germany through other constitutional reforms, and especially through confederation, federation and decentralization. These questions are dealt with in Appendix 1, and the dismemberment of Prussia is dealt with in Appendix 2.

In considering the future political system of Germany, four points must always be kept in mind. First, no system will exist for a long time if it proves to be unacceptable to the broad masses of the German people. We can do a lot towards the Germans. We can disarm them, destroy their industry if we want to, deprive them of most of their territory, evict the population from there, and so on. However, the final form of their state structure should be determined by them, and not imposed by us. Otherwise, there is no way we can prevent the collapse.

Secondly, it must be remembered that during the last hundred years there has been a strong desire among the German population for such political unity as its neighbors have already achieved. There is every reason to believe that this aspiration will reappear if the unity of Germany is broken as a result of actions from outside or as a result of dismemberment carried out by other states. Under such circumstances, the purpose of the recovery

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the buildings of a united Germany will be the focus of all the discontents, aspirations and activities of the Germans. This will be all the more likely if the polity, approved by Germany under pressure from outside, causes internal divisions and a discrepancy in the distribution of power between the center and the states that are part of Germany. Political instability of this kind may eventually give rise to a movement to concentrate power in the hands of a strong central government. This just happened in

the period of existence of Weimar Germany, which led first to a government established by constitutional means, and ultimately to Hitler.

Thirdly, an important concomitant of any system of decentralization is the effective dismemberment of Prussia. The factors speaking against the dismemberment of Germany as a whole do not apply to Prussia. It would be absurd, through the decentralization of Germany, to revive the Prussian state in the form in which it existed before the Nazi government abolished the system of federal states. The fact that a powerful Prussian government can act as a counterbalance and thus further weaken the central government is fraught with danger: the resurrection of Prussia in the form in which it existed before 1918 will generate in the population of Germany precisely those elements which we want to suppress, that is, it will create the prerequisites on the basis of which she will exercise her power over the rest of Germany in a spirit not favorable to the interests of the United Nations.

Fourth, if a constitutional system is eventually established, then we should not see this as a guarantee of security. We will ensure Germany's security only when she is so weakened that she is unable or unwilling to continue the struggle. As long as this continued weakening of Germany continues, we shall be insured against further attacks from her side. But if, through insufficient perseverance, a false sense of security, or a quarrel with our present allies, we weaken our strength or vigilance, then we will not save ourselves, relying only on the fact that a democratic order can be established in Germany, or that Germany can - could represent a federal state or even that Germany would be dismembered. It may not be an exaggeration to say that all these political measures contain the germ of the danger that they may give the people the false impression that they are effective as a means of security, allowing us to abandon the measures envisaged by the program. security, which requires on our part the effort and deprivation. Is it possible to hope that the people will never be mistaken in such assumptions? We could not afford to trust the Maginot political lines.

The general purpose of this document is that, when discussing these issues with our allies, we should advocate the need to destroy Prussia, as discussed in Appendix No. 2 of the memorandum. We should point out that, without striving for the forcible introduction of federalism in Germany, we need to propagate the idea of federalism in the context as described in the 16th paragraph of Annex No. 1 of the memorandum. However, in our defense of this point of view, we should not

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go so far as to challenge the point of view of the Soviet representative in the European Consultative Commission (approved in the main by the US representative) that our control body should make full use of the German central administrative apparatus.

## Application No. 1

## Germany: confederation, federation and decentralization

## I. Confederation

2. A confederation (or syyyyepbipa – a union of states) means for the Germans the formation of a league of sovereign states created as a result of the conclusion of a multilateral treaty.

The confederation is not a state. Its central apparatus is usually reduced to the level of a deliberative assembly, and its power does not extend to a separate member state of the confederation. The main and, perhaps, the exclusive interests of the central confederal apparatus are concentrated around the spheres of external relations, protection and preservation of peace within the confederation. Such was the system established after the Napoleonic Wars,

when Germany was a confederation of 39 sovereign states" which were represented in the German Reichstag in Frankfurt.

[..]

4. However ... either the confederation will be so fragile that most of the features characteristic of a state of complete dismemberment with all its inherent disadvantages and dangers will reappear, among which will be the disappearance of the very name of Germany, or the confederal states of Germany will be able to to strengthen the central apparatus until the latter begins to perform the functions that the central government performs under a federal system. All the confederations that have existed over the past few centuries have had this tendency. Any attempt by the United Nations to help the German Confederation to become a federal state will create approximately the same difficulties and dangers as may occur if the United Nations tries to keep Germany in a state of complete dismemberment.

#### P. Federation

5. A federation (or *Bipdeÿÿÿÿÿÿ* — a union state) as opposed to a confederation  $\{az{enBipa}$  is a state in which sovereignty is divided between the center and the members of the federation on the basis of the principles set forth in the constitution. With such a three-state arrangement, the central government may, in those matters in which it is competent, extend its power to the states that are part of the federation. Such was the constitution of Germany until 1918. However, the confederation that existed until 1866 was condemned by the German people.

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The Germans were very proud of the federal system created by Bismarck and perceived by them as an achievement of their national unity, which they had been striving for for such a long time. Therefore, a return to a federal system will not evoke bitter memories in the German people. Indeed, such a state system may well be supported by broad public opinion. It may be seen as a relief from the overwhelming centralization of the Nazi-imposed regime and as a return to the prosperity and well-being of Germany, although it may be considered a reactionary measure on the grounds that all current trends are towards larger states and greater centralization of power. . Moreover, the concept of federal states is still fresh in the memory of the average German, since these states, although deprived of many of their functions by the Weimar constitution and placed entirely under the control of the central government by the Nazis in 1935, are nominally still remain the main administrative units in the resolution of issues that are under the jurisdiction of local authorities. The Nazi plan to replace them with new provinces based on party districts was not fully developed, and it was only during the war that the districts were used as administrative areas, as opposed to party districts.

6. However, the ground for this must be carefully prepared so that the idea of a return to federalism seems to the Germans as if coming from themselves, and not imposed by foreign invaders. Moreover, the federal system that we would like to introduce in Germany should not be an exact copy of the system created by Bismarck. From our point of view, the latter had two serious shortcomings. First, under this system there was no "responsible" government at the center, and very little responsibility was borne by the various federal states. Secondly, there was a huge difference between federal states. Some of them were very small, while Prussian power was overwhelming over three-fifths of the population. The Prussian king had the supreme power of the emperor. This defect was completely destroyed by the Weimar constitution, since its authors failed to carry out their original plans for the dismemberment of Prussia.

7. Thus, none of our aims will be solved by a return either to the constitution of 1871 or to the Weimar constitution, since in either case Prussia will receive a privileged position, and also retain her such traces of the past as, for example, the former state of Schaumburg-Lippe?. Therefore, a federation based on a democratic system of government, along with the dismemberment of Prussia, will have more advantages. With the destruction of Prussia, created by the Hohenzollerns, one of the main material and spiritual foundations of German aggression will be destroyed. The economic planning required by modern warfare will be more difficult under a federal system, given that the solution of economic problems will largely be in the hands of federal states. The opposition to the conduct of military policy, if it is led by two or three federal states, will be stronger than if it comes simply from a national minority with few

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number of votes in the Reichstag. There will be two possible motives for opposition from the federal states: a genuine desire for peace, and a dislike for the formation of an army by the central government.

8. However, the true case for federalism goes much deeper. It rests on the assumption that the main political defect of the Germans is their willingness to submit to leadership. This, in turn, the usual behavior of the Germans, gives great importance to the government apparatus, invested in their eyes with a power that they cannot challenge. They consider themselves tools of the state apparatus, and not vice versa. This feeling towards the German Empire is supported by artificially bred nationalism, the main postulate of which is the great destiny of the immortal nation, and not the formulation of the rights, qualities and virtues of an individual. The Nazi doctrine that every individual must exist for society is in line with the way of thinking of the Germans. The larger the society to which the individual belongs, and the higher the government to which the individual is subject, the stronger the whole complex of exploitation. One of the results of federalism will be that the individual in Germany will begin to think differently and will consider himself less a German of the Reich, as the Nazis taught him, and more a Bavarian, a Hanoverian, and so on, as his grandfathers considered themselves.

9. The Germans showed some ability in the organization of local self-government, but in the organization of parliamentary democracy on a national scale, their ability was insignificant. A small autonomous state (between local self-government and parliamentary democracy in terms of type) is a true state body that should bear political responsibility for solving important issues. Particularism is in some cases a good basis for a political system, since even in Germany it is not aggressive. Its purpose is to protect and develop its own existence and to prevent outside interference rather than engage in aggression.

10. There are two main difficulties which may be an obstacle to the restoration of federalism in Germany. One of them is that most of the types of German states remembered by history are unsuitable for the purpose of creating a federation. The second difficulty is that in Germany and in some other countries there is a strong tendency towards the centralization of political and economic power. This will greatly complicate the problem of establishing a balance between federal and state power. Both of them are related. It is very difficult to find such systems of government that would equally safely and effectively exist both in Prussia and in Schaumburg-Lippe. There may be very little in common between them. Therefore, in order for the federation to be successful, it is important to get rid of the eternally great Prussia and from those states that, due to the necessity of the size of their territory, are not suitable for autonomous existence.

11. The various alternative ways of becoming a federation of Germany cannot be discussed in detail here. However, much can be said about this. Southern part of Germany

presents difficulties, since the states existing there can be used. current pro

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The provinces of Prussia will be made up of nine federal states, including East Prussia. Some adjacent non-Prussian territories could be united with some of these new states. For example, Saxony and the Prussian provinces of Saxony could be united into one federal state. The same can be done with the Prussian Principality of Hesse and with the non-Prussian Hesse. In the same way, the small historical principalities that are part of Prussia can be included in the new neighboring federal states. An exception can be made for Thuringia, Mecklenburg and the Hanseatic cities?!, as well as for other small states that have their own characteristics.

12. The question also arises regarding the restoration of former dynasties. However, this is a question that can only be discussed when we have a better idea of the conditions under which federal states will be resurrected. In some cases, as with Bavaria and Baden, for example, the restoration of the local dynasty may facilitate this resurrection. In other cases, it may serve as an obstacle. In the event that the majority of states were to be formed from the territories of Prussia, the creation of a dynasty would be impossible. It must be stated that in any case the Hohenzollerns must be

excluded.

#### S. Decentralization

[...]

14. Such a system is, of course, preferable to the unitary system created by Hitler, and can be introduced more easily than a federal system, which to some extent will delay the course of history. It will also be as good as a federation in terms of teaching the German people the art of self-government. But in other respects, the federation will be more conducive to the implementation of the plans of the allies. It can contribute to the weakening of German nationalism by strengthening local patriotism, non-aggressive in nature, and this will actually create obstacles to the leadership of countries in Germany by the central government. None of these problems can be solved by decentralization. The provinces, which owe their existence to the central government, will have no means, and may not want to prevent the central government from further attempting to take away from them the powers it has given them.

#### GU. Allied activities

15. Dismemberment must be done by force. The new states will be given the right to draw up their own constitutions. As far as federation is concerned, the only, albeit important, measure to be carried out by the Allies will be the dismemberment of Prussia. For the rest, the best hopes for the success of the federation are based on the fact that the Germans will voluntarily agree to this.

16. However, this will not prevent the Allies from giving all possible support to the implementation of such a policy, using traditional feelings based on memories of the historical situation.

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living German states. The administrative control bodies of the allies must be set up in such a way as to facilitate the functioning of the federal system and the individual states. The establishment of democratic institutions at the level of federal states should be encouraged at the earliest opportunity.



## Annex No. 2 D. The situation of Prussia

1. The United Nations are fighting for the destruction of "Nazi tyranny and Prussian militarism, those two hated forms of domination" (Prime Minister, August 1943). The destruction of only one of them, of course, will not be sufficient.
2. The most important and effective means of cracking down on Prussian-German militarism will be the liquidation of the German armed forces and military institutions and the prohibition of their re-establishment. The economic situation of the Prussian Junkers is a secondary, albeit serious, problem. This issue is now being considered separately. The question of the future of the Prussian state itself remains unconsidered.
3. Prussia, subdivided into 11 provinces and districts of Berlin, is one of the 15 German states. It is one of the largest of these, comprising over three-fifths of the total area and population of Germany, as well as the large coal and industrial Ruhr region, the most concentrated complex of its kind in Europe. Economic security measures for the Ruhr are a separate issue and are not addressed in this memorandum.
4. The existing occupation plans of the Allies in relation to Germany provide for the division of Prussia into four main areas for the purpose of their occupation and administration:
  - a) the fate of East Prussia, which will again be separated from Germany and occupied by the Russians, is subject to further consideration by the Allies;
  - 6) the Prussian provinces of Upper and Lower Silesia, Pomerania, Mark-Brandenburg? and Saxony are to be occupied by the Russians. Berlin will be occupied by three countries;
  - c) the Prussian provinces of Schleswig-Holstein, Westphalia and the Rhine Province are subject to occupation by England;
  - d) the Prussian province of Hesse-Nassau is subject to occupation by America.

## P. The problem of the destruction of Prussia as a state

5. There is no doubt that the said division of Prussia is in practice almost what is required. If further measures are required, they will be aimed at supporting the trend that may arise in individual provinces with a view to breaking the ties that bind them to Prussia. The main arguments in favor of not taking any further measures related to the destruction of the Prussian state are the following:

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- a) a great advantage can be gained by reducing interference in German affairs to the necessary minimum. Those measures that will need to be taken, such as the liquidation of the Nazi organizations and the destruction of the military machine, must be carried out with the utmost care. The energy of the Allied authorities must not be squandered on secondary tasks designed to arouse more resentment on the part of the Germans, without providing an important advantage for the Allies;
- 6) the destruction of the Prussian state, in any case, is unlikely to be more than the formal completion of the policy pursued by the Nazis themselves. The Prussian administrative apparatus was to a large extent united with the administrative apparatus of Germany. The last remaining Prussian Ministry (Finance) was abolished on September 8 of this year. Hitler remains the nominal Imperial Viceroy of Prussia, and Goering the nominal Prime Minister. However, the Prussian state is no longer an efficient administrative unit. The eleven Prussian provinces are in many respects on the same level as the non-Prussian states and imperial regions;

c) the existence of a fundamental connection between Prussian militarism and independently existing National Socialism was exaggerated very recently by German émigrés who tried to transfer their indignation against Germany to Prussia. The capital of the Nazi movement is Munich. During the Weimar Republic, Prussia had democratic rule, which lasted until 1932, when it was abolished.

6. The main arguments in favor of erasing the Prussian state from the map:

a) Prussia has undoubtedly been the focus of German militarism since the time of Frederick the Great. The destruction of Prussia will be a strong and best action, understandable to all. The Nazis proved it unwise to underestimate the power of symbolism, especially in Germany. The implementation of such a policy will not require the use of decisive measures and large manpower reserves;

6) the destruction of the Prussian state by dismembering it will be a good start for the Allies to pursue a general policy of German decentralization, if such a policy is desired. The dismemberment of Prussia by no means means the necessity of the dismemberment of Germany, and this restriction may have a positive effect on the policy of decentralization of Germany;

c) the destruction of Prussia will be a means of security for the future, and if this is not done after this war, then it is unlikely that an opportunity will again arise for this in the future. The fact that Prussia as a state is not, of course, strong at the present time does not exclude the possibility that it may become so in time. If the skeleton of the Prussian state remains, then it will be a potential basis for the revival of militaristic Germany. It seems improbable, however, that a revived German militarism could take on a Prussian rather than a German form. If Prussia is destroyed, then it will not be easy for the Germans to revive it, and in any case, attempts to do this will be important for the Allies.

danger signals;

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d) the destruction of Prussia by dismembering it will actually be carried out in accordance with the Allied plans for dividing Prussia into zones of occupation. Administratively, this will be a simple operation that does not entail the destruction of the administrative apparatus mentioned for the allied occupation authorities. On the one hand, the German ministries will remain, and on the other, the provincial and local governments;

e) such a policy must be supported by the public opinion of the Allies, especially the British, for whom the adjective "Prussian" is much more sinister and repulsive than "Germanic";

f) the reaction from the Germans is unlikely to be hostile. After the First World War, they themselves discussed ways to divide Prussia. The inhabitants of the Rhineland and Hanover are not typical Prussians. This fact they will probably emphasize strongly when the rest of Prussia is occupied by the Russians. In Bavaria, the gloating over the destruction of Prussia will probably be much more differentiated.

7. The following conclusions can be drawn:

a) the arguments in favor of the destruction of Prussia prevail over the arguments against it. The Prussian state must be destroyed by dismembering it;

6) the destruction of Prussia will be an administratively easy operation;

c) the destruction of Prussia will be one of the security measures. In itself, it will obviously be a significant guarantee against the revival of German militarism.

Sh. Methods for the destruction of Prussia

8. Granting that the destruction of the Prussian state is desirable, it may nevertheless be argued that the application of special measures by the Allies in this direction would be unnecessary and undesirable, given the effective division of Prussia during its occupation by the Allies and the scope, which is likely to achieved particularist tendencies among the Germans. However, the Allied occupation will not last forever. Moreover, it is easy to overestimate the possible strength and effectiveness of the particularist sentiments of the Germans towards Prussia (of course, if the anti-Prussian sentiments are strong enough to weaken Prussian bonds, then so much the better). Therefore, in any case, if it is decided that the destruction of Prussia is the desirable course of policy towards Germany, it will be necessary to determine the details of this policy for as long as possible.

9. It is currently not possible to discuss this policy in detail. However, the following program can be taken as a basis:

a) the Prussian state, together with all the remaining institutions and organizations of state importance, should be abolished by an official act in the very near future after the establishment of the "triple control". This may be done by the Allied authorities, acting in accordance with Article 12 of the Instrument of Surrender, or by one of the German authorities, acting under the direction of the Allied

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kov, taking into account the existing circumstances. At the same time, the activity of the Prussian state ministry, headed by the Prussian prime minister and the Prussian Reichstag, together with other representatives of the Prussian state that had survived by that time, standing above the provincial administrative bodies in importance, should be terminated;

6) the Prussian provinces in the respective Allied occupation zones should be retained as administrative regions and treated on an equal footing with non-Prussian lands;

c) this division into existing provinces need not be permanent. It may change according to the particularistic tendencies that may arise. No obstacles will be created, for example, to merge two or more provinces into one. Rhine-Westphalia is such an example;

d) any change of power in the German states as a result of the creation of federalism or the implementation of decentralization will, of course, apply to each Prussian province.

No. 68 Sov. secret January 27, 1945

#### MESSAGE FROM THE LONDON RESIDENCE

British Foreign Office memo? for the British Delegation at the Crimean Conference of the Leaders of the Three Allied Powers. Obtained through agents.

"The upcoming meeting of the heads of the three governments will provide an opportunity for the three great powers to reach agreed decisions on issues affecting the entire international post-war situation. This conference will take place at a time when public opinion in America, and less loudly here, is troubled by the contrast between the brilliant dreams of a future world of international cooperation and the harsh reality that has emerged from certain developments in Europe.

Therefore, only at this kind of meeting can the combined influence of America and this country be effectively used to influence Stalin's mind. This can only be achieved if Stalin gives instructions for a turnaround in Soviet daily policy and

according to practical activities in the direction of this cooperation. And it is quite possible that Stalin, now that victory is already in sight, is oscillating between the policy of cooperation and the old Soviet line, created "alone".

It is quite probable, therefore, that the political decisions of the conference which it will adopt will determine the contours of the future, and in this connection we must draw up a certain plan for preparing for the conference and, in addition, where necessary, seek from the President preliminary support our views. The somewhat exaggerated importance that Americans sometimes attach to avoiding a "coordinated

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lied" directed against the Russians. This case is undoubtedly one in which hasty decisions on important issues can cause irreparable damage, and equally failure to reach a decision on some issues can equally cause harm.

Based on the foregoing, we have reviewed the current situation in order to get an idea of the nature of the following:

First /A/. Matters on which a decision needs to be made and which should be raised by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

1. Questions concerning the future of Germany.
2. Polish-German border.
3. The Polish problem.
4. Participation of France in a future meeting of foreign ministers and heads of the three governments.
9. Iran.

The first /B/. Issues that require a decision to be made and that need to be raised by other participants in the conference.

1. Communication between the allied armies.
2. Sixteen Soviet socialist republics.
3. Procedure for voting in the Security Council.

Second. Non-urgent issues that, under certain circumstances, it is useful to resolve:

1. Italo-Yugoslav border.
2. Deliveries for Europe.
3. Displaced persons.
4. European Economic Committee.

Third: Issues that may be raised by other participants in the conference, but which we prefer to avoid discussing.

1. Straits.
2. Behavior of Russians in Eastern Europe and on control commissions.
3. Preliminary peace treaty with Italy.

Fourth: Other questions that may arise during the discussion. This includes such issues as Greece, Turkey, Macedonia, prisoners of war, the Kiel Canal and its surrounding areas, the participation of Russians in all kinds of international organization, and so on.

This list of questions is not exhaustive and other questions may arise before the meeting. A brief summary of them will be prepared separately in due course and will be submitted for consideration.

Questions under sections one, two and three are dealt with more fully with the preservation of the same blanks (as in the text of the document. - Approx. ed.).

The first /a/. Matters on which a decision needs to be made and which should be raised by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

1. A question concerning the future of Germany. Certain aspects of our future attitude towards Germany after her defeat have received general approval. In this case, we mean occupation, control, complete disarmament, the change of German borders in 1937 with the simultaneous cession by Germany of certain territories in the eastern part of the country.

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But then a number of more important issues on which decisions have not yet been taken, although they were discussed at the conferences that took place earlier. The most important of them are:

1. Dismemberment and decentralization;
2. The size of the German border concessions in the East;
3. The future of the Rhenish-Westphalian basin;
4. Kiel region;
5. Population displacement;
6. Economic security measures;
7. Reparations;
8. Treatment of major war criminals.

In a recent conversation with Low, President Roosevelt expressed the opinion that it would be unwise to take any decision now that would determine policy towards Germany for a long period of time and it would be foolish to commit ourselves to plans before we get there and see the situation. in place. Apart from this, His Majesty's Government itself has not yet come to a definite conclusion on many of the great problems which are still being studied in official circles. But while it may not yet be time for final decisions to be made, it does seem that the time has come for these questions to be successfully studied, without as yet making any commitment, in the European Advisory Commission, which, as you know, was created in order to " study and make joint recommendations to the three governments on European problems related to the end of hostilities...".

One or two attempts have already been made to use E.K.K. in this direction, but so far to no avail.

For example, in Tehran they decided to transfer the issue of the dismemberment of Germany to E.K.K. Over the past few months, consideration has been given to the American proposal that questions of reparations and economic security be studied under the auspices of E.K.K. During

conversations in Paris in November, the Foreign Minister said that H.K.K. now the problem of the Rhineland must be dealt with. In November, the Soviet delegation presented a work plan to E.K.K. which included two main issues: the elimination of the Nazi regime and the transfer of war criminals, and control over the German economy. Thus, there seems to be a general agreement in principle that E.K.K. should be used to fulfill the tasks assigned to it. All it takes is to really start looking into the problems.

In order for this to be done, it is necessary, first of all, to strengthen the Soviet delegation, since Gusev himself does not have enough time to carry out the work actually included in the current agenda of the commission, and he also does not delegate authority to his subordinates.

If E.K.K. really undertakes to study the main problems, it is necessary that the Soviet delegation be headed by a person who would work in the Commission full-time, and it is also certain that the subordinate staff of the delegation will also need to be strengthened. This is a matter on which it is necessary to make contact with the Americans and secure their consent to argue before Stalin for sending Russian delegates with quite unusual powers.

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2. Polish-German border. Moscow has for some time been recommending the Oder-Neisse line as the future western border of Poland. At first we assumed that this refers to the line of the Oder River and "SKTAEBV", I repeat "SGATAEK" of Neisse in Silesia. However, it is quite clear from recent statements that the Lublin Poles lay claim to the entire territory up to the Oder line and the SOVTEEK Neisse, and certainly not without some approval from the USSR.

The Russians are undeniably interested in extending Polish territory as far west as possible, in order thus to create a permanent basis for Poland's quarrels with Germany and to make it dependent on the support and protection of the USSR.

The Poles in London are fully aware of this and most of them oppose such extravagant demands. Even Mikołajczyk, while in Moscow, insisted that if Poland were to expand its borders to the Oder, it would be only after a clear statement that this was being done as a result of an agreement between the three great powers, and not of Poland's own will. The present Polish government has spoken out expressly against the acquisition of territories in the west besides Danzig, East Prussia and Oppel Silesia.

His Majesty's Government publicly pledged to support the acquisition of these three territories by Poland, however, it never made public statements or expressed its opinion to the Russians regarding additional territorial demands. There is a danger that, if we do not make our position clear, the Russians may assume that we are tacitly agreeing to their proposals to establish the boundaries of the Oder-Gorlitzer-Neisse. Any such cession of German territory, which, as might be supposed, must be accompanied by the expulsion of the German population, entails the most serious practical difficulties connected with the transfer and resettlement of German citizens. Moreover, the wisdom of such a measure is doubtless strongly doubted by various circles of public opinion here, partly because of the practical difficulties mentioned above, partly because Poland's ability to settle such vast German territories is very doubtful. The annexation by Poland of such a vast German territory besides East Prussia will give the future Germany a permanent cause for discontent and will cause serious instability in Europe. Accordingly, it is highly desirable that our point of view be, as far as possible, in agreement with the US Government, explained to the Soviet Government at the forthcoming conference. As regards our country, it can take the following position: it cannot be considered that His Majesty's Government agrees with any line of the western borders of Poland and that it cannot say whether the transfer of German territory to Poland besides East Prussia, Danzig and Oppel would be acceptable to English public opinion. Silesia.

### 3. The Polish problem.

As a result of the recognition of Lublin by the Soviet Government and the lack of immediate prospects that His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States will refuse to recognize the Polish Government in London, we will probably gain little if we try to raise the question of creating a new Polish government at the Conference of the Heads of the Three Governments. , at

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known by the three great powers. If in the meantime Mikolajczyk does not become prime minister of the Polish government in London again, then the prospects for success of this attempt will be too small. Nevertheless, even before the conference, we must determine our position and, if possible, try to win the Americans over to our side. It is especially important to determine our point of view on the question of whether the western borders of Poland should be established even before the end of the war. One of the weaknesses of our position has so far been the apparent lack of unanimity among the three Great Powers on these questions. The fact that the US government did not dare to insist on an immediate settlement of the Polish question gave the London Poles the opportunity to take a wait-and-see attitude and prove that it was beyond their competence to decide on this important issue, since the three great powers themselves did not reach an agreement. The ideal solution, from our point of view, would probably be to reach an understanding between all three powers that these questions as a whole should remain unresolved until the end of the war. Probably, too high hopes should not now be placed on this, since the Soviet government is in a position to conclude an agreement with the provisional Polish government on the eastern borders. However, such an agreement will ultimately undermine the authority of Lublin in the eyes of the Poles not only in London but also in Poland, and this will make it even more difficult for us to create a united Poland, as we would like to see it in the future and in which we could all the Poles would eventually return. Accordingly, consideration should be given to the question of whether we should not suggest to the US government that they take advantage of the conference of the heads of the three governments and tell the Soviet government that, in our opinion, the Polish problem should be considered as a whole, and the question of Eastern borders should not be decided only by the Soviet and provisional Polish governments. A settlement of this question would probably be acceptable and tolerable to the majority of Poles if it could form part of a general decision about Poland, which would also cover the problems of Poland's western borders, the creation of a real fully committed Polish government, recognized by the three governments, in the presence of appropriate guarantees from all major states regarding the future of Poland.

### 4. The participation of France and the meeting of foreign ministers and heads of the three governments.

We and the Russians are in favor of the participation of the French in the so-called "joint actions", however, the Americans are against this. Since the French are now full members of the European Advisory Commission, their non-participation in these meetings, which decide what should be done by the European Advisory Commission, creates an intolerable situation. At this conference, we must obtain the consent of the Americans for the participation of the French in further conferences and, if their consent is obtained, inform the French of this as soon as possible. It would also be prudent to enlist the support of the Russians in this matter beforehand.

### 5. Iran.

There has been a lull in the Soviet-Iranian dispute over oil concessions for the time being. Kavtaradze returned to Moscow. After he officially declared to the Iranian government that the relationship

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he and the USSR cannot be good until the law on oil concessions recently adopted by the Majlis is changed. Nevertheless, it is strongly recommended that this issue be discussed at the forthcoming conference of the heads of the three governments. The calm will probably not last long. It can be expected that the Soviet government will resume its increased pressure on the Iranians, using the following measures: subversive propaganda in the Russian-subsidized Iranian press;

organizing strikes in Iranian factories, as well as demonstrations and unrest, especially in the Russian-occupied zone, where the Russians do not allow the Iranian army and police to operate;

intimidation of Iranian ministers and so on;

refusal to allow the delivery of food from the Russian-occupied zone to Tehran, thus threatening the food supply of the Iranian capital.

Another reason why it is necessary to raise this question at the meeting of the heads of the three governments is that the Russians have just sent us a long official note in which they express their dissatisfaction with the fact that His Majesty's Government has taken an unfavorable attitude towards their efforts, aimed at acquiring oil concessions in Iran. Our task will be to achieve a joint resolution that the Iranian Government, as an independent Government, has the right to decide not to negotiate any oil concessions as long as there are foreign troops on Iranian territory. At the same time, we should make it clear to the Russians that we and the Americans do not at all approve of their policy of pressuring the Iranians to change their attitude. We can perhaps satisfy the Russians to some extent by agreeing that the whole matter be reviewed after the evacuation of foreign troops from Iran. We should consult with the Americans before the start of the conference of the heads of the three governments and, if possible (as in the text of the document. — Ed.), achieve mutual understanding regarding the line that should be taken at the conference.

First. Issues on which decisions need to be made and which should be raised by other conference participants.

#### 1. Implementation of interaction between allied armies.

We and the Americans are interested in ensuring in the near future the provision of appropriate communications between the allied armies in Southern Europe, especially in regard to air operations. An offer which had recently been made to the Russians in this connection was rejected by them on the ground that such questions could be settled in Moscow. Over time, we may also need to establish missions to liaise with the various armies in Northern Europe, although this is not yet the time for that. An important issue is also the proposal to establish a military commission of the three powers in Moscow. In this connection, Mr. Balfour was instructed to try to ascertain the opinion of the Russians on this matter. The Chiefs of Staff want to resolve these issues and will no doubt want to bring them up for discussion at the next meeting. We should give them the right to contribute these

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issues for consideration and we should give them all the support we can. They maintained and still maintain close contact with the Americans on this issue.

#### 2. 16 Soviet socialist republics.

There is agreement that we should not raise this issue ourselves, but unless, as is very likely, it is raised by Marshal Stalin, we should leave the negotiation of this issue to the President. The present provision, approved by the post-war armistice committee, is as follows: "Let the United States lead the discussion



with the Russians and then stating that since the United States holds this view, we are inclined to support them and there is no positive evidence that the citizens of these republics actually enjoy any rights of independence. However, if the USSR and the USA agree to some kind of compromise, we are also ready to accept it, provided that India is represented in an international organization. We should perhaps inform the Americans in advance that, given the position of India, it is rather difficult for us to speak convincingly against the Russians, but we will give them all possible support.

The procedure for voting in the Security Council. This issue is important for discussion, since after the end of the negotiations in Dumbarton Oaks, its decision was postponed until the next meeting of the heads of the three governments. Our point of view on this issue will probably be clear after the cabinet meeting on 9 January. If, hopefully, His Majesty's Government supports President Roosevelt's proposal (compromise A), we can, together with him, try to win Marshal Stalin over to our side. However, it may well be that Marshal Stalin not only proposes changes to Compromise A, but also raises the issue of the 16 Soviet Socialist Republics. If he does not agree to compromise A, as it stands, the only way out is probably to discuss it thoroughly at the next meeting of experts, which, in any case, was proposed by President Roosevelt. As regards the question of the 16 Soviet Socialist Republics, see the previous paragraph.

Second. Non-urgent issues that, in some cases, may be useful to resolve.

#### 1. Italo-Yugoslav border.

Based on our experience in Greece, it seems preferable not to establish an allied military government in this disputed border region after the evacuation of troops from there, as this may well lead to a clash of British troops with the troops of Marshal Tito and with Slovene and Italian partisans. Instead, we can try to draw a time line beyond which the Yugoslav Partisans must pledge not to advance or penetrate. The Yugoslav authorities will temporarily be responsible for the administration of the territory to the east of this line, while the territory to the west of this line will be administered by the Italians. This line will run approximately between the 1914 and 1939 lines, although it may be closer to the 1914 line than to the 1939 line. If the port, road and rail facilities available in the area are required by the headquarters of the military

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air forces to maintain communications with Austria, it may be necessary to declare part of the territory of this area a military zone (for example, the city of Trieste and the zone along the railway leading to Austria). However, the management of this zone should be carried out jointly by the Allies, and not only by the British. If any of these proposals prove successful, it is important that the responsibility for the negotiations and their defense be shared also by the governments of the US and the Soviet Union. These questions are currently being discussed by the Chiefs of Staff, but if we only intend to make certain proposals, this question will apparently be subject to discussion at a meeting of the heads of the three governments, and we will have to take the initiative to raise this question. It would be good to agree on this issue with the Americans in advance, but time is now short and there are certain advantages in trying to reach an agreement between the heads of the three governments. If the matter is decided in principle, it will be relatively easy for the experts to agree on a valid line, which will then be discussed with Marshal Tito.

#### 2. Deliveries for Europe.

On November 22, the President proposed to the Prime Minister that, until the end of the war with Germany, supplies to the already liberated countries and to those countries that will be liberated should be limited to a minimum of aid goods (food and fuel), that is to say, such quantity of goods should be supplied as is necessary to prevent the spread of disease and disorder among the civilian population, which would subsequently lead to a delay in Allied military operations. This proposal, if adopted, will prevent any measures aimed at restoring economic life, and hence the import of, for example, raw materials. This will create unwanted political and social unrest in the liberated European countries. Lowe traveled to Washington on behalf of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and senior members of the War Cabinet to persuade the Americans to withdraw their offer. He will try to get the Americans to agree to the study by the British and Americans of the problem of international shipping (which has not taken place since the Quebec conference) and the need for ships for civilian and military supplies. At the same time, the needs of the liberated territories must be taken into account in the same way.

In the event that such a study shows that the shortage of goods is so significant that it will be necessary to make some changes to the military supply program in order to meet the needs of the liberated territories, and if it is not possible to reconcile the contradictions of "military" and "political" needs in lower instances, then an agreement on these issues can be reached between the prime minister and the president, then it will be necessary to decide whether this issue should be brought up for discussion between Churchill, Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin. From the outside it seems that it would be most expedient for it to be discussed by the Prime Minister and the President, although they may wish to inform Marshal Stalin of this or consult him on the matter.

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the very influence politically and militarily of their decision on Europe as a whole.

### 3. Displaced persons.

In accordance with the Prime Minister's directive signed by him last summer, His Majesty's Government is taking every measure to increase the effectiveness of UNRRA. One of the main tasks of UNRRA is the repatriation of displaced persons. Among the main areas in which UNRRA appears to be addressing the issue of displaced persons is Germany, where there are known to be between 8 and 10 million displaced persons. Most of the governments of the United Nations have agreed that UNRRA in Germany should act in this direction on their behalf. Allied Command Headquarters has a decree with UNRRA authorizing UNRRA to act on behalf of displaced persons in territory under Allied Command control during the period prior to the occupation of Germany. If UNRRA acts in Germany after her surrender, she can do so only on the instructions of the Allied Control Commission. For UNRRA to act in this way, the consent of the Soviet government would be required. The Soviet Government has not yet given its consent to UNRRA acting in Germany on behalf of Soviet displaced persons, even in the period preceding the surrender of Germany, or on behalf of displaced persons of other United Nations on German territory under Soviet control. Thus, at present there is a lot of reluctance in the issue of coordination.

We hope to discuss this matter with the Soviet authorities soon, which may be done through the European Advisory Commission, with a view to obtaining their agreement that UNRRA should be in charge of the question of the displaced in Germany after its defeat and possibly also before the defeat. Germany in those areas that will be under the control of Soviet troops. If matters reach a stage where they must be discussed by a European Consultative Commission, it would naturally be desirable that pressure be exerted on the Soviet government by the top leaders of the other two governments, in order to induce the Soviet representatives in the Commission to show readiness to use

UNRRA under the leadership of the Allied Control Commission in the period following the surrender of Germany. The use of UNRRA to ensure that the resettlement of 20 million or more displaced or deported persons as a result of the war is correctly and properly coordinated will not lead to political complications, but will certainly contribute to an effective and quick solution to a cumbersome problem.

#### 4. European Economic Committee.

His Majesty's Government is now considering the establishment of a European Economic Committee to deal with some of the economic problems that the Allied European Governments may have to face during the transitional period. The committee will include representatives of all allied European governments, as well as representatives of the British, American and Soviet governments.

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His Majesty's Government informed the US Government of their proposal. Both of these governments want this question to be preliminary and informally discussed in London at a conference of four powers - Britain, the USA, the USSR and France. Importance is attached to the presence of a Soviet representative, whether he should be present as a post-war representative or as an observer. However, despite several attempts on our part, we were not able to ascertain the point of view of the Soviet Government regarding our proposal. If, by the time the Conference of the Heads of the Three Governments begins, we are not yet aware of the intentions of the Soviet Government, it may be desirable to raise this question.

Third. Questions that may be raised by other conference participants, but which we prefer to avoid discussing.

1. Straits. When the Prime Minister was in Moscow in October, STALIN announced that the Russians were not particularly satisfied with the Montreux Convention and would make proposals for revising it. The Prime Minister noted that, in his opinion, there would be no objections to some proposals of the convention. The Prime Minister told STALIN to submit his proposals on this issue. No proposals were submitted on this issue. In view of the fact that we do not wish to encourage the Russians in this matter, we ourselves should not raise the question of the straits. If the Russians raise this question, then we must avoid discussing it. We have only to state that we are ready to discuss any proposals presented by the Russians.

#### 2. Behavior of Russians in Eastern Europe and Allied Control Commissions.

Apparently, things in Romania and Bulgaria are not going so badly. Russians behave well in Finland. The current agreement on our position in the control commission has some inconveniences for us. Through diplomatic channels we are seeking the consent of the Russians to improve our position in the Control Commission for Hungary. We cannot present any complaints to the Russians about their behavior on the question of Greece. Raising fundamental questions about these countries will immediately lead to the question of spheres of influence. Therefore, we can and should try to avoid raising this issue at the conference. We must continue to resolve these issues through diplomatic channels gradually.

#### 3. Preliminary peace treaty with Italy.

It is possible that the Americans may raise the question of concluding a preliminary treaty with Italy. Recently, they raised this issue in connection with the talks in Washington to issue a new directive to Macmillan to implement the declaration on Italy adopted in Quebec. We intend to instruct our embassy in Washington to oppose this American proposal. But even if our embassy can get Washington to abandon this idea when discussing the directive to Macmillan, then the American government can still

raise this issue again at the conference. In this case /given that the prime minister will approve the memorandum of minister indel/ we must again oppose

idea of the Americans, which, it should be assumed, will also not cause the approval of the USSR

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No. 69 Sov. secret February 28, 1945 MESSAGE FROM THE LONDON RESIDENCE

Contents of a letter from the British Foreign Office addressed to the British Ambassador in Moscow on the issue of the formation of the Polish government in accordance with the decisions of the Crimean Conference to the leaders of the three Allied Powers.

The document was received by agents.

1) From the point of view of His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States, the main points of the Polish question are as follows:

1. In the new provisional government of national unity, the various "non-Lublin" groups of Polish public opinion must be proportionately represented\*°.
2. That these groups should be able to exert a real influence not only on the new government's permits, but also on the implementation of those decisions.
3. That the new government should have the maximum confidence on the part of the "anti-Lublin" Poles inside Poland and abroad (including, of course, the Polish armed forces under our command<sup>85</sup>) and on the part of British, American and world public opinion.
4. That the new government created in this way should be ensured the existence until the moment of re-elections.
5. Until a new government is set up, the position of the "anti-Lublin" Poles in Poland must not be damaged in any way.

2) We should expect that Mr. Molotov will use his influence in the commission on Poland in favor of the "Lublin" Poles and will try to ensure that the real power is concentrated in their hands. There can hardly be any doubt that the "Lublin" government relies on the support of the Red Army and that the NKVD plays a significant role in the administration of the territories transferred to "Lublin", as well as the territories under the control of the Red Army. Therefore, there are large forces on the side of the "Lublin" administration, and we and the Americans need to strongly defend the principles from the very beginning that the regime was not only "appropriately created" (see the 5th paragraph of the section on the Polish issue of the Crimean Conference ), but also, it could function properly and freely. As in Yalta, Mr. Molotov will no doubt be of the opinion that the Soviet Government can act only after consultation with Lublin. In this way he will place himself at the outset as Lublin's lawyer, and Sir Clark Kerr\* (we hope with the support of Harriman\*%) should not hesitate to openly act as lawyer for other Poles in Poland and abroad. .

3) If the functions of the commission are not established on an appropriate basis, everything will prove disastrous from the very beginning. The first task, therefore, should be to reach an agreement on the method of work of the commission.

Among other things, it is clear that cooperation between Poles, representing a certain group of Polish public opinion abroad

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no security will be secured within Poland unless their natural fears that their fate is already sealed are dispelled. This can only be achieved by informing them of the ways and methods by which the Commission will begin its work.

4) From our point of view, the Commission should not itself select Poles to form a new government, but should lead and guide discussions in which Poles representing different circles of public opinion will participate. The commission itself should act, as it were, as a neutral "chairman". Otherwise, we can risk that Mr. Molotov, judging by the line taken by the Russians at the Crimean Conference, will start asking for the opinion of Lublin? about which Poles outside "Lublin" should be included in the reorganized "Lublin" government (possibly assuming a set number) and consulted with "Lublin" regarding desirable candidates and balloting of those persons who do not like "Lublin".

5) We should therefore suggest that the Commission immediately invite the representatives of "Lublin" and a certain number of Poles, representing various circles of public opinion within Poland and abroad, to Moscow to discuss between them, under the direction of the Commission, the question of how a representative government should be formed, the main posts in the government should be distributed and how the functions of the president, the minister of the interior should be performed at the time of the elections.

Representatives of "Lublin" will undoubtedly offer themselves.

6) As regards other Poles outside of Poland, we should hope, if the Commission resolves this issue positively, that some of the Poles representing certain circles of Polish public opinion, such as Mikolajczyk, Grabski, Romer, and also representatives of socialists and peasant democrats will be present during these negotiations and will have the right to invite other Poles, both in Poland and abroad, to take part in this discussion. None of the proposed candidates should be rejected (unless such a decision will be made by a unanimous vote of three members of the committee in the future on the basis that any fascists cannot be called democrats and anti-Nazis).

7) Similarly, from among the Poles in Poland, one or two Poles whose names are known, such as Mr. be invited to participate in these negotiations with the right to invite others.

The Soviet authorities should invite the "Lublin" administration to find and invite these persons. In this case, balling should be prevented.

8) Naturally, it would be most desirable, if possible, to put an immediate end to the measures directed against the "anti-Lublin" Poles, the leaders of the Polish underground movement, against the underground movement in general and against the underground army\*. It is clear to achieve

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this will be difficult, however, His Majesty's Government (and, we hope, also the US Government) must immediately put pressure on the Soviet Government so that all prosecutions and administrative measures directed against individuals, with the exception of those who committed crimes against the law and against the Red Army must be postponed until the formation of the Polish government.

9) The first priority is to get US agreement to the above proposals. If Mr. Stettinius is still in Moscow, the Ambassador of His Majesty's Government may show him this telegram and suggest that he instruct Mr. Harriman to agree with Sir C. Kerr on the issue of making Russian

the submission proposed in paragraph 8 of this telegram, and to act in accordance with paragraphs 4-7 of this telegram as regards the work of the commission for Poland.

We will at the same time inform the State Department, through the Ambassador of His Majesty's Government in Washington, that such action is being taken.

10) It is undoubtedly important that these proposals, if possible, be brought to the attention of Mr. Molotov before he submits his own proposals for the work of the Commission.

No. 70 Sov. secret March 3, 1945 MESSAGE FROM THE LONDON RESIDENCE

Letter from the British Foreign Office to the British Ambassador in Cairo about the reaction of General Anders?? on the decision of the Crimean Conference.

1) The reaction of General Anders to the proposals of the Crimean Conference on Poland is expressed by uncompromising skepticism. In a conversation with the Prime Minister on February 21, he described the proposals of the Crimean Conference as "the end of Poland." He could not be convinced that Marshal Stalin's intentions were not strictly dishonorable. He believes that the proposed new interim government will be nothing more than a lightly disguised "Lublin". He confirmed that virtually no Pole in the Polish army would be able to return to Poland. He publicly stated that it was his intention and the intention of the troops under his command to remain true to their constitutional oath to the present Polish president and government.

2) The recent appointment of General Anders as Acting Commander-in-Chief of all Polish Armed Forces was made without consultation with His Majesty's Government and we have publicly stated that we do not take any responsibility for this step, which we regard as unfavorable.

3) General Anders seems to be mainly concerned at this time with the question of maintaining unity and discipline among the Polish armed forces in order to secure a future for them, preferably on the British side.

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territory, after the war, if the return to Poland, free from any Soviet influence,  
will turn out to be impossible.

4) The Prime Minister, in his speech in Parliament on 27 February, paid tribute to the gallantry of the Polish armed forces under British command and stated that while he personally hoped that it would be possible to offer citizenship of the British Empire to any To anyone who desires this, His Majesty's Government favors that as many Polish troops as possible be able to return safely and at their own request to Poland.

5) It may be difficult for your personal information to find accommodation for Polish troops on British soil after the war. Moreover, it is desirable, in order to fulfill our goal of securing a truly independent and democratic Poland, that as many Poles as possible, serving in our armed forces, return to Poland. Therefore, we should not allow the Poles to infer from the Prime Minister's remark that His Majesty's Government was forced to offer them residence in the British Empire, as they believe that the Poles will not be able to return to Poland.

6) Please inform the Resident Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in the Middle East about the above.

The latter may have already received guidance on the Polish question through Marshal Alexander.

No. 71 Sov. secret March 21, 1945 MESSAGE FROM THE LONDON RESIDENCE

Telegram dated February 16, 1945, from German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to the German envoy in Ireland on the issue of concluding a separate peace between Germany and the Western countries.

The following directive is transmitted only for the head of the mission and his representatives at the same time. What is stated here should be used in conversation with particularly important political figures who are able to convey the essence of these directives to influential and prominent British and Americans.

"I don't know which English and Americans you can count on in this case. If you have the opportunity, I ask you to convey these directives through an agent of a particularly important department of British or American circles. Nothing in writing should ever come from you. The content of the verbal directives is as follows: according to reliable information, authoritative Berlin political circles characterize the situation as follows:

1. Germany now, as always, intends to fight unwaveringly on the side of her allies, defending the empire by all possible means and continue the war until the enemy of Germany realizes that Germany and her allies cannot be defeated.

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2. The international situation evokes the following thought in Berlin circles: the new and greatest fact revealed by this war is the military might of the Soviet Union. How strong the Soviet Union is today has been shown by its winter offensive. It shows how the Soviet Union operates. Stalin subjugated virtually all of Eastern Europe and the Balkans (Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, ELAS in Greece, Serbia, Hungary) to his power. Tito is nothing more than an agent of the Comintern (so in the text. - Approx. ed.). The measures taken by the Russians in these countries show, although they sometimes try to hide the facts, that they have no intention of abandoning these countries and that they ultimately intend to transform these countries into communist states as part of the Soviet Union.

Even in France and Italy, the Communists are exceptionally active, and the execution of Prince Kirill shows what the Soviet methods are.

3. Stalin will not be satisfied with what he has already conquered. He considers Turkey as his sphere of influence and wants to gain control over this country. He has won a victory in Iran and intends to take over Northern Norway. However, the offensive against Germany shows that Stalin achieves, besides all this, the realization of a greater goal: he plans the conquest and occupation of Germany and thus he thinks to complete his program of exercising domination over Europe. This is illustrated by the fact that Molotov, even during his visit to Berlin, made it clear that the Russians were claiming control of the Skagerrak and Kattegat. Germany today is the only force that fights against the Soviet Union. Germany is the wall that Stalin must smash if he wants to fight his way into Europe. If Stalin manages to break Germany's resistance on the Eastern Front, the Bolshevization of Germany, and hence of all of Europe, will be a fait accompli forever. If one Russian ever enters Berlin, then without further ado Europe will become communist.

4. From the German point of view, it is naive and unrealistic to believe that the British and Americans, having fulfilled their plan of subjugation of Germany through the use of Bolshevism, will then be able to completely defeat Stalin's designs by agreements on the division of the occupied zone of Germany. Even if Stalin agreed to such an agreement during the conference of the heads of the three

governments, this was just a tactic and in no case will his plans for the Bolshevization of Europe and its complete subordination to the suzerainty of the Kremlin change.

The indescribably ugly behavior of the Red Army in the East German provinces (extermination and withdrawal of the population) is already a sufficient factor to clearly show what Stalin's intentions are.

Moreover, it is well known that during the past few years he sent thousands of prisoners of war to political schools and formed cadres from them for the new German-Soviet army. The leadership of these political and military troops is concentrated in the hands of the Communists, who previously left Germany and studied at the Comintern School, and now, together with several captured German officers, have become members of the Free Germany Committee.

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The troops working together with the GPU are intended to build communism in Germany as soon as possible after its occupation by the Red Army, to exterminate the intelligentsia and to establish the German-Soviet regime. If Bolshevism ever triumphs in Germany, it will not be limited to the Elbe, the Weser, or even the Rhine, but will spread throughout the entire European continent. What this will mean for England is pretty obvious.

At the present time, Stalin is still proceeding cautiously to deal with Mr. Churchill. But as soon as the German counterweight is out of the way, Stalin will show himself to Churchill in his present light.

A characteristic light that helps to understand the tactics of the Kremlin towards the British government is shed by the following incident, which took place recently between Molotov and the new envoy of communist Bulgaria in Moscow. When the latter voiced his fear that England might one day renew her opposition to Tito and, by strengthening her influence among the old Serbian parties, break up the federal bloc between communist Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which was already being formed, Molotov did only a contemptuous gesture and declared that the British would go on a rampage fearing for the Aegean, but they would not dare to utter a word if the Bulgarian-Yugoslav bloc, to which Macedonia and ELAS in Greece would later join and which would be created under the leadership of Moscow, became even before the end of the war. It is important that this bloc be established before the end of the war, at a time when England is occupied with the Greek question, which will help to present her with a fait accompli. We know about this conversation from a telegram sent from Moscow to Sofia, which fell into the hands of the German authorities.

After Germany and Europe have been defeated, the Soviet Union will automatically begin to carry out its declaration first in the direction of the Middle East.

Britain's oil interest in Iran and the Middle East will be lost to her in a short time, and no force in the world will prevent Stalin from fighting his way to the Suez Canal. The extreme danger for the English fleet to be left without its own oil and the danger for the Empire to face the fact of an interrupted sea route to India are obvious, but even this is not the ultimate goal of the Kremlin.

The decisive factor is, as is well known, that Stalin hates England. Therefore, after the conquest of Europe, the destruction of the British Empire by the Soviet Union will only be a matter of time. A glance at the map is sufficient for every politically literate person to be convinced of this fact. The destruction of British imperialism as the stronghold of capitalism, as already preached by Lenin, will then be completed by advancing towards India and establishing communism there.

Stalin's attitude towards the modern ruling class in America is well known in Berlin. His hatred of this class is no less than his hatred of English capitalism.



With Roosevelt, Stalin also plays only a tactical game. America, all alone, will stand before the powerful European bloc thus created, which has never existed in the history of the world.

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There is no need to go into detail about what this will mean for America in East Asia, since it was always Stalin's dream to make China communist. All influence of the United States will immediately cease in East Asia, and the Bolshevization of the United States itself by this gigantic world bloc will once again be only a matter of time.

5. The assumptions of the Americans and the British that Germany can be democratized and not Sovietized are regarded in Berlin as an empty illusion. Apart from everything in the past, the millions of people in Germany, whose houses were destroyed during the raids and the enormous economic and moral damage caused by the war, make it certain that if the National Socialist regime is destroyed, Germany will become Bolshevik, however, the decisive moment is as follows: Stalin considers the Anglo-American air raids as manna from heaven, since he knows to what extent this contributes to the implementation of the political tasks of the Kremlin. He is said to have declared that the Anglo-American air force was his European artillery, and that the British and American soldiers were performing the historic task of helping him take back Europe for the Soviets.

If the German Eastern Front is really ever defeated, the aforementioned Soviet program will begin immediately. Any attempt to change the direction of present-day British and American military policy will then be in no way impossible. It would be correct to say that from the day of our defeat on the German Eastern Front, the fate of Europe, the British Empire, and ultimately America will be decided, because where the Soviet bayonet stands, the GPU will immediately destroy all the intelligentsia in order to re-educate those who remain in alive in the communist spirit, that is, as Stalin demands, in particular, the complete subordination of this country.

In this way, Stalin creates an unchanging political reality, which completely excludes the possibility of any influence from any other circles in the country occupied by the Soviet Union.

The only political and spiritual counterbalance to the undoubtedly formidable doctrine of communism is now National Socialism, that is, precisely the factor that the British and Americans intend to destroy.

The English Crown, the English Conservative Party and the American ruling classes should therefore have only one desire, namely, that no misfortune befall Adolf Hitler.

During the World War of 1914-1918 the situation was different. At that time, communism had not yet spread beyond Russia. However, even then it was impossible to take effective military and political measures against communism in Russia. The British troops stationed in Arkhangelsk were very quickly withdrawn from this area, since not only could they not do anything militarily, but they had already begun to be infected with communism.

Now, however, behind the aggressive spirit of the communist conception of international politics stands Stalin with some 650 divisions ready to come to the rescue where any European or non-European

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sky power, i.e. British or Americans will oppose Bolshevization and the planting of communism in Europe. Even the strongest Anglo-American army and air fleet, which

can ever be sent by these countries to Europe, they will not be able to do much in the end in the fight against the powerful bloc of Russia and Germany with this huge human and material reserves.

The hope of the British and Americans that, if Germany is defeated, they can put an end to communism in the areas they occupied, while the Soviets will introduce communism into the areas they occupied, is in the eyes of politicians familiar with the methods of the shevism, erroneous and naive. In fact, communism may, within a short period of time, also win in the Anglo-American occupation zones. Not a single German will raise his hand to prevent this. The hatred towards the British and Americans for their bombardment of Germany is too great for that. Obviously, the British and American bayonets are powerless in the fight against the communist idea.

Apparently, it will also be necessary to take into account the danger of the penetration of the Bolshevik-Communist infection into the British and American armies located in Europe, since taking into account the much more widespread propaganda and subversive activities of the Soviets since that time, this danger has become infinitely greater than it was during the first world war.

6. Proceeding from these military and political moments, no one in Germany understands the policy of England and the USA anymore, because these states are doing everything possible to destroy the factor that is the only counterbalance and obstacle to the Soviet Union uniting the large manpower reserves and material resources of all of Europe . Germany is such a factor.

After the colossal power of Russia becomes apparent, not only Germany, but all of Europe will have to spend their forces for generations to protect against the danger coming from the East. Therefore, for England there is no longer any danger from Europe. In Berlin, there was an opinion that instead of the previous system of equilibrium in Europe, a new system of equilibrium among the great powers should arise in the future. Given Russia's enormous strength, there can only be a future equilibrium in the western hemisphere if the European countries stand shoulder to shoulder against Russia and the sea routes to the US are open.

Similarly, the existence of Japan as a great power is a prerequisite for balancing power in the East Asian area, since Russia's power is enormous: Russia is undoubtedly the richest country in the world, exceptionally strong biologically (high and still rising). fertility). Its military industry, established in just a few years, is scattered throughout the country and is virtually immune to attack.

The decisive factor, however, is the awakening and technical training of the Russians themselves. This helped the Kremlin, using the natural resources of the country and the people, to create the most powerful military machine that has ever existed. If Germany is ever destroyed,

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then the scales will once and for all fall in the direction of Soviet Russia. However, with the German and, in addition, the European potential in men and technology that will be at its disposal, the Soviet Union will be all-powerful. Germany sought an honest alliance with the Soviet Union, and to this end she concluded an agreement with it in the summer of 1939. Stalin, however, cherished the hope that Germany would be involved in a long war in the West and hoped that he would be able to use this war to undermine Germany through propaganda and use it to his advantage.

At the start of the war, there were already more than a thousand Russian agents in Berlin, in the so-called Soviet delegation, who used every hour of the evening to infect the German workers with the idea of communism.

When Stalin saw, after the defeat of France, that his calculations were wrong, he began to pursue a more aggressive policy (movement aimed at capturing the Baltic states and Romania, Molotov's visit, during which he claimed the Dardanelles and the withdrawal from the Baltic States). sea).

Finally, in his speech delivered to students of the Frunze Academy in May 1941, he quite openly preached war against Germany. The last fact became known from three Russian officers issued by military ranks, who were taken prisoner at different times and interrogated separately. These officers were present at the military banquet and fully confirmed the facts.

Germany will fight the Soviet Union to the end. However, the time will come when Germany must choose between East and West. Broad circles of the German people, especially the population whose property was destroyed during the bombardment, as well as broad circles of the Party, are definitely turning their sights to the East. Based on this trend, conclusions must now be drawn. Over the past time, this trend is becoming more and more felt. Undoubtedly, this will be regarded by the British and Americans as a bluff, however, from the point of view of Berlin, it is anything but a bluff, and in the event that the eastern front could not be held, Hitler and the people decided, despite the serious disasters that as a result then they will fall on Germany, continue this path to the very end. If the British and Americans do not believe this, they will be taught by the events that will take place in such a case.

In any case, Germany, under such circumstances, will not be in a position to change the course of events in any respect. If the West misses the psychological moment, then Germany will be forced to invariably orient itself towards the East.

7. According to the concept of Berlin, the world balance is an obligatory factor in order to prevent further (the group is not deciphered. — Approx. ed.). In today's world with the existing development of technology, there can never again be a void anywhere politically or militarily. The strongest power will always fill such a void with force.

Therefore, if German power in Europe is ever broken by the combined efforts of the Allies, then the vacuum of power in Germany and in Europe will automatically be filled by the strongest power, i.e. Soviet Union.

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It is therefore essential to the interests of England and America that Germany and, in East Asia, Japan continue to exist as great powers, and that these two great powers participate in the coming collusion of the great world powers as powerful factors of force.

Germany's goal in the war is clear. She wishes to go with her own peoples within her borders. Germany wants all nations in Europe to be free. The assertion that Germany seeks to dominate Europe is a product of foreign propaganda.

The policy pursued by Germany in France and the Balkans shows that Germany never intended to violate the freedom of individual nations. Even the internal policy of National Socialism is so perverted by enemy propaganda that not a single Englishman or American really knows what National Socialism means.

Berlin is convinced that every country, including England and America, must finally solve the social problem without delay, and if they do not follow the path of an all-destroying

Bolshevism or Communism, they can only follow the path of Adolf Hitler socially. Berlin is convinced that National Socialism is an orderly synthesis of capitalism and is therefore a form of rational capitalism.

The Jewish question is a matter of German domestic policy which must be resolved in Germany if Germany does not fall victim to Communism. The Jewish question in other countries does not interest Germany. In fact, the Germans are of the opinion that the Germans can cooperate with other countries in solving the Jewish question throughout the world.

The slander is especially great in connection with the ecclesiastical question. There is no doubt that the radical wing of the party holds anti-clerical views, but for several years, there has been an ever-increasing evolution in this matter, even within the party itself, and as a result, all churches in Germany are more attended than ever before. Basically, the party, as always, insists on the principles of the party program, that is, its attitude towards Christianity is positive; the program establishes that each person can have their own faith. However, that the church cannot interfere in public affairs is a principle that has now become established in practice and is out of the question in leading circles, despite occasional interference from radical circles, which sometimes

occurs.

As an interesting symptom in this connection, it may be noted that the state annually puts more than a billion marks from the revenues of the people at the disposal of the German churches.

Economically, Berlin is of the opinion that one should strive for the maximum production of necessary goods within the country's own territory, and that the basis of maximum self-sufficiency in necessary goods is the main condition for economic reconstruction and the exchange of goods between different countries and thus prosperity. world trade.

8. Berlin clearly realizes that only the cooperation of the great powers among themselves and the participation of Germany in the future order of the world according to

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can both achieve agreement and ensure the cooperation of the world powers. The cooperation of the world powers, which must take the place of military alliances, and in which Germany must take an active part, will in itself help prevent the outbreak of a third world war. However, all the demands presented to Germany by her opponents are aimed at preventing any cooperation of this kind in the future and at creating conditions for perpetual war. Unconditional surrender and the supposed shipment of chained German parties to Siberia would only mean surrendering Germany to communism.

Berlin is surprised that no one in London or Washington recognizes this fact and that the present policy of the British and American governments should not lead to a lasting peace, but quite the opposite, to a state of perpetual war.

These thoughts, which reveal the depth of the evolution now taking place in Germany, at the same time contain a warning of threatening events. But if the moment is lost and the German Empire is destroyed by Bolshevism, then there will no longer be an opportunity to negotiate with Germany, because Germany can never again be a democratic country, but only a communist country and will only drag out its existence. The day of defeat on the German-eastern front will therefore be, in the fullest sense of the word, a turning point in world history.

No. 72 Sov. secret April 4, 1945

## MESSAGE FROM THE LONDON RESIDENCE IN LONDON ON THE INTENTIONS OF THE POLISH EMIGRANTS GOVERNMENT IN LONDON TO CONTINUE THE FIGHT FOR POLAND BY FORCE METHODS

1. The leaders of the Polish government in exile in London Rachkevich and Artsishevsky do not intend to lay down their arms in their struggle against the USSR and Polish democracy. There is a prevailing conviction among the Poles in London that the creation of a government of national unity cannot serve as a reason for ceasing activities towards the elimination of Soviet influence in Poland and in the future resolving the issue of borders by armed means.

2. The London "government" intends to significantly increase its army. All men fit for military service are drafted into the army. In France and Belgium, the Polish authorities, with the help of money, manage to attract to their side a significant number of Poles, whom they immediately draft into the army. An important reserve for strengthening the Polish army are hundreds of thousands of the Polish population, liberated by the Allied armies. All Poles liberated by the Allies are placed at the disposal of the Polish military authorities.

According to information received from Switzerland, the Swiss government agreed with the German government on the transfer of all Poles taken by the Germans during the suppression of the uprising in Warsaw. A formal agreement has been reached under which the Germans are handing over 200 thousand Poles

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Swiss authorities. The latter organize special camps for these Poles. From these camps the escapes of the Poles to Anders' army will be organized.

Ambassador of the Polish government in Switzerland Ladoev in his telegram dated March 19 of this year. informed the government that the first shipments of Poles would soon arrive, and that, in his opinion, it was necessary to hurry up with sending special military workers to "serve" these Poles.

Artsishevsky's government has the possibility, with the assistance of the allied governments, to create a large army by the end of this year. General Anders announced at a meeting of senior officers on March 7 that he would create an army of one million.

No. 73 Sov. secret April 9, 1945 MESSAGE FROM THE LONDON RESIDENCE

FBI agent LEMON told our source "D" that he had learned from an OSS (Donovan's organization?%) employee who recently arrived from Italy to England that before Kesselring's transfer? from the Italian to the western front, Kesselring himself, or two senior German officers on his behalf, negotiated the surrender of the German troops stationed on the Italian front with the Allied command in Italy.

"D" reported this to LIDDELL?", who reluctantly confirmed the plausibility of this information. LIDDELL did not want to continue to talk about this subject.

No. 74 Sov. secret April 22, 1945 MESSAGE FROM THE LONDON RESIDENCE

The summary content of Sargent's memorandum? dated April 2 this year:

"In connection with the end of the military situation, I want to know if the time has not come to reconsider our defensive, almost conciliatory attitude towards the USSR. Acting defensively, now that we are strong, might give the Russians reason to think we are hiding something from them, such as wanting to rebuild Germany. Such a desire does not really exist. So maybe it's time to insist on a showdown.

Even if the Russians adhere to the Yalta procedure on the Polish question at the commission, we must nevertheless state clearly what we want; otherwise

the settlement of the Polish question will be short-lived, as was the case with the Czechoslovak question after Munich. Cards must be revealed on the following issues:

1. Germany and Austria.
2. Soviet cordon sanitaire.

On the first question, we must insist on decision-making in a European consultative commission. On the second question, we should not

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go along with the USSR's tendency to establish a sphere of influence. Any result from revealing the cards can hardly be worse than the current passive policy, which always ends not in our favor.

On April 4, Sargent made notes on the memorandum: "I think that the opening of the cards should be limited only to the question of Poland. On this issue, we must make a statement in Parliament." To this Eden added: "I agree, although the field marshal does not agree with this." Cadogan continues: "I don't know where this will lead. But if we achieve a suitable solution to the Polish question, then this will be enough for the time being." Eden made a note on April 8: "I agree."

No. 75 Sov. secret April 26, 1945 MESSAGE FROM THE LONDON RESIDENCE

Churchill's message to Eden on the adoption of measures to accelerate the advance of the Anglo-American troops in Czechoslovakia. Obtained through agents.

Churchill suggested that Eden do everything possible to ensure that the USA instructed Eisenhower to speed up the advance of his troops in Czechoslovakia, with the aim of entering Prague before the Red Army did so. Churchill declares that if it is the Anglo-American troops, and not the Red Army, who liberate Prague, then the whole political orientation of Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak government in the post-war period will be different.

No. 76 Sov. secret April 28, 1945

MESSAGE FROM THE LONDON RESIDENCE

The content of the telegram dated April 13, 1945, from the English envoy in Stockholm, W. Mallet, to the British Foreign Office about Himmler's conversation with the chairman of the Swedish Red Cross, F. Bernadotte.

1. Count Bernadotte gave me, in strict confidence, some information about his interview with Himmler in Berlin last week, which lasted four hours.
2. In contrast to when Bernadotte saw Himmler three weeks ago, Himmler now admitted that it was all over. Bernadotte stated that the correct policy would be to capitulate immediately, and that this would save countless lives. Himmler replied that he would support such a line, but Hitler did not want to hear about it, and he considered himself bound by an oath of allegiance to Hitler. Bernadotte said that Himmler's loyalty to the German people was more important, but Himmler replied that he owed everything to the Fuhrer and could not leave him at the last minute.

Himmler did not seem at all agitated, and the impression was that he was perfectly normal and had retained his energy and organization.

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zation ability. He even has time to read books in runic script, which has obviously always been his favorite pastime.

Himmler remarked that he was aware that he was at the top of our lists of war criminals. Bernadotte told him that it was only natural that he be regarded as a war criminal, since he was the head of the Gestapo, whose terrible atrocities proven.

I asked Bernadotte if he had any impression of Himmler as a sadist. Bernadotte told me that, to his surprise, Himmler did not make such an impression on him. Himmler himself told him that he was aware that outside of Germany he was considered cruel, but in fact he did not like cruelty, and that a completely wrong opinion had been created about him abroad. Bernadotte reiterated that he should be judged by the actions of his subordinates. Himmler declared that the actions of his subordinates were greatly exaggerated. Then Bernadotte pointed out to him the specific and confirmed facts of the murders committed by the Gestapo, including the killing of 200 Jews in one of the hospitals. Himmler replied that this fact had not taken place, but Bernadotte insisted on his own, and the next day, when Himmler saw him again, he had the honesty to say that after making inquiries, he, unfortunately, must admit that this incident really took place.

Himmler stated that he wanted to evacuate the Jews from Germany, in fact the deportation of 1,200 Jews to Switzerland was arranged through him, but unfortunately reports of this in the Swiss press became known to Hitler. As a result, Hitler gave strict orders that such incidents should not be repeated.

3. Schellenberg - one of Himmler's main assistants, according to Bernadotte, is his intelligence officer and is characterized by Bernadotte as a decent and humane person who provided great assistance in preparing the evacuation of Norwegian and Danish internees to the camp in Neuengamme.

On the other hand, Kaltenbrunner, who is very powerful, is regarded by everyone as the most terrible type of cruel person and murderer. Even Himmler seems to be wary of him, and instructed Schellenberg to warn Bernadotte that Kaltenbrunner was the most dangerous man and that he had arranged to wiretap all the telephones Bernadotte uses in Germany.

4. All the information about Hitler that Bernadotte managed to collect in Germany suggests that he is completely crazy. It is said that he devotes his time almost entirely to studying the architectural plans for the rebuilding of German cities, and it is said that he is also planning the rebuilding of London.

Despite this, he retains his incomprehensible prestige even among such die-hard people as Himmler. He still has the power to veto decisions, but he seems to have lost all initiative.

5. Bernadotte believes that Goering is still alive, but does not play any role. He is said to be addicted to cocaine, wearing a toga again and painting his nails red.

6. It is expected in Berlin that the Allies will soon cut Germany in two and that the Nazi leaders will settle in their last residence in the south [of Germany].

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No. 77 Sov. secret May 5, 1945 MESSAGE FROM THE LONDON RESIDENCE

I am transmitting a summary of Churchill's telegram of April 20 of this year, addressed to Eden in Washington. Obtained through agents.

"In Moscow, Tito gave an interview to the press. At this press conference, he made absolutely no mention of British aid or territorial claims.

This is additional proof that it is completely useless to waste our forces in a lost game with Soviet Russia in Yugoslavia. Now one of our main goals must be the harmony of British, American and Italian interests in the Adriatic Sea area.

Please let me know what the State Department and the White House think about this. I believe that the Russians will not intimidate the new president (Truman). I strive for a lasting friendship with the Russian people, but I am sure that this friendship can only be based on the recognition by the Russians of Anglo-American strength.

No. 78 Sov. secret May 6, 1945 MESSAGE FROM THE LONDON RESIDENCE

Summary of Churchill's telegram of April 18, addressed to Eden in Washington. Obtained through agents.

"You know my opinion of Tito since he escaped from Wiz. We must stop our supplies to him immediately. I instructed the joint headquarters of the commanders to find a plausible pretext for this.

We must stop the absorption by the Soviet Union of Western and Central Europe. We must insist that there be no territorial changes before the peace conference, the future of Trieste will be the only hope to split the Italian Communist Party.

This question will generate strong sympathy in Italy, and Italy is very popular in the USA. Joint action with the United States and close cooperation with Italian public opinion should be a good policy."

No. 79 Sov. secret

REPORT FROM SAN FRANCISCO DATED MAY 10, 1945 ON US POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

"After a trip to China by the new American ambassador, Horley, the country's government promised Chiang Kai-shek to train and equip 35-40 Chinese divisions and in the future to increase the number of such divisions to 50.

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Formally, this decision was made with the aim of using Chinese manpower in the fight against Japan. However, the admirals and generals who initiated this plan, led by King and Sommervell, are well aware that at present they cannot equip an army of this size and then supply it with sufficient weapons and ammunition to wage war against Japan. They are aware that this plan will only be feasible when the Americans land on the Chinese coast and take possession of ports with sufficient capacity to deliver the necessary equipment and weapons to the Chinese troops.

There are no concrete plans to create an industrial base for the Chinese army yet. However, Leon Henderson studied such possibilities on the spot and consulted on this issue with the leadership of the US Army and Navy.

The plan to create a combat-ready Chinese army is designed primarily to defeat the Chinese communists and support the Kuomintang, as well as to create an effective barrier against the penetration of the USSR into Manchuria and China.



There are groupings in the US ruling elite who want to keep Japan strong enough to use it against the USSR and against the Chinese Communists in the event of a conflict.

At present, however, the majority of American leaders, including the army and navy, do not trust Japan, admitting the possibility that Japan, armed with US funds to fight communism, may, under certain conditions, go over to the side of the USSR. Therefore, the entire US policy in Asia is based on the strengthening of China and the maximum weakening of Japan.

On the issue of Manchuria, the position of the United States is to prevent the creation of an independent Manchurian state, in view of fears that it may fall under the influence of the USSR. The USA will demand the return of Manchuria to China. Korea should become an independent state after a period of Chinese tutelage. It is unlikely that the United States would voluntarily agree to the participation of the USSR in the custody of Korea.

General Horley, who was recently in Moscow, told the State Department that he represented Cde. STALIN American proposals on the issue of supporting Chiang Kai-shek and that comrade. STALIN wholeheartedly approved them. Horley is fully responsible for the disruption of negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists.

At Horley's insistence, all American officers who were supporters of cooperation with the Communists in the fight against Japan were withdrawn from China.

Horley also threatened American diplomatic representatives with immediate recall if they advocated cooperation with the Chinese Communists.

Britain in principle supports the US plan to eliminate communism in China.

The United States is now studying the issue of transferring \$ 200 million in gold to the Chinese government. This amount is part of a US\$500 million loan to China. Chiang Kai-shek was not interested in using these funds to purchase equipment and raw materials.

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He wished mainly to use them to consolidate his influence among Chinese generals and politicians through bribery. To this end, he demanded that part of the loan be repaid in gold, ostensibly to fight inflation, but in reality gold is used only for the above purposes.

The anti-Soviet elements in the ruling elite do not want to weaken Germany too much economically. They adhere to Churchill's opinion that a strong buffer must be maintained between the English Channel and the USSR. These circles will strive to keep a sufficiently powerful German industry under American control so that in the event of a clash with the USSR, a ready-made production apparatus could be returned to Germany.

No. 80 Copy of Sov. secret

to comrade I.V. STALIN, to comrade V.M. MOLOTOV, to comrade L.P. BERIA

July 5, 45 AD

The NKGB of the USSR reports the content of telegrams Nos. 6972 and 6973 of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 30.6.45, addressed to the British Ambassador in Washington. Copies of these telegrams were sent to the British ambassador in Moscow.

The texts of the documents were obtained through undercover means in London.

1. Telegram No. 6972

"In addition to my telegram No. 5594 dated May 29, 1945 on the issue of negotiations between the heads of the three governments in the "Terminal"!

1. We have not yet received a response from the State Department to our list of issues to be discussed at the conference. But since the sending of our telegram No. 5594 we have considered these questions in the light of recent developments, and my subsequent telegram contains a revised list of questions. This list has been drawn up in a form suitable for submission to the Soviet Government, if this is considered desirable.

2. When submitting this list to the State Department, you must do the following:

explanations

The question of Poland remains on the list in case the problems connected with it are extremely important, or if such problems arise during the negotiations currently taking place in Moscow.

4. Under subparagraph 1 (a), it will be possible to discuss such matters as, for example, the convening of a peace conference, the future of the European Advisory Commission and a permanent mechanism to deal with the problems of countries occupied by the Allies. We do not intend to discuss at the conference the details of the final settlement of the borders, etc. Subparagraph "B" can be mainly discussed in connection with subparagraph

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paragraphs 5 "a" and 5 "D". We hope that the Americans will, under any circumstances, take the initiative with respect to these sub-items. The former subparagraph 9 (c) is now included in the paragraph "Germany", where this question seems to be more relevant. Subparagraph 1(a) is new and may not be necessary in view of the negotiations now taking place in London.

5. Of the issues included in paragraph 3, in our opinion, subparagraphs "a" and "B" should certainly be discussed. We hope that the Americans will take the initiative regarding subparagraph B, as they have already raised this issue with us. All subparagraphs "c", "4", "e" and "y" are within the competence of the control commission. We are now asking the British representatives on the Control Commission whether they find it useful to have an exchange of views on some or all of these issues at the forthcoming conference.

6. There are additional questions related to Germany that may arise, but which we ourselves do not intend to raise. These questions include the following:

- 1) About German merchant ships.
- 2) On the future of German industry.
- 3) About reparations.
- 4) About the German fleet.
- 5) About Russian and Polish citizens forcibly driven to Germany.

If the Russians raise the fourth and fifth questions, it will be impossible to avoid discussing them. However, we will insist that the first three questions must be decided by the reparations commission and are not subject to discussion at this conference.

7. We ourselves do not intend to raise at this conference the question of the composition of the new Austrian government.

8. With regard to paragraph 4, it seems to us that we should briefly inform the Russians of our intention to conclude a peace treaty with Italy and express the hope that the Russians will agree to this. We consider that there is no need at present to discuss with the Soviet Government the question of changing our policy and our interests in Italy. But we would be glad to have the opportunity to exchange views with the members of the American delegation in London after the conference, if that proves possible.

9. We hope that the American delegation will take the initiative in introducing subparagraphs "a", "c" and "E" of paragraph 5 for discussion. Subparagraph "Yo" will provide an opportunity to discuss the issue of elections in Greece and, possibly, Albania if deemed desirable.

10. With regard to point 6, we consider that the question of the straits must inevitably be discussed at the conference at the "Terminal" in connection with the last exchange of opinions between the Soviet and Turkish governments concerning the relations between these two countries.

In addition to the questions mentioned in my telegram No. 6973, our delegation will receive instructions on a number of other questions which we do not intend to raise ourselves, but which we are prepared to discuss if the Soviet representatives bring them up for discussion. In addition to the questions mentioned in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, such questions include the following: proposals for arming the European allies, the fate of the Italian

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fleet, the question of Venice Giulia, the internal situation in Greece, Albania, the special regime in the Baltic Sea, the Levantine question, the question of Russian attitudes towards Switzerland, and the question of Tangier.

P. Telegram No. 6973

"In addition to my telegram No. 6972 on the issue of negotiations between the heads of the three governments in the Terminal.

I am submitting a revised list of issues to be discussed at the forthcoming conference of the heads of the three governments.

General issues:

a) The procedure for settling pan-European issues.

b) Application of the Declaration of the Crimean Conference on the Question of a Liberated Europe.

c) Creation of conditions for representatives of the allied countries in the countries of Eastern Europe.

4) The question of war criminals.

2. The question of Poland.

3. Question about Germany:

a) Polish western border. The status of the Polish administration in the former German territory.

b) The resettlement of the German population from Poland and Czechoslovakia.

c) An exchange of views on the establishment of a central German administration in Berlin to coordinate transport, etc.; future German government.

4) Position in relation to political parties and their activities.

f) Attitude towards Germany as an economic whole.

ÿ Coordinating propaganda and information for Germany.

4. The question of Italy.

Conclusion of a peace treaty.

5. The question of the Balkans.

a) The internal situation in the former satellite countries, with special reference to the form of governments established there.

B) The question of concluding a peace treaty with these countries.

(c) The Statute of British and American Representatives on Control Commissions pending the conclusion of peace treaties.

4) Export of industrial equipment, especially from Romania, under the guise of trophies.

f) The situation in Yugoslavia and the implementation of the agreement signed by TITO and SUBASIC,

1) Assurance of holding free elections in the Balkan countries.

6. The question of Turkey.

a) Russian-Turkish relations.

B) Revision of the convention concluded in Montreux.

7. Question about Iran.

The question of the mutual withdrawal of troops.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR (V. Merkulov)

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No. 81 Copy of Sov. secret

State Defense Committee - Comrade Stalin I.V. NKID - Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV NKVD - Comrade BERIA L.P.

July 18, 45

In addition to special message No. 4100/n dated 5.7.45, the NKGB of the USSR announces the contents of the telegraphic correspondence between the British Foreign Ministry and the British ambassador in Washington in connection with the conference of the leaders of the three powers! 3.

The documents were obtained through undercover means in London.

1. Telegram from the British Foreign Office No. 7125 dated

4.7.45 addressed to the British Ambassador in Washington. "In addition to my telegram No. 6973 dated 30.6.45 regarding the list

These are the issues to be discussed at the conference in the "Terminal" (the code name for the meeting place of the leaders of the three powers. - Note by the NKGB).

It now seems to us that, in addition to the questions listed in our telegram No. 6973, the question of the distribution of posts in the Executive Committee and in the Preparatory Commission for the United Nations should be included in the section "general questions". At the first meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Commission, no decision was made on this issue. It is therefore quite obvious that we should, if possible, reach an agreement among the five Great Powers, at least on the question of the chairman and secretary of the Executive Committee, before the meeting of the Committee, which will take place at the beginning of August. If an agreement can be reached at the Conference of Heads of Government in the Terminal, then it will be possible to agree on this issue with the French and Chinese before the end of this month, and then there will be no great difficulty in getting the Executive Committee at its first meeting to agree to any proposal accepted by the five Great Powers. Therefore, we propose to add to the list of issues to be discussed in the "Terminal" paragraph 1 (e) under the following heading: "Distribution of posts in the Executive Committee and in the Preparatory Commission".

2. We also believe that it would be desirable at the same time to raise for discussion the question of the place of work of an international organization. This issue is on the agenda of the Executive Committee and it is quite possible that it will be discussed in August. The meeting of the leaders of the three powers is undoubtedly a very suitable place for a general exchange of views on this important issue, but we believe that the final decision should not be made in the "Terminal", since it is quite clear that the point of view of other countries should also be accepted. into account.

3. Therefore, we propose to add to the list of issues to be discussed in the "Terminal" also item 1 "E under the following heading: "Preliminary exchange of views on the place of work of the international organization".

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P. Telegram from the British Ambassador in Washington, No. 4709, dated 6.7.45, addressed to the British Foreign Office.

"In addition to my telegram No. 4708.

1. We convey the content of the remarks of MATHEUS (Director of European Affairs, US Department of State. ~ NKGB note) regarding some of the issues outlined by the State Department for discussion at the conference of the leaders of the three powers.

Item 1. In connection with this item, MATHEUS showed the text of the memorandum which the US Ambassador in London had been instructed to submit to the Foreign Office. This document proposes that, in connection with the consideration of urgent problems related to the conclusion of peace treaties and the resolution of territorial issues, the Foreign Ministers of the five major countries should establish a council to draft treaties (before submitting them to the consideration of the United Nations) with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria and, at a later stage, if the five governments so agree, with Germany, when it is jointly recognized that there is a German government with which such an agreement can be concluded. Such a council would also be able, by common consent, to deal with other urgent European problems.

2. MATHEUS declared that the US government would await the results of the discussion of the position of the British and American governments on this question at a conference of the leaders of the three powers in relation to this proposal. If this position is approved, it should be considered as soon as possible at a meeting of the proposed Council, which will meet in Berlin itself, or in one of the smaller European capitals (he named Brussels and Vienna). He also said that the US proposal that the composition of the Council be limited to the foreign ministers of the five main allies is regarded as the most convenient way to avoid claims from other countries, for example, from Ukraine and Belarus, regarding their participation in the drafting of peace contracts. Question regarding

the conclusion of a peace treaty with Finland is not provided for in the proposal, since the United States was not at war with this country.

Point 2 "a". MATHEUS stated that the US government believes that, after the establishment of the Control Council, the European Advisory Commission should cease to exist as soon as possible, and its functions should be taken over by the Control Council.  
advice.

Point 5. MATHEUS pointed out that it is important to do everything possible so that the Soviet government not only joins such organizations as the European Economic Committee, the European Coal Committee and the European International Transport Organization, but also actively cooperates in them, contributing to the success of their work.

Point 6. MATHEUS stated that free communication and information related to the problem of persuading the Soviet government to allow telegraph communication in its zones of occupation, as well as to allow access there for foreign journalists.

MATHEUS then stated that his earlier comments on your revised list of issues in my cable no. 4620 reflect the views of the State Department and may

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not on the following grounds (the references below are to the revised list of issues contained in your telegram No. 6973):

Point 3 "a". The State Department is convinced that the Soviet Government will raise the question of Poland's western frontier at a conference of the leaders of the three powers and will hope to have it resolved at the conference.

Item 3 "B". MATHEUS confirmed that the Americans would not want to take the initiative in bringing up the question of the resettlement of the German population from Poland and Czechoslovakia, and declared that they had not yet begun discussing this matter with us. (I have learned from paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 6651 that the US Embassy in London has made representations to you regarding the expulsion of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia. In the light of what MATHEUS stated and on the basis of your instructions communicated by your telegram of June 11, in accordance to which we have already taken action, it can be assumed that the State Department believes that we will take the lead in raising the issue of resettlement of other minority groups.)

Point 7. MATHEUS stated that the US government agreed with us that the withdrawal of troops from Iran should take place on an equal footing.

3. With regard to the additional points referred to in your telegram No. 7125, I learned today at the Department of State that it has no objection to discussing these points at the forthcoming conference of the leaders of the three powers, but considers that these questions should be discussed in lower levels, not by the leaders of the three powers, but by their foreign ministers, and therefore should not appear on the official agenda."

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR (V. Merkulov)

No. 82 Copy of Sov. secret

State Defense Committee - Comrade Stalin I.V. NKID - Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV NKVD - Comrade BERIA L.P.

August 3, 45

The NKGB of the USSR reports excerpts from the memorandum dated 11.7.45, Assistant to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Orme SARGENT, on the policy of England towards the USSR.

The text of the document was obtained through undercover means in London.

"In connection with the imminent demobilization and evacuation of American troops from Europe, we must take a firm stand in the near future if we do not want the situation in Europe to develop unfavorably for us. In practice, this means that we must firmly establish our influence in Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria; temporarily we may have to stop distributing

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our influence on Romania and Hungary, since these countries are outside the reach for us.

If we have to face off against the Soviet Union in the diplomatic arena, then now is the time for you to go on the offensive, challenging Russia in these six countries, instead of waiting for the Soviet government to become our threaten in Germany, Italy, Greece and Turkey. Our aim must be to turn the last three countries into bastions of anti-totalitarian liberalism, even if in so doing we have to take on responsibilities and obligations that under other circumstances we would only be glad to get rid of. However, the struggle for Germany, when it begins, will not only be much more difficult, but decisive for the whole of Europe.

We cannot rely on continued cooperation with the US. The Americans will consider us restless and reactionary, just as we considered France in the 1920s. However, they will very readily agree to cooperate with us in solving European economic problems, since these questions affect their prestige and interests. In this regard, it may be hoped that it will be difficult for them not to take an interest in the political developments in the countries to which they provide substantial material assistance.

If we only allow Germany to play in this political game as the "buyer who offers the highest price", then we will lose everything, since the Soviet Union will have the best chance of paying this price.

In short:

a) We must base our foreign policy on the principle of cooperation between the three great powers. This is in our interests, as the weakest power of the three. In order to strengthen our position, we should win over the dominions, and especially France, not to mention the smaller European countries.

b) We need not be afraid of pursuing our own policies independent of those of the other two great partners, nor should we be wary of deviating from the course of action dictated to us by Russia or the United States, simply because they are more powerful or because this is the line of least resistance, or because we do not hope that we will be able to hold on to Europe without US help.

c) In our policy, we should adhere to the basic British traditions and be based on principles that will be acceptable to the United States, dominions and small European countries, especially Western ones. Such a policy by its nature should be definitely anti-totalitarian and, in view of this, should be directed both against right-wing totalitarianism (fascism, etc.) and against the left (communism, etc.).

In pursuing this policy of liberalism, we will have to take risks and at times even go beyond our political capacity.

We should not, for example, hesitate to

regarding our diplomacy

interference in the international affairs of other countries, including

when they are threatened with the loss of their liberal institutions or their political independence. In the near future, we should challenge commun

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infiltration in most of the countries of Eastern Europe and we must be ready to counteract every attempt by the Soviet government to communize or establish political control over Germany, Italy, Greece or Turkey. We must not deviate from this course or become discouraged even if the United States does not give us support and even if they choose, quite possibly, a policy of "appeasement" towards the Russians. We must make every effort to overcome the economic crisis in Europe, not only in our own interests (wealthy Europe is the best market for Great Britain), but also in order to use the material resources at our disposal and at America's disposal. as a counterbalance throughout Europe against communist propaganda, which the Soviet Union will use at every opportunity to achieve its goals.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR (V. Merkulov)

No. 83 Copy of Sov. secret

September 7, 45

to comrade I.V. STALIN, to comrade V.M. MOLOTOV, to comrade L.P. BERIA

The NKGB of the USSR reports intelligence data received in London on the statements of the British Foreign Minister BEVIN on questions of British foreign policy.

"1. BEVIN, in a conversation with his assistant, expressed the following considerations on questions of British foreign policy.

At this time, there is generally continuity in British foreign policy, but there are some differences from the foreign policy of the coalition government.

For example, we believe that the previous government failed to carry out its political line in Europe. It made too many concessions to the Russians and these concessions led to the division of Europe, in a sense, into spheres of influence, with which the current government does not agree.

Based on this, our policy should be aimed at preventing the Balkans from becoming a sphere of Russian influence. Hence the importance of the problem of Trieste and Austria.

IDEN understands very little about questions of the economy and the social-democratic movement in Europe. This was the reason for what he did, without the need for a series of concessions to the Russians. Using the moments of the economic order and the social democratic movement, we can put into action such forces in Europe that will be on our side, which Eden has not been able to do.

As regards the Western bloc and France, we, in any case, do not intend to be too hasty with this question.

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The premature creation of a Western diplomatic bloc would prevent us now from waging a struggle against the division of Europe into spheres of influence, i.e. fight against the Russians.

We could probably lay the foundations of the Western bloc now, but we should not show that we are officially in a hurry with this matter.



Using our position in Trieste, in Austria, and special conditions in the Middle East - in Egypt, Iraq, Iran - we must make economic factors serve British political interests and create not a Western bloc, but a European and Middle Eastern bloc.

As regards Italy, there are objective conditions for the establishment of close Anglo-Italian allied relations, as close as Anglo-French relations, inasmuch as all three countries will be members of the proposed bloc. But even here we should not rush. Italy can be made dependent on us by using such a means of economic pressure as coal, but so far we do not have coal for this purpose. In addition, the current American policy is delaying the Anglo-Italian rapprochement, although this cannot last long.

In order to neutralize the activities of the communists in Italy, we will need a little time.

As for Spain, we hope to establish good relations with the successor (as in the text. - Approx. ed.) FRANCO. We can only achieve this if FRANCO is not overthrown by a civil war. A civil war will only serve the interests of the Russians, and one of the main objectives of British policy is to keep the Russians away from Spain.

2. In another conversation, with RIDSDALE, the head of the press department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and some leading officials of this ministry, BEVIN stated:

Trieste will become a great port - the Amsterdam of the Mediterranean. All of Southeast Europe will be supplied through this port. Trieste is to become an open port and will be of great importance to British and imperial trade. Therefore, it is very important to prevent the exclusive control of Yugoslavia over this port. Trieste must be under international or Italian control.

A communist regime in Trieste would lead to damage to our interests in Austria. Hence the great importance which we attach to our policy in Austria.

The discussion of questions concerning Rumania should take place in the Allied Control Commission; it is a pity that the United States involved King MIKHAIL in this matter and took the discussion outside the commission.

A change of government in England will not affect the situation in Greece. As a member of the War Cabinet, I have always supported the policy of the British Government in Greece. Naturally, the policy of the Labor government towards Greece will be a continuation of the policy of the previous government. It must be borne in mind that Greece is the only country in the Balkans where there is freedom of criticism and there is OPPOSITION.

I will have a serious conversation with MOLOTOV about police regimes in the states of Eastern Europe.

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Russia's policy is aimed at achieving two goals: raising the living standards of the population to the level existing in the US and England and ensuring the country's security.

As a result of twenty years of isolation, Russia is still extremely suspicious. I will try to eliminate this suspicion.

As regards our policy in the Middle East, it will be aimed, among other things, at improving the conditions of the broad masses and reducing the dreadful gulf between the few rich and the majority of the poor; to improve social services for the masses, to provide them with medical care, etc. Such a policy will increase sympathy

the population of these countries to Great Britain and the development of closer relations between Great Britain and the countries of the Middle East”.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR (V. Merkulov)

Declassified documents from the SVR archive on the interaction between Soviet and British foreign intelligence services during the war years.

Published for the first time

#1 Top secret

A RECORD OF WHAT THE SOVIET AND BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES AGREED IN THEIR CONVERSATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF SUBVERTIBLE WORK AGAINST

GERMANY AND ALLIES

Chapter I.

1. Between August 14 and 29, 1941, we, the representatives of the Soviet and British agencies responsible for subversive work, held preliminary conversations to ascertain whether cooperation in the subversive work was desirable and feasible. and if so, on what basis this cooperation should be based.

2. As a result of these conversations, we have come to the unanimous opinion that cooperation is not only desirable and feasible, but also essential for achieving our common goal of defeating the enemy.

3. The leaders of the Soviet and British organizations have now agreed that cooperation in subversive work should be based on the principles stipulated in the course of our conversations.

These principles and our proposals for cooperation in the field of propaganda are set out below.

Section P.

4. Soviet and British territories, as well as other territories occupied by the USSR or England, specified below, are excluded from the sphere of activity of the respective organizations of each of the parties:

a) the USSR and the Baltic States, with the exception of Finland.

6) The British Empire and Mandatory Territories, as well as Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Transjordan and Abyssinia.

5. Questions of eventual cooperation between Soviet agencies and sabotage organizations in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia should be the subject of discussion between the governments of these countries and the USSR.

6. Cooperation in all other countries not listed in paragraphs. 4 and 5 will be determined by the leaders of the Soviet and British organizations and will be based on a common line of conduct. This general line of conduct includes:

a) Coordination of sabotage work and identification of objects,

6) Coordination of propaganda aimed at inciting the local population to revolts, active sabotage and other types of subversive work,

c) Determining the timing of special operations, especially if they affect the political or operational plans of one side or the other.

7. To assist the leaders of the Soviet and British bodies in matters relating to each of the organizations, sections of communication are being created in each of the countries.

These communication sections will consist of 4-5 people, including secretaries and technical staff, such as radio specialists.

8. The Soviet and British organizations will provide each other with all possible assistance in introducing agents of each of these organizations into the occupied countries. Such assistance includes the provision of documents, the organization of cover, the provision and delivery of materials and radio equipment.

9. The Soviet and British organizations will provide each other with every possible assistance in establishing communication and, if necessary, each of the parties will consider the possibility of allowing the installation of radio stations of the other side on its territory.

10. Cooperating and assisting each other, the Soviet and British agencies are unwilling to do anything that could endanger their organization or unnecessarily endanger their agents.

The secret Soviet and British organizations will not be revealed to each other, nor will there be, as a rule, any contact between their operating agents, except in those cases when the heads of organizations of one and the other side are sure that such contact would have its advantages. .

11. Soviet and British agencies will exchange information and intelligence that may be useful for subversive work. Such information should include information about the results of sabotage work, which may affect the efficiency of agents of each side, and the names of active enemy agents known to each side.

12. Soviet and British agencies will exchange achievements in the field of improving new technical means and methods for subversive work.

### Section III

13. We consider it expedient that representatives of the Soviet and British propaganda organs also meet as soon as possible to discuss and develop a common line of conduct in the conduct of propaganda aimed at increasing resistance to the domination of the Axis Powers in the occupied countries.

14. The discussion should include the advisability of reciprocal use of the broadcasting system, distribution by each side of the other side's campaign leaflets, and all other means of propaganda that both sides deem useful to the cause.

15. Since the question of the line of conduct in incitement to sabotage and subversive work through propaganda is of vital importance to our work, we have considered it in more detail and propose that:

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a) such propaganda was directed primarily through a call for subversive activities of transport workers in the countries of the Axis powers and in the territories occupied by them. This also includes calls for strikes and petty acts of sabotage;

6) call on workers in neutral countries to prevent acts of sabotage against Soviet and British goods and shipping and to report such incidents to the local police;

c) to instruct agents in neutral and occupied countries in the sense of bribing the crews of Axis-controlled ships and, if possible, persuade them to divert ships to Allied ports;

d) creating general discontent and organizing sabotage in factories and plants working for the Axis powers is highly desirable, but this should be of secondary importance compared to the involvement of transport workers in subversive activities.

#### Section IV.

16. The actions of guerrilla groups are especially effective when they are in contact with regular military operations or receive some kind of indirect military support.

Therefore, the corresponding Soviet and British organizations should create partisan detachments in those countries that are close to the borders of the USSR and England or that can potentially become the arena of hostilities in the future. With regard to these countries, there will be another advantage, that it will be easier to supply them.

In this regard, the corresponding European countries will, for the purpose of organizing and supplying partisan detachments, be distributed as follows between the Soviet and British spheres activities:

SSeR: England; Romania, Bulgaria, Finland Western Europe from Spain to Norway, Greece

17. The question of organizing partisan detachments in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia should be discussed between the USSR and the governments of these countries.

18. Neither the USSR nor England will undertake any propaganda campaign calling for insurrections or partisan movement in countries within the sphere of operations of one of the parties without the consent of the other side.

Representative of the Soviet Organization of the British Organization General Lieutenant  
Colonel /Nikolaev/ /Guinness/

MOSCOW "30" September 1941

This document is printed in three copies, of which: Nos. 1 and 3 of the Soviet organization and copies. No. 2 at the British organization.

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#2 Top secret

#### PRELIMINARY PLAN FOR A GENERAL LINE OF CONDUCT IN SUBVERSION WORK FOR THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SOVIET AND BRITISH COMMUNICATION SECTIONS

##### 1. GENERAL OBJECTS OF SUBVERSION WORK.

The relevant Soviet and British organizations agree that the main object of their subversive work should be all forms of transport. Great attention must also be paid to the enemy's war industry.

The main transport objects are:

Shipping, including port facilities, shipyards and repair docks;

Channels, especially in Germany, France, Belgium and Holland;

Railways, especially steam locomotives and rolling stock, locomotive and car building plants, as well as oil and coal depots;

road transport, especially tires, lubricating oils and oil reserves.

The main objects of the military industry are:

Weapons factories, aircraft factories and factories for aviation equipment of military equipment and ammunition depots;

Chemical screams that produce explosives, poisons, synthetic rubber, and fuels.

Electric power plants, especially for the maintenance of railways and leading enterprises of the military industry;

Oil fields and fuel depots, especially stocks of lubricating oils.

## 2. COMMUNICATION.

The Soviet and British organizations will give each other every possible assistance in establishing contact with their respective agents, especially if one of the parties is unable to contact its agents. One of the ways in which such a connection can be established is safe houses. The agents of the non-communicating party could send their messages, encrypted with their own code, to these addresses. With the help of the other side, these messages could then be delivered to the appropriate communication sections.

There should not be a DIRECT LINK between agents and safe houses.

The question of the necessity of organizing common lines of communication in one country or another and of the methods of carrying out this task must be resolved in each individual case by the leaders of the Soviet and British organizations.

## 3. SUPPLY OF MATERIALS.

As a rule, the Soviet and British organizations will supply their agents with the necessary materials each independently. However, in those cases when one of the parties will feel a lack of these materials, or their delivery will be difficult, the other side will provide it with all possible assistance.

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## 4. SUBVERTIBLE WORK AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.

In the course of our conversations, we worked out a preliminary outline of the line of conduct that should be adopted in subversive work.

Below are the conclusions we have reached and our proposals for mutual assistance. They were approved by the leaders of the Soviet and British organizations, although the latter are fully aware that our present line of conduct is subject to frequent changes, especially in some neutral countries, where it will depend on their political position.

Therefore, all practical questions that arise as a result of our conversations will be resolved by the leaders of the Soviet and British organizations through their communications sections.

FINLAND.

The British organization is not in a position to carry out active work on sabotage at the present time. It will, however, consider the question of what assistance it can render to the Soviet organization.

#### SWEDEN.

Provided Sweden does not cooperate more closely with the Axis Powers, active sabotage in that country must for the present be limited to action against the shipping and supply of the Axis Powers, even if carried out by Swedish steamships and Swedish railways.

If Sweden joins the Axis powers, then all restrictions on sabotage will fall away and it should be directed against the following objects in order of their importance: shipping, iron ore mines in Gallivare, railways, especially those leading to Finland and Norway and ferries to ferry trains to Denmark.

The British organization, for political reasons, would not like to provide direct operational assistance to the Soviet organization at the present time. It will, however, consider, to the best of its ability, any proposals that the Soviet Organization puts forward as urgent and important, such as, for example, with regard to communications. The British organization is, of course, ready to coordinate with the Soviet organization future plans for Sweden.

#### NORWAY.

The main objects of subversive work are shipping and hydroelectric power plants serving aluminum and rare metal smelters.

Actions against railroads and other objects must be limited for the time being, as they may cause strong countermeasures. However, the railroad at Narvik and the transport of iron ore by sea from the port of Narvik are to be attacked this winter.

#### DENMARK.

The main objects of subversive work should be shipping and railway communication by ferries to Sweden.

#### HOLLAND.

The main objects of subversive work, in order of importance, are canal shipping, maritime shipping, railways and warehouses, and oil transportation.

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Electrical installations should not be subjected to acts of sabotage, as this may lead to flooding of the country.

#### BELGIUM.

The main objects, in order of importance, are: railways, maritime navigation and canal navigation.

#### FRANCE.

The main objects, in order of importance, are: railways, shipping, canal navigation, and German aviation and pilots.

The high-voltage wire system in France is imperfect and a good target for sabotage.

The British organization will provide the Soviet organization with all possible assistance in establishing contact with its organization in France and will transfer Soviet agents for this purpose.

#### GERMANY. AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY.

The main objects, in order of importance, are: railways, maritime and canal shipping, road transport, and military industries, especially those producing synthetic fuels.

The British organization does not have its organization in Germany, and therefore it is recommended that the possibilities of both sides be used for the present to expand the organization of the Soviet side. The British organization will render all possible assistance to the Soviet organization in establishing contact with its organization and in transferring agents, couriers, materials and radio equipment to Germany. If the British Organization wanted to set up an organization in Germany, the Soviet Organization, in turn, would also give it full assistance.

#### ITALY.

The main objects are railways (especially in the Alps/), shipping and road transport. The electrical distribution system is very imperfect and is a suitable object for sabotage.

The Soviet and British organizations will assist each other in expanding and supplying their respective organizations. The British organization will assist the Soviet organization in establishing contact with its organization in Italy.

#### SWITZERLAND.

Switzerland is the base of communication with the Axis and therefore nothing should be done that might induce the Swiss to limit our work in this direction.

The subversive work must therefore be reduced to actions against factories working for Germany and to petty acts of sabotage against supplies destined for the Axis powers.

#### SPAIN.

Active sabotage must be limited to actions against the shipping of the Axis powers or shipping controlled by them. No other active work should be carried on at the present time, as it may turn the Spaniards against us.

The British organization, for political reasons, is at present unable to assist the Soviet organization in Spain.

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#### PORTUGAL.

The Soviet organization does not have its own organization in Portugal and is not striving to create one at the present time. The British organization is currently not allowed to operate in Portugal and therefore,

cannot render assistance to the Soviet organization.

#### BALKANS.

Romania.

The main objects should be oil refineries and oil reserves in Romania and the means of transporting oil - by rail, river and sea routes.

Bulgaria.

Sabotage must now be limited to actions against Axis-controlled shipping.

However, the Soviet and British organizations must be prepared to carry out active subversive work on the railways leading to Turkey in case the latter is attacked by the Axis powers.

Greece.

The main object of subversive work is shipping.

#### ASSISTANCE IN THE BALKANS.

The Soviet and British organizations will render each other every possible assistance in establishing contact with their respective organizations and in transferring agents of each of the parties to the Balkan countries. For this purpose, it is desirable that the representatives of the Soviet and British organizations in Istanbul maintain contact with each other. This contact must take place in great secrecy so as not to arouse suspicion among the Turks.

Türkiye.

Active sabotage must for the present be limited to actions against Axis shipping, especially oil tankers.

If Turkey becomes hostile or is invaded by Germany, then our main objects of sabotage would be the railways leading to the Caucasus, Syria and Iraq.

For political reasons, there should be no cooperation at present between the Soviet and British organizations operating in Turkey. Nevertheless, the leaders of our respective organizations must coordinate plans for the future.

No attempt should be made at present to organize partisan detachments. However, the possibility of creating such irregular units in the territories along the borders of Turkey, which, if necessary, could be transferred to Turkey, is not ruled out.

This last question should be considered separately by the Soviet and British organizations, which should inform each other about the results achieved in this respect.

#### IRAN.

In connection with the occupation of Iran by Soviet and British troops, the task of our organizations there should be to fight against the German 5th column and to actively sabotage if Iran is captured by the Axis powers. With such an eventuality, the objects of subversive work should be: ports to the Caspian Sea

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sea and railways and highways leading to the South-East from these ports to the Caucasus.

The British organization will prepare measures to destroy the oil industry.

Cooperation between the Soviet and British organizations will be best achieved by dividing Iran into Soviet and British spheres of operations. The leaders of these



independent organizations will be connected either directly or by radio.

#### CHINA.

In unoccupied China, the Soviet and British sides will set up subversive organizations. The main functions of these organizations will be the preparation and deployment of agents to occupied China in order to be ready in case Japan becomes hostile.

Assistance may be required from the Chinese Government, but it must be kept to a minimum in the interest of the security of our institutions.

In developing our plans and in determining the timing of our operations, it will be necessary, to a certain extent, to take into account the military plans of China.

A more detailed line of conduct is to be worked out in London and Moscow in the near future, and the details to be discussed between the Soviet and British representatives in China.

#### NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA.

Our common task in the Americas must be to fight against the 5th column of the Axis Powers. Active sabotage must be directed against the shipping of the Axis powers and the air lines they control. If Japan enters the war against the USSR or England, its shipping will become the main object of subversion.

The Soviet side does not currently have organizations in either North or South America and, therefore, active operations are proposed to be carried out by a British organization acting jointly with the Americans.

If Japan enters the war and becomes hostile, the Soviet side may be interested in creating its own organization in the Americas to carry out subversive work against Japan and Germany, and for this purpose it will need the assistance of the British

sides. Such assistance can only be provided with the consent of the US government.

Representative of the Soviet Organization of the British Organization General  
Lieutenant Colonel /Nikolaev/ /Guinness/

MOSCOW < 30 "September 1941.

This document is printed in triplicate, of which: Ex. Nos. 1 and 3 of the Soviet organization and copies. No. 2 at the British organization.

Declassified documents from the SVR archive on nuclear issues (published earlier in the journal "Questions of History, Natural Science and Technology", No. 3, 1992)

Document No. 1 Sov. secret

INFORMATION on No. 6881/1065 dated 25.X.41 from London

VADIM! transmits the message of the "List"? about the Meeting of the Uranium Committee held on 16.X.413. Boss\* chaired the meeting.

The following was reported at the meeting.

The uranium bomb may well be developed within two years, especially if Imperial Chemical Industries is required to make it in the shortest possible time.

Woolwich Arsenal spokesman FERGUSON said the fuse for the bomb could be constructed in a matter of months. There is no need and no possibility of obtaining a minimum velocity of the relative movement of the explosive mass of 6 thousand feet/sec. The explosion process will occur prematurely. But even in this case, the force of the explosion will be enormously greater than the force of an ordinary explosive.

Until recently, the calculation of the critical mass was carried out only theoretically, because there was no data on the cross-sectional size of the O-235 core. But in connection with the question of fast neutrons, there is evidence that the cross sections of the O-235 nucleus and ordinary uranium do not differ much. It is expected that the necessary measurements will be made by December.

In the near future, it is planned to conduct experiments to achieve the highest explosion efficiency by determining the neutron density in the interval between neighboring masses 10-235.

Three months ago, Metropolitan Vickers was commissioned to build a 20-stage apparatus, but permission to do so has only recently been given. It is planned to ensure the fulfillment of this order in the order of the 1st turn.

Imperial Chemical Industries has a contract to receive hexafluoruran, but the company has not yet begun production. Recently, a US patent was issued for a simpler manufacturing process using uranium nitrate.

At the meeting, it was reported that information on the best type of diffusion membranes can be obtained in the USA?.

The Committee of Chiefs of Staff, at its meeting held on 20.11.41, passed a decision on the immediate start of construction in England of a plant for the manufacture of uranium bombs.

Vadim asks for an assessment of Liszt's uranium materials.

\* Hanki (written by hand).

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Document No. 2 Sov. secret

INFORMATION on No. 7073, 7081/1096 dated 3.X.41 from London

VADIM informs about the report received from "List" and handed over to the Military Cabinet on 24.[X.41] on the work of the Uranium Cabinet.

The report highlights the following issues.

The determination of the critical mass of uranium depends on the determination of the cross-section of the uranium-235 nucleus ( $B_{10n}$  cross section). It is assumed that the value of the critical mass is in the range from 10 to 43 kg. This value was determined on the basis of general information on the properties of O-235 and the action of fast neutrons on atoms of other elements.

The preparation of hexafluoruran (hexafluoriduran) was developed by Imperial Chemical Industries, which has already received 3 kg of this substance. E-235\* is obtained by diffusion of hexafluoruranium in the vapor state through a series of membranes, which are a mesh of the thinnest wire.

The design of a separation plant is very difficult, because:

1) Hexafluorouran destroys lubricants. Therefore, it may be necessary to develop a special lubricant. But even in this case, the installation of gas locks will be required.

- 2) Hexafluorouran undergoes decomposition in the presence of water vapor. In the presence of even a small amount of moisture, hexafluorouran acts destructively on the equipment.
- 3) The process takes place at a vacuum of 0.4 mm, and therefore the presence of the smallest possible number of connections in the apparatus will be required.
- 4) The design and installation of the diaphragms must be such as to ensure that the diaphragms are completely vibration-free.
- 5) Possibility of leakage and contamination of seals.

It is estimated that the entire separation plant will require 19,000\*\* 10-stage units, which means that the plant area should be over 20 acres.

The total amount of hexafluoruranium will be no more than 0.5 tons per day, therefore, the chemical part of the plant will occupy only a small part of it.

It is reported that in addition to the huge destructive effect of a uranium bomb, the air at the site of its explosion will be saturated with radioactive particles capable of killing all living things that fall under the action of these particles.

\* Obviously 00-235. \*\* Obviously, a typo - not 19.000, but 1.900.

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Document No. 3 Sov. secret

Ex. No. 1 KZ-4 of the USSR PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS "\_\_\_" March 1942  
Moscow

STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF THE SSR to comrade STALIN

In a number of capitalist countries, in connection with the ongoing work on the fission of the atomic nucleus in order to obtain a new source of energy, a study was begun on the question of using the atomic energy of uranium for military purposes.

In 1939, intensive research work began in France, England, the USA and Germany to develop a method for using uranium for new explosives. These works are carried out in conditions of greater secrecy.

From the attached top secret materials obtained by the NKVD of the USSR in England through undercover means, characterizing the activities of the Uranium Committee on the issue of uranium atomic energy, it can be seen that:

a) The British War Cabinet, considering the possibility of a successful solution of this problem by Germany, pays great attention to the problem of using uranium atomic energy for military purposes.

6) Uranium Committee of the War Cabinet, headed by the famous English physicist HP. THOMSON, coordinates the work of prominent British scientists involved in

the question of the use of atomic  $\text{E} = mc^2$  energy of uranium, both in relation to theoretical and mretic, experimental, quiet work, and purely applied, tezhi <24202: i.e. manufacture of uranium bombs with a large destructive effect age etr Aÿ ao eo oo buinya fodchoe fo pau ooroonoog od NOI SILOI. 1-0 9 saa O) oboo "YOU © kill the era, you elela \$ i 6 6.35443 9966ÿÿ 65-00)! c) These investigations are based on the use of one of the isotopes of uranium Zoroee, 11-235, which possesses the CCO TE property of efficient splitting of aerobic oson by OTO ion. For this, uranome is used, UNO II SUR e not rittuye-b ap. 76 rea < DRU

group of Rutherford and his colleagues, the most significant contamination of the product is dust. SA ah! logo My bobo. get  
over 50 ^chE-pastures of which are found in Canada, in the Congo and the Belgian Congo, in the Sudetes and the Vab IEN area, the average is 10006 manea. Portugal. am. AE: giza, d) French scientists  
HAL-ORR

BAN and KOVARSKY, emigrated from the "eme Be, 673

who came to England, developed a method for isotope isolation of uranium-235 by using uranium oxide treated with heavy water.

English scientists, Professor PEYERLS and Doctor of Physical Sciences BICE, have developed a method for separating the reactive isotope (<sup>235</sup>U) using a diffusing apparatus designed by Dr. SIMON, which is recommended for practical use in obtaining uranium, which is used to make a uranium bomb.

e) In mastering the production method for isolating <sup>235</sup>U, in addition to a number of scientific research institutions in England, the Woolwich Arsenal, as well as the Metro-Vickers firms, the chemical concern Imperial Chemical Industries, are directly involved. This concern gives the following assessment of the state of development of the method for obtaining <sup>235</sup>U and the production of uranium bombs:

"Research work on the use of atomic energy for uranium bombs has reached the stage where it is necessary to start work on a large scale. This problem can be solved and the necessary plant can be built."

f) The Uranium Committee seeks cooperation with the relevant scientific research organizations and firms in the USA (DuPont firm), limiting itself to theoretical questions only.

The applied side of the development is based on the following main provisions, confirmed by theoretical calculations and experimental work, namely:

Professor of the University of Birmingham R. PEYERLS determined theoretically that the weight of 10 kg of <sup>235</sup>U is a critical quantity. The amount of this substance is less than critical, stable and completely safe, while in a mass of <sup>235</sup>U, more than 10 kg, a progressive fission reaction occurs, causing an explosion of colossal force.

When designing bombs, the active part must consist of two equal halves, in their sum exceeding the critical value. To produce the maximum explosive force of these parts <sup>235</sup>U, according to Professor FERGUSSON of the Research Department of the Woolwich Arsenal, the velocity of the masses must lie within 6,000 feet/second. With a decrease in this speed, the chain reaction of the splitting of uranium atoms is attenuated and the force of the explosion decreases significantly, but still many times exceeds the force of an explosion of a conventional explosive.

Professor TAYLOR calculated that the destructive effect of 10 kg of <sup>235</sup>U would correspond to 1,600 tons of TNT.

The whole complexity of the production of uranium bombs lies in the difficulty of separating the active part of uranium - <sup>235</sup>U from other isotopes, manufacturing a shell of a bomb that prevents disintegration, and obtaining the necessary speed of mass movement.

According to the Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) concern, the separation of the <sup>235</sup>U isotope will require 1,900 devices of the Dr. SIMON system at a cost of 3,300,000 pounds sterling, and the cost of the entire enterprise will be expressed in the amount of 4.5-5 million pounds.

With the production of 36 bombs per year by such a plant, the cost of one bomb

would be £236,000 compared to £326,000 for 1,500 tons of TMT.

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The study of materials on the development of the problem of uranium for military purposes in England leads to the following conclusions:

1. The British High Command considers that the question of the practical use of uranium (0-235) atomic energy for military purposes has been resolved in principle.
2. The Uranium Committee of the British War Cabinet developed a preliminary theoretical part for the design and construction of a plant for the manufacture of uranium bombs.
3. The efforts and possibilities of the most important scientific research organizations and large firms in England are united and directed towards the development of the problem of uranium-235, which is especially classified.
4. The British War Cabinet is dealing with the question of a principled decision to organize the production of uranium bombs.

Based on the importance and relevance of the problem of the practical application of uranium-235 atomic energy for the military purposes of the Soviet Union, it would be advisable:

1. To work out the issue of creating a scientific advisory body under the State Defense Committee of the USSR from authoritative persons to coordinate, study and direct the work of all scientists, scientific research organizations of the USSR dealing with the issue of uranium atomic energy.
2. Provide secret acquaintance with the materials of the NKVD of the USSR on uranium to prominent specialists in order to give an assessment and appropriate use.

Note:

The problems of nuclear fission in the USSR were dealt with by Academician KAPITSA at the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician SKOBELETSIN at the Leningrad Physics Institute, and Professor Slutsky at the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of S.S.R. (L. Beria)

Document No. 4 (Provided in abridged form) Sov. secret

No. P-37ss "" April 1943 U.S.S.R., DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONERS PERVUKHIN MOSCOW-KREMLIN

TO THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR TO COMRADE V.N. MERKULOV

At the same time, I am sending a note from Professor I.V. Kurchatov. about materials on the problem of uranium.

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I ask you to give instructions on additional clarification of the questions posed in the note. After using the material, please return it to me.

(signature) Pervukhin 8/GU

Comm. secret

TO THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONERS OF THE UNION OF THE SSR,  
comrade MG PERVUKHIN

The examination of the material by ME has shown that its receipt is of tremendous, indefatigable significance for our State.

Sciences. On the one hand, the material showed the seriousness and intensity of scientific

research work in England on the problem of uranium, on the other hand, made it possible to obtain very important guidelines for our scientific research, to bypass many very laborious phases of developing the problem and to learn about new scientific and technical ways of solving it.

Further considerations are given for individual sections of the material.

(This part of the document has been omitted.)

Conclusion.

Obtaining material, as can be seen from the foregoing, forces us to reconsider our views on many questions of the problem and to establish three new directions in work for Soviet physics.

1. Separation of the uranium-235 isotope by diffusion.
2. The implementation of nuclear combustion in a mixture of uranium - heavy water.
3. Study of the properties of the element EkaO594.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the totality of information about the material points to the technical possibility of solving the entire problem of uranium in a much shorter period than our scientists think.

not familiar with the progress of work on this problem abroad. The question naturally arises as to whether the obtained materials reflect

They are the actual course of research work in England, and are not fiction, the task of which would be to disorientate our science. This issue is of particular importance to us because in many important sections of the work (due to the lack of a technical base) we are not yet able to verify the data presented in the material.

Based on a careful examination of the material, I was left with the impression that it reflects the true state of things.

Some conclusions, even on very important sections of the work, seem doubtful to me, some of them are poorly substantiated, but English scientists are responsible for this, and not the good quality of the information.

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This letter will be handed over to you by your Assistant Comrade A.I. Vasin, who has draft notes to be destroyed for the letter. The contents of the letter to anyone but him, can not yet be known.

Moscow laboratory 7.03.43 Professor Kurchatov Document No. 5

Owls. secret

PRELIMINARY OPINION ON THE MATERIAL TO THE COMMUNICATION No. 1/3/6134 dated April 6, 1945

material of great value. It contains data: 1) on the atomic characteristics of a nuclear explosive; 2) on the details of the explosive method of setting the atomic bomb into action; 3) according to the electromagnetic method of separation of uranium isotopes.

#### I. Atomic characteristics of a nuclear explosive.

The data on the spontaneous targeting of heavy bombers are extremely important in this case, the content is confirmation of the previously received message O

lower probability of spontaneous fission of uranium-235 compared to uranium-238. The probability of this process in plutonium-240 is strikingly high.

In the table giving the values of the number of secondary neutrons per fission (nir og R5\$10n pneumnz\$ reg Dýssýop) it is not indicated for the splitting by which neutrons (fast or slow)  $\gamma = 2.47$  was obtained for uranium-235 and no, in addition, the values of  $\gamma$  for the fission of uranium-238 by fast neutrons.

It would be important to have more information on these issues.

In paragraph 6 of this section, a very important table of values for the cross sections for targeting uranium-235 and plutonium-239 by fast neutrons of different energies This table of exact cross-section values allows over

It is important to determine the critical dimensions of the atomic bomb. Only thanks to this it is possible to recognize that the formula for the critical radius (p. 4)

may indeed be correct to within 2%, as indicated in the text.

It remains unclear to me how such a high degree of accuracy was achieved in determining the fission cross section of both uranium and plutonium.

It follows from the text that some quantities were determined in differential experiments, and some - in "integral" experiments, in which the multiplication of neutrons from a conventional source surrounded by uranium-235 or plutonium was studied. Such experiments can only be carried out with large quantities of these substances, and it would be extremely important to

READ AT LEAST the most general ideas about experiments on neutron multiplication

nov, which were produced with large quantities of uranium-235 or plutonium.

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In connection with the consideration of the issues raised in this section, it can be mentioned that we came to the same estimates of the effectiveness of the bomb, as indicated in the materials, and the same law of proportionality of the effectiveness of the bomb to the cube of its excess mass over critical mass.

#### P. Details of the explosive method of detonating the bomb.

In this largest section of materials, the method of setting the bomb into action by "explosion inward" (intriosýop teo4), which we learned about quite recently and work on which we are just starting.

However, all its advantages over the counter-shot method have already become clear to us.

The materials obtained contain: 1) a scheme according to which the propagation of a detonation wave in an explosive and the process of deformation of the insulation material should be considered; 2) description of the processes of compression of the body by the explosion and the explosion itself.

All this is very valuable material, but indications of the conditions under which it is possible to obtain the symmetry of the explosion effect, which is absolutely necessary in the very essence of the method, are especially important.

Interesting phenomena of non-uniform action of a blast wave are described. Very valuable are the indications that this uneven action can be eliminated by an appropriate arrangement of detonators and the use of interlayers of explosives of different action.

In the same section of the material, important questions of the technique of experiments with explosives and the optics of explosive phenomena are analyzed.

In view of the fact that research on this method has not yet advanced at all in our country, it is now impossible to formulate a question in this area that requires additional elucidation. This can be done later after a serious analysis of the material under consideration.

I would consider it necessary to show the corresponding text (from page 6 to the end, except for page 22) by prof. Yu.B. Khariton.

ARB

April 7, 1945 (Signed) Kurchatov

Ex. unity

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Document #6

Top secret

BOMB TYPE "Ne" (NISN EXPIOSIUE)

In July of this year, the first explosion of the atomic bomb is expected.

bomb design. The active substance of this bomb is element 94 without the use of uranium-235. In the center of a ball of plutonium weighing 6 kilograms is placed the so-called. the initiator is a beryllium-polonium source of alpha particles (Plutonium is surrounded by 60 pounds of tube alloy\*, which is "tamper".) All this is placed in an 11 cm thick aluminum shell. This aluminum shell, in turn, is surrounded by a layer of explosive substance "pentalite" or "controciop C" (according to other sources "Controciop B") with a wall thickness of 46 cm. The body of the bomb, in which this explosive is placed, has an internal diameter of 140 cm. weight

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bombs, including pentallite, hull, etc. - about 3 tons.

The explosive force of the bomb is expected to be equal to that of 5,000 tons of TNT. (Efficiency - 5-6%.) The amount of "yöyöop" is equal to 75-10.

Stocks of active material.

a) Uranium-235. As of April this year was 25 kilograms of uranium-235. Its production is currently 7.5 kg per month.

b) Plutonium (element 94). In camp-2 there are 6.5 kg. plutonium. Its production has been established, the production plan is overfulfilled.

\* Tube-alloy is the code name for uranium (sotegcia! gaiiit siBaPou) (attributed from below by hand to the word "uranium"), it is not known whether it is natural 235 or enriched in dif. installation).

Tentatively, the explosion is expected on July 10 this year. (written by hand) Kurchatov.

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Document #7

Top secret TO COMRADE BERIA L.P.

At the same time, I am sending a message about the design of the atomic bomb, compiled on the basis of undercover materials received from the NKGB of the USSR Appendix: on "7" pages.

(Merkulov V.N.)

OTP. 4 copies.

1 - Comrade. Beria

2 - Sect of the NKGB of the USSR

3-4 - in case 1 of the NKGB CID

Spanish Semenov, 11 dept. i UPR NKGB pech. Bushuev v. 10 18.X.45

Top secret

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ATOMIC BOMB

In appearance, the atomic bomb is a pear-shaped projectile with a maximum diameter of 127 cm and a length of 325 cm together with a stabilizer. The total weight is about 4500 kg. The bomb consists of the following components:

- a) initiator
- b) Active material
- c) Tamper
- d) aluminum layer
- e) Explosive
- f) 32 explosive lenses
- g) Detonator device
- h) Duralumin shell
- i) Armored steel shells
- j) Stabilizer.

All of the above parts of the bomb, with the exception of the stabilizer, detonator device and the outer steel shell, are hollow balls that are inserted into each other. Thus, for example, the active material is made in the form of a hollow sphere, in the center of which an initiator is placed. The ball of active material itself is placed inside the tamper (retarder), which is also a hollow ball. The tamper ball is placed inside another hollow aluminum ball, which in turn is surrounded by a spherical layer of explosive substances.

Behind the explosive layer, in which the lenses are also placed, there is a duralumin shell, to which a detonator device is attached and on top of which there is an outer bomb shell made of armored steel.

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## DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTS OF THE BOMB 1. Initiator

The bomb uses an Urchin type initiator. It consists of a hollow beryllium ball, on the inner surface of which there are wedge-shaped recesses. The planes of all recesses are parallel to one another. The surface of the recesses is covered with a layer of gold 0.1 mm thick and a layer of polonium. Inside this ball is placed a solid beryllium ball, the surface of which is also covered with a layer of gold and polonium.

Dimensions "Urchin":

The outer radius of the hollow beryllium ball ..... 1.0 cm The radius of the base of the wedge-shaped recess ..... 0.40 cm == Tops == 0.609 cm —"- solid beryllium ball..... 0.40 cm Number of wedge-shaped notches ..... 15 Amount of polonium on the surface of all recesses ..... 30 curie Amount of polonium on a solid 0 ball ..... curie

A hollow ball is made from two halves that are pressed together in a Nickel Carbonyl atmosphere to form a nickel coating on the surface of the ball. This coating prevents or at least slows down the self-decomposition of polonium. The initiator acts as follows.

The impact directed toward the center from the explosion of the outer layer of the explosive is transmitted through the layer of aluminum and tempera, through the layer of active material to the surface of the hollow beryllium ball of the initiator. The resulting stresses break this ball along the planes passing through the top of the wedge-shaped recesses, thus exposing the beryllium of the hollow ball to the action of alpha particles emanating from the polonium coating on the central ball of the initiator. This creates a stream of neutrons. Neighboring surfaces of the recesses collide, as a result of which a "Munro jet" is formed, which penetrates through the layer of polonium and gold into the central ball, thus bringing the polonium on the inner surface of the hollow beryllium ball into contact with solid beryllium. This also creates a flux of neutrons.

The neutron flux created in the initiator attacks the active material.

## 2. Active material

The active material of the atomic bomb is the delta-phase plutonium element with a specific gravity of 15.8. It is made in the form of a hollow ball consisting of two halves, which, like the outer ball of the initiator, are pressed in a Nickel-Carbonyl atmosphere. The outer diameter of the ball is 80-90 mm. The weight of the active material together with the initiator is 7.3-10.0 kg. Between the hemispheres there is a gasket made of corrugated gold 0.1 mm thick, which prevents high-speed jets moving along the connection plane of the hemispheres of the active material from penetrating the initiator. These jets can prematurely activate the initiator.

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One of the hemispheres has a hole 25 mm in diameter, which serves to introduce the initiator into the center of the active material, where it is fixed on a special bracket. After the introduction of the initiator, the hole is closed with a stopper, also made of plutonium.

## 3. Tamper (retarder)

The tamper is a hollow ball with an outer diameter of 230 mm, made of metallic uranium. The ball has a hole that serves to introduce the active material inside. The hole is closed with a plug, also made of uranium metal.

The purpose of the tamper (moderator) is that it reduces the amount of active material needed to make an atomic bomb.

The outer surface of the tempera is covered with a layer of boron, which traps thermal neutrons coming from the radioactive substances of the system and which can cause predetonation.

## 4. Aluminum layer

The aluminum layer surrounding the outer surface of the tamper is a hollow ball with an outer diameter of 460 mm, made of two halves, for the connection of which grooves and protrusions are provided. One of the hemispheres has a hole for introducing the active material into the inside of the bomb. The hole is closed with a cork made of aluminum.

The purpose of the aluminum layer is the uniform transmission of the blow received as a result of the explosion of the outer layer of the explosive towards the center of the bomb.

## 5. Explosive layer and lenses

Behind the aluminum layer is an explosive layer, which is formed from 32 specially shaped bars. The inner surface of the bars facing the center is spherical with a diameter equal to the outer diameter of the aluminum layer. In the outer surface of the explosive bars, there are special recesses, the shape of which provides for the placement of 20 hexagonal lenses and 12 pentagonal lenses in them. Between the surfaces of the explosive and the lenses perpendicular to the axis of the ball, a spacer made of felt with a thickness of  $\frac{1}{4}$  inch is placed, and the voids between

radial contact surfaces are filled with blotting paper. Air gaps between the explosive layer and the lenses should not exceed 1/16 inch, since large air gaps can slow down or, conversely, accelerate detonation, depending on the direction of these gaps. Lenses are cast in special molds made from cellulose acetate. Each lens consists of two types of explosives, one fast-explosive and the other slow-explosive. When the lenses are put in place, the rapidly exploding part of it comes into contact with the explosive layer. The total weight of the explosive is about 2 tons.

One detonator is connected to each lens, which has two electric igniters for a greater guarantee of a simultaneous explosion. There are 64 electrical wires in total, divided into 4 quadrants of 16 wires each. Two electrical wires are connected to the lens, but from different quadrants.

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#### 6. Dural shell

The explosive layer and lenses are covered with a duralumin shell, to which a blasting device weighing 180 kg is attached. The inner diameter of the shell is about 1400 mm, the weight together with the demolition device is about 700 kg.

#### 7. Armored steel outer shell

#### 8. Stabilizer

#### Bomb assembly

A ball of metallic uranium is placed inside an aluminum ball in such a way that the hole in it is opposite the hole in the aluminum. BB bars with lenses are laid on the outer surface of aluminum, with the exception of one bar located above the hole in the aluminum. The lenses are mounted on a duralumin shell, to which a demolition device is also attached. In this form, the bomb is ready for transportation to the place of use. Further assembly is carried out as follows. The initiator is put into the inside of the ball of active material - plutonium, which is put into the inside of the tamper. The plugs are put in place, after which the last block of explosives is applied and the holes in the duralumin and steel shells are closed.

Due to the fact that the plutonium and radioactive substances of the initiator self-heat to a temperature 90 degrees Celsius higher than the ambient temperature, the bombs are transported to the final assembly site in special containers equipped with a system cooling.

"" October 1945

Right: Colonel - (Vasilevsky)

Document #8

NK-4 Soviet Secret USSR Ex. No. 1 PEOPLE'S COMMISSARY FOR STATE SECURITY  
February 28, 1945

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF THE SSR TO COMRADE BERIA L.P.

The NKGB of the USSR presents information obtained by agents on the progress of work on the creation of an atomic bomb of great destructive power:

The research work carried out by the leading scientists of England and the USA on the use of intra-atomic energy for

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The buildings of the atomic bomb showed that this type of weapon should be considered practicable, and the problem of its development is currently reduced to two main tasks:

1. Production of the required amount of fissile elements - uranium-235 and plutonium.
2. Structural development of the actuation of the bomb.

In accordance with these tasks, the following centers have been established in the United States:

1.a) Camp-1, also known as Camp "X" - Woods Holle, 35 kilometers from Knoxville, pc. Tennessee. A plant for the production of uranium-235 is being built here. 2 billion dollars have been allocated for the construction of this plant and about 130,000 people are employed. The general management of the plant construction was entrusted to the Kelleks firm, a subsidiary of the well-known design firm M.V. Kellogg in New York. Construction contract issued to Johnson Construction; in addition, other well-known companies were involved: Dupont, Carbide and Carbon Chemical.Co. All work on the creation of the plant bears the code name "Clinton Engineering Works".

According to the plan, the construction of the first stage should be completed in 1945. It takes about 3 years to complete the construction.

b) Camp U, near Hanford, pc. Washington, on the Columbia River. The DuPont facility produces element 94 or plutonium.

2. Camp-2, also known as Camp "U" - in the town of Los Alamos, 70 kilometers northwest of the small town of Santa Fe, pc. New Mexico. The camp is under the direct control of the War Ministry. Research and experimental work on the creation of the bomb itself is carried out here.

Camp-2 is isolated from the outside world. It is located in a desert area, on top of a flat "table" mountain. About 2,000 people live in the camp, fenced off with wire and under special protection. For them, good household

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conditions: comfortable apartments, playgrounds, swimming pool, club, etc. Postal correspondence with the outside world is controlled. Departure of workers from the camp is allowed only with special permission from the military authorities. There are several training grounds around the camp. The nearest one is Anchor Ranch, located 5 miles from Los Alamos.

Latest research data on the effectiveness of the atomic bomb brings new insight

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about the extent of the destruction. According to calculations, the energy of an atomic bomb with a total weight of about 3 tons will be equivalent to the energy of a conventional explosive weighing from 2,000 to 10,000 tons. It is believed that the explosion of an atomic bomb will be accompanied not only by the formation of an explosive wave, but also by the development of high temperature, as well as a powerful radioactive effect, and that as a result of this, all life within a radius of up to 1 kilometer will be destroyed.

Two methods are being developed to produce an atomic bomb explosion:

1. Ballistic
2. The method of "internal explosion".

There are no definite dates for the manufacture of the first bomb, since research and design work has not yet been completed. It is assumed that the manufacture of such a bomb will take a minimum of one year and a maximum of 5 years.

As for bombs of somewhat lesser power, it is reported that in a few weeks one or two bombs can be expected to be made, for which the Americans already have the necessary amount of active substance in stock. This bomb will not be as effective, but still it will be of practical importance as a new type of weapon, far exceeding those existing today in terms of its effectiveness. The first experimental "combat" explosion is expected in 2-3 months.

In connection with the whole problem of using intra-atomic energy of uranium as a whole, the question of the presence and capacity of uranium ore deposits in each of the countries becomes especially important.

meaning.

We have the following data on this subject:

The main deposits of uranium ores are located in the Belgian Congo, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Australia and the island of Madagascar.

Canadian ore is mined by Canadian Radio and Uranium Corp at Port Hope, Ontario and has been used by both the British and the Americans. There was an intention on the part of the Canadian government to nationalize uranium mining. But the Americans forestalled this event by purchasing Canadian deposits, albeit already largely depleted.

In addition, the Americans achieved unlimited control over the mining of uranium ores in the Belgian Congo. The position of the British in the Belgian Congo is much weaker, since the industrial elite of this colony leans towards the Americans and is separatist, speaking out in favor of becoming an independent state.

Deposits of uranium ore in Czechoslovakia are located in the Sudetenland, in the vicinity of Joachimstal on the southern slopes of the Erzgebirg, 20 kilometers north of Carlsbad.

According to our intelligence information, the British allegedly intended to conclude an agreement with the Czechoslovak government in London on the exploitation of these deposits.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR (V. Merkulov)

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Document No. 9 Sov. secret

# CONCLUSION ON THE MATERIALS AT THE COMMUNICATION No. 1/3/3920 DATED MARCH 5, 1945 ON THE SECTION "ATOMIC BOMB"

The material is of great interest; along with the methods and schemes we are developing, it indicates the possibilities that we have not considered so far. These include: 1) the use of uranium hydride-235 instead of metallic uranium-235 as an explosive in the atomic bomb; 2) the use of "Explosion inside" to bring the bomb into action.

I

The use of uranium hydride-235 instead of uranium-235, as indicated in the material, is based on the high probability of absorption of slow neutrons by uranium, which leads to a decrease in the critical mass. The introduction of hydrogen, however, leads to a slowdown in the development of the entire process and can drag it out to unacceptably long periods of time. In addition, due to the low density of matter, an increase in the critical mass is necessary. Thus, it is far from obvious that the use of uranium hydride instead of uranium can give that large (almost 20-fold) gain in mass, which is indicated in the materials.

It is possible to give an assessment of the proposal under consideration only after a rigorous theoretical analysis of the issue.

The materials contain the following ambiguities in this section. Under the uranium hydride is usually meant the compound  $\text{UH}_3$ , while in the text the hydride from  $\text{O}_2\text{O}$ ,  $\times 8 \text{ H}_2\text{O}$  is indicated. Further in the text it is indicated that a system of hydride from  $\text{O}_2\text{O}$ ,  $\times 8 \text{ H}_2\text{O}$  was studied. containing 75% of the 235 isotope and 25% of the 238 isotope with beryllium oxide insulation, that the critical mass was determined to be 560 grams, but it is not mentioned how this determination was made.

It seems extremely important to find out whether the specified system was studied by calculation or by experiment? If the second assumption turned out to be correct, this would mean that the atomic bomb had already been carried out and uranium-235 had been isolated in large quantities. There is a remark in the material that seems to speak in favor of this. In describing the "explosion inward" method, it is indicated that no experiments have yet been carried out with the active material, but that in the coming it is planned to carry out such experiments for months.

In the light of the foregoing, it seems to be a top priority task of exceptional importance to obtain several tens of grams of uranium highly enriched in uranium 235 from the laboratories whose materials are considered here.

P

The "explosion inward" method uses the enormous pressures and velocities that develop during an explosion. The materials indicate that this method makes it possible to increase the relative velocity of particles up to

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10.0 meters per second if the pressure symmetry is ensured, and that, therefore, this method should be preferred to the "shot" method. Now it is difficult to give a final assessment of the correctness of such a conclusion, but there is no doubt that the method of "explosion in

inside" is of great interest, is fundamentally correct and should be subjected to serious theoretical and experimental analysis.

Interesting remarks are contained in the material on the question of the substance of insulation for the atomic bomb. They correspond to the views that have been developed in our country in recent times. In our designs, it is also planned to use beryllium for insulation, however, in the form of a metal, and not its oxide, as suggested in the materials.

(Signed) Kurchatov 16.03.45

Notes to Documents No. 1-83

' Matsuoka Iosuke (1880-1946) Japanese Foreign Minister from 1940-1941.

? A.P. Baksheev is a former major general of the White Guard army, one of the accomplices of Ataman Semenov.

3 G.M. Semenov (1890-1945) - the former chieftain of the Transbaikalian Cossack army, the leader of the white emigration in the Far East, was associated with Japanese intelligence. In 1945 he was captured by Soviet troops and hanged by the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

\* British intelligence practiced the regular compilation of summaries of the intelligence information it received for a report to the government. Soviet intelligence, through its agents, had the opportunity to receive this information, which was of great importance to it, since in connection with the war it lost its agent positions in Germany and its allied countries.

5 Sikorski Wladyslaw (1881-1943) - Prime Minister of Poland in 1922-1923. In 1939-1943 - Prime Minister of the Polish government in exile in London, General.

6 Ambassador of the Polish government in exile in London to the British government.

7 Hull Cordell (1871-1955) - US politician and statesman, diplomat. In 1933-1944 - US Secretary of State.

8 Cripps Richard Stafford (1889-1952) - British statesman and politician, diplomat, British Ambassador to the USSR in 1940-1942.

9 McFarlane is an English diplomat, a responsible officer of the British diplomatic mission in the USSR during the war years.

yu Beaverbrook William Maxwell (1879-1964) - a major political figure in England, in 1940-1945. was a member of the British Cabinet. In September 1941, Beaverbrook, who at that time held the post of Minister of Supplies, traveled to Moscow to participate in a conference of representatives of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain on the issue of rendering assistance to the USSR.

! Atherton is an employee of the US State Department.

? See Document #8.

3 See Document No. 10.

M Harriman William Averell (1891-1986) - a prominent US statesman and politician, ambassador to the USSR in 1943-1946.

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5 See Document No. 8.



On December 16, 7, 1941, the Japanese armed forces attacked the bases and possessions of the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific Ocean. On December 8, Japan declared war on Great Britain and the United States.

" The Japanese government made the attack on the USSR dependent on the situation on the Soviet German front.

8 See Document No. 6.

' ) Anders Wladislaw - Polish general. In 1941-1942. commanded the Polish army formed in the USSR, which the Polish government in exile transferred to Iran and then to Iraq. In 1943-1944. commanded the Polish corps in the Allied forces in Italy, in 1945 - the Polish troops in Western Europe. After the Second World War - one of the leaders of the right wing of the Polish emigration.

2 located off the coast of Canada, the islands of Saint Pierre and Miquelon were controlled by the Vichy authorities. A poll conducted among the inhabitants gave 98% of the vote in favor of the "Free France", which served as de Gaulle's pretext for their release. The US took this action as a violation of its agreement with Vichy to neutralize the French colonies in the Western Hemisphere.

2 See doc. No. 10.

2? Darlan Jean Louis (1881-1942) - French admiral of the fleet. In World War II, he was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. After the defeat of France, he was part of the Vichy government. He led the Vichy armed forces in North Africa. In November 1942, he was killed in Algeria by a French nationalist.

23 Walter Brauchitsch (1881-1948) - Field Marshal General of the Nazi Army. One of the authors of the plan for a blitzkrieg against the USSR. Displaced by Hitler after the defeat of the German troops, near Moscow.

24 In the second half of December 1941, the British government sent Foreign Minister A. Eden to Moscow to negotiate with the Soviet government and conclude an agreement on alliance, mutual assistance and post-war cooperation. However, due to the refusal of the British government to recognize the western borders of the USSR in the form in which they existed at the time of the German attack on the Soviet Union, the treaty was not signed.

In his memorandum to the British government, Eden considers various options for resolving disputed issues.

25 The Atlantic Charter is a declaration by the heads of government of the United States and Great Britain, signed on August 14, 1941. Promulgated "some general principles of national policy" of these countries. In a general form, it proclaimed the goals of the war against fascist Germany and its allies, declared the foundations of the post-war structure, the rejection of territorial seizures, the right of peoples to choose their own form of government. The USSR joined the Atlantic Charter in September 1941.

26 See Document No. 10.

27 "Curzon Line" is the code name for the line recommended in December 1919 by the Supreme Council of the Entente as the eastern border of Poland. It was named after the then British Foreign Secretary George Nathaniel Curzon, who sent a note on this issue to the Soviet government on behalf of the Entente Council.

28 Halifax Edward Frederick Lindley Wood (1881-1959) - a major English statesman and politician, diplomat, British ambassador to the United States during the Second World War

29 Benes, Eduard (1884-1948) - statesman of Czechoslovakia. In 1935-1938 - President of Czechoslovakia During the Second World War, he headed the government of Czechoslovakia

in exile.

3% See Document No. 17.

3 Harry Lloyd Hopkins (1890-1946), US statesman and diplomat, special adviser and assistant to US President Roosevelt.

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32 See Document No. 12.

33 See Document No. 10.

“ Lloyd George (1863-1945) - statesman and politician of England. In 1916-1922. - Prime Minister of Great Britain.

3 See Document No. 12.

36 See Document No. 15.

37 See Document No. 10.

3 See Document No. 23.

33 Bullitt is an American diplomat. Before World War II, he was US Ambassador to Paris.

40 See Document No. 10.

4“ Giraud (1879-1949) - French general. After escaping from German captivity, he collaborated with the Vichy collaborationist government. Then, with the help of the Americans, who made a bet on him in the confrontation with de Gaulle, he moved to North Africa as commander-in-chief of the French armed forces. However, in the end, de Gaulle was recognized as the leader of the patriotic forces of France, and he headed the French Committee of National Liberation.

42 See Document No. 16.

43 See Document No. 8.

“4 See Document No. 16.

45 See Document No. 16

46 See Document No. 39.

47 Laval Pierre (1883-1945) - in 1942-1944 - the head of the Vichy collaborationist government, in 1945 he was executed by the verdict of the French tribunal as a traitor.

48 Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975) - Chinese military and political figure. Head of the Kuomintang government in China in 1927-1949.

See Document #18.

% Welles Samner (1892-1961) US Assistant Secretary of State during World War II.

5" See document no. 6.

52 See Document No. 18.

53 See Document No. 6.

4 Mine Hjalmar (1877-1970) - President of the Reichsbank and economic adviser for the rearmament of Nazi Germany.

53 Mihailovich Draza (1893-1946) - Serbian general, in 1941-1945. headed the pro-fascist organization of the Chetniks, in 1944-1945. - Minister of the Yugoslav government in exile in London. In 1946, he was executed as a war criminal by the verdict of the people's court of the FPRY.

% Peter P Karageorgievich - King of Yugoslavia since 1934. After the beginning of the fascist occupation of Yugoslavia in April 1941, he fled the country. On November 29, 1945, the Constituent Assembly of Yugoslavia abolished the monarchy.

57 Stresemann Gustav (1878-1929) - in 1923-1929 - German Foreign Minister. Founder and leader of the German People's Party.

58 This refers to the conference of foreign ministers of leading European states held in Locarno in 1925, which considered the question of concluding a Western European guarantee pact.

5 Franz Papen (1879-1969) was a German statesman and diplomat. In July-November 1932 - Chancellor of Germany, in 1934-1944. - German Ambassador to Turkey. He was acquitted by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg (1946), in 1947 he was sentenced as a war criminal to 8 years in prison by the German Denazification Court in Nuremberg, released in 1949.

60 See Document No. 45.

6! See Document #18.

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62 Roosevelt Franklin Delano (1882-1945), President of the United States from 1933-1945.

63 See Document No. 8.

6 Wynant is the US Ambassador to the UK.

65 See Document No. 43.

6 See Document No. 23.

6 Robert Daniel Murphy (1894-1978) - US diplomat, was the US representative to the Vichy government, then a political adviser in the rank of US envoy to the headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the Anglo-American forces in North Africa. US Ambassador to Belgium and Japan 1949-1953 He served as Deputy Secretary of State for the United States. Since 1959 in retired.

68 Macmillan Harold (1894-1986) – UK Resident Minister at the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Anglo-American Forces in North Africa. In 1957-1963 British Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party.

69 See Document No. 39.

1 See Document No. 51.

On August 14–24, 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill met in Quebec, Canada, to discuss the conduct of the war in the European and Pacific theaters. During this meeting it was

a decision was made to land in May 1944 allied troops in Northern France (Operation Overlord), to continue the military campaign in Italy, and also to conduct an auxiliary operation to land Anglo-American troops in southern France in the Toulon-Marseille region.

The Allies informed the Soviet government in general about their decisions in Quebec. The information received by foreign intelligence allowed the Soviet leadership to take a broader and deeper look at this meeting, in particular, to identify the difference in the approaches of Roosevelt and Churchill to the landing of allied troops in France, the desire of the latter to push this operation into the background and replace it with Italy. - Balkan version.

7? The Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain took place on October 19-30, 1943. It preceded the meeting of the heads of governments of the allied countries in Tehran, prepared the agenda for this meeting and considered the main issues of the upcoming Tehran Conference at the level of foreign ministers. .

3 This refers to the King of Yugoslavia, Peter P.

7 See Document No. 49.

75 See Document No. 8.

16 Zeitzler (Zeitzler) Kurt (1895-1963) - Colonel General, Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces.

n After the defeat of the Russian-Austrian troops at Austerlitz (December 2, 1805), Napoleon created a confederation obedient to himself initially from 16 German states (the Confederation of the Rhine), which later (by 1811) was joined by 20 more Western states, Central and Northern Germany, including Saxony and the Kingdom of Westphalia.

After the defeat of the Napoleonic troops in the Battle of Leipzig in 1813, the Confederation of the Rhine broke up.

18 One of the smallest states before the unification of Germany, which was annexed to Prussia in the 60s of the nineteenth century.

7 Hohenzollerns - a dynasty of Prussian kings (1701-1918) and German emperors (1871-1918).

80 So in the text of the document.

8' This refers to the North German cities headed by Lübeck, which were part of the trade and political union - the Hansa in the 12th-15th centuries.

82 The prefix "mark" means county.

83 The note was drawn up at the direction of Minister Eden by the secretary of the British delegation at the conference, Wilson, after consultation with all the heads of departments of the British Foreign Office.

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%\* The Crimean (Yalta) conference of the leaders of the three allied powers - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain - took place on February 4-11, 1945 near Yalta.

85 This refers to the forces oriented towards the Polish government in exile in London.

8 This refers to the army of V. Anders.

87 Carr Archibald John Clark - British Ambassador to the USSR in 1942-1946.

8 See Document No. 12.

8 This refers to the supporters of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, created at the end of 1943 in Lublin by the Polish patriotic forces, who were directly involved in the liberation of the German invaders by Poland.

% We are talking about the underground structures of the Home Army, which were designed to ensure the coming to power in Poland of the London government in exile.

9 Stettinius Eduard Reilly (1900-1949) - US statesman and diplomat, in 1944-1945. - US Secretary of State.

32 See Document No. 15.

33 Alexander Harold Rupert Leofric George (1891-1969) - English field marshal, was the commander-in-chief of the allied forces in the Mediterranean theater of operations.

% Rachkevich is one of the ministers of the Polish government in exile in London.

95 Artsishevsky Tomasz – Prime Minister of the Polish government in exile in London from November 29, 1944 to June 28, 1945.

% Donovan William Joseph - one of the organizers of US foreign intelligence (during the war years - OSS).

37 Kesselring Alber (1885-1960) - Field Marshal of the Nazi army, commanded the German army in Northern Italy.

98 Liddell Guy is the head of one of the departments of the British counterintelligence.

9 Sargent Orme Garton – British Deputy Foreign Secretary in 1945.

10 Cadogan Alexander George Montagu (1884-1963) Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain from 1938-1946. In 1946-1950. – Permanent Representative of Great Britain to the UN

01 This refers to the forthcoming conference of the leaders of the three allied powers in Yalta.

9? Šubašić (1892-1955), head of the Yugoslav government in exile in London.

93 This refers to the forthcoming meeting in Yalta.

Notes to documents from the SVR archive on nuclear issues

To documents Nos. 1-2

Each of the documents is one typewritten page. Both documents are the earliest evidence of Soviet intelligence being aware of the start of intensive work on building an atomic bomb abroad.

There is a handwritten note on document No. 2 at the bottom right: "Reference: a copy of an excerpt from the translation of this report into Russian and Academician Kurchatov's review of its value are in the 2nd volume of the Enormoz ag.case (intelligence case), page 20- 38". "Enormoz" is an undercover

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the title of the Soviet atomic project. Probably Kurchatov met him at the beginning of 1943 (see document No. 4 and notes to it).

Vadim is the undercover pseudonym of the head of the Soviet residency in London, A.V. Gorsky.

2 "List" is the undercover pseudonym of D. McLean (Popa]4 Maciean), a senior official of the British Foreign Office who collaborated with Soviet intelligence.

3 The Uranium Committee of the British War Cabinet, according to document No. 3, was headed by the famous British physicist J.P. Thomson and coordinated the work on the uranium project, called "Tube Alloys". Not being able to comment on all the details of the British atomic project, we will refer those interested to the special literature devoted to this problem: Sozhipe M. Vgtsash and Aboptis Enegvu, 1939-1945.

M.U. 51. Magit'5, 1964.

\* Imperial Chemical Industries (IKI) is the largest British corporation, which became the main industrial contractor of the British nuclear project, the directorate of which was headed by its representatives W. Eckers and M. Perrin.

° Document No. 1 indicates that British scientists had a clear plan to create an atomic bomb based on uranium-235, which they intended to obtain using the diffusion method of separating uranium isotopes.

6 The initial estimate of the critical mass of uranium was overestimated by a factor of 2-8.

To Document No. 3

The document consists of five typewritten pages. There are three handwritten notes on the first page:

a) The copy has been destroyed. 5. [W. Signature "(apparently, the deputy head of the scientific and technical intelligence unit L.R. Kvasnikova, who from 1943 to 1945 was a resident of Soviet intelligence in New York).

b) "t. Beria, in order to send the material to Comrade Stalin, a transmitting document was handed over in a different version. As A.A. Yatskov, "a copy of the "other version" was not found in the file, obviously, it remained in Beria's archive."

c) "Sheet" (i.e. D. McLean), received at the end of 1941. Obviously, this refers to the main source, according to which this document was compiled. Probably, documents No. 1 and No. 2 did not exhaust this information.

Mentioned in the text by J.P. Thomson, R. Peierls, H. Halban, L. Kowarsky, F. Simon, and others are well-known British physicists, as well as physicists who emigrated from France and Germany, who took an active part in the development of the British atomic project. For details, we refer to the monograph by M. Gowing, mentioned in the notes to documents No. 1 and No. 2.

This document is one of the first official reactions of the Soviet leadership at the government level to intelligence information about work on the creation of an atomic bomb in the West. The choice of experts on the issues of "atomic fission", recommended in the note for consultations and involvement in the assessment of relevant intelligence materials, turned out to be unsuccessful.

To document No. 4

The document consists of 14 handwritten pages (standard size) written by I.V. Kurchatov. Attached to it is an accompanying note (typewritten) by Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars M.G. Pervukhin (to whom

Kurchatov's "review" on intelligence data on the British uranium project was addressed) to Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs V.N. Merkulov.

To document number 5

Another Kurchatov conclusion. Most of the document is published (all but the last section on the electromagnetic method of isotope separation). In the first section of the document ("Atomic Characteristics of a Nuclear Explosive"), special attention should be paid to Kurchatov's high assessment of the exact data on the fission cross sections of uranium-235 and plutonium-239, which made it possible to reliably calculate the critical dimensions of uranium and plutonium bombs. In the second section, devoted to the "explosion inward" method, the need to connect Yu.B. Khariton.

To document number 6

The document is a description of the design of the plutonium bomb, takes up less than one typewritten page, and was compiled from a telegraph message from New York specifically for Kurchatov's oral orientation. The inscription "t. Kurchatov is acquainted. 2.UP.45", probably belongs to Colonel Vasilevsky. The document also indicates the approximate date of the first explosion of the atomic bomb - July 10, 1945. This explosion in Alamogordo (New Mexico) was carried out on July 16.

The number of "Essio" (75 x 10) obviously corresponds to the number of nuclei of the fissile material. The indicated parameters of the bomb are close to those that were dropped on Nagasaki. However, we will refrain from commenting at this point for the time being.

To Document No. 7

A more detailed description of the design of the plutonium bomb (only eight pages, together with Merkulov's cover letter to Beria, dated October, probably October 18, 1945). The document was prepared by the aforementioned Colonel Vasilevsky. Neither accompanying

The note and the description itself are not signed.

To document number 8

The document mentions for the first time the "internal explosion" method.

To document No. 9

Only the section relating to the uranium-graphite pile, which uses liquid uranium hexafluoride as a cooling medium, is published. The main advantages of this system were the facilitated method of plutonium separation and the simplified requirements for the cooling system. Kurchatov notes that this method, however, requires five times as much uranium as other uranium-graphite pile systems.

The unpublished part of the conclusion (one and a half handwritten pages) is devoted to a review of a number of particular aspects of nuclear physics (cross sections of absorption and scattering of neutrons by uranium, boron and other elements, analysis of uranium isotopes by alpha particles emitted by them).

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Foreword

RR BB Bbb = eoyuF < yuoyachs a b b b >

oooh oooh oooh oooh oo oo oo oo oo oo oo oo oo oo oo oo oo oo oo fo fo oo oo oo oo

Memoirs of the head of foreign intelligence P.M. Fitina .....

First hours, first days... ....

oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh sooo oooh sooo oooh oooh oooh

"When under the tanks of the enemy the dear earth was buzzing..." .....

"Winners" and their commander D.N. Medvedev .....

Who are you, Paul Siebert? ..... Hero of the Soviet Union S.A. Bomb for Gauleiter .....

Operation "Monastery" .....

. A life devoted to intelligence ... . Resident and diplomat ..... . Without taking a breath .....

. Goal achieved .....

. Queen's Counsel.....

. Destination - Rome .....

. In occupied France

oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh

Vaupshasov ..... ini

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ho oo oo fo ovo oo oo oo oo oo oo oo oo oo oo oo ovo oo oo fo oo fo fo oo

. Operational game "Berezino" ..... Shiites

. "Red Chapel" in the fire of war ..... „yen

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oofo sooo oooh ooh

off off ooo ooo ooo ooo ooo ooo o o o o o o o o o o o o oo oo oo oo oo oo

oooh oooh fo oooh sooo oooh sooo oooh oo oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh fo oooh oooh oo oooo oooh

. Secrets of the decryption service ..... lily or 

OTTO OOO OOV 00000000

. V.M. Zarubin: stages of mastery ..... lilies

. Illegal scout I.A. Akhmerov ..... „and

oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh

oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh sooo oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh oooh



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